TY  - JOUR
A1  - Schierbaum, Sonja
T1  - The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts
T2  - Topoi
N2  - Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one’s body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus’s account is close to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ accounts, whereas Ockham’s account is incompatible with them.
KW  - double intentionality
KW  - intentional action
KW  - Ockham
KW  - Scotus
KW  - interior and exterior acts
Y1  - 2022
UR  - https://opus.bibliothek.uni-wuerzburg.de/frontdoor/index/index/docId/26985
UR  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269857
SN  - 1572-8749
VL  - 41
IS  - 1
ER  -