@phdthesis{Foerster2020,
  author    = {F{\"o}rster, Anna},
  title     = {Searching for truth in dishonesty: The cognitive architecture of lying},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-20973},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-209730},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Honest actions predominate human behavior. From time to time, this general preference must yield to dishonest actions, which require an effortful process of overcoming initial honest response activation. This thesis presents three experimental series to elucidate this tug-of-war between honest and dishonest response tendencies in overtly committed instances of lies, thereby joining recent efforts to move from a sheer phenomenological perspective on dishonest responding as being more difficult than honest responding to a precise description of the underlying cognitive processes. The consideration of cognitive theories, empirical evidence, and paradigms from different research fields - dishonesty, cognitive control and sensorimotor stage models of information processing - lay the groundwork for the research questions and methodological approach of this thesis. The experiments pinpoint the underlying conflict of dishonest responding in the central, capacity-limited stage of information processing (Experiments 1 to 4), but they also demonstrate that cognitive control processes (Experiments 5 to 7) and the internalization of false alibis (Experiments 8 to 11) can reduce or even completely eliminate this conflict. The data reveals great flexibility at the cognitive basis of dishonest responding: On the one hand, dishonest responding appears to rely heavily on capacity-limited processes of response selection to overcome honest response tendencies alongside up- and downstream consequences of response activation and monitoring. On the other hand, agents have powerful tools to mitigate these effortful processes through control adaptation and false alibis. These results support and expand current theorizing of the cognitive underpinnings of dishonest responding. Furthermore, they are alerting from an applied perspective on the detection of lies, especially when considering the flexibility of even basic cognitive processes in the face of false alibis. A promising way to move forward from here would be a fine-grained discrimination of response activation, passive decay and active inhibition of honest representations in dishonest responding and the assessment of the adaptiveness of these processes.},
  subject      = {L{\"u}ge},
  language  = {en}
}