@article{ReisPfisterKundeetal.2023,
  author    = {Reis, Moritz and Pfister, Roland and Kunde, Wilfried and Foerster, Anna},
  title     = {Creative thinking does not promote dishonesty},
  series = {Royal Society Open Science},
  volume    = {10},
  journal   = {Royal Society Open Science},
  number    = {12},
  issn      = {2054-5703},
  doi       = {10.1098/rsos.230879},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-349859},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {We assessed the relation of creativity and unethical behaviour by manipulating the thinking style of participants (N = 450 adults) and measuring the impact of this manipulation on the prevalence of dishonest behaviour. Participants performed one of three inducer tasks: the alternative uses task to promote divergent thinking, the remote associates task to promote convergent thinking, or a simple classification task for rule-based thinking. Before and after this manipulation, participants conducted the mind game as a straightforward measure of dishonesty. Dishonest behaviour increased from before to after the intervention, but we found no credible evidence that this increase differed between induced mindsets. Exploratory analyses did not support any relation of trait creativity and dishonesty either. We conclude that the influence of creative thinking on unethical behaviour seems to be more ambiguous than assumed in earlier research or might be restricted to specific populations or contexts.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Stemmler2011,
  author    = {Stemmler, Thomas},
  title     = {Just do it! Guilt as a moral intuition to cooperate - A parallel constraint satisfaction approach},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-74873},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2011},
  abstract  = {Nach langer Dominanz rationaler Urteils- und Entscheidungsmodelle in der Moralpsychologie (z.B. Kohlberg, 1969) besteht seit einiger Zeit verst{\"a}rktes Interesse an intuitiven, emotionalen Einfl{\"u}ssen auf moralische Urteile und Entscheidungen (z.B. Greene, 2007; Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, \& Beer, 2007). Der Einfluss von Emotionen auf moralische Entscheidungen wird in der Literatur u.a. mittels heuristischer, non-kompensatorischer Informationsverarbeitung erkl{\"a}rt (z.B. Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, \& Cushman, 2010; Sunstein, 2005; Tobler, Kalis, \& Kalenscher, 2008). Hierbei wird jedoch der Prozess der Emotionsentstehung ignoriert. Appraisaltheorien postulieren, dass Emotionen durch die Inkoh{\"a}renz (oder Diskrepanz) von Verhaltensrepr{\"a}sentationen wie Zielen und Aktionen entstehen (Moors, 2009). Emotionsentstehung und (intuitives) Entscheiden kann in einem Modell vereint werden sobald man bei beiden Prozessen eine konnektionistische Struktur (z.B. Barnes \& Thagard, 1996) zugrunde legt. Die vorliegende Arbeit kontrastiert beide Perspektiven intuitiv-emotionalen Entscheidens im Hinblick auf Schuld und Kooperation.},
  subject      = {Kooperation},
  language  = {en}
}