@phdthesis{Liesner2022,
  author    = {Liesner, Marvin Paul},
  title     = {I control it, but does it mean it is part of me? How the relationship between body movements and controlled object movements influences the sense of agency and the sense of ownership},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-28703},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-287030},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {The "active self" approach suggests that any object we manipulate voluntarily and foreseeably becomes part of our "self" in the sense that we feel control over this object (sense of agency) and experience it as belonging to our own body (sense of ownership). While there is considerable evidence that we can indeed experience both a sense of agency and a sense of ownership over a broad variety of objects when we control these through our actions, the approach has also been criticized for exaggerating the flexibility of the human self. In this thesis, I investigate the influence that the relationship between the body movements controlling an object and the movements of the object itself has on the process of integrating an object into the self. I demonstrate that fully controlling an object is not sufficient for it to be integrated into the self since both explicit and implicit measures of the sense of agency and the sense of ownership indicate less or no integration when body movements are transformed into inverted object movements. Furthermore, I show that such inversions lead to the downregulation of sensory signals either from the body or from the controlled object in order to deal with the conflicting multisensory information when performing such actions. I argue that this downregulation is the underlying factor behind the diminished or eliminated integration of inverted body and object movements and I discuss further pathways for possible future studies building up on these findings.},
  subject      = {Experimentelle Psychologie},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Muth2023,
  author    = {Muth, Felicitas Vanessa},
  title     = {Step by step: Sense of agency for complex action-event sequences},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-30756},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-307569},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {From simply ringing a bell to preparing a five-course menu, human behavior commonly causes changes in the environment. Such episodes where an agent acts, thereby causing changes in their environment constitute the sense of agency. In this thesis four series of experi-ments elucidate how the sense of agency is represented in complex action-event sequences, thereby bridging a gap between basic cognitive research and real-life practice. It builds upon extensive research on the sense of agency in unequivocal sequences consisting of single ac-tions and distinct, predominantly auditory, outcomes. Employing implicit as well as explicit measures, the scope is opened up to multi-step sequences. The experiments show that it is worthwhile devoting more research to complex action-event sequences. With a newly introduced auditory measure (Chapter II), common phenomena such as temporal binding and a decrease in agency ratings following distorted feedback were replicated in multi-step sequences. However, diverging results between traditional implicit and explicit measures call for further inspection. Multisensory integration appears to gain more weight when multiple actions have to be performed to attain a goal leading to more accurate representations of the own actions (Chapter III). Additionally, freedom of choice (Chapter III) as well as early spatial ambiguity altered the perceived timing of outcomes, while late spatial ambi-guity (Chapter IV) and the outcome's self-relevance did not (Chapter V). The data suggests that the cognitive system is capable of representing multi-step action-event sequences implicitly and explicitly. Actions and sensory events show a temporal attraction stemming from a bias in the perception of outcomes. Explicit knowledge about causing an event-sequence facilitates neither feelings of control nor taking authorship. The results corroborate current theorizing on the un-derpinnings of temporal binding and the divergence between traditional implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency. Promising avenues for further research include structured analyses of how much inferred causality contributes to implicit and explicit measures of agency as well as finding alternative measures to capture conceptual as well as non-conceptual facets of the agency experience with one method.},
  subject      = {Psychologie},
  language  = {en}
}