@phdthesis{Demmer2019,
  author    = {Demmer, Claudia},
  title     = {Merger-specific Efficiency Gains},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-18392},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-183928},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {The present thesis analyzes whether and - if so - under which conditions mergers result in merger-specific efficiency gains. The analysis concentrates on manufacturing firms in Europe that participate in horizontal mergers as either buyer or target in the years 2005 to 2014. The result of the present study is that mergers are idiosyncratic processes. Thus, the possibilities to define general conditions that predict merger-specific efficiency gains are limited. However, the results of the present study indicate that efficiency gains are possible as a direct consequence of a merger. Efficiency changes can be measured by a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) approach. Significant merger-specific efficiency gains are more likely for targets than for buyers. Moreover, mergers of firms that mainly operate in the same segment are likely to generate efficiency losses. Efficiency gains most likely result from reductions in material and labor costs, especially on a short- and mid-term perspective. The analysis of conditions that predict efficiency gains indicates that firm that announce the merger themselves are capable to generate efficiency gains in a short- and mid-term perspective. Furthermore, buyers that are mid-sized firms are more likely to generate efficiency gains than small or large buyers. Results also indicate that capital intense firms are likely to generate efficiency gains after a merger. The present study is structured as follows. Chapter 1 motivates the analysis of merger-specific efficiency gains. The definition of conditions that reasonably likely predict when and to which extent mergers will result in merger-specific efficiency gains, would improve the merger approval or denial process. Chapter 2 gives a literature review of some relevant empirical studies that analyzed merger-specific efficiency gains. None of the empirical studies have analyzed horizontal mergers of European firms in the manufacturing sector in the years 2005 to 2014. Thus, the present study contributes to the existing literature by analyzing efficiency gains from those mergers. Chapter 3 focuses on the identification of mergers. The merger term is defined according to the EC Merger Regulation and the Horizontal Merger Guidelines. The definition and the requirements of mergers according to legislation provides the framework of merger identification. Chapter 4 concentrates on the efficiency measurement methodology. Most empirical studies apply a Total Factor Productivity (TFP) approach to estimate efficiency. The TFP approach uses linear regression in combination with a control function approach. The estimation of coefficients is done by a General Method of Moments approach. The resulting efficiency estimates are used in the analysis of merger-specific efficiency gains in chapter 5. This analysis is done separately for buyers and targets by applying a Difference-In-Difference (DID) approach. Chapter 6 concentrates on an alternative approach to estimate efficiency, that is a Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) approach. Comparable to the TFP approach, the SFA approach is a stochastic efficiency estimation methodology. In contrast to TFP, SFA estimates the production function as a frontier function instead of an average function. The frontier function allows to estimate efficiency in percent. Chapter 7 analyses the impact of different merger- and firm-specific characteristics on efficiency changes of buyers and targets. The analysis is based on a multiple regression, which is applied for short-, mid- and long-term efficiency changes of buyers and targets. Chapter 8 concludes.},
  subject      = {Verarbeitende Industrie},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Luecking2013,
  author    = {L{\"u}cking, Thomas},
  title     = {Acquisition Behavior in High-Technology Industries - The Role of Product Diversification, Technological Change, and IP Protection},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-85065},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {Frequent acquisition activities in high-technology industries are due to the intense competition, driven by short product life cycles, more complex products/services and prevalent network effects. This dissertation theoretically analyzes the circumstances leading to technology-driven acquisitions and empirically tests these within a clearly defined market scenario.},
  subject      = {Mergers and Acquisitions},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Steinmetz2009,
  author    = {Steinmetz, Alexander},
  title     = {Essays on Strategic Behavior and Dynamic Oligopoly Competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-47934},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2009},
  abstract  = {This thesis deals with three selected dimensions of strategic behavior, namely investment in R\&D, mergers and acquisitions, and inventory decisions in dynamic oligopolies. The question the first essay addresses is how the market structure evolves due to innovative activities when firms' level of technological competence is valuable for more than one project. The focus of the work is the analysis of the effect of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting in R\&D on firms' incentives to innovate. A dynamic step-by-step innovation model with history dependency is developed. Firms can accumulate knowledge by investing in R\&D. As a benchmark without knowledge accumulation it is shown that relaxing the usual assumption of imposed imitation yields additional strategic effects. Therefore, the leader's R\&D effort increases with the gap as she is trying to avoid competition in the future. When firms gain experience by performing R\&D, the resulting effect of knowledge induces technological leaders to rest on their laurels which allows followers to catch up. Contrary to the benchmark case the leader's innovation effort declines with the lead. This causes an equilibrium where the incentives to innovate are highest when competition is most intense. Using a model of oligopoly in general equilibrium the second essay analyzes the integration of economies that might be accompanied by cross-border merger waves. Studying economies which prior to trade were in stable equilibrium where mergers were not profitable, we show that globalization can trigger cross-border merger waves for a sufficiently large heterogeneity in marginal cost. In partial equilibrium, consumers benefit from integration even when a merger wave is triggered which considerably lowers intensity of competition. Welfare increases. In contrast, in general equilibrium where interactions between markets and therefore effects on factor prices are considered, gains from trade can only be realized by reallocation of resources. The higher the technological dissimilarity between countries the better can efficiency gains be realized in integrated general equilibrium. The overall welfare effect of integration is positive when all firms remain active but indeterminate when firms exit or are absorbed due to a merger wave. It is possible for decreasing competition to dominate the welfare gain from more efficient resource allocation across sectors. Allowing for firms' entry alters results as in an integrated world coexistence of firms of different countries is never possible. Comparative advantages with respect to entry and production are important for realizing efficiency gains from trade. The third essay analyzes the interaction between price and inventory decisions in an oligopoly industry and its implications for the dynamics of prices. The work extends existing literature and especially the work of Hall and Rust (2007) to endogenous prices and strategic oligopoly competition. We show that the optimal decision rule is an (S,s) order policy and prices and inventories are strategic substitutes. Fixed ordering costs generate infrequent orders. Additionally, with strategic competition in prices, (S,s) inventory behavior together with demand uncertainty generates cyclical pattern in prices The last chapter presents some concluding remarks on the results of the essays.},
  subject      = {Wettbewerbsstrategie},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Kleer2008,
  author    = {Kleer, Robin},
  title     = {Three Essays on Competition Policy and Innovation Incentives},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-34763},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2008},
  abstract  = {Diese Dissertation befasst sich mit dem Thema Innovations{\"o}konomik. In einer allgemeinen Einf{\"u}hrung werden wettbewerbspolitische Gesichtspunkte, die Innovationsanreize von Firmen beeinflussen, dargestellt. In drei einzelnen Arbeiten werden dann spezielle Fragestellungen intensiver analysiert. Die erste Arbeit behandelt die Wechselwirkungen von Firmenzusammenschl{\"u}ssen und Innovationen, zwei zentrale Elemente der Wettbewerbsstrategie von Unternehmen. Der Schwerpunkt der Arbeit liegt dabei auf dem Einfluss von Firmenzusammenschl{\"u}ssen auf die Innovationsaktivit{\"a}ten und den Wettbewerb im Produktmarkt. Dabei werden auch m{\"o}gliche Ineffizienzen, die sich durch Probleme bei der Integration der Firmen nach dem Zusammenschluss ergeben, untersucht. Es wird gezeigt, dass die optimale Investitionsaktivit{\"a}t sehr stark von der sich ergebenden Marktstruktur abh{\"a}ngt und es signifikante Unterschiede zwischen Insider und Outsider des Firmenzusammenschlusses gibt. In dem Modell mit linearer Nachfragefunktion und konstanten Grenzkosten steigern Zusammenschl{\"u}sse die soziale Wohlfahrt. Die zweite Arbeit betrachtet die unterschiedlichen Vorteile von kleinen und großen Firmen im Innovationswettbewerb. W{\"a}hrend große Firmen typischerweise {\"u}ber einen besseren Zugang zu Produktm{\"a}rkten verf{\"u}gen, weisen kleine Firmen h{\"a}ufig eine bessere Forschungseffizienz auf. Diese verschiedenen Vorteile werfen unmittelbar die Frage nach Kooperationen auf. Im dargestellten Modell mit vier Unternehmen haben große Firmen die M{\"o}glichkeit kleine Firmen zu kaufen. Innovationen werden mittels Patentwettbewerb modelliert. Sequentielles Bieten erm{\"o}glicht es der ersten großen Firma strategisch zu handeln um eine Reaktion der zweiten großen Firma hervorzurufen. Ergeben sich hohe Effizienzen durch den Firmenzusammenschluss, so bevorzugen die großen Firmen eine unmittelbare Akquisition und es entsteht eine symmetrische Marktstruktur. Bei geringen Effizienzen wartet die erste Firma dagegen ab und zwingt die zweite Firma dadurch zum Kauf. Somit entsteht trotz symmetrischer Ausgangssituation eine asymmetrische Marktstruktur. Weiterhin wird gezeigt, dass Akquisitionen die Chancen f{\"u}r eine erfolgreiche Innovation erh{\"o}hen. Die dritte Arbeit befasst sich mit Forschungssubventionen. Dabei wird neben dem eigentlichen Ziel der Subvention -- der F{\"o}rderung sozial erw{\"u}nschter Projekte, die nicht gen{\"u}gend private Anreize zur Durchf{\"u}hrung bieten -- die Signalwirkung einer Subvention betrachtet. Eine Staatsbeh{\"o}rde untersucht dabei die Projekte auf Risiken und Wohlfahrtswirkungen und entscheidet daraufhin {\"u}ber eine F{\"o}rderung. Dies wird in einem einfachen Signalisierungsspiel mit zwei Risikoklassen von Forschungsprojekten modelliert. Die Staatsbeh{\"o}rde bevorzugt dabei riskante Projekte, die hohe erwartete soziale Gewinne versprechen, w{\"a}hrend Banken wenig riskante Projekte mit hohen privaten Gewinnen bevorzugen. Erm{\"o}glicht die Subvention lediglich die Unterscheidung von riskanten und weniger riskanten Projekten, so ist das Signal der Beh{\"o}rde wenig hilfreich f{\"u}r die Investitionsenscheidung der Banken. Bietet das Signal jedoch zus{\"a}tzlich einen Hinweis auf die Qualit{\"a}t der Projekte, so k{\"o}nnen sich erh{\"o}hte, bzw. effizienter ausgew{\"a}hlte, private Investitionen ergeben. Im letzten Kapitel werden die wichtigsten Aussagen zusammengefasst sowie in abschließenden Bemerkungen der Zusammenhang der Ergebnisse erl{\"a}utert.},
  subject      = {Wettbewerbspolitik},
  language  = {en}
}