@article{Schierbaum2021,
  author    = {Schierbaum, Sonja},
  title     = {Crusius {\"u}ber die Vern{\"u}nftigkeit des Wollens und die Rolle des Urteilens},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  volume    = {69},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  number    = {4},
  issn      = {2192-1482},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2021-0051},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-245582},
  pages     = {607 -- 618},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius's conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius's distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius's conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Ziegler2020,
  author    = {Ziegler, Robert Hugo},
  title     = {Die R{\"u}ckkehr des Realen},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  volume    = {68},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  number    = {4},
  issn      = {2192-1482},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2020-0040},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-217771},
  pages     = {611 -- 626},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {We are witnessing a return of the real which philosophy seems illequipped to handle. I argue (1) that this return of the real must be read as a rejection of those philosophical tendencies which were prevalent in the past decades and which I call philosophies of mediation: They supplanted all references to something real by the sole reference to those processes in which reality was supposed to be given or shaped (in interpretations, linguistic structures, historical or social conditions, media…). The current urgency of the question of the real indicates that those philosophies have lost credibility. On the other hand (2), the contemporary attempts to resuscitate philosophical realism cannot be considered satisfactory either. It is curiously the real itself they fail to fully appreciate. All in all (3), the return of the real has to be interpreted as the effect of an event that has little to do with philosophy, namely the return of politics.},
  language  = {de}
}