@phdthesis{Steinmetz2009,
  author    = {Steinmetz, Alexander},
  title     = {Essays on Strategic Behavior and Dynamic Oligopoly Competition},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-47934},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2009},
  abstract  = {This thesis deals with three selected dimensions of strategic behavior, namely investment in R\&D, mergers and acquisitions, and inventory decisions in dynamic oligopolies. The question the first essay addresses is how the market structure evolves due to innovative activities when firms' level of technological competence is valuable for more than one project. The focus of the work is the analysis of the effect of learning-by-doing and organizational forgetting in R\&D on firms' incentives to innovate. A dynamic step-by-step innovation model with history dependency is developed. Firms can accumulate knowledge by investing in R\&D. As a benchmark without knowledge accumulation it is shown that relaxing the usual assumption of imposed imitation yields additional strategic effects. Therefore, the leader's R\&D effort increases with the gap as she is trying to avoid competition in the future. When firms gain experience by performing R\&D, the resulting effect of knowledge induces technological leaders to rest on their laurels which allows followers to catch up. Contrary to the benchmark case the leader's innovation effort declines with the lead. This causes an equilibrium where the incentives to innovate are highest when competition is most intense. Using a model of oligopoly in general equilibrium the second essay analyzes the integration of economies that might be accompanied by cross-border merger waves. Studying economies which prior to trade were in stable equilibrium where mergers were not profitable, we show that globalization can trigger cross-border merger waves for a sufficiently large heterogeneity in marginal cost. In partial equilibrium, consumers benefit from integration even when a merger wave is triggered which considerably lowers intensity of competition. Welfare increases. In contrast, in general equilibrium where interactions between markets and therefore effects on factor prices are considered, gains from trade can only be realized by reallocation of resources. The higher the technological dissimilarity between countries the better can efficiency gains be realized in integrated general equilibrium. The overall welfare effect of integration is positive when all firms remain active but indeterminate when firms exit or are absorbed due to a merger wave. It is possible for decreasing competition to dominate the welfare gain from more efficient resource allocation across sectors. Allowing for firms' entry alters results as in an integrated world coexistence of firms of different countries is never possible. Comparative advantages with respect to entry and production are important for realizing efficiency gains from trade. The third essay analyzes the interaction between price and inventory decisions in an oligopoly industry and its implications for the dynamics of prices. The work extends existing literature and especially the work of Hall and Rust (2007) to endogenous prices and strategic oligopoly competition. We show that the optimal decision rule is an (S,s) order policy and prices and inventories are strategic substitutes. Fixed ordering costs generate infrequent orders. Additionally, with strategic competition in prices, (S,s) inventory behavior together with demand uncertainty generates cyclical pattern in prices The last chapter presents some concluding remarks on the results of the essays.},
  subject      = {Wettbewerbsstrategie},
  language  = {en}
}