@article{HausmanKubik2023, author = {Hausman, Hannah and Kubik, Veit}, title = {Delayed metacomprehension judgments do not directly improve learning from texts}, series = {Journal of Intelligence}, volume = {11}, journal = {Journal of Intelligence}, number = {7}, issn = {2079-3200}, doi = {10.3390/jintelligence11070150}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-323361}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Making judgments of learning (JOLs) after studying can directly improve learning. This JOL reactivity has been shown for simple materials but has scarcely been investigated with educationally relevant materials such as expository texts. The few existing studies have not yet reported any consistent gains in text comprehension due to providing JOLs. In the present study, we hypothesized that increasing the chances of covert retrieval attempts when making JOLs after each of five to-be-studied text passages would produce comprehension benefits at 1 week compared to restudy. In a between-subjects design, we manipulated both whether participants (N = 210) were instructed to covertly retrieve the texts, and whether they made delayed target-absent JOLs. The results indicated that delayed, target-absent JOLs did not improve text comprehension after 1 week, regardless of whether prior instructions to engage in covert retrieval were provided. Based on the two-stage model of JOLs, we reasoned that participants' retrieval attempts during metacomprehension judgments were either insufficient (i.e., due to a quick familiarity assessment) or were ineffective (e.g., due to low retrieval success).}, language = {en} } @article{Franz2022, author = {Franz, David J.}, title = {Moral responsibility for self-deluding beings}, series = {Philosophia}, volume = {50}, journal = {Philosophia}, number = {4}, issn = {0048-3893}, doi = {10.1007/s11406-022-00469-0}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324871}, pages = {1791-1807}, year = {2022}, abstract = {In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of moral responsibility. Second, this viewpoint leads to a reasons-focused account of human behavior. Examples of human action discussed in debates about moral responsibility suggest that typical human actions are driven primarily by the agent's subjective reasons and are sufficiently transparent for the agent. Third, this conception of self-transparent action is a questionable idealization. As shown by psychological research on self-assessment, motivated reasoning, and terror management theory, humans oftentimes have only a limited understanding of their conduct. Self-deception is rather the rule than the exception. Fourth, taking the limited self-transparency of practical reason seriously leads to a socially contextualized conception of moral responsibility.}, language = {en} } @article{FoersterMoellerFringsetal.2023, author = {Foerster, Anna and Moeller, Birte and Frings, Christian and Pfister, Roland}, title = {What is left after an error? Towards a comprehensive account of goal-based binding and retrieval}, series = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, volume = {85}, journal = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, number = {1}, doi = {10.3758/s13414-022-02609-w}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324851}, pages = {120-139}, year = {2023}, abstract = {The cognitive system readily detects and corrects erroneous actions by establishing episodic bindings between representations of the acted upon stimuli and the intended correct response. If these stimuli are encountered again, they trigger the retrieval of the correct response. Thus, binding and retrieval efficiently pave the way for future success. The current study set out to define the role of the erroneous response itself and explicit feedback for the error during these processes of goal-based binding and retrieval. Two experiments showed robust and similar binding and retrieval effects with and without feedback and pointed towards sustained activation of the unbound, erroneous response. The third experiment confirmed that the erroneous response is more readily available than a neutral alternative. Together, the results demonstrate that episodic binding biases future actions toward success, guided primarily through internal feedback processes, while the erroneous response still leaves detectable traces in human action control.}, language = {en} } @article{RinnLudwigFassleretal.2023, author = {Rinn, Robin and Ludwig, Jonas and Fassler, Pauline and Deutsch, Roland}, title = {Cues of wealth and the subjective perception of rich people}, series = {Current Psychology}, volume = {42}, journal = {Current Psychology}, number = {31}, issn = {1046-1310}, doi = {10.1007/s12144-022-03763-y}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324922}, pages = {27442-27457}, year = {2023}, abstract = {These pre-registered studies shed light on the cues that individuals use to identify rich people. In two studies (N = 598), we first developed a factor-analytical model that describes the content and the mental structure of 24 wealth cues. A third within-subject study (N = 89) then assessed the perception of rich subgroups based on this model of wealth cues. Participants evaluated the extent to which the wealth cues applied to two distinct subgroups of rich people. The results show: German and US-American participants think that one can identify rich people based on the same set of cues which can be grouped along the following dimensions: luxury consumption, expensive hobbies, spontaneous spending, greedy behavior, charismatic behavior, self-presentation, and specific possessions. However, Germans and US-Americans relied on these cues to different degrees to diagnose wealth in others. Moreover, we found evidence for subgroup-specific wealth cue profiles insofar as target individuals who acquired their wealth via internal (e.g., hard work) compared to external means (e.g., lottery winners) were evaluated differently on these wealth cues, presumably because of their perceived differences in valence and competence. Together, this research provides new insights in the cognitive representation of the latent construct of wealth. Practical implications for research on the perception of affluence, and implications for political decision makers, are discussed in the last section.}, language = {en} } @article{FoersterPfisterWirthetal.2023, author = {Foerster, Anna and Pfister, Roland and Wirth, Robert and Kunde, Wilfried}, title = {Post-execution monitoring in dishonesty}, series = {Psychological Research}, volume = {87}, journal = {Psychological Research}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1007/s00426-022-01691-x}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324862}, pages = {845-861}, year = {2023}, abstract = {When telling a lie, humans might engage in stronger monitoring of their behavior than when telling the truth. Initial evidence has indeed pointed towards a stronger recruitment of capacity-limited monitoring processes in dishonest than honest responding, conceivably resulting from the necessity to overcome automatic tendencies to respond honestly. Previous results suggested monitoring to be confined to response execution, however, whereas the current study goes beyond these findings by specifically probing for post-execution monitoring. Participants responded (dis)honestly to simple yes/no questions in a first task and switched to an unrelated second task after a response-stimulus interval of 0 ms or 1000 ms. Dishonest responses did not only prolong response times in Task 1, but also in Task 2 with a short response-stimulus interval. These findings support the assumption that increased monitoring for dishonest responses extends beyond mere response execution, a mechanism that is possibly tuned to assess the successful completion of a dishonest act.}, language = {en} } @article{ReisPfisterFoerster2023, author = {Reis, Moritz and Pfister, Roland and Foerster, Anna}, title = {Cognitive load promotes honesty}, series = {Psychological Research}, volume = {87}, journal = {Psychological Research}, number = {3}, doi = {10.1007/s00426-022-01686-8}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324913}, pages = {826-844}, year = {2023}, abstract = {In three experiments, we examined the cognitive underpinnings of self-serving dishonesty by manipulating cognitive load under different incentive structures. Participants could increase a financial bonus by misreporting outcomes of private die rolls without any risk of detection. At the same time, they had to remember letter strings of varying length. If honesty is the automatic response tendency and dishonesty is cognitively demanding, lying behavior should be less evident under high cognitive load. This hypothesis was supported by the outcome of two out of three experiments. We further manipulated whether all trials or only one random trial determined payoff to modulate reward adaptation over time (Experiment 2) and whether payoff was framed as a financial gain or loss (Experiment 3). The payoff scheme of one random or all trials did not affect lying behavior and, discordant to earlier research, facing losses instead of gains did not increase lying behavior. Finally, cognitive load and incentive frame interacted significantly, but contrary to our assumption gains increased lying under low cognitive load. While the impact of cognitive load on dishonesty appears to be comparably robust, motivational influences seem to be more elusive than commonly assumed in current theorizing.}, language = {en} } @article{HoffmannKochHuestegge2022, author = {Hoffmann, Mareike A. and Koch, Iring and Huestegge, Lynn}, title = {Are some effector systems harder to switch to? In search of cost asymmetries when switching between manual, vocal, and oculomotor tasks}, series = {Memory \& Cognition}, volume = {50}, journal = {Memory \& Cognition}, number = {7}, doi = {10.3758/s13421-022-01287-1}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324887}, pages = {1563-1577}, year = {2022}, abstract = {In task-switching studies, performance is typically worse in task-switch trials than in task-repetition trials. These switch costs are often asymmetrical, a phenomenon that has been explained by referring to a dominance of one task over the other. Previous studies also indicated that response modalities associated with two tasks may be considered as integral components for defining a task set. However, a systematic assessment of the role of response modalities in task switching is still lacking: Are some response modalities harder to switch to than others? The present study systematically examined switch costs when combining tasks that differ only with respect to their associated effector systems. In Experiment 1, 16 participants switched (in unpredictable sequence) between oculomotor and vocal tasks. In Experiment 2, 72 participants switched (in pairwise combinations) between oculomotor, vocal, and manual tasks. We observed systematic performance costs when switching between response modalities under otherwise constant task features and could thereby replicate previous observations of response modality switch costs. However, we did not observe any substantial switch-cost asymmetries. As previous studies using temporally overlapping dual-task paradigms found substantial prioritization effects (in terms of asymmetric costs) especially for oculomotor tasks, the present results suggest different underlying processes in sequential task switching than in simultaneous multitasking. While more research is needed to further substantiate a lack of response modality switch-cost asymmetries in a broader range of task switching situations, we suggest that task-set representations related to specific response modalities may exhibit rapid decay.}, language = {en} } @article{EckDignathKalckertetal.2022, author = {Eck, Julia and Dignath, David and Kalckert, Andreas and Pfister, Roland}, title = {Instant disembodiment of virtual body parts}, series = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, volume = {84}, journal = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, number = {8}, doi = {10.3758/s13414-022-02544-w}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324844}, pages = {2725-2740}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Evidence from multisensory body illusions suggests that body representations may be malleable, for instance, by embodying external objects. However, adjusting body representations to current task demands also implies that external objects become disembodied from the body representation if they are no longer required. In the current web-based study, we induced the embodiment of a two-dimensional (2D) virtual hand that could be controlled by active movements of a computer mouse or on a touchpad. Following initial embodiment, we probed for disembodiment by comparing two conditions: Participants either continued moving the virtual hand or they stopped moving and kept the hand still. Based on theoretical accounts that conceptualize body representations as a set of multisensory bindings, we expected gradual disembodiment of the virtual hand if the body representations are no longer updated through correlated visuomotor signals. In contrast to our prediction, the virtual hand was instantly disembodied as soon as participants stopped moving it. This result was replicated in two follow-up experiments. The observed instantaneous disembodiment might suggest that humans are sensitive to the rapid changes that characterize action and body in virtual environments, and hence adjust corresponding body representations particularly swiftly.}, language = {en} } @article{KuertenRaettigGutzeitetal.2023, author = {K{\"u}rten, Jens and Raettig, Tim and Gutzeit, Julian and Huestegge, Lynn}, title = {Dual-action benefits: global (action-inherent) and local (transient) sources of action prepotency underlying inhibition failures in multiple action control}, series = {Psychological Research}, volume = {87}, journal = {Psychological Research}, number = {2}, doi = {10.1007/s00426-022-01672-0}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324893}, pages = {410-424}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Previous research has shown that the simultaneous execution of two actions (instead of only one) is not necessarily more difficult but can actually be easier (less error-prone), in particular when executing one action requires the simultaneous inhibition of another action. Corresponding inhibitory demands are particularly challenging when the to-be-inhibited action is highly prepotent (i.e., characterized by a strong urge to be executed). Here, we study a range of important potential sources of such prepotency. Building on a previously established paradigm to elicit dual-action benefits, participants responded to stimuli with single actions (either manual button press or saccade) or dual actions (button press and saccade). Crucially, we compared blocks in which these response demands were randomly intermixed (mixed blocks) with pure blocks involving only one type of response demand. The results highlight the impact of global (action-inherent) sources of action prepotency, as reflected in more pronounced inhibitory failures in saccade vs. manual control, but also more local (transient) sources of influence, as reflected in a greater probability of inhibition failures following trials that required the to-be-inhibited type of action. In addition, sequential analyses revealed that inhibitory control (including its failure) is exerted at the level of response modality representations, not at the level of fully specified response representations. In sum, the study highlights important preconditions and mechanisms underlying the observation of dual-action benefits.}, language = {en} } @article{SchwarzWeller2023, author = {Schwarz, Katharina A. and Weller, Lisa}, title = {Distracted to a fault: attention, actions, and time perception}, series = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, volume = {85}, journal = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, number = {2}, doi = {10.3758/s13414-022-02632-x}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324936}, pages = {301-314}, year = {2023}, abstract = {In the last years, it has become general consensus that actions change our time perception. Performing an action to elicit a specific event seems to lead to a systematic underestimation of the interval between action and effect, a phenomenon termed temporal (or previously intentional) binding. Temporal binding has been closely associated with sense of agency, our perceived control over our actions and our environment, and because of its robust behavioral effects has indeed been widely utilized as an implicit correlate of sense of agency. The most robust and clear temporal binding effects are typically found via Libet clock paradigms. In the present study, we investigate a crucial methodological confound in these paradigms that provides an alternative explanation for temporal binding effects: a redirection of attentional resources in two-event sequences (as in classical operant conditions) versus singular events (as in classical baseline conditions). Our results indicate that binding effects in Libet clock paradigms may be based to a large degree on such attentional processes, irrespective of intention or action-effect sequences. Thus, these findings challenge many of the previously drawn conclusions and interpretations with regard to actions and time perception.}, language = {en} }