@phdthesis{Muth2023,
  author    = {Muth, Felicitas Vanessa},
  title     = {Step by step: Sense of agency for complex action-event sequences},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-30756},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-307569},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {From simply ringing a bell to preparing a five-course menu, human behavior commonly causes changes in the environment. Such episodes where an agent acts, thereby causing changes in their environment constitute the sense of agency. In this thesis four series of experi-ments elucidate how the sense of agency is represented in complex action-event sequences, thereby bridging a gap between basic cognitive research and real-life practice. It builds upon extensive research on the sense of agency in unequivocal sequences consisting of single ac-tions and distinct, predominantly auditory, outcomes. Employing implicit as well as explicit measures, the scope is opened up to multi-step sequences. The experiments show that it is worthwhile devoting more research to complex action-event sequences. With a newly introduced auditory measure (Chapter II), common phenomena such as temporal binding and a decrease in agency ratings following distorted feedback were replicated in multi-step sequences. However, diverging results between traditional implicit and explicit measures call for further inspection. Multisensory integration appears to gain more weight when multiple actions have to be performed to attain a goal leading to more accurate representations of the own actions (Chapter III). Additionally, freedom of choice (Chapter III) as well as early spatial ambiguity altered the perceived timing of outcomes, while late spatial ambi-guity (Chapter IV) and the outcome's self-relevance did not (Chapter V). The data suggests that the cognitive system is capable of representing multi-step action-event sequences implicitly and explicitly. Actions and sensory events show a temporal attraction stemming from a bias in the perception of outcomes. Explicit knowledge about causing an event-sequence facilitates neither feelings of control nor taking authorship. The results corroborate current theorizing on the un-derpinnings of temporal binding and the divergence between traditional implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency. Promising avenues for further research include structured analyses of how much inferred causality contributes to implicit and explicit measures of agency as well as finding alternative measures to capture conceptual as well as non-conceptual facets of the agency experience with one method.},
  subject      = {Psychologie},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Liesner2022,
  author    = {Liesner, Marvin Paul},
  title     = {I control it, but does it mean it is part of me? How the relationship between body movements and controlled object movements influences the sense of agency and the sense of ownership},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-28703},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-287030},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {The "active self" approach suggests that any object we manipulate voluntarily and foreseeably becomes part of our "self" in the sense that we feel control over this object (sense of agency) and experience it as belonging to our own body (sense of ownership). While there is considerable evidence that we can indeed experience both a sense of agency and a sense of ownership over a broad variety of objects when we control these through our actions, the approach has also been criticized for exaggerating the flexibility of the human self. In this thesis, I investigate the influence that the relationship between the body movements controlling an object and the movements of the object itself has on the process of integrating an object into the self. I demonstrate that fully controlling an object is not sufficient for it to be integrated into the self since both explicit and implicit measures of the sense of agency and the sense of ownership indicate less or no integration when body movements are transformed into inverted object movements. Furthermore, I show that such inversions lead to the downregulation of sensory signals either from the body or from the controlled object in order to deal with the conflicting multisensory information when performing such actions. I argue that this downregulation is the underlying factor behind the diminished or eliminated integration of inverted body and object movements and I discuss further pathways for possible future studies building up on these findings.},
  subject      = {Experimentelle Psychologie},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Schmidts2021,
  author    = {Schmidts, Constantin},
  title     = {Affective regulation of cognitive conflict},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-21989},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-219897},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Kognitive Kontrolle beschreibt Prozesse die n{\"o}tig sind um zielgerichtetes Handeln im Angesicht von internen oder externen Widerst{\"a}nden zu erm{\"o}glichen. Wenn wir aus eigenen St{\"u}cken oder inspiriert durch unsere Umwelt Handlungen vorbereiten die unseren aktuellen Zielen entgegen stehen, kommt es zu Konflikten. Solche Konflikte k{\"o}nnen sich auf nachfolgendes Erleben und Verhalten auswirken. Aversive Konsequenzen von Konflikt k{\"o}nnten in einem Konflikt{\"u}berwachungsmodul registriert werden, welches anschließend Aufmerksamkeits{\"a}nderungen und Handlungstendenzen zur Reduzierung dieses negativen Affektes in Gang setzt. Wenn das der Fall w{\"a}re, k{\"o}nnten die vielfach beobachteten Verhaltensanpassungen an kognitiven Konflikt ein Ausdruck von Emotionsregulation sein. Ein theoretischer Eckpfeiler der gegenw{\"a}rtigen Forschung zur Emotionsregulation ist das Prozessmodell der Emotionsregulation, das aus den Regulationsstrategien Situationsauswahl, Situationsmodifikation, Aufmerksamkeitslenkung, kognitiven Ver{\"a}nderungen und Reaktionsmodulation besteht. Unter der Annahme, dass Konfliktanpassung und Affektregulation auf gemeinsamen Mechanismen fußen, habe ich aus dem Prozessmodell der Emotionsregulation Vorhersagen zur kognitiven Kontrolle abgeleitet und diese in elf Experimenten getestet (N = 509). Die Versuchsteilnehmer zeigten Situationsauswahl in Bezug auf Konflikte, allerdings nur dann, wenn sie ausdr{\"u}cklich auf Handlungs- und Ergebniskontingenzen hingewiesen wurden (Experimente 1 bis 3). Ich fand Anzeichen f{\"u}r einen Mechanismus, der der Situationsmodifikation {\"a}hnelt, aber keine Hinweise auf eine Beteiligung von Affekt (Experimente 4 bis 10). Eine {\"A}nderung der Konfliktbewertung hatte keinen Einfluss auf das Ausmaß der Konfliktadaptation (Experiment 11). Insgesamt gab es Hinweise auf eine explizite Aversivit{\"a}t kognitiver Konflikte, jedoch weniger auf implizite Aversivit{\"a}t, was darauf hindeutet, dass Konflikte vor allem dann Affektregulationsprozesse ausl{\"o}sen, wenn Menschen explizit Affektregulationsziele vor Augen haben.},
  subject      = {Affekt},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Weller2019,
  author    = {Weller, Lisa},
  title     = {How to not act? Cognitive foundations of intentional nonactions},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-17667},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-176678},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions. The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1-3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4-5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6-8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects. In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.},
  subject      = {Intention},
  language  = {en}
}