@phdthesis{Muthers2017,
  author    = {Muthers, Johannes},
  title     = {Essays in Industrial Organization},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-141671},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {The dissertation deals with the market and welfare effects of different business practices and the firm's incentives to use them: resale price maintenance, revenue sharing of a platform operator, membership fees to buyers using a platform and patent licensing. In the second chapter we investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer pricesby voiding retailer price competition and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even decreasing the overall service level. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM tends to distort the allocation of sales services towards the high-priced products of the manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM. The third chapter deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical two-part tariffs only (which previous literature on two-sided markets has focused on) as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, some products that are not known to the platform operator will not be offered at all. We discuss the effects of different platform tariffs on this hold-up problem. We find that revenue-based fees lower the platform operator's incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, what may explain why several trade platforms indeed charge proportional fees. The fourth chapter investigates the optimal tariff system in a model in which buyers are heterogeneous. A platform model is presented in which transactions are modeled explicitly and buyers can differ in their expected valuations when they decide to join the platform. The main effect that the model identifies is that the participation decision sorts buyers according to their expected valuations. This affects the pricing of sellers. Furthermore diffing form the usual approach, in which buyers are ex-ante homogeneous, the platform does not internalize the full transaction surplus. Hence it does not implement the socially efficient price on the platform, also it has control of the price with the transaction fee. The fifth chapter investigates the effects of licensing on the market outcome after the patent has expired. In a setting with endogenous entry, a licensee has a head start over the competition which translated into a first mover advantage if strategies are strategic substitutes. As competitive strategies quantities and informative advertising are considered explicitly. We find that although licensing increases the joint profit of the patentee and licensee, this does not necessarily come from a reduction in consumer surplus or other firms profits. For the case of quantity competition we show that licensing is welfare improving. For the case of informative advertising, however, we show that licensing increases prices and is thus detrimental to consumer surplus.},
  subject      = {Wettbewerbsverhalten},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Wismer2013,
  author    = {Wismer, Sebastian},
  title     = {Essays in Industrial Organization: Intermediation, Marketing, and Strategic Pricing},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-99102},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {This dissertation deals with certain business strategies that have become particularly relevant with the spread and development of new information technologies. The introduction explains the motivation, discusses different ways of defining the term "two-sided market", and briefly summarizes the subsequent essays. The first essay examines the effects of product information on the pricing and advertising decision of a seller who offers an experience good whose quality is unknown to consumers prior to purchase. It comprises of two theoretical models which differ with respect to their view on advertising. The analysis addresses the question how the availability of additional, potentially misleading information affects the seller's quality-dependent pricing and advertising decision. In the first model, in which both advertising and product reviews make consumers aware about product existence, the seller's optimal price turns out to be increasing in product quality. However, under certain circumstances, also the seller of a low-quality product prefers setting a high price. Within the given framework, the relationship between product quality and advertising depends on the particular parameter constellation. In the second model, some consumers are assumed to interpret price as a signal of quality, while others rely on information provided by product reviews. Consequently, and differently from the first part, pricing may indirectly inform consumers about product quality. On the one hand, in spite of asymmetric information on product quality, equilibria exist that feature full information pricing, which is in line with previous results presented by the signaling literature. On the other hand, potentially misleading product reviews may rationalize further pricing patterns. Moreover, assuming that firms can manipulate product reviews by investing in concealed marketing, equilibria can arise in which a high price signals low product quality. However, in these extreme cases, only a few (credulous) consumers consider buying the product. The second essay deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he sets classical two-part tariffs (on which previous literature on two-sided markets focussed) as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, products whose existence is not known to the platform operator in the first place and which can only be established by better informed sellers may not be offered at all. However, revenue-based fees lower the platform operator's incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, what may explain why several trade platforms indeed do charge proportional fees. The third essay examines settings in which sellers can be active both on an intermediary's trade platform and in other sales channels. It explores the sellers' incentives to set different prices across sales channels within the given setup. Afterwards, it analyzes the intermediary's tariff decision, taking into account the implications on consumers' choice between different sales channels. The analysis particularly focusses on the effects of a no-discrimination rule which several intermediaries impose, but which appears to be controversial from a competition policy view. It identifies under which circumstances the intermediary prefers restricting sellers' pricing decisions by imposing a no-discrimination rule, attaining direct control over the split-up of customers on sales channels. Moreover, it illustrates that such rules can have both positive and negative effects on welfare within the given framework.},
  subject      = {Industrie{\"o}konomie},
  language  = {en}
}