@phdthesis{Greer2015,
  author    = {Greer, Katja},
  title     = {Essays in Industrial Organization: Vertical Agreements in a Dynamic View},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-136939},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {This dissertation deals with the contract choice of upstream suppliers as well as the consequences on competition and efficiency in a dynamic setting with inter-temporal externalities. The introduction explains the motivation of the analysis and the comparison of different contract types, as for example standard contracts like simple two-part tariffs and additional specifications as contracts referencing the quantity of the contract-offering firm or the relative purchase level. The features of specific market structures should be considered in the analysis of specific vertical agreements and their policy implications. In particular, the role of dynamic changes regarding demand and cost parameters may have an influence on the results observed. In the first model, a dominant upstream supplier and a non-strategic rival sell their products to a single downstream firm. The rival supplier faces learning effects which decrease the rival's costs with respect to its previous sales. Therefore, learning effects represent a dynamic competitive threat to the dominant supplier. In this setup, the dominant supplier can react on inter-temporal externalities by specifying its contract to the downstream firm. The model shows that by offering market-share discounts, instead of simple two-part tariffs or quantity discounts, the dominant supplier maximizes long-run profits, and restricts the efficiency gains of its rival. If demand is linear, the market-share discount lowers consumer surplus and welfare. The second model analyzes the strategic use of bilateral contracts in a sequential bargaining game. A dominant upstream supplier and its rival sequentially negotiate with a single downstream firm. The contract choice of the dominant supplier as well as the rival supplier's reaction are investigated. In a single-period sequential contracting game, menus of simple two-part tariffs achieve the industry profit maximizing outcome. In a dynamic setting where the suppliers sequentially negotiate in each period, the dominant supplier uses additional contractual terms that condition on the rival's quantity. Due to the first-mover advantage of the first supplier, the rival supplier is restricted in its contract choice. The consequences of the dominant supplier's contract choice depend on bargaining power. In particular, market-share contracts can be efficiency enhancing and welfare-improving whenever the second supplier has a relatively high bargaining position vis-`a-vis the downstream firm. For a relatively low bargaining position of the rival supplier, the result is similar to the one determined in the first model. We show that results depend on the considered negotiating structure. The third model studies the contract choice of two upstream competitors that simultaneously deal with a common buyer. In a complete information setting where both suppliers get to know whether further negotiations fail or succeed, a singleperiod model solves for the industry-profit maximizing outcome as long as contractual terms define at least a wholesale price and a fixed fee. In contrast, this collusive outcome cannot be achieved in a two-period model with inter-temporal externalities. We characterize the possible market scenarios, their outcomes and consequences on competition and efficiency. Our results demonstrate that in case a rival supplier is restricted in its contract choice, the contract specification of a dominant supplier can partially exclude the competitor. Whenever equally efficient suppliers can both strategically choose contract specifications, the rivals defend their market shares by adapting appropriate contractual conditions. The final chapter provides an overview of the main findings and presents some concluding remarks.},
  subject      = {Unternehmenskooperation},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Zidorn2012,
  author    = {Zidorn, Wilfried},
  title     = {Alliances and R\&D activites in the Biotechnology Industry},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-75483},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {This dissertation is divided into three studies by addressing the following constitutive research questions in the context of the biotechnology industry: (1) How do different types of inter-firm alliances influence a firm's R\&D activity? (2) How does an increasing number and diversity of alliances in a firm's alliance portfolio affect its R\&D activity? (3) What is the optimal balance between exploration and exploitation? (1) To answer these research questions the first main chapter analyzes the impact of different types of alliances on the R\&D activities of successful firms in the biotechnology industry. Following the use of a new approach to measuring changes in research activities, the results show that alliances are used to specialize in a certain research field, rather than to enter a completely new market. This effect becomes smaller when the equity involvement of the partners in the alliance project increases. (2) The second main chapter analyzes the impact on innovation output of having heterogeneous partners in a biotechnology firm's alliance portfolio. Previous literature has stressed that investment in the heterogeneity of partners in an alliance portfolio is more important than merely engaging in multiple collaborative agreements. The analysis of a unique panel dataset of 20 biotechnology firms and their 8,602 alliances suggests that engaging in many alliances generally has a positive influence on a firm's innovation output. Furthermore, maintaining diverse alliance portfolios has an inverted U-shaped influence on a firm's innovation output, as managerial costs and complexity levels become too high. (3) And the third main chapter investigates whether there is an optimal balance to be found between explorative and exploitative innovation strategies. Previous literature states that firms that are ambidextrous (i.e., able to focus on exploration and exploitation simultaneously) tend to be more successful. Using a unique panel dataset of 20 leading biotechnology firms and separating their explorative and exploitative research, the chapter suggests that firms seeking to increase their innovation output should avoid imbalances between their explorative and exploitative innovation strategies. Furthermore, an inverted U-shaped relationship between a firm's relative research attention on exploration and its innovation output is found. This dissertation concludes with the results of the dissertation, combines the findings, gives managerial implications and proposes areas for potential further research.},
  subject      = {Biotechnologische Industrie},
  language  = {en}
}