@article{Schierbaum2022,
  author    = {Schierbaum, Sonja},
  title     = {The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts},
  series = {Topoi},
  volume    = {41},
  journal   = {Topoi},
  number    = {1},
  issn      = {1572-8749},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11245-021-09741-6},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269857},
  pages     = {171-181},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, 'Anscombian' views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one's body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus's account is close to contemporary, 'Anscombian' accounts, whereas Ockham's account is incompatible with them.},
  language  = {en}
}
@incollection{Klein2023,
  author    = {Klein, Martin},
  title     = {Metaphors, Dead and Alive},
  series = {Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind},
  booktitle = {Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind},
  editor    = {Hochschild, Joshua P. and Nevitt, Turner C. and Wood, Adam and Borb{\´e}ly, G{\´a}bor},
  publisher = {Springer},
  doi       = {10.1007/978-3-031-15026-5_8},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-359678},
  publisher      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {This paper examins how the medieval distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. I will show how Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ordinary ambiguous terms and metaphors, whereas William of Ockham and Walter Burley do not leave room for this distinction. I will argue that Ockham's conception of transfer of sense through subsequent institution of words is best thought of as an explanation of how ordinary usage can contain ambiguities, whereas Burley's conception of transfer of sense without new imposition is more plausible when it comes to explaining metaphors. If metaphorical use is lumped together with equivocation, the account of how they work cannot do full justice to either, an insight that we already find in Peter Abelard, if not in Boethius.},
  language  = {en}
}