@article{Franz2022,
  author    = {Franz, David J.},
  title     = {Is Applied Ethics Morally Problematic?},
  series = {Journal of Academic Ethics},
  volume    = {20},
  journal   = {Journal of Academic Ethics},
  issn      = {1572-8544},
  doi       = {10.1007/s10805-021-09417-1},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269095},
  pages     = {359-374},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {This paper argues that applied ethics can itself be morally problematic. As illustrated by the case of Peter Singer's criticism of social practice, morally loaded communication by applied ethicists can lead to protests, backlashes, and aggression. By reviewing the psychological literature on self-image, collective identity, and motivated reasoning three categories of morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism by applied ethicists are identified: serious psychological discomfort, moral backfiring, and hostile conflict. The most worrisome is moral backfiring: psychological research suggests that ethical criticism of people's central moral convictions can reinforce exactly those attitudes. Therefore, applied ethicists unintentionally can contribute to a consolidation of precisely those social circumstances that they condemn to be unethical. Furthermore, I argue that the normative concerns raised in this paper are not dependent on the commitment to one specific paradigm in moral philosophy. Utilitarianism, Aristotelian virtue ethics, and Rawlsian contractarianism all provide sound reasons to take morally problematic consequences of ethical criticism seriously. Only the case of deontological ethics is less clear-cut. Finally, I point out that the issues raised in this paper provide an excellent opportunity for further interdisciplinary collaboration between applied ethics and social sciences. I also propose strategies for communicating ethics effectively.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{Franz2022,
  author    = {Franz, David J.},
  title     = {Moral responsibility for self-deluding beings},
  series = {Philosophia},
  volume    = {50},
  journal   = {Philosophia},
  number    = {4},
  issn      = {0048-3893},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11406-022-00469-0},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324871},
  pages     = {1791-1807},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of moral responsibility. Second, this viewpoint leads to a reasons-focused account of human behavior. Examples of human action discussed in debates about moral responsibility suggest that typical human actions are driven primarily by the agent's subjective reasons and are sufficiently transparent for the agent. Third, this conception of self-transparent action is a questionable idealization. As shown by psychological research on self-assessment, motivated reasoning, and terror management theory, humans oftentimes have only a limited understanding of their conduct. Self-deception is rather the rule than the exception. Fourth, taking the limited self-transparency of practical reason seriously leads to a socially contextualized conception of moral responsibility.},
  language  = {en}
}