@phdthesis{Campion2015,
  author    = {Campion, Marie-Genevi{\`e}ve},
  title     = {Competition between Originators and Generics: Public Regulation and Incentives to Innovate},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-111701},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {The aim of this thesis is to examine the competition patterns that exist between originators and generics by focusing on the articulations between regulation and incentives to innovate. Once the characteristics of regulation in pharmaceutical markets is reviewed in the first chapter and an analysis of some current challenges related to cost-containment measures and innovation issues is performed, then in the second chapter, an empirical study is performed to investigate substitution patterns. Based on the EC´s merger decisions in the pharmaceutical sector from 1989 to 2011, this study stresses the key criteria to define the scope of the relevant product market based on substitution patterns and shows the trend towards a narrower market in time. Chapters three and four aim to analyse in depth two widespread measures, the internal reference pricing system in off-patent markets, and risk-sharing schemes in patent-protected markets. By taking into account informational advantages of originators over generics, the third chapter shows the extent to which the implementation of a reference price for off-patent markets can contribute in promoting innovation. Finally, in the fourth chapter, the modeling of risk-sharing schemes explains how such schemes can help in solving moral hazard and adverse selection issues by continuously giving pharmaceutical companies incentives to innovate and supplying medicinal products of a higher quality.},
  subject      = {Pharmazeutische Industrie},
  language  = {en}
}