@article{ReussKieselKundeetal.2012,
  author    = {Reuss, Heiko and Kiesel, Andrea and Kunde, Wilfried and W{\"u}hr, Peter},
  title     = {A cue from the unconscious - masked symbols prompt spatial anticipation},
  series = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume    = {3},
  journal   = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-123971},
  pages     = {397},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {Anticipating where an event will occur enables us to instantaneously respond to events that occur at the expected location. Here we investigated if such spatial anticipations can be triggered by symbolic information that participants cannot consciously see. In two experiments involving a Posner cueing task and a visual search task, a central cue informed participants about the likely location of the next target stimulus. In half of the trials, this cue was rendered invisible by pattern masking. In both experiments, visible cues led to cueing effects, that is, faster responses after valid compared to invalid cues. Importantly, even masked cues caused cueing effects, though to a lesser extent. Additionally, we analyzed effects on attention that persist from one trial to the subsequent trial. We found that spatial anticipations are able to interfere with newly formed spatial anticipations and influence orienting of attention in the subsequent trial. When the preceding cue was visible, the corresponding spatial anticipation persisted to an extent that prevented a noticeable effect of masked cues. The effects of visible cues were likewise modulated by previous spatial anticipations, but were strong enough to also exert an impact on attention themselves. Altogether, the results suggest that spatial anticipations can be formed on the basis of unconscious stimuli, but that interfering influences like still active spatial anticipations can suppress this effect.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HaeringKiesel2012,
  author    = {Haering, Carola and Kiesel, Andrea},
  title     = {Mine is earlier than yours: Causal beliefs influence the perceived time of action effects},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-76229},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {When a key press causes a stimulus, the key press is perceived later and the stimulus earlier than key presses and stimuli presented independently. This bias in time perception has been linked to the intention to produce the effect and thus been called intentional binding (IB). In recent studies it has been shown that the IB effect is stronger when participants believed that they caused the effect stimulus compared to when they believed that another person caused the effect (Desantis et al., 2011). In this experiment we ask whether causal beliefs influence the perceived time of an effect when the putative effect occurs temporally close to another stimulus that is also an effect. In our study two participants performed the same task on connected computers with separate screens. Each trial started synchro- nously on both computers. When a participant pressed a key, a red and a yellow stimulus appeared as action effects simultaneously or with a slight delay of up to 50 ms. The partic- ipants' task was to judge the temporal order of these two effect stimuli. Participants were either told that one participant caused one of the two stimuli while the other participant seated at the other computer caused the other stimulus, or each participant was told that he/she caused both stimuli. The different causal beliefs changed the perceived time of the effects' appearance relative to each other. When participants believed they each caused one effect, their "own" effect was perceived earlier than the other participant's effect. When the participants believed each caused both effects, no difference in the perceived temporal order of the red and yellow effect was found. These results confirm that higher order causal beliefs change the perceived time of an action effect even in a setting in which the occurrence of the putative effect can be directly compared to a reference stimulus.},
  subject      = {Psychologie},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{PfisterPohlKieseletal.2012,
  author    = {Pfister, Roland and Pohl, Carsten and Kiesel, Andrea and Kunde, Wilfried},
  title     = {Your Unconscious Knows Your Name},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-75304},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {One's own name constitutes a unique part of conscious awareness - but does this also hold true for unconscious processing? The present study shows that the own name has the power to bias a person's actions unconsciously even in conditions that render any other name ineffective. Participants judged whether a letter string on the screen was a name or a non-word while this target stimulus was preceded by a masked prime stimulus. Crucially, the participant's own name was among these prime stimuli and facilitated reactions to following name targets whereas the name of another, yoked participant did not. Signal detection results confirmed that participants were not aware of any of the prime stimuli, including their own name. These results extend traditional findings on ''breakthrough'' phenomena of personally relevant stimuli to the domain of unconscious processing. Thus, the brain seems to possess adroit mechanisms to identify and process such stimuli even in the absence of conscious awareness.},
  subject      = {Psychologie},
  language  = {en}
}