@article{RudloffHutmacherAppel2023,
  author    = {Rudloff, Jan Philipp and Hutmacher, Fabian and Appel, Markus},
  title     = {Post-truth epistemic beliefs rooted in the Dark Factor of Personality are associated with higher COVID-19 vaccination refusal},
  series = {Scientific Reports},
  volume    = {13},
  journal   = {Scientific Reports},
  doi       = {10.1038/s41598-023-31079-9},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-357619},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {A substantial number of people refused to get vaccinated against COVID-19, which prompts the question as to why. We focus on the role of individual worldviews about the nature and generation of knowledge (epistemic beliefs). We propose a model that includes epistemic beliefs, their relationship to the Dark Factor of Personality (D), and their mutual effect on the probability of having been vaccinated against COVID-19. Based on a US nationally representative sample (N = 1268), we show that stronger endorsement of post-truth epistemic beliefs was associated with a lower probability of having been vaccinated against COVID-19. D was also linked to a lower probability of having been vaccinated against COVID-19, which can be explained by post-truth epistemic beliefs. Our results indicate that the more individuals deliberately refrain from adhering to the better argument, the less likely they are vaccinated. More generally, post-truth epistemic beliefs pose a challenge for rational communication.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HruschkaAppel2023,
  author    = {Hruschka, Timon M. J. and Appel, Markus},
  title     = {Learning about informal fallacies and the detection of fake news: an experimental intervention},
  series = {PLoS One},
  volume    = {18},
  journal   = {PLoS One},
  number    = {3},
  issn      = {1932-6203},
  doi       = {10.1371/journal.pone.0283238},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-350404},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {The philosophical concept of informal fallacies-arguments that fail to provide sufficient support for a claim-is introduced and connected to the topic of fake news detection. We assumed that the ability to identify informal fallacies can be trained and that this ability enables individuals to better distinguish between fake news and real news. We tested these assumptions in a two-group between-participants experiment (N = 116). The two groups participated in a 30-minute-long text-based learning intervention: either about informal fallacies or about fake news. Learning about informal fallacies enhanced participants' ability to identify fallacious arguments one week later. Furthermore, the ability to identify fallacious arguments was associated with a better discernment between real news and fake news. Participants in the informal fallacy intervention group and the fake news intervention group performed equally well on the news discernment task. The contribution of (identifying) informal fallacies for research and practice is discussed.},
  language  = {en}
}