@phdthesis{Weller2019,
  author    = {Weller, Lisa},
  title     = {How to not act? Cognitive foundations of intentional nonactions},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-17667},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-176678},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2019},
  abstract  = {Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions. The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1-3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4-5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6-8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects. In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.},
  subject      = {Intention},
  language  = {en}
}