@phdthesis{Hoerner2020,
  author    = {H{\"o}rner, Sven},
  title     = {Empirical Studies on Accounting - Shareholders' Perceptions of Earnings Quality},
  doi       = {10.25972/OPUS-18847},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-188473},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2020},
  abstract  = {Accounting plays an essential role in solving the principal-agent problem between managers and shareholders of capital market-oriented companies through the provision of information by the manager. However, this can succeed only if the accounting information is of high quality. In this context, the perceptions of shareholders regarding earnings quality are of particular importance. The present dissertation intends to contribute to a deeper understanding regarding earnings quality from the perspective of shareholders of capital market-oriented companies. In particular, the thesis deals with indicators of shareholders' perceptions of earnings quality, the influence of the auditor's independence on these perceptions, and the shareholders' assessment of the importance of earnings quality in general. Therefore, this dissertation examines market reactions to earnings announcements, measures of earnings quality and the auditor's independence, as well as shareholders' voting behavior at annual general meetings. Following the introduction and a theoretical part consisting of two chapters, which deal with the purposes of accounting and auditing as well as the relevance of shareholder voting at the annual general meeting in the context of the principal-agent theory, the dissertation presents three empirical studies. The empirical study presented in chapter 4 investigates auditor ratification votes in a U.S. setting. The study addresses the question of whether the results of auditor ratification votes are informative regarding shareholders' perceptions of earnings quality. Using a returns-earnings design, the study demonstrates that the results of auditor ratification votes are associated with market reactions to unexpected earnings at the earnings announcement date. Furthermore, there are indications that this association seems to be positively related to higher levels of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders. Thus, there is empirical support for the notion that the results of auditor ratification votes are earnings-related information that might help shareholders to make informed investment decisions. Chapter 5 investigates the relation between the economic importance of the client and perceived earnings quality. In particular, it is examined whether and when shareholders have a negative perception of an auditor's economic dependence on the client. The results from a Big 4 client sample in the U.S. (fiscal years 2010 through 2014) indicate a negative association between the economic importance of the client and shareholders' perceptions of earnings quality. The results are interpreted to mean that shareholders are still concerned about auditor independence even ten years after the implementation of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. Furthermore, the association between the economic importance of the client and shareholders' perceptions of earnings quality applies predominantly to the subsample of clients that are more likely to be financially distressed. Therefore, the empirical results reveal that shareholders' perceptions of auditor independence are conditional on the client's circumstances. The study presented in chapter 6 sheds light on the question of whether earnings quality influences shareholders' satisfaction with the members of the company's board. Using data from 1,237 annual general meetings of German listed companies from 2010 through 2015, the study provides evidence that earnings quality - measured by the absolute value of discretionary accruals - is related to shareholders' satisfaction with the company's board. Moreover, the findings imply that shareholders predominantly blame the management board for inferior earnings quality. Overall, the evidence that earnings quality positively influences shareholders' satisfaction emphasizes the relevance of earnings quality.},
  subject      = {Qualit{\"a}t},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Leidner2017,
  author    = {Leidner, Jacob Justus},
  title     = {Empirical Studies on Auditing in Germany and the U.S.},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-143901},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {Chapter 2 concerns the audit market for German credit institutions (excluding savings banks and cooperative banks), and the presented study allows conclusions to be drawn regarding recent concentration levels of this particular audit market. The last reliable (statistical) studies concerning the audit market for German credit institutions were published several years ago (Grothe 2005; Lenz 1996b; Lenz 1997; Lenz 1998). This is surprising because parts of the new regulations concerning the audit market for public-interest entities—which should also apply to credit institutions (European Commission 2006c)—in Europe would require analyses of the audit market concentration to be performed on a regular basis. Therefore, this study begins to fill this research gap, and it reveals that the audit market for German credit institutions was highly concentrated (market leadership: KPMG AG WPG and PricewaterhouseCoopers AG WPG) in 2006 and 2010. Moreover, the findings also highlight that between these years, neither a notable trend toward higher levels of concentration nor a deconcentration process was evident. Finally, it is illustrated that the regulatory requirements for publishing audit fees and the corresponding right to claim exemption (\S\S 285 Sentence 1 No. 17, 314 (1) No. 9 Commercial Code) do not allow the calculation of concentration figures that cover the entire audit market for credit institutions. Thus, it will continue to be necessary to use surrogates for audit fees, and analyses reveal that the arithmetic mean of the total business volume (or total assets) of a credit institution and its square root is a very good surrogate for calculating concentration measures based on audit fees. Chapter 3 seeks to determine whether public oversight of public-interest entities (PIEs) increases audit fees specifically in the financial industry, which is already a highly regulated industry characterized by intense supervision. To answer this question, a sample of 573 German credit institutions is examined over the 2009-2011 period, as not all credit institutions were considered PIEs in Germany (until very recently). First, the results show that a credit institution's business risk is related to audit fees. In addition, the findings reveal not only that PIE credit institutions pay statistically significantly higher audit fees but also that this effect is economically substantial (representing an audit fee increase of 31.38\%). Finally, there are several indications that the relationship between (other) credit institutions' business risks and audit fees is greater for PIE credit institutions. Chapter 4 examines the association between the results of auditor ratification votes and perceived external financial reporting quality. As has been recently remarked by Wei et al. (2015), far too little is known about shareholders' interests in and perceptions of the election, approval or ratification of auditors. Although auditor ratification by shareholders is normally a routine, non-binding action and the voting ratios are in the range of 95\% or higher, the SEC emphasized the importance of this process by amending the disclosure requirements for such voting results in 2010 (SEC 2009; SEC 2010). This study demonstrates that the results of auditor ratification votes are associated with market reactions to earnings surprises (SEC registrants; 2010 to 2013). Moreover, there are moderate indications that this effect may be positively related to higher levels of information asymmetry between managers and shareholders, that such voting results contain incremental informational content beyond that of other publicly available audit-related information, and that the time lag between the ratification of an auditor and the earnings announcement influences the vote's importance. Finally, the study sheds additional light on an overlooked audit-related topic (e.g., Dao et al. 2012; Hermanson et al. 2009; Krishnan and Ye 2005; Sainty et al. 2002), and illustrates its relation to accounting. More importantly, the provided evidence indicates that disclosure of the results of auditor ratification votes might benefit (prospective) shareholders. Chapter 5 addresses the question of whether and when shareholders may have a negative perception of an auditor's economic dependence on the client. The results for a Big 4 client sample in the U.S. (2010 to 2014) show that the economic importance of the client—measured at the audit office-level—is negatively associated with shareholders' perceptions of external financial reporting quality—measured in terms of the earnings response coefficient and the ex ante cost of equity capital—and, therefore, is perceived as a threat to auditor independence. Moreover, the study reveals that shareholders primarily regard independence due to client dependence as a problem for firms that are more likely to be in financially distressed conditions.},
  subject      = {Deutschland},
  language  = {en}
}