@article{MuthWirthKunde2021,
  author    = {Muth, Felicitas V. and Wirth, Robert and Kunde, Winfried},
  title     = {Temporal binding past the Libet clock: testing design factors for an auditory timer},
  series = {Behavior Research Methods},
  volume    = {53},
  journal   = {Behavior Research Methods},
  number    = {3},
  doi       = {10.3758/s13428-020-01474-5},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-234922},
  pages     = {1322-1341},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {Voluntary actions and causally linked sensory stimuli are perceived to be shifted towards each other in time. This so-called temporal binding is commonly assessed in paradigms using the Libet Clock. In such experiments, participants have to estimate the timing of actions performed or ensuing sensory stimuli (usually tones) by means of a rotating clock hand presented on a screen. The aforementioned task setup is however ill-suited for many conceivable setups, especially when they involve visual effects. To address this shortcoming, the line of research presented here establishes an alternative measure for temporal binding by using a sequence of timed sounds. This method uses an auditory timer, a sequence of letters presented during task execution, which serve as anchors for temporal judgments. In four experiments, we manipulated four design factors of this auditory timer, namely interval length, interval filling, sequence predictability, and sequence length, to determine the most effective and economic method for measuring temporal binding with an auditory timer.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{PfisterObhiRiegeretal.2014,
  author    = {Pfister, Roland and Obhi, Sukhvinder S. and Rieger, Martina and Wenke, Dorit},
  title     = {Action and perception in social contexts: intentional binding for social action effects},
  doi       = {10.3389/fnhum.2014.00667},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-112828},
  year      = {2014},
  abstract  = {The subjective experience of controlling events in the environment alters the perception of these events. For instance, the interval between one's own actions and their consequences is subjectively compressed—a phenomenon known as intentional binding. In two experiments, we studied intentional binding in a social setting in which actions of one agent prompted a second agent to perform another action. Participants worked in pairs and were assigned to a "leader" and a "follower" role, respectively. The leader's key presses triggered (after a variable interval) a tone and this tone served as go signal for the follower to perform a keypress as well. Leaders and followers estimated the interval between the leader's keypress and the following tone, or the interval between the tone and the follower's keypress. The leader showed reliable intentional binding for both intervals relative to the follower's estimates. These results indicate that human agents experience a pre-reflective sense of agency for genuinely social consequences of their actions.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{HaeringKiesel2012,
  author    = {Haering, Carola and Kiesel, Andrea},
  title     = {Mine is earlier than yours: Causal beliefs influence the perceived time of action effects},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-76229},
  year      = {2012},
  abstract  = {When a key press causes a stimulus, the key press is perceived later and the stimulus earlier than key presses and stimuli presented independently. This bias in time perception has been linked to the intention to produce the effect and thus been called intentional binding (IB). In recent studies it has been shown that the IB effect is stronger when participants believed that they caused the effect stimulus compared to when they believed that another person caused the effect (Desantis et al., 2011). In this experiment we ask whether causal beliefs influence the perceived time of an effect when the putative effect occurs temporally close to another stimulus that is also an effect. In our study two participants performed the same task on connected computers with separate screens. Each trial started synchro- nously on both computers. When a participant pressed a key, a red and a yellow stimulus appeared as action effects simultaneously or with a slight delay of up to 50 ms. The partic- ipants' task was to judge the temporal order of these two effect stimuli. Participants were either told that one participant caused one of the two stimuli while the other participant seated at the other computer caused the other stimulus, or each participant was told that he/she caused both stimuli. The different causal beliefs changed the perceived time of the effects' appearance relative to each other. When participants believed they each caused one effect, their "own" effect was perceived earlier than the other participant's effect. When the participants believed each caused both effects, no difference in the perceived temporal order of the red and yellow effect was found. These results confirm that higher order causal beliefs change the perceived time of an action effect even in a setting in which the occurrence of the putative effect can be directly compared to a reference stimulus.},
  subject      = {Psychologie},
  language  = {en}
}