@article{KrauseWeber2018,
  author    = {Krause, Stefan and Weber, Silvana},
  title     = {Lift me up by looking down: social comparison effects of narratives},
  series = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume    = {9},
  journal   = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  issn      = {1664-1078},
  doi       = {10.3389/fpsyg.2018.01889},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-190624},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {Stories are a powerful means to change recipients' views on themselves by being transported into the story world and by identifying with story characters. Previous studies showed that recipients temporarily change in line with a story and its characters (assimilation). Conversely, assimilation might be less likely when recipients are less identified with story protagonists or less transported into a story by comparing themselves with a story character. This may lead to changes, which are opposite to a story and its characters (contrast). In two experiments, we manipulated transportation and experience taking via two written reviews (Experiment 1; N = 164) and by varying the perspective of the story's narrator (Experiment 2; N = 79) of a short story about a negligent student. Recipients' self-ratings in comparison to others, motives, and problem-solving behavior served as dependent variables. However, neither the review nor the perspective manipulation affected transportation or experience taking while reading the story. Against our expectations, highly transported recipients (in Study 1) and recipients with high experience taking (in Study 2) showed more persistency working on an anagram-solving task, even when controlling for trait conscientiousness. Our findings are critically discussed in light of previous research.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Epstude2005,
  author    = {Epstude, Kai},
  title     = {What you get is what you see? Comparisons influence the social induction of affect},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-14961},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {The present research is concerned with the topic of socially induced affect. In previous research the focus was mainly on affective convergence. A prominent topic in that context was "emotional contagion" (Hatfield, Cacioppo, \& Rapson, 1994). Affective divergence has been also been found. However, its influence on the theoretical debate remained weak. Besides research on emotions also social comparison research attended to the topic. In order to explain affective divergence and convergence an integrative model based on social comparison processes is proposed here. Based on the selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003) it is assumed that affective convergence can be seen as assimilation to a comparison standard (the observed model). Therefore, the basic assumption is that a comparison between an observer and the model takes place. Affective divergence corresponds to an affective contrast from that standard. Which of these two phenomena occurs depends on the type of comparison processes that took place. Six experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1 it was shown that comparisons intensify the social induction of affect. The influence of the comparison focus was studied in Experiments 2 and 3. If the perceiver searches for similarities between the self and the model, affective convergence occurs. If differences are searched for, affective divergence is found. The latter is mainly found under special circumstances, e.g. if the model belongs to another social group (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1-3 it was shown comparisons influence the social induction of affect. In Experiment 4-6 the underlying processes were explored. The selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003) attributes a central role to the selective activation of self-knowledge in order to explain judgmental assimilation and contrast. In Experiments 4 and 5 the role of the self was explored more thoroughly. Evidence for socially induced affect (affective convergence) has only been found when the self has been previously activated. When the self was not activated no such effect was found. The assumption that the activation of specific self-knowledge is the basis for socially induced affect was tested in Experiment 5. Results supported the assumption. The present experiments give rise to the assumption that social comparisons are a key element in the social induction of affect. Affective convergence and divergence are explained and processes for the affect induction are defined. The findings also have implications for research on automatic behaviour and especially to explain automatic contrast. In addition implications for social comparison research can be derived.},
  language  = {en}
}