@phdthesis{Glasgow2017,
  author    = {Glasgow, Rupert},
  title     = {The Minimal Self},
  publisher = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  address   = {W{\"u}rzburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-95826-052-8 (print)},
  doi       = {10.25972/WUP-978-3-95826-053-5},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-145252},
  school      = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  pages     = {392},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {The aim of The Minimal Self is to undertake a conceptual analysis of the term 'self' and thereby establish the minimal conditions that must be met to ascribe selfhood to an entity. This conceptual analysis focuses on what is termed 'intrinsic reflexivity', which is taken as the defining feature of selfhood. Three underlying categories of intrinsic reflexivity are distinguished: self-maintenance, self-reproduction and self-containment. These three fundamental categories provide a framework within which it is possible to distinguish entities that can be designated 'selves' from entities that are merely 'self-like', thus establishing the logical preconditions for the 'emergence' of selfhood. By examining the fuzzy borderlines between selves and the merely self-like as manifest in phenomena such as dissipative systems, genetic material, viruses and bacteria, it becomes possible to ascertain a form of 'minimal selfhood', a mode of being shared by all selves qua selves. Free-living single-celled organisms such as protozoa are paradigmatic instances of minimal selfhood to the extent that they can be characterized in terms of the three intrinsically reflexive processes of self-maintenance, self-reproduction and self-containment. Minimal selfhood is also presupposed by more complex multicellular selves such as animals. Such an analysis is found to shed light on the origin of life and on the nature of organisms and biological individuals.},
  subject      = {Selbst},
  language  = {en}
}
@book{Glasgow2018,
  author    = {Glasgow, Rupert},
  title     = {Minimal Selfhood and the Origins of Consciousness},
  edition   = {1. Auflage},
  publisher = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  address   = {W{\"u}rzburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-95826-078-8 (Print)},
  doi       = {10.25972/WUP-978-3-95826-079-5},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-157470},
  publisher      = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  pages     = {260},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {The aim of the book is to ground the logical origins of consciousness in what I have previously called the 'minimal self'. The idea is that elementary forms of consciousness are logically dependent not, as is commonly assumed, on ownership of an anatomical brain or nervous system, but on the intrinsic reflexivity that defines minimal selfhood. The book seeks to trace the logical pathway by which minimal selfhood gives rise to the possible appearance of consciousness. It is argued that in specific circumstances it thus makes sense to ascribe elementary consciousness to certain predatory single-celled organisms such as amoebae and dinoflagellates as well as to some of the simpler animals. Such an argument involves establishing exactly what those specific circumstances are and determining how elementary consciousness differs in nature and scope from its more complex manifestations.},
  subject      = {Selbst},
  language  = {en}
}