@article{MockeWellerFringsetal.2020, author = {Mocke, Viola and Weller, Lisa and Frings, Christian and Rothermund, Klaus and Kunde, Wilfried}, title = {Task relevance determines binding of effect features in action planning}, series = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, volume = {82}, journal = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, issn = {1943-3921}, doi = {10.3758/s13414-020-02123-x}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-231906}, pages = {3811-3831}, year = {2020}, abstract = {Action planning can be construed as the temporary binding of features of perceptual action effects. While previous research demonstrated binding for task-relevant, body-related effect features, the role of task-irrelevant or environment-related effect features in action planning is less clear. Here, we studied whether task-relevance or body-relatedness determines feature binding in action planning. Participants planned an action A, but before executing it initiated an intermediate action B. Each action relied on a body-related effect feature (index vs. middle finger movement) and an environment-related effect feature (cursor movement towards vs. away from a reference object). In Experiments 1 and 2, both effects were task-relevant. Performance in action B suffered from partial feature overlap with action A compared to full feature repetition or alternation, which is in line with binding of both features while planning action A. Importantly, this cost disappeared when all features were available but only body-related features were task-relevant (Experiment 3). When only the environment-related effect of action A was known in advance, action B benefitted when it aimed at the same (vs. a different) environment-related effect (Experiment 4). Consequently, the present results support the idea that task relevance determines whether binding of body-related and environment-related effect features takes place while the pre-activation of environment-related features without binding them primes feature-overlapping actions.}, language = {en} } @article{NeszmelyiWellerKundeetal.2022, author = {Neszm{\´e}lyi, Bence and Weller, Lisa and Kunde, Wilfried and Pfister, Roland}, title = {Social action effects: representing predicted partner responses in social interactions}, series = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience}, volume = {16}, journal = {Frontiers in Human Neuroscience}, issn = {1662-5161}, doi = {10.3389/fnhum.2022.837495}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-276609}, year = {2022}, abstract = {The sociomotor framework outlines a possible role of social action effects on human action control, suggesting that anticipated partner reactions are a major cue to represent, select, and initiate own body movements. Here, we review studies that elucidate the actual content of social action representations and that explore factors that can distinguish action control processes involving social and inanimate action effects. Specifically, we address two hypotheses on how the social context can influence effect-based action control: first, by providing unique social features such as body-related, anatomical codes, and second, by orienting attention towards any relevant feature dimensions of the action effects. The reviewed empirical work presents a surprisingly mixed picture: while there is indirect evidence for both accounts, previous studies that directly addressed the anatomical account showed no signs of the involvement of genuinely social features in sociomotor action control. Furthermore, several studies show evidence against the differentiation of social and non-social action effect processing, portraying sociomotor action representations as remarkably non-social. A focus on enhancing the social experience in future studies should, therefore, complement the current database to establish whether such settings give rise to the hypothesized influence of social context.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Weller2019, author = {Weller, Lisa}, title = {How to not act? Cognitive foundations of intentional nonactions}, doi = {10.25972/OPUS-17667}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-176678}, school = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions. The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1-3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4-5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6-8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects. In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.}, subject = {Intention}, language = {en} } @article{SchwarzWeller2023, author = {Schwarz, Katharina A. and Weller, Lisa}, title = {Distracted to a fault: attention, actions, and time perception}, series = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, volume = {85}, journal = {Attention, Perception, \& Psychophysics}, number = {2}, doi = {10.3758/s13414-022-02632-x}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324936}, pages = {301-314}, year = {2023}, abstract = {In the last years, it has become general consensus that actions change our time perception. Performing an action to elicit a specific event seems to lead to a systematic underestimation of the interval between action and effect, a phenomenon termed temporal (or previously intentional) binding. Temporal binding has been closely associated with sense of agency, our perceived control over our actions and our environment, and because of its robust behavioral effects has indeed been widely utilized as an implicit correlate of sense of agency. The most robust and clear temporal binding effects are typically found via Libet clock paradigms. In the present study, we investigate a crucial methodological confound in these paradigms that provides an alternative explanation for temporal binding effects: a redirection of attentional resources in two-event sequences (as in classical operant conditions) versus singular events (as in classical baseline conditions). Our results indicate that binding effects in Libet clock paradigms may be based to a large degree on such attentional processes, irrespective of intention or action-effect sequences. Thus, these findings challenge many of the previously drawn conclusions and interpretations with regard to actions and time perception.}, language = {en} }