@article{Summa2023,
  author    = {Summa, Michela},
  title     = {Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology},
  series = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  volume    = {22},
  journal   = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences},
  number    = {3},
  issn      = {1568-7759},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11097-022-09828-4},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324753},
  pages     = {719-741},
  year      = {2023},
  abstract  = {Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-{\`a}-vis explanatory models.},
  language  = {en}
}