@phdthesis{Epstude2005,
  author    = {Epstude, Kai},
  title     = {What you get is what you see? Comparisons influence the social induction of affect},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-14961},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2005},
  abstract  = {The present research is concerned with the topic of socially induced affect. In previous research the focus was mainly on affective convergence. A prominent topic in that context was "emotional contagion" (Hatfield, Cacioppo, \& Rapson, 1994). Affective divergence has been also been found. However, its influence on the theoretical debate remained weak. Besides research on emotions also social comparison research attended to the topic. In order to explain affective divergence and convergence an integrative model based on social comparison processes is proposed here. Based on the selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003) it is assumed that affective convergence can be seen as assimilation to a comparison standard (the observed model). Therefore, the basic assumption is that a comparison between an observer and the model takes place. Affective divergence corresponds to an affective contrast from that standard. Which of these two phenomena occurs depends on the type of comparison processes that took place. Six experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1 it was shown that comparisons intensify the social induction of affect. The influence of the comparison focus was studied in Experiments 2 and 3. If the perceiver searches for similarities between the self and the model, affective convergence occurs. If differences are searched for, affective divergence is found. The latter is mainly found under special circumstances, e.g. if the model belongs to another social group (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1-3 it was shown comparisons influence the social induction of affect. In Experiment 4-6 the underlying processes were explored. The selective accessibility model (Mussweiler, 2003) attributes a central role to the selective activation of self-knowledge in order to explain judgmental assimilation and contrast. In Experiments 4 and 5 the role of the self was explored more thoroughly. Evidence for socially induced affect (affective convergence) has only been found when the self has been previously activated. When the self was not activated no such effect was found. The assumption that the activation of specific self-knowledge is the basis for socially induced affect was tested in Experiment 5. Results supported the assumption. The present experiments give rise to the assumption that social comparisons are a key element in the social induction of affect. Affective convergence and divergence are explained and processes for the affect induction are defined. The findings also have implications for research on automatic behaviour and especially to explain automatic contrast. In addition implications for social comparison research can be derived.},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Rueter2004,
  author    = {R{\"u}ter, Katja},
  title     = {The efficiency of routine standards in social comparison},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-9448},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2004},
  abstract  = {One primary source for self-knowledge is social comparison. Often objective criteria for self-evaluations are not available or useful and therefore comparisons with other people play a crucial role in self-evaluations. But the question is whether social comparisons could indeed provide information about the self without consuming too much cognitive resources or time. Therefore, in this research I wanted to look at practice effects in social comparison and the particular significance of routine standards. Whereas traditional research on standard selection mostly focused on goal-oriented and strategic standard selection processes, this research sets out to integrate social cognitive knowledge, ideas, and methods. Researchers from many different fields agree that people's behavior and thinking is not fully determined by rational choices or normative considerations. Quite the contrary, factors like knowledge accessibility, habits, procedural practice, stereotyping, categorization, and many more cognitive processes play an important role. The same may be true in social comparison and standard selection. In my research I demonstrate that efficiency concerns play an important role in social comparison. Since people may not be able to engage in a strategic standard selection whenever they engage in social comparison processes, there has to be a more efficient alternative. Using routine standards would be such an alternative. The efficiency advantage of routine standards may thereby be founded not only in the abandonment of a strategic but arduous standard selection process, but also in a higher efficiency of the comparison process itself. I therefore set out to show how the use of routine standards facilitates the social comparison processes. This was done in three steps. First, I replicated and improved our former research (Mussweiler \& R{\"u}ter, 2003, JPSP) indicating that people really do use their best friends as routine standards to evaluate themselves. Second, I demonstrated that it is more efficient to compare with a routine standard than with another standard. In Studies 2 and 3 I therefore show that comparisons between the self and a routine standard (either a natural routine standard like the best friend or a experimentally induced routine standard based on practice) are faster and more efficient than comparisons with other standards. Finally, I looked at the underlying mechanism of the efficiency advantage of routine standards. The results of Studies 4 and 5 point out, that both general as well as specific practice effects occur with repeated comparisons. Whereas a specific practice effect implies the repeated processing of the same content (i.e., knowledge about the routine standard), general practice effects indicate that the pure process (i.e., comparing the self with a routine standard) becomes more efficient regardless whether new content (i.e., comparison relevant knowledge) has to be processed. Taken together, the efficiency advantage of routine standards during self-evaluation is based not only on the lack of necessity for an arduous standard selection, but is additionally supported by the facilitation of the comparison process itself. The efficiency of routine standards may provide an explanation as to why people base self-evaluations on comparisons with these standards and dispense with strategic considerations to select the most suitable standard.},
  language  = {en}
}