@phdthesis{Zuern2015,
  author    = {Z{\"u}rn, Michael},
  title     = {The Dual Nature of Utility - Categorical and Comparative Evaluations in Economic Decisions},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-120141},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {Utility is perhaps the most central concept in modern economic theorizing. However, the behaviorist reduction to Revealed Preference not only removed the psychological content of utility but experimental investigations also exposed numerous anomalies in this theory. This program of research focused on the psychological processes by which utility judgments are generated. For this purpose, the standard assumption of a homogeneous concept is substituted by the Utilitarian Duality Hypothesis. In particular, judgments concerning categorical utility (uCat) infer an object's category based on its attributes which may subsequently allow the transfer of evaluative information like feelings or attitudes. In contrast, comparative utility (uCom) depends on the distance to a reference value on a specific dimension of comparison. Importantly, dimensions of comparison are manifold and context dependent. In a series of experiments, we show that the resulting Dual Utility Model is able to explain several known anomalies in a parsimonious fashion. Moreover, we identify central factors determining the relative weight assigned to both utility components. Finally, we discuss the implications of the Utilitarian Duality for both, the experimental practice in economics as well as the consequences for economic theorizing. In sum, we propose that the Dual Utility Model can serve as an integrative framework for both the rational model and its anomalies.},
  subject      = {Nutzen},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{ZuernStrack2017,
  author    = {Z{\"u}rn, Michael and Strack, Fritz},
  title     = {When More Is Better - Consumption Priming Decreases Responders' Rejections in the Ultimatum Game},
  series = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  volume    = {8},
  journal   = {Frontiers in Psychology},
  number    = {2226},
  issn      = {1664-1078},
  doi       = {10.3389/fpsyg.2017.02226},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-189989},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {During the past decades, economic theories of rational choice have been exposed to outcomes that were severe challenges to their claim of universal validity. For example, traditional theories cannot account for refusals to cooperate if cooperation would result in higher payoffs. A prominent illustration are responders' rejections of positive but unequal payoffs in the Ultimatum Game. To accommodate this anomaly in a rational framework one needs to assume both a preference for higher payoffs and a preference for equal payoffs. The current set of studies shows that the relative weight of these preference components depends on external conditions and that consumption priming may decrease responders' rejections of unequal payoffs. Specifically, we demonstrate that increasing the accessibility of consumption-related information accentuates the preference for higher payoffs. Furthermore, consumption priming increased responders' reaction times for unequal payoffs which suggests an increased conflict between both preference components. While these results may also be integrated into existing social preference models, we try to identify some basic psychological processes underlying economic decision making. Going beyond the Ultimatum Game, we propose that a distinction between comparative and deductive evaluations may provide a more general framework to account for various anomalies in behavioral economics.},
  language  = {en}
}