@article{Schierbaum2021,
  author    = {Schierbaum, Sonja},
  title     = {Crusius {\"u}ber die Vern{\"u}nftigkeit des Wollens und die Rolle des Urteilens},
  series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  volume    = {69},
  journal   = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie},
  number    = {4},
  issn      = {2192-1482},
  doi       = {10.1515/dzph-2021-0051},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-245582},
  pages     = {607 -- 618},
  year      = {2021},
  abstract  = {In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius's conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius's distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius's conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.},
  language  = {de}
}
@article{Schierbaum2022,
  author    = {Schierbaum, Sonja},
  title     = {The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts},
  series = {Topoi},
  volume    = {41},
  journal   = {Topoi},
  number    = {1},
  issn      = {1572-8749},
  doi       = {10.1007/s11245-021-09741-6},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269857},
  pages     = {171-181},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, 'Anscombian' views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one's body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus's account is close to contemporary, 'Anscombian' accounts, whereas Ockham's account is incompatible with them.},
  language  = {en}
}