@phdthesis{Muthers2017,
  author    = {Muthers, Johannes},
  title     = {Essays in Industrial Organization},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-141671},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2017},
  abstract  = {The dissertation deals with the market and welfare effects of different business practices and the firm's incentives to use them: resale price maintenance, revenue sharing of a platform operator, membership fees to buyers using a platform and patent licensing. In the second chapter we investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer pricesby voiding retailer price competition and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even decreasing the overall service level. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM tends to distort the allocation of sales services towards the high-priced products of the manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM. The third chapter deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical two-part tariffs only (which previous literature on two-sided markets has focused on) as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, some products that are not known to the platform operator will not be offered at all. We discuss the effects of different platform tariffs on this hold-up problem. We find that revenue-based fees lower the platform operator's incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, what may explain why several trade platforms indeed charge proportional fees. The fourth chapter investigates the optimal tariff system in a model in which buyers are heterogeneous. A platform model is presented in which transactions are modeled explicitly and buyers can differ in their expected valuations when they decide to join the platform. The main effect that the model identifies is that the participation decision sorts buyers according to their expected valuations. This affects the pricing of sellers. Furthermore diffing form the usual approach, in which buyers are ex-ante homogeneous, the platform does not internalize the full transaction surplus. Hence it does not implement the socially efficient price on the platform, also it has control of the price with the transaction fee. The fifth chapter investigates the effects of licensing on the market outcome after the patent has expired. In a setting with endogenous entry, a licensee has a head start over the competition which translated into a first mover advantage if strategies are strategic substitutes. As competitive strategies quantities and informative advertising are considered explicitly. We find that although licensing increases the joint profit of the patentee and licensee, this does not necessarily come from a reduction in consumer surplus or other firms profits. For the case of quantity competition we show that licensing is welfare improving. For the case of informative advertising, however, we show that licensing increases prices and is thus detrimental to consumer surplus.},
  subject      = {Wettbewerbsverhalten},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Campion2015,
  author    = {Campion, Marie-Genevi{\`e}ve},
  title     = {Competition between Originators and Generics: Public Regulation and Incentives to Innovate},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-111701},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {The aim of this thesis is to examine the competition patterns that exist between originators and generics by focusing on the articulations between regulation and incentives to innovate. Once the characteristics of regulation in pharmaceutical markets is reviewed in the first chapter and an analysis of some current challenges related to cost-containment measures and innovation issues is performed, then in the second chapter, an empirical study is performed to investigate substitution patterns. Based on the EC´s merger decisions in the pharmaceutical sector from 1989 to 2011, this study stresses the key criteria to define the scope of the relevant product market based on substitution patterns and shows the trend towards a narrower market in time. Chapters three and four aim to analyse in depth two widespread measures, the internal reference pricing system in off-patent markets, and risk-sharing schemes in patent-protected markets. By taking into account informational advantages of originators over generics, the third chapter shows the extent to which the implementation of a reference price for off-patent markets can contribute in promoting innovation. Finally, in the fourth chapter, the modeling of risk-sharing schemes explains how such schemes can help in solving moral hazard and adverse selection issues by continuously giving pharmaceutical companies incentives to innovate and supplying medicinal products of a higher quality.},
  subject      = {Pharmazeutische Industrie},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Greer2015,
  author    = {Greer, Katja},
  title     = {Essays in Industrial Organization: Vertical Agreements in a Dynamic View},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-136939},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2015},
  abstract  = {This dissertation deals with the contract choice of upstream suppliers as well as the consequences on competition and efficiency in a dynamic setting with inter-temporal externalities. The introduction explains the motivation of the analysis and the comparison of different contract types, as for example standard contracts like simple two-part tariffs and additional specifications as contracts referencing the quantity of the contract-offering firm or the relative purchase level. The features of specific market structures should be considered in the analysis of specific vertical agreements and their policy implications. In particular, the role of dynamic changes regarding demand and cost parameters may have an influence on the results observed. In the first model, a dominant upstream supplier and a non-strategic rival sell their products to a single downstream firm. The rival supplier faces learning effects which decrease the rival's costs with respect to its previous sales. Therefore, learning effects represent a dynamic competitive threat to the dominant supplier. In this setup, the dominant supplier can react on inter-temporal externalities by specifying its contract to the downstream firm. The model shows that by offering market-share discounts, instead of simple two-part tariffs or quantity discounts, the dominant supplier maximizes long-run profits, and restricts the efficiency gains of its rival. If demand is linear, the market-share discount lowers consumer surplus and welfare. The second model analyzes the strategic use of bilateral contracts in a sequential bargaining game. A dominant upstream supplier and its rival sequentially negotiate with a single downstream firm. The contract choice of the dominant supplier as well as the rival supplier's reaction are investigated. In a single-period sequential contracting game, menus of simple two-part tariffs achieve the industry profit maximizing outcome. In a dynamic setting where the suppliers sequentially negotiate in each period, the dominant supplier uses additional contractual terms that condition on the rival's quantity. Due to the first-mover advantage of the first supplier, the rival supplier is restricted in its contract choice. The consequences of the dominant supplier's contract choice depend on bargaining power. In particular, market-share contracts can be efficiency enhancing and welfare-improving whenever the second supplier has a relatively high bargaining position vis-`a-vis the downstream firm. For a relatively low bargaining position of the rival supplier, the result is similar to the one determined in the first model. We show that results depend on the considered negotiating structure. The third model studies the contract choice of two upstream competitors that simultaneously deal with a common buyer. In a complete information setting where both suppliers get to know whether further negotiations fail or succeed, a singleperiod model solves for the industry-profit maximizing outcome as long as contractual terms define at least a wholesale price and a fixed fee. In contrast, this collusive outcome cannot be achieved in a two-period model with inter-temporal externalities. We characterize the possible market scenarios, their outcomes and consequences on competition and efficiency. Our results demonstrate that in case a rival supplier is restricted in its contract choice, the contract specification of a dominant supplier can partially exclude the competitor. Whenever equally efficient suppliers can both strategically choose contract specifications, the rivals defend their market shares by adapting appropriate contractual conditions. The final chapter provides an overview of the main findings and presents some concluding remarks.},
  subject      = {Unternehmenskooperation},
  language  = {en}
}
@phdthesis{Wismer2013,
  author    = {Wismer, Sebastian},
  title     = {Essays in Industrial Organization: Intermediation, Marketing, and Strategic Pricing},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-99102},
  school      = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg},
  year      = {2013},
  abstract  = {This dissertation deals with certain business strategies that have become particularly relevant with the spread and development of new information technologies. The introduction explains the motivation, discusses different ways of defining the term "two-sided market", and briefly summarizes the subsequent essays. The first essay examines the effects of product information on the pricing and advertising decision of a seller who offers an experience good whose quality is unknown to consumers prior to purchase. It comprises of two theoretical models which differ with respect to their view on advertising. The analysis addresses the question how the availability of additional, potentially misleading information affects the seller's quality-dependent pricing and advertising decision. In the first model, in which both advertising and product reviews make consumers aware about product existence, the seller's optimal price turns out to be increasing in product quality. However, under certain circumstances, also the seller of a low-quality product prefers setting a high price. Within the given framework, the relationship between product quality and advertising depends on the particular parameter constellation. In the second model, some consumers are assumed to interpret price as a signal of quality, while others rely on information provided by product reviews. Consequently, and differently from the first part, pricing may indirectly inform consumers about product quality. On the one hand, in spite of asymmetric information on product quality, equilibria exist that feature full information pricing, which is in line with previous results presented by the signaling literature. On the other hand, potentially misleading product reviews may rationalize further pricing patterns. Moreover, assuming that firms can manipulate product reviews by investing in concealed marketing, equilibria can arise in which a high price signals low product quality. However, in these extreme cases, only a few (credulous) consumers consider buying the product. The second essay deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he sets classical two-part tariffs (on which previous literature on two-sided markets focussed) as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, products whose existence is not known to the platform operator in the first place and which can only be established by better informed sellers may not be offered at all. However, revenue-based fees lower the platform operator's incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, what may explain why several trade platforms indeed do charge proportional fees. The third essay examines settings in which sellers can be active both on an intermediary's trade platform and in other sales channels. It explores the sellers' incentives to set different prices across sales channels within the given setup. Afterwards, it analyzes the intermediary's tariff decision, taking into account the implications on consumers' choice between different sales channels. The analysis particularly focusses on the effects of a no-discrimination rule which several intermediaries impose, but which appears to be controversial from a competition policy view. It identifies under which circumstances the intermediary prefers restricting sellers' pricing decisions by imposing a no-discrimination rule, attaining direct control over the split-up of customers on sales channels. Moreover, it illustrates that such rules can have both positive and negative effects on welfare within the given framework.},
  subject      = {Industrie{\"o}konomie},
  language  = {en}
}