@article{Ziegler2020, author = {Ziegler, Robert Hugo}, title = {Die R{\"u}ckkehr des Realen}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie}, volume = {68}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie}, number = {4}, issn = {2192-1482}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2020-0040}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-217771}, pages = {611 -- 626}, year = {2020}, abstract = {We are witnessing a return of the real which philosophy seems illequipped to handle. I argue (1) that this return of the real must be read as a rejection of those philosophical tendencies which were prevalent in the past decades and which I call philosophies of mediation: They supplanted all references to something real by the sole reference to those processes in which reality was supposed to be given or shaped (in interpretations, linguistic structures, historical or social conditions, media…). The current urgency of the question of the real indicates that those philosophies have lost credibility. On the other hand (2), the contemporary attempts to resuscitate philosophical realism cannot be considered satisfactory either. It is curiously the real itself they fail to fully appreciate. All in all (3), the return of the real has to be interpreted as the effect of an event that has little to do with philosophy, namely the return of politics.}, language = {de} } @article{Schierbaum2021, author = {Schierbaum, Sonja}, title = {Crusius {\"u}ber die Vern{\"u}nftigkeit des Wollens und die Rolle des Urteilens}, series = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie}, volume = {69}, journal = {Deutsche Zeitschrift f{\"u}r Philosophie}, number = {4}, issn = {2192-1482}, doi = {10.1515/dzph-2021-0051}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-245582}, pages = {607 -- 618}, year = {2021}, abstract = {In this paper, I consider the relevance of judgment for practical considerations by discussing Christian August Crusius's conception of rational desire. According to my interpretation of Crusius's distinction between rational and non-rational desire, we are responsible at least for our rational desires insofar as we can control them. And we can control our rational desires by judging whether what we want complies with our human nature. It should become clear that Crusius's conception of rational desire is normative in that we necessarily desire things that are compatible with our nature, such as our own perfection. Therefore, a desire is rational if the desired object is apt to satisfy the desires compatible with our nature. From a contemporary perspective, such a normative conception of rational desire might not appear very attractive; it is apt, however, to stimulate a debate on the normative criteria and the role of judgment for rational desire, which is the ultimate aim of this paper.}, language = {de} } @article{Schierbaum2022, author = {Schierbaum, Sonja}, title = {The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts}, series = {Topoi}, volume = {41}, journal = {Topoi}, number = {1}, issn = {1572-8749}, doi = {10.1007/s11245-021-09741-6}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269857}, pages = {171-181}, year = {2022}, abstract = {Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, 'Anscombian' views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one's body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus's account is close to contemporary, 'Anscombian' accounts, whereas Ockham's account is incompatible with them.}, language = {en} } @article{ReulChristHarteltetal.2019, author = {Reul, Christian and Christ, Dennis and Hartelt, Alexander and Balbach, Nico and Wehner, Maximilian and Springmann, Uwe and Wick, Christoph and Grundig, Christine and B{\"u}ttner, Andreas and Puppe, Frank}, title = {OCR4all—An open-source tool providing a (semi-)automatic OCR workflow for historical printings}, series = {Applied Sciences}, volume = {9}, journal = {Applied Sciences}, number = {22}, issn = {2076-3417}, doi = {10.3390/app9224853}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-193103}, pages = {4853}, year = {2019}, abstract = {Optical Character Recognition (OCR) on historical printings is a challenging task mainly due to the complexity of the layout and the highly variant typography. Nevertheless, in the last few years, great progress has been made in the area of historical OCR, resulting in several powerful open-source tools for preprocessing, layout analysis and segmentation, character recognition, and post-processing. The drawback of these tools often is their limited applicability by non-technical users like humanist scholars and in particular the combined use of several tools in a workflow. In this paper, we present an open-source OCR software called OCR4all, which combines state-of-the-art OCR components and continuous model training into a comprehensive workflow. While a variety of materials can already be processed fully automatically, books with more complex layouts require manual intervention by the users. This is mostly due to the fact that the required ground truth for training stronger mixed models (for segmentation, as well as text recognition) is not available, yet, neither in the desired quantity nor quality. To deal with this issue in the short run, OCR4all offers a comfortable GUI that allows error corrections not only in the final output, but already in early stages to minimize error propagations. In the long run, this constant manual correction produces large quantities of valuable, high quality training material, which can be used to improve fully automatic approaches. Further on, extensive configuration capabilities are provided to set the degree of automation of the workflow and to make adaptations to the carefully selected default parameters for specific printings, if necessary. During experiments, the fully automated application on 19th Century novels showed that OCR4all can considerably outperform the commercial state-of-the-art tool ABBYY Finereader on moderate layouts if suitably pretrained mixed OCR models are available. Furthermore, on very complex early printed books, even users with minimal or no experience were able to capture the text with manageable effort and great quality, achieving excellent Character Error Rates (CERs) below 0.5\%. The architecture of OCR4all allows the easy integration (or substitution) of newly developed tools for its main components by standardized interfaces like PageXML, thus aiming at continual higher automation for historical printings.}, language = {en} } @article{Summa2021, author = {Summa, Michela}, title = {How are fictions given? Conjoining the 'artifactual theory' and the 'imaginary-object theory'}, series = {Synthese}, volume = {199}, journal = {Synthese}, number = {5-6}, issn = {1573-0964}, doi = {10.1007/s11229-021-03396-x}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269845}, pages = {13749-13769}, year = {2021}, abstract = {According to the so-called 'artifactual theory' of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.}, language = {en} } @article{SummaKleinSchmidt2022, author = {Summa, Michela and Klein, Martin and Schmidt, Philipp}, title = {Introduction: Double Intentionality}, series = {Topoi}, volume = {41}, journal = {Topoi}, number = {1}, issn = {1572-8749}, doi = {10.1007/s11245-021-09786-7}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269865}, pages = {93-109}, year = {2022}, abstract = {No abstract available.}, language = {en} } @article{Spano2022, author = {Spano, Nicola}, title = {Husserl's taxonomy of action}, series = {Husserl Studies}, volume = {38}, journal = {Husserl Studies}, number = {3}, issn = {0167-9848}, doi = {10.1007/s10743-022-09306-4}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324744}, pages = {251-271}, year = {2022}, abstract = {In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl's phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume 'Wille und Handlung' of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins. In so doing, I first present Husserl's universal characterization of action (Handlung) as a volitional process (willentlicher Vorgang). Then, after clarifying what it means for a process to have a character of volitionality (Willentlichkeit), I illustrate the various types of actions, which Husserl distinguishes as 'straightforward' (schlicht) or 'deciding' (entscheidend), 'primary' (prim{\"a}r) or 'secondary' (sekund{\"a}r), 'inner' (innere) or 'outer' ({\"a}ußere), 'immediate' (unmittelbar) or mediate (mittelbar), 'simple' (einfach) or 'compound' (zusammengesetzt). Finally, I consider Husserl's discussion of the direction and foundation of action.}, language = {en} } @article{Summa2023, author = {Summa, Michela}, title = {Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology}, series = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, volume = {22}, journal = {Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences}, number = {3}, issn = {1568-7759}, doi = {10.1007/s11097-022-09828-4}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324753}, pages = {719-741}, year = {2023}, abstract = {Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-{\`a}-vis explanatory models.}, language = {en} } @article{Franz2022, author = {Franz, David J.}, title = {Moral responsibility for self-deluding beings}, series = {Philosophia}, volume = {50}, journal = {Philosophia}, number = {4}, issn = {0048-3893}, doi = {10.1007/s11406-022-00469-0}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324871}, pages = {1791-1807}, year = {2022}, abstract = {In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of moral responsibility. Second, this viewpoint leads to a reasons-focused account of human behavior. Examples of human action discussed in debates about moral responsibility suggest that typical human actions are driven primarily by the agent's subjective reasons and are sufficiently transparent for the agent. Third, this conception of self-transparent action is a questionable idealization. As shown by psychological research on self-assessment, motivated reasoning, and terror management theory, humans oftentimes have only a limited understanding of their conduct. Self-deception is rather the rule than the exception. Fourth, taking the limited self-transparency of practical reason seriously leads to a socially contextualized conception of moral responsibility.}, language = {en} }