@phdthesis{Muthers2017, author = {Muthers, Johannes}, title = {Essays in Industrial Organization}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-141671}, school = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg}, year = {2017}, abstract = {The dissertation deals with the market and welfare effects of different business practices and the firm's incentives to use them: resale price maintenance, revenue sharing of a platform operator, membership fees to buyers using a platform and patent licensing. In the second chapter we investigate the incentives of two manufacturers with common retailers to use resale price maintenance (RPM). Retailers provide product specific services that increase demand and manufacturers use minimum RPM to compete for favorable services for their products. Minimum RPM increases consumer pricesby voiding retailer price competition and can create a prisoner's dilemma for manufacturers without increasing, and possibly even decreasing the overall service level. If manufacturer market power is asymmetric, minimum RPM tends to distort the allocation of sales services towards the high-priced products of the manufacturer with more market power. These results challenge the service argument as an efficiency defense for minimum RPM. The third chapter deals with trade platforms whose operators not only allow third party sellers to offer their products to consumers, but also offer products themselves. In this context, the platform operator faces a hold-up problem if he uses classical two-part tariffs only (which previous literature on two-sided markets has focused on) as potential competition between the platform operator and sellers reduces platform attractiveness. Since some sellers refuse to join the platform, some products that are not known to the platform operator will not be offered at all. We discuss the effects of different platform tariffs on this hold-up problem. We find that revenue-based fees lower the platform operator's incentives to compete with sellers, increasing platform attractiveness. Therefore, charging such proportional fees can be profitable, what may explain why several trade platforms indeed charge proportional fees. The fourth chapter investigates the optimal tariff system in a model in which buyers are heterogeneous. A platform model is presented in which transactions are modeled explicitly and buyers can differ in their expected valuations when they decide to join the platform. The main effect that the model identifies is that the participation decision sorts buyers according to their expected valuations. This affects the pricing of sellers. Furthermore diffing form the usual approach, in which buyers are ex-ante homogeneous, the platform does not internalize the full transaction surplus. Hence it does not implement the socially efficient price on the platform, also it has control of the price with the transaction fee. The fifth chapter investigates the effects of licensing on the market outcome after the patent has expired. In a setting with endogenous entry, a licensee has a head start over the competition which translated into a first mover advantage if strategies are strategic substitutes. As competitive strategies quantities and informative advertising are considered explicitly. We find that although licensing increases the joint profit of the patentee and licensee, this does not necessarily come from a reduction in consumer surplus or other firms profits. For the case of quantity competition we show that licensing is welfare improving. For the case of informative advertising, however, we show that licensing increases prices and is thus detrimental to consumer surplus.}, subject = {Wettbewerbsverhalten}, language = {en} } @article{GruendlerMayerScharler2023, author = {Gr{\"u}ndler, Daniel and Mayer, Eric and Scharler, Johann}, title = {Monetary policy announcements, information shocks, and exchange rate dynamics}, series = {Open Economies Review}, volume = {34}, journal = {Open Economies Review}, number = {2}, issn = {0923-7992}, doi = {10.1007/s11079-022-09682-6}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-325175}, pages = {341-369}, year = {2023}, abstract = {We study nominal exchange rate dynamics in the aftermath of U.S. monetary policy announcements. Using high-frequency interest rate and stock price movements around FOMC announcements, we distinguish between pure monetary policy shocks and information shocks, which are associated with new information contained in the announcements. Contractionary pure policy shocks give rise to a strong, but transitory, appreciation on impact. Information shocks also appreciate the exchange rate, but the effect builds up only slowly over time and is highly persistent. Thus, we conclude that although the short-run effects on the exchange rate are primarily due to pure policy shocks, the medium-run response is driven by information effects.}, language = {en} } @phdthesis{Mehringer2019, author = {Mehringer, Sarah}, title = {Essays on Intergenerational Income Mobility in Germany and the United States}, doi = {10.25972/OPUS-16069}, url = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-160693}, school = {Universit{\"a}t W{\"u}rzburg}, year = {2019}, abstract = {This dissertation consists of three contributions. Each addresses one specific aspect of intergenerational income mobility and is intended to be a stand-alone analysis. All chapters use comparable data for Germany and the United States to conduct country comparisons. As there are usually a large number of studies available for the United States, this approach is useful for comparing the empirical results to the existing literature. The first part conducts a direct country comparison of the structure and extent of intergenerational income mobility in Germany and the United States. In line with existing results, the estimated intergenerational income mobility of 0.49 in the United States is significantly higher than that of 0.31 in Germany. While the results for the intergenerational rank mobility are relatively similar, the level of intergenerational income share mobility is higher in the United States than in Germany. There are no significant indications of a nonlinear run of intergenerational income elasticity. A final decomposition of intergenerational income inequality shows both greater income mobility and stronger progressive income growth for Germany compared to the United States. Overall, no clear ranking of the two countries can be identified. To conclude, several economic policy recommendations to increase intergenerational income mobility in Germany are discussed. The second part examines the transmission channels of intergenerational income persistence in Germany and the United States. In principle, there are two ways in which well-off families may influence the adult incomes of their children: first through direct investments in their children's human capital (investment effect ), and second through the indirect transmission of human capital from parents to children (endowment effect ). In order to disentangle these two effects, a descriptive as well as a structural decomposition method are utilized. The results suggest that the investment effect and the endowment effect each account for approximately half of the estimated intergenerational income elasticity in Germany, while the investment effect is substantially more influential in the United States with a share of around 70 percent. With regard to economic policy, these results imply that equality of opportunity for children born to poor parents cannot be reached by the supply of financial means alone. Conversely, an efficient policy must additionally substitute for the missing direct transmission of human capital within socio-economically weak families. The third part explicitly focuses on the intergenerational income mobility among daughters. The restriction to men is commonly made in the empirical literature due to women's lower labor market participation. While most men work full-time, the majority of (married) women still work only part-time or not at all. Especially with the occurrence of assortative mating, daughters from well-off families are likely to marry rich men and might decide to reduce their labor supply as a result. Thus, the individual labor income of a daughter might not be a good indicator for her actual economic status. The baseline regression analysis shows a higher intergenerational income elasticity in Germany and a lower intergenerational income elasticity in the United States for women as compared to men. However, a separation by marital status reveals that in both countries unmarried women exhibit a higher intergenerational income elasticity than unmarried men, while married women feature a lower intergenerational income elasticity than married men. The reason for the lower mobility of unmarried women turns out to be a stronger human capital transmission from fathers to daughters than to sons. The higher mobility of married women is driven by a weaker human capital transmission and a higher labor supply elasticity with respect to spousal income for women as compared to men. In order to further study the effects of assortative mating, the subsample of married children is analyzed by different types of income. It shows that the estimated intergenerational income elasticity of children's household incomes is even higher than that of their individual incomes. This can be seen as an indication for strong assortative mating. If household income is interpreted as a measure of children's actual economic welfare, there are barely any differences between sons and daughters. The intergenerational income elasticity of spousal income with respect to parental income is again relatively high, which in turn supports the hypothesis of strong assortative mating. The elasticity of the sons-in-law with respect to their fathers-in-law in Germany is even higher than that of the sons with respect to their own fathers.}, subject = {Deutschland}, language = {en} }