TY  - JOUR
A1  - Summa, Michela
T1  - Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology
JF  - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
N2  - Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models.
KW  - causality
KW  - conditionality
KW  - motivation
KW  - phenomenology
KW  - exemplarity
Y1  - 2023
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324753
SN  - 1568-7759
VL  - 22
IS  - 3
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Summa, Michela
A1  - Klein, Martin
A1  - Schmidt, Philipp
T1  - Introduction: Double Intentionality
JF  - Topoi
N2  - No abstract available.
KW  - double intentionality
KW  - intentional directions
KW  - experiences
Y1  - 2022
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269865
SN  - 1572-8749
VL  - 41
IS  - 1
ER  - 
TY  - JOUR
A1  - Summa, Michela
T1  - How are fictions given? Conjoining the ‘artifactual theory’ and the ‘imaginary-object theory’
JF  - Synthese
N2  - According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected.
KW  - phenomenology
KW  - fiction
KW  - ontology
KW  - givenness
KW  - constitution
KW  - imagination
Y1  - 2021
U6  - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269845
SN  - 1573-0964
VL  - 199
IS  - 5-6
ER  -