TY - JOUR A1 - Bilalic, Merim A1 - Kiesel, Andrea A1 - Pohl, Carsten A1 - Erb, Michael A1 - Grodd, Wolfgang T1 - It Takes Two–Skilled Recognition of Objects Engages Lateral Areas in Both Hemispheres JF - PLoS ONE N2 - Our object recognition abilities, a direct product of our experience with objects, are fine-tuned to perfection. Left temporal and lateral areas along the dorsal, action related stream, as well as left infero-temporal areas along the ventral, object related stream are engaged in object recognition. Here we show that expertise modulates the activity of dorsal areas in the recognition of man-made objects with clearly specified functions. Expert chess players were faster than chess novices in identifying chess objects and their functional relations. Experts’ advantage was domain-specific as there were no differences between groups in a control task featuring geometrical shapes. The pattern of eye movements supported the notion that experts’ extensive knowledge about domain objects and their functions enabled superior recognition even when experts were not directly fixating the objects of interest. Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) related exclusively the areas along the dorsal stream to chess specific object recognition. Besides the commonly involved left temporal and parietal lateral brain areas, we found that only in experts homologous areas on the right hemisphere were also engaged in chess specific object recognition. Based on these results, we discuss whether skilled object recognition does not only involve a more efficient version of the processes found in non-skilled recognition, but also qualitatively different cognitive processes which engage additional brain areas KW - Expert chess players KW - Anterior inferotemporal cortex KW - Deliberate practice KW - Neural basis KW - Function knowledge KW - Parietal cortex KW - Macaque monkey KW - Temporal areas KW - Memory KW - Task Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-176935 VL - 6 IS - 1 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Fischer, Rico A1 - Plessow, Franziska A1 - Kiesel, Andrea T1 - The effects of alerting signals in masked priming JF - Frontiers in Psychology N2 - Alerting signals often serve to reduce temporal uncertainty by predicting the time of stimulus onset. The resulting response time benefits have often been explained by facilitated translation of stimulus codes into response codes on the basis of established stimulus-response (S-R) links. In paradigms of masked S-R priming alerting signals also modulate response activation processes triggered by subliminally presented prime stimuli. In the present study we tested whether facilitation of visuo-motor translation processes due to alerting signals critically depends on established S-R links. Alerting signals resulted in significantly enhanced masked priming effects for masked prime stimuli that included and that did not include established S-R links fi.e., target vs. novel primes). Yet, the alerting-priming interaction was more pronounced for target than for novel primes. These results suggest that effects of alerting signals on masked priming are especially evident when S-R links between prime and target exist. At the same time, an alerting-priming interaction also for novel primes suggests that alerting signals also facilitate stimulus-response translation processes when masked prime stimuli provide action-trigger conditions in terms of programmed S-R links. KW - response selection KW - visual cortex KW - temporal predictability KW - stimuli KW - primes KW - target primes KW - simon task KW - automaticity KW - performance KW - perception KW - mechanism KW - novel primes KW - action-trigger KW - masked priming KW - accessory KW - alerting signal Y1 - 2013 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-122581 SN - 1664-1078 VL - 4 IS - 448 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Haering, Carola A1 - Kiesel, Andrea T1 - Mine is earlier than yours: Causal beliefs influence the perceived time of action effects N2 - When a key press causes a stimulus, the key press is perceived later and the stimulus earlier than key presses and stimuli presented independently. This bias in time perception has been linked to the intention to produce the effect and thus been called intentional binding (IB). In recent studies it has been shown that the IB effect is stronger when participants believed that they caused the effect stimulus compared to when they believed that another person caused the effect (Desantis et al., 2011). In this experiment we ask whether causal beliefs influence the perceived time of an effect when the putative effect occurs temporally close to another stimulus that is also an effect. In our study two participants performed the same task on connected computers with separate screens. Each trial started synchro- nously on both computers. When a participant pressed a key, a red and a yellow stimulus appeared as action effects simultaneously or with a slight delay of up to 50 ms. The partic- ipants’ task was to judge the temporal order of these two effect stimuli. Participants were either told that one participant caused one of the two stimuli while the other participant seated at the other computer caused the other stimulus, or each participant was told that he/she caused both stimuli. The different causal beliefs changed the perceived time of the effects’ appearance relative to each other. When participants believed they each caused one effect, their “own” effect was perceived earlier than the other participant’s effect. When the participants believed each caused both effects, no difference in the perceived temporal order of the red and yellow effect was found. These results confirm that higher order causal beliefs change the perceived time of an action effect even in a setting in which the occurrence of the putative effect can be directly compared to a reference stimulus. KW - Psychologie KW - intentional binding KW - causal belief KW - causality KW - temporal order judgments KW - TOJ KW - agency Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-76229 ER - TY - THES A1 - Kiesel, Andrea T1 - Handlungsdeterminierende Prozesse beim Aufgabenwechsel und die Notwendigkeit der Dekomposition von Wechselkosten T1 - Determining processes while switching between tasks and the necessity to decompose switch costs N2 - In dieser Arbeit werden handlungsdeterminierende Prozesse beim Aufgabenwechsel untersucht. Die ersten durchgeführten Experimente zeigten, dass es notwendig ist, Wechselkosten in verschiedene Teile zu zerlegen, so dass die Dekomposition von Wechselkosten einen großen Teil des Empirieteils ausmacht. Im ersten Kapitel der Arbeit werden verschiedene Theorien zur Handlungsdetermination vorgestellt. Die Theorien werden danach unterschieden, ob sie eher annehmen, dass Umweltreize das menschliche Handeln determinieren oder aber davon ausgehen, dass Handeln überwiegend durch intentionale Prozesse determiniert wird. Zunächst werden der Behaviorismus und einige Ansätze der kognitiven Psychologie erläutert, die den Einfluss von Reizen auf die Handlungsdetermination in den Vordergrund stellen. Das ideomotorische Prinzip dagegen betont die Determination menschlichen Handelns durch das Anstreben von Zielen. Schließlich werden Hybridmodelle (z.B. ABC-Theorie; Hoffmann, 1993) besprochen, die den gemeinsamen Einfluss von Intentionen und Außenreizen auf menschliches Handeln berücksichtigen. Im zweiten und dritten Kapitel wird die Entwicklung des Aufgabenwechselparadigmas und die vermuteten Prozesse und Faktoren beim Aufgabenwechsel erläutert. Ursprünglich wurde das Aufgabenwechselparadigma verwendet, um die Anpassung an flexible Handlungsanforderungen und die dabei notwendigen exekutiven Steuerungsmechanismen zu untersuchen. Doch in vielen Untersuchungen zu Aufgabenwechseln wurde dieses Ziel aus den Augen verloren und die Untersuchung der Vorgänge beim Wechseln wurde zum Selbstzweck. Intentionen und das Anstreben von Zielen wurden innerhalb des Aufgabenwechselparadigmas bisher nicht thematisiert. Im vierten Kapitel wird deshalb versucht Aufgabenwechsel aus der Perspektive der ABC-Theorie (Hoffmann, 1993) zu betrachten, einer Theorie, die sowohl den Einfluss von Intentionen als auch von Außenreizen auf menschliches Handeln berücksichtigt. Aus der ABC-Theorie wurden folgende Vorhersagen für den Aufgabenwechselkontext abgeleitet: 1. Eine parallele Aktivierung verschiedener Handlungsbereitschaften ist prinzipiell möglich. Wechsel zwischen Aufgaben sind nur nötig, wenn sich die Handlungsbereitschaften der Aufgaben widersprechen. 2. Ein Wechsel der Intention und der entsprechenden Handlungsbereitschaften erfolgt sobald die auszuführende Aufgabe feststeht und kann abgeschlossen werden, bevor der Reiz erscheint. Kosten für den exekutiven Prozess des Intentionswechsels können deshalb nur bei kurzer Vorbereitungszeit erfasst werden. Wechselkosten, die nach langer Vorbereitungszeit für die Aufgabe verbleiben (residuale Wechselkosten) spiegeln nicht den Aufwand exekutiver Prozesse wider. 3. Wechsel zwischen Intentionen verursachen mehr exekutiven Aufwand, wenn die Zielzustände der Handlungsbereitschaften überlappen, da dann erst eine Entkopplung des Zielzustandes mit einem Startzustand notwendig ist, bevor der Zielzustand an einen anderen Startzustand gekoppelt werden kann. In den ersten drei Experimenten konnten die Vorhersagen der ABC-Theorie für den Aufgabenwechselkontext nicht bestätigt werden. Beim Vergleich von Durchgängen, in denen die Aufgabe wechselt, mit Durchgängen, in denen die Aufgabe wiederholt wird, zeigten sich auch bei langer Vorbereitungszeit deutliche Wechselkosten, d.h. höhere Reaktionszeiten in den Wechseltrials. Weiterhin ergab sich kein Unterschied der Wechselkosten für Wechsel zwischen Aufgaben mit verschiedenen oder gleichen Zielzuständen (operationalisiert als verschiedene vs. gleiche auszuführende Aktionen). Aus diesen Ergebnissen und vielen Hinweisen in der Aufgabenwechselliteratur ergaben sich Zweifel an der Aussagekraft des herkömmlich berechneten Wechselkostenmaßes als Differenz der Reaktionszeiten bei Aufgabenwechseln minus Aufgabenwiederholungen. Deshalb wird die Entwicklung einer neue Methode zur Dekomposition von Wechselkosten vorgeschlagen, die es ermöglicht, die Reaktionszeitdifferenz zwischen Aufgabenwechseln und Aufgabenwiederholungen in Anteile zu unterteilen, die a) spezifisch die Anforderung beim Wechseln (Intentionswechselkosten) widerspiegeln oder b) durch die Erleichterung eine Reaktion auf denselben Reiz hin zu wiederholen (Repetition Priming) entstehen, oder c) durch die Erschwernis entstehen, auf einen Reiz reagieren zu müssen, auf den zuvor nicht reagiert werden durfte (Negatives Priming). In den Experimenten 4 bis 7 wird diese Methode experimentell validiert. Werden Wechselkosten in die verschiedenen Anteile zerlegt, stimmen die empirischen Befunde mit den Vorhersagen der ABC-Theorie überein: Ein Wechsel der Intention und der entsprechenden Handlungsbereitschaften kann bei genügend langer Vorbereitungszeit abgeschlossen werden, bevor der Stimulus erscheint. Residuale Wechselkosten (Wechselkosten, die bei langer Vorbereitungszeit verbleiben) sind nicht auf exekutive Kontrollprozesse zurückzuführen, sondern durch Repetition Priming und Negatives Priming verursacht. Weiterhin sind Wechsel einfacher, wenn die zu antizipierenden Zielzustände (operationalisiert als die auszuführenden Aktionen) der Aufgaben verschieden sind. In der Abschlussdiskussion werden der theoretische und der methodische Schwerpunkt der Arbeit noch einmal überblicksartig zusammengestellt und es wird ein Ausblick gegeben, wie untersucht werden könnte, ob die ABC-Theorie besser geeignet ist zur Erklärung der Phänomene beim Aufgabenwechsel als bisherige Theorien und Modelle. N2 - The thesis deals with the investigation of action control processes while switching between tasks. The first experiments showed the necessity to decompose switch costs in different dues. Thus, the decomposition of switch costs constitutes the main part of the empirical work. The first chapter of the thesis sketches different theories of action control. The theories differ according to whether they emphasise the role of external stimuli or intentional processes for human actions. Initially, the behaviourism and some accounts within cognitive psychology are illustrated. They mainly consider the impact of external stimuli on action control. In contrast, the ideomotor principle claims that actions are determined by intentions to reach specific goals. Finally, hybrid models (e.g. ABC-theory; Hoffmann, 1993) are illustrated that consider the mutual impact of intentions and stimuli on human actions. The development of the task switching paradigm and the assumed processes and variables while switching between tasks are discussed in the second and third chapter. Originally, the task switching paradigm was introduced to investigate how humans adapt on flexible action requirements and which executive control processes are involved. But in many task switching studies this goal eclipsed and the investigation of the processes while switching became important. Within the task switching paradigm intentions and the aim to reach specific goals haven’t been debated. Therefore, task switching is surveyed from the point of view of the ABC-theory (Hoffmann, 1993) as the ABC-theory considers the impact of intentions as well as external stimuli on human acting. The following predictions for the task switching context are deducted from the ABC-theory: 1. In principle, parallel activation of different action dispositions is possible. Switching between tasks is only necessary when the action dispositions of different tasks conflict. 2. Switching between intentions and action dispositions starts as soon as participants are informed about the identity of the task and can be completed before the stimulus occurs. Switch costs that remain after long preparation time for the task (residual switch costs) do not reflect the effort of executive processes. 3. Switching between intentions causes more effort of executive processes when the action dispositions aim for the same goal states as in this case it is first necessary to decouple the goal state from one start condition before this goal state can get coupled to another start condition. The first three experiments were not able to confirm the predictions of the ABC-theory. When comparing trials in which the task switches with trials in which the task repeats there are significant switch costs, e.g. longer reaction times for switch trials, even when participants have sufficient time to prepare for the task. Furthermore, switch costs do not differ for switching between tasks with different vs. equal goal states (operationalised as different vs. equal required actions). These results and many cues from the task switching literature led to doubts about the informational value of the measurement of switch costs computed as difference of reaction times of task switches minus task repetitions. Hence a new method is proposed that decomposes switch costs into a) the specific requirements due to the necessity to switch (intentional switch costs) b) the benefit to repeat a response afforded by the same stimulus (repetition priming) and c) the difficulty to respond to a stimulus to which no response was allowed shortly before (negative priming). Experiments 4 to 7 validate this new method experimentally. If switch costs are decomposed into the different parts, the empirical results fit to the predictions of the ABC-theory: Switching between tasks (i.e. between intentions and appropriate action dispositions) can be fully completed when the preparation time is sufficient before the stimulus is presented. Residual switch costs (switch costs that remain for long preparation time intervals) are not due to executive control processes but due to repetition priming and negative priming. Furthermore, switching between tasks is easier if the anticipated goals / the to-be-performed actions for the tasks differ. The final discussion summarizes the theoretical and the empirical focus of the thesis. A prospect is exemplified how to investigate whether the ABC-theory is more appropriate to account for the phenomena while switching between tasks as current theories and models. KW - Aufgabenwechsel KW - Handlung KW - Determination KW - Aufgabenwechsel KW - exekutive Prozesse KW - Wechselkosten KW - Negatives Priming KW - Wiederholungsgewinne KW - task switching KW - executive processes KW - switch costs KW - negative priming KW - repetition priming Y1 - 2003 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-7392 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pfister, Roland A1 - Pohl, Carsten A1 - Kiesel, Andrea A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Your Unconscious Knows Your Name N2 - One’s own name constitutes a unique part of conscious awareness – but does this also hold true for unconscious processing? The present study shows that the own name has the power to bias a person’s actions unconsciously even in conditions that render any other name ineffective. Participants judged whether a letter string on the screen was a name or a non-word while this target stimulus was preceded by a masked prime stimulus. Crucially, the participant’s own name was among these prime stimuli and facilitated reactions to following name targets whereas the name of another, yoked participant did not. Signal detection results confirmed that participants were not aware of any of the prime stimuli, including their own name. These results extend traditional findings on ‘‘breakthrough’’ phenomena of personally relevant stimuli to the domain of unconscious processing. Thus, the brain seems to possess adroit mechanisms to identify and process such stimuli even in the absence of conscious awareness. KW - Psychologie Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-75304 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Pohl, Carsten A1 - Kunde, Wilfried A1 - Ganz, Thomas A1 - Conzelmann, Annette A1 - Pauli, Paul A1 - Kiesel, Andrea T1 - Gaming to see: action video gaming is associated with enhanced processing of masked stimuli N2 - Recent research revealed that action video game players outperform non-players in a wide range of attentional, perceptual and cognitive tasks. Here we tested if expertise in action video games is related to differences regarding the potential of shortly presented stimuli to bias behavior. In a response priming paradigm, participants classified four animal pictures functioning as targets as being smaller or larger than a reference frame. Before each target, one of the same four animal pictures was presented as a masked prime to influence participants' responses in a congruent or incongruent way. Masked primes induced congruence effects, that is, faster responses for congruent compared to incongruent conditions, indicating processing of hardly visible primes. Results also suggested that action video game players showed a larger congruence effect than non-players for 20 ms primes, whereas there was no group difference for 60 ms primes. In addition, there was a tendency for action video game players to detect masked primes for some prime durations better than non-players. Thus, action video game expertise may be accompanied by faster and more efficient processing of shortly presented visual stimuli. KW - video gaming masked stimuli KW - masked priming KW - action videogaming KW - unconscious processing KW - prime visibility KW - expertise Y1 - 2014 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-112681 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Reuss, Heiko A1 - Kiesel, Andrea A1 - Kunde, Wilfried A1 - Wühr, Peter T1 - A cue from the unconscious - masked symbols prompt spatial anticipation JF - Frontiers in Psychology N2 - Anticipating where an event will occur enables us to instantaneously respond to events that occur at the expected location. Here we investigated if such spatial anticipations can be triggered by symbolic information that participants cannot consciously see. In two experiments involving a Posner cueing task and a visual search task, a central cue informed participants about the likely location of the next target stimulus. In half of the trials, this cue was rendered invisible by pattern masking. In both experiments, visible cues led to cueing effects, that is, faster responses after valid compared to invalid cues. Importantly, even masked cues caused cueing effects, though to a lesser extent. Additionally, we analyzed effects on attention that persist from one trial to the subsequent trial. We found that spatial anticipations are able to interfere with newly formed spatial anticipations and influence orienting of attention in the subsequent trial. When the preceding cue was visible, the corresponding spatial anticipation persisted to an extent that prevented a noticeable effect of masked cues. The effects of visible cues were likewise modulated by previous spatial anticipations, but were strong enough to also exert an impact on attention themselves. Altogether, the results suggest that spatial anticipations can be formed on the basis of unconscious stimuli, but that interfering influences like still active spatial anticipations can suppress this effect. KW - masked priming KW - unconscious processing KW - anticipation KW - endogenous shifts of attention KW - spatial cueing Y1 - 2012 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-123971 VL - 3 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Reuss, Heiko A1 - Pohl, Carsten A1 - Kiesel, Andrea A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Follow the sign! Top-down contingent attentional capture of masked arrow cues JF - Advances in Cognitive Psychology N2 - Arrow cues and other overlearned spatial symbols automatically orient attention according to their spatial meaning. This renders them similar to exogenous cues that occur at stimulus location. Exogenous cues trigger shifts of attention even when they are presented subliminally. Here, we investigate to what extent the mechanisms underlying the orienting of attention by exogenous cues and by arrow cues are comparable by analyzing the effects of visible and masked arrow cues on attention. In Experiment 1, we presented arrow cues with overall 50% validity. Visible cues, but not masked cues, lead to shifts of attention. In Experiment 2, the arrow cues had an overall validity of 80%. Now both visible and masked arrows lead to shifts of attention. This is in line with findings that subliminal exogenous cues capture attention only in a top-down contingent manner, that is, when the cues fit the observer’s intentions. KW - Attention KW - arrow cues KW - spatial cuing KW - masked priming KW - contingent capture Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-140030 VL - 7 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Reuss, Heiko A1 - Pohl, Carsten A1 - Kiesel, Andrea A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Instructed illiteracy reveals expertise-effects on unconscious processing JF - Frontiers in Psychology N2 - We used a new methodological approach to investigate whether top-down influences like expertise determine the extent of unconscious processing. This approach does not rely on preexisting differences between experts and novices, but instructs essentially the same task in a way that either addresses a domain of expertise or not. Participants either were instructed to perform a lexical decision task (expert task) or to respond to a combination of single features of word and non-word stimuli (novel task). The stimuli and importantly also the mapping of responses to those stimuli, however, were exactly the same in both groups. We analyzed congruency effects of masked primes depending on the instructed task. Participants performing the expert task responded faster and less error prone when the prime was response congruent rather than incongruent. This effect was significantly reduced in the novel task, and even reversed when excluding identical prime-target pairs. This indicates that the primes in the novel task had an effect on a perceptual level, but were not able to impact on response activation. Overall, these results demonstrate an expertise-based top-down modulation of unconscious processing that cannot be explained by confounds that are otherwise inherent in comparisons between novices and experts. KW - top-down control KW - expertise KW - masked priming KW - unconscious processing KW - lexical decision task Y1 - 2015 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-125332 VL - 6 IS - 239 ER -