TY - JOUR A1 - Spano, Nicola T1 - Husserl’s taxonomy of action JF - Husserl Studies N2 - In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume ‘Wille und Handlung’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins. In so doing, I first present Husserl’s universal characterization of action (Handlung) as a volitional process (willentlicher Vorgang). Then, after clarifying what it means for a process to have a character of volitionality (Willentlichkeit), I illustrate the various types of actions, which Husserl distinguishes as ‘straightforward’ (schlicht) or ‘deciding’ (entscheidend), ‘primary’ (primär) or ‘secondary’ (sekundär), ‘inner’ (innere) or ‘outer’ (äußere), ‘immediate’ (unmittelbar) or mediate (mittelbar), ‘simple’ (einfach) or ‘compound’ (zusammengesetzt). Finally, I consider Husserl’s discussion of the direction and foundation of action. KW - Edmund Husserl KW - action KW - phenomenology of acting and willing Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324744 SN - 0167-9848 VL - 38 IS - 3 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kirsch, Wladimir A1 - Königstein, Elisabeth A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Action feedback affects the perception of action-related objects beyond actual action success N2 - Successful object-oriented action typically increases the perceived size of aimed target objects. This phenomenon has been assumed to reflect an impact of an actor's current action ability on visual perception. The actual action ability and the explicit knowledge of action outcome, however, were confounded in previous studies. The present experiments aimed at disentangling these two factors. Participants repeatedly tried to hit a circular target varying in size with a stylus movement under restricted feedback conditions. After each movement they were explicitly informed about the success in hitting the target and were then asked to judge target size. The explicit feedback regarding movement success was manipulated orthogonally to actual movement success. The results of three experiments indicated the participants' bias to judge relatively small targets as larger and relatively large targets as smaller after explicit feedback of failure than after explicit feedback of success. This pattern was independent of the actual motor performance, suggesting that the actors' evaluations of motor actions may bias perception of target objects in itself. KW - Action feedback KW - visual perception KW - action KW - knowledge of results KW - action access KW - action ability KW - perception-action coupling Y1 - 2014 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-112670 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Kirsch, Wladimir A1 - Kitzmann, Tim A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Action affects perception through modulation of attention JF - Attention, Perception & Psychophysics N2 - The present study explored the origin of perceptual changes repeatedly observed in the context of actions. In Experiment 1, participants tried to hit a circular target with a stylus movement under restricted feedback conditions. We measured the perception of target size during action planning and observed larger estimates for larger movement distances. In Experiment 2, we then tested the hypothesis that this action specific influence on perception is due to changes in the allocation of spatial attention. For this purpose, we replaced the hitting task by conditions of focused and distributed attention and measured the perception of the former target stimulus. The results revealed changes in the perceived stimulus size very similar to those observed in Experiment 1. These results indicate that action's effects on perception root in changes of spatial attention. KW - perception KW - action KW - attention Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-273176 SN - 1943-393X VL - 83 IS - 5 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ingerslev, Line Ryberg T1 - Inhibited Intentionality: On Possible Self-Understanding in Cases of Weak Agency JF - Frontiers in Psychology N2 - The paper addresses the question of how to approach consciousness in unreflective actions. Unreflective actions differ from reflective, conscious actions in that the intentional description under which the agent knows what she is doing is not available or present to the agent at the moment of acting. Yet, unreflective actions belong to the field in which an agent experiences herself as capable of acting. Some unreflective actions, however, narrow this field and can be characterized by intentionality being inhibited. By studying inhibited intentionality in unreflective actions, the aim of the paper is to show how weaker forms of action urge us to expand our overall understanding of action. If we expand the field of actions such that it encompasses also some of the involuntary aspects of action, we are able to understand how unreflective actions can remain actions and do not fall under the scope of automatic behavior. With the notion of weak agency, the paper thus addresses one aspect of unreflective action, namely, “inhibited intentionality” in which an agent feels a diminished sense of authorship in relation to her possibility for self-understanding. The notion of weak agency clarifies how agency itself remains intact but can involve a process of appropriation of one’s actions as one’s own. With a diachronic account of consciousness in unreflective action, the paper accounts for possible self-understanding in cases where none seems available at the moment of action. KW - unreflective actions KW - habits KW - consciousness KW - action KW - responsibility KW - diachronicity Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-212950 SN - 1664-1078 VL - 11 ER -