TY - THES A1 - Stemmler, Thomas T1 - Just do it! Guilt as a moral intuition to cooperate - A parallel constraint satisfaction approach T1 - Schuld als moralische Intuition zu Kooperation - ein parallel constraint satisfaction Ansatz N2 - Nach langer Dominanz rationaler Urteils- und Entscheidungsmodelle in der Moralpsychologie (z.B. Kohlberg, 1969) besteht seit einiger Zeit verstärktes Interesse an intuitiven, emotionalen Einflüssen auf moralische Urteile und Entscheidungen (z.B. Greene, 2007; Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). Der Einfluss von Emotionen auf moralische Entscheidungen wird in der Literatur u.a. mittels heuristischer, non-kompensatorischer Informationsverarbeitung erklärt (z.B. Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010; Sunstein, 2005; Tobler, Kalis, & Kalenscher, 2008). Hierbei wird jedoch der Prozess der Emotionsentstehung ignoriert. Appraisaltheorien postulieren, dass Emotionen durch die Inkohärenz (oder Diskrepanz) von Verhaltensrepräsentationen wie Zielen und Aktionen entstehen (Moors, 2009). Emotionsentstehung und (intuitives) Entscheiden kann in einem Modell vereint werden sobald man bei beiden Prozessen eine konnektionistische Struktur (z.B. Barnes & Thagard, 1996) zugrunde legt. Die vorliegende Arbeit kontrastiert beide Perspektiven intuitiv-emotionalen Entscheidens im Hinblick auf Schuld und Kooperation. N2 - After a long dominance of rational models of judgment and decision-making in moral psychology (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969) there is now a strong interest in how intuitions and emotions influence moral judgments and decisions (e.g. Greene, 2007; Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). In the literature, the influence of emotions on moral decisions is explained by heuristic or non-compensatory information processing (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010; Sunstein, 2005; Tobler, Kalis, & Kalenscher, 2008). However, the process of emotion elicitation is ignored. Appraisal theories postulate that emotion elicitation is due to the incoherence (or discrepancy) of behavioral representations like goals and actions (Moors, 2009). Emotion elicitation and intuitive decision-making can be combined if both processes apply a connectionist information processing structure (e.g. Barnes & Thagard, 1996). The current work contrasts both perspectives of intuitive-emotional decision-making with respect to guilt and cooperation. KW - Kooperation KW - Schuldgefühl KW - Moralisches Handeln KW - parallel constraint satisfaction KW - Intuition KW - Entscheidung KW - Gefühl KW - Informationsverarbeitung KW - morality KW - guilt KW - cooperation KW - emotion KW - intuition KW - decision-making KW - parallel constraint satisfaction Y1 - 2011 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-74873 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Reis, Moritz A1 - Pfister, Roland A1 - Kunde, Wilfried A1 - Foerster, Anna T1 - Creative thinking does not promote dishonesty JF - Royal Society Open Science N2 - We assessed the relation of creativity and unethical behaviour by manipulating the thinking style of participants (N = 450 adults) and measuring the impact of this manipulation on the prevalence of dishonest behaviour. Participants performed one of three inducer tasks: the alternative uses task to promote divergent thinking, the remote associates task to promote convergent thinking, or a simple classification task for rule-based thinking. Before and after this manipulation, participants conducted the mind game as a straightforward measure of dishonesty. Dishonest behaviour increased from before to after the intervention, but we found no credible evidence that this increase differed between induced mindsets. Exploratory analyses did not support any relation of trait creativity and dishonesty either. We conclude that the influence of creative thinking on unethical behaviour seems to be more ambiguous than assumed in earlier research or might be restricted to specific populations or contexts. KW - dishonesty KW - creativity KW - thinking style KW - unethical behaviour KW - morality Y1 - 2023 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-349859 SN - 2054-5703 VL - 10 IS - 12 ER -