TY - JOUR A1 - Hirsch, Martin A1 - Krauss, Manuel E. A1 - Opferkuch, Toby A1 - Porod, Werner A1 - Staub, Florian T1 - A constrained supersymmetric left-right model JF - JOURNAL OF HIGH ENERGY PHYSICS N2 - We present a supersymmetric left-right model which predicts gauge coupling unification close to the string scale and extra vector bosons at the TeV scale. The subtleties in constructing a model which is in agreement with the measured quark masses and mixing for such a low left-right breaking scale are discussed. It is shown that in the constrained version of this model radiative breaking of the gauge symmetries is possible and a SM-like Higgs is obtained. Additional CP-even scalars of a similar mass or even much lighter are possible. The expected mass hierarchies for the supersymmetric states differ clearly from those of the constrained MSSM. In particular, the lightest down-type squark, which is a mixture of the sbottom and extra vector-like states, is always lighter than the stop. We also comment on the model’s capability to explain current anomalies observed at the LHC. KW - supersymmetry KW - phenomenology KW - LHC Y1 - 2016 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-168016 VL - 03 IS - 009 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Summa, Michela T1 - How are fictions given? Conjoining the ‘artifactual theory’ and the ‘imaginary-object theory’ JF - Synthese N2 - According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected. KW - phenomenology KW - fiction KW - ontology KW - givenness KW - constitution KW - imagination Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269845 SN - 1573-0964 VL - 199 IS - 5-6 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Summa, Michela T1 - Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences N2 - Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models. KW - causality KW - conditionality KW - motivation KW - phenomenology KW - exemplarity Y1 - 2023 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324753 SN - 1568-7759 VL - 22 IS - 3 ER -