TY - THES A1 - Fischer, Katrin T1 - Der Hervorgang der Welt aus Gott. Die Rezeption von Avicennas Ontologie bei Dominicus Gundisalvi, Wilhelm von Auvergne und Heinrich von Gent T1 - The Procession of the World from God. The Reception of Avicenna’s Ontology by Dominicus Gundisalvi, William of Auvergne and Henry of Ghent N2 - Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–1037) entwickelt vornehmlich in Kapitel I.5 und ergänzend in den Kapiteln V.1 und 2 seiner Metaphysik (al-Ilāhiyyāt) – dem vierten Teil seiner philosophischen Summe Buch der Heilung (Kitāb al-Šifāʾ) – den Grundgedanken seiner Ontologie: die Distinktion von Sein und Wesen. Diese Lehre hat er als erster Denker zu einer eigenständigen ontologischen Theorie ausgearbeitet und auf ihrer Basis eine Modalontologie entwickelt. Sie sollte zu einem seiner bekanntesten und einflussreichsten Lehrstücke werden – nicht nur in der arabischen und hebräischen Tradition, sondern auch in der lateinischen. Für Gelehrte, die von einer monotheistischen Weltanschauung geprägt sind, liegt die enorme Attraktivität der avicennischen Ontologie darin, dass sich aus der Sein-Wesen-Distinktion rein rational die wichtigsten Aspekte der Beziehung ableiten lassen, in der Gott und Welt zueinander stehen, wenn man diese Beziehung im Hinblick auf das Sein betrachtet. Mit der Übernahme der Ontologie Avicennas vermag man als christlicher Denker das eigene Modell der Wirklichkeit rational-argumentativ zu begründen, ohne in Autoritätsargumenten auf die Offenbarung zurückgreifen zu müssen. Dies kommt dem Modell insofern zugute, als die rationale Fundierung dazu dient, es zu stärken und den Glauben mittels der Vernunft besser zu begreifen – freilich ohne ihn dadurch zu rechtfertigen. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Avicennas Ontologie bei den lateinischen Denkern stark rezipiert wurde, stellt sich für mich die zentrale Frage, die ich in dieser Arbeit verfolge: Wie weit kann man als christlicher Denker mit Avicenna gehen, wenn man dessen Ontologie her-anzieht, um das Verhältnis von Gott und Welt zu erklären? Mich interessiert vor allem, an welchen Stellen und aus welchen Motiven ein Denker Modifikationen an der avicennischen Theorie vornimmt, sie anders als andere interpretiert oder gänzlich mit ihr bricht. Was be-deuten diese Änderungen inhaltlich? Und insbesondere: Wie werden sie rational gerechtfertigt? Da Ontologie, Theologie und Kosmogonie miteinander verschränkt sind, wirken sich grundlegende Annahmen der Ontologie auch auf die beiden anderen Bereiche aus. Diese Auswirkungen nehme ich ebenfalls in den Blick. Meine Fragen trage ich an die Theorien dreier ausgewählter Denker der lateinisch-christlichen Tradition heran: Dominicus Gundisalvi († ca. 1190), Wilhelm von Auvergne (†1249) und Heinrich von Gent (†1293). Alle drei Denker sind in unterschiedliche Phasen der Rezeption von Avicennas Metaphysik im lateinischen Westen zu verorten. Für jeden Autor untersuche ich zunächst, inwiefern seine Ontologie von Avicennas Lehre beeinflusst ist und in welchem Verhältnis Gott und Welt zueinander stehen. Ausgehend davon verfolge ich anschließend, in wie weit der jeweilige Denker das in der Ontologie entwickelte Konzept eines durch sich selbst notwendig Seienden für Gott von Avicenna übernimmt und wie er die Spannungen zwischen avicennischer und christlicher Lehre zu lösen versucht, die sich beispielsweise hinsichtlich der Trinitätstheologie ergeben. Sodann lege ich dar, wie sich die einzelnen Autoren im Unterschied zu Avicenna Gottes Wirken ad extra vorstellen, auf welche Weise sie ihr eigenes Modell rechtfertigen und damit verbunden Avicenna kritisieren. Umgekehrt werde ich ausgehend von Avicennas Standpunkt die Lehren der christlichen Denker kritisch befragen. Die Kapitel meiner Arbeit widmen sich jeweils einem Autor und sind meiner Fragestellung entsprechend parallel zueinander in einen Abschnitt zur Ontologie, Theologie und Kosmogonie unterteilt. N2 - Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–1037) is famous for his ontology, in which he introduces the distinction of essence and existence and combines it with a modal theory. Based on this theory, he develops the following model of reality in a purely rational way, without relying on religious authority: On the one hand, there is a first principle that serves as both the efficient and final cause of the universe and can be identified with God. It is a necessary existent through itself (wāǧib al-wuǧūd bi-ḏātihī; necesse esse per se) that is able to exist out of itself alone, since essence and existence coincide in it. This characterization applies exclusively to the first principle. All other beings – the world as a whole as well as every single entity in it – are only possible existents through themselves (mumkin al-wuǧūd bi-ḏātihī, possibile esse per se), since their essences do not include existence. They are contingent beings, which means that their existence (and non-existence) is completely dependent on a cause. However, a cause that is only responsible for their coming into existence is not enough. Rather, during the whole duration of their actual existence, they need an external metaphysical efficient cause that coexists with them and permanently bestows existence upon them, since they never lose their essential disposition as possible existents in themselves. The chain of metaphysical efficient causes ends in the necessary existent through itself, God. Therefore, one can conclude that the world, with respect to its existence, is totally dependent on God. In addition to permanently bestowing being upon all worldly entities, he is responsible for the order of the cosmos, i.e., the formal structure of the world. Avicenna provides a detailed ontological and cosmological analysis in the Metaphysics (al-Ilāhiyyāt) of his philosophical summa Kitāb al-Šifāʾ (Book of the Healing). The Metaphysics was translated into Latin in the twelfth century as Liber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina. From then on, Latin Christian thinkers had access to Avicenna’s doctrines. They were attracted to his ontology, since in the model of reality described above, which can be developed based on this ontology, the relationship between God and the world corresponds to Christian faith. Taking over Avicenna’s ontology allows Christian thinkers to explain and demonstrate their own model of reality in a purely rational manner. In this way, they strengthen their own theory and show that reason does not contradict faith. Therefore, it is not surprising that Avicenna’s ontology became highly successful among Latin Christian thinkers. Since ontology provides the basic view of reality, it is not a theory that stands alone. Rather, it has an impact on other areas, such as theology and cosmogony. For example, Avicenna’s view of God and the way in which God causes the world’s existence are directly dependent on the ontological dispositions developed for the necessary existent through itself. Concerning the reception of Avicenna’s teachings among Latin thinkers, the main question of my dissertation is as follows: How far can a Christian thinker follow Avicenna when taking over the latter’s ontology to explain the relationship between God and the world? I am mainly interested in analysing where and why a given thinker modifies Avicenna’s theory or interprets it differently from other thinkers, and especially in finding out which rational justifications are provided for the modifications and interpretations. My analysis is based on the works of three Medieval Christian thinkers: Dominicus Gundisalvi (†ca. 1190), William of Auvergne (†1249), and Henry of Ghent (†1293). Each of them represents a different phase in the reception of Avicenna’s Metaphysics and deals with Avicenna in a different way. A separate chapter is dedicated to each author, with each chapter divided into sections on ontology, theology, and cosmogony. N2 - Wie weit kann ein christlicher Denker Avicenna folgen, wenn er dessen Ontologie zur Erklärung des Verhältnisses von Gott und Welt heranzieht? Dieser zentralen Frage der Avicenna-Rezeption widmet sich die vorliegende Arbeit. Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā, 980–1037) entwickelt in der Metaphysik (al-Ilāhiyyāt) – dem vierten Teil seiner philosophischen Summe Buch der Heilung (Kitāb al-Šifāʾ) – den Grundgedanken seiner Ontologie: die Distinktion von Sein und Wesen, die zu einem seiner bekanntesten und einflussreichsten Lehrstücke wurde. Nach der lateinischen Übersetzung von Avicennas Metaphysik im zwölften Jahrhundert fand die darin entworfene Ontologie rasche Verbreitung unter den lateinisch-christlichen Gelehrten. Für deren monotheistische Weltanschauung war diese Lehre insofern attraktiv, als sich aus der Sein-Wesen-Distinktion die wichtigsten ontologischen Aspekte der Beziehung von Gott und Welt rein rational ableiten lassen. Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich die genannte Frage, wie weit ein christlicher Denker mit Avicenna gehen kann, wenn er dessen Ontologie heranzieht, um das Verhältnis von Gott und Welt zu erklären. Diese Frage untersucht die Autorin für die drei Gelehrten Dominicus Gundisalvi († nach 1190), Wilhelm von Auvergne († 1249) und Heinrich von Gent († 1293). Die Verschränkung von Ontologie, Theologie und Kosmogonie gibt der Autorin die Möglichkeit, für diese drei Bereiche jeweils herauszuarbeiten, an welchen Stellen und aus welchen Motiven Modifikationen an der avicennischen Theorie vorgenommen wurden, um sie eigenen Zwecken oder neuen Kontexten wie der Trinitätstheologie anzupassen. Zugleich zeigt sie auf, an welchen Punkten mit Avicennas Theorie gänzlich gebrochen wurde. Was bedeuten diese Änderungen und Brüche inhaltlich? Und insbesondere: Wie werden sie rational gerechtfertigt? KW - Avicenna KW - Guilelmus, Arvernus KW - Heinrich, von Gent KW - Dominicus, Gundissalinus KW - Trinität KW - arabisch-lateinische Tradition KW - ontology KW - trinity KW - arabic-latin tradition KW - philosophy KW - emanation KW - Emanation KW - Ontologie KW - Philosophie KW - Theologie Y1 - 2024 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-351705 SN - 978-3-95826-244-7 SN - 978-3-95826-245-4 N1 - Parallel erschienen als Druckausgabe bei Würzburg University Press, 32,90 Euro, ISBN 978-3-95826-244-7. PB - Würzburg University Press CY - Würzburg ER - TY - CHAP A1 - Klein, Martin ED - Hochschild, Joshua P. ED - Nevitt, Turner C. ED - Wood, Adam ED - Borbély, Gábor T1 - Metaphors, Dead and Alive T2 - Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind N2 - This paper examins how the medieval distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. I will show how Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ordinary ambiguous terms and metaphors, whereas William of Ockham and Walter Burley do not leave room for this distinction. I will argue that Ockham’s conception of transfer of sense through subsequent institution of words is best thought of as an explanation of how ordinary usage can contain ambiguities, whereas Burley’s conception of transfer of sense without new imposition is more plausible when it comes to explaining metaphors. If metaphorical use is lumped together with equivocation, the account of how they work cannot do full justice to either, an insight that we already find in Peter Abelard, if not in Boethius. KW - Aquinas KW - Ockham KW - Burley KW - metaphor KW - equivocation KW - signification KW - imposition KW - transference Y1 - 2023 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-359678 UR - https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-15026-5_8 N1 - Subject to Springer Nature’s AM terms of use (https://www.springernature.com/gp/open-research/policies/accepted-manuscript-terms). PB - Springer ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Franz, David J. T1 - Moral responsibility for self-deluding beings JF - Philosophia N2 - In this article, I argue for four theses. First, libertarian and compatibilist accounts of moral responsibility agree that the capability of practical reason is the central feature of moral responsibility. Second, this viewpoint leads to a reasons-focused account of human behavior. Examples of human action discussed in debates about moral responsibility suggest that typical human actions are driven primarily by the agent’s subjective reasons and are sufficiently transparent for the agent. Third, this conception of self-transparent action is a questionable idealization. As shown by psychological research on self-assessment, motivated reasoning, and terror management theory, humans oftentimes have only a limited understanding of their conduct. Self-deception is rather the rule than the exception. Fourth, taking the limited self-transparency of practical reason seriously leads to a socially contextualized conception of moral responsibility. KW - moral responsibility KW - self-deception KW - reasoning biases KW - practical reasoning KW - rationalization KW - motivated reasoning Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324871 SN - 0048-3893 VL - 50 IS - 4 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Summa, Michela T1 - Phenomenological explanation: towards a methodological integration in phenomenological psychopathology JF - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences N2 - Whether, and in what sense, research in phenomenology and phenomenological psychopathology has—in addition to its descriptive and hermeneutic value—explanatory power is somewhat controversial. This paper shows why it is legitimate to recognize such explanatory power. To this end, the paper analyzes two central concerns underlying the debate about explanation in phenomenology: (a) the warning against reductionism, which is implicit in a conception of causal explanation exclusively based on models of natural/physical causation; and (b) the warning against top-down generalizations, which neglect the specificity of the individual. While acknowledging that these two caveats express serious concerns regarding the debate on explanatory models, I show that phenomenology has the resources to respond to them. These can be found in analyses of different types of causation relating to different regions of reality and in the structure of explanatory models based on exemplarity. On the basis of these analyses, I defend a pluralist account vis-à-vis explanatory models. KW - causality KW - conditionality KW - motivation KW - phenomenology KW - exemplarity Y1 - 2023 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324753 SN - 1568-7759 VL - 22 IS - 3 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spano, Nicola T1 - Book Review: The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency JF - Husserl Studies N2 - No abstract available. KW - Erhard, C., & Keiling, T. / The Routledge Handbook of Phenomenology of Agency KW - book review Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324731 SN - 0167-9848 VL - 38 IS - 2 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Spano, Nicola T1 - Husserl’s taxonomy of action JF - Husserl Studies N2 - In the present article I discuss, in confrontation with the most recent studies on Husserl’s phenomenology of acting and willing, the taxonomy of action that is collected in the volume ‘Wille und Handlung’ of the Husserliana edition Studien zur Struktur des Bewussteins. In so doing, I first present Husserl’s universal characterization of action (Handlung) as a volitional process (willentlicher Vorgang). Then, after clarifying what it means for a process to have a character of volitionality (Willentlichkeit), I illustrate the various types of actions, which Husserl distinguishes as ‘straightforward’ (schlicht) or ‘deciding’ (entscheidend), ‘primary’ (primär) or ‘secondary’ (sekundär), ‘inner’ (innere) or ‘outer’ (äußere), ‘immediate’ (unmittelbar) or mediate (mittelbar), ‘simple’ (einfach) or ‘compound’ (zusammengesetzt). Finally, I consider Husserl’s discussion of the direction and foundation of action. KW - Edmund Husserl KW - action KW - phenomenology of acting and willing Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-324744 SN - 0167-9848 VL - 38 IS - 3 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Summa, Michela A1 - Klein, Martin A1 - Schmidt, Philipp T1 - Introduction: Double Intentionality JF - Topoi N2 - No abstract available. KW - double intentionality KW - intentional directions KW - experiences Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269865 SN - 1572-8749 VL - 41 IS - 1 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Schierbaum, Sonja T1 - The Double Intentionality of Moral Intentional Actions: Scotus and Ockham on Interior and Exterior Acts JF - Topoi N2 - Any account of intentional action has to deal with the problem of how such actions are individuated. Medieval accounts, however, crucially differ from contemporary ones in at least three respects: (i) for medieval authors, individuation is not a matter of description, as it is according to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ views; rather, it is a metaphysical matter. (ii) Medieval authors discuss intentional action on the basis of faculty psychology, whereas contemporary accounts are not committed to this kind of psychology. Connected to the use of faculty psychology is (iii) the distinction between interior and exterior acts. Roughly, interior acts are mental as opposed to physical acts, whereas exterior acts are acts of physical powers, such as of moving one’s body. Of course, contemporary accounts are not committed to this distinction between two ontologically different kinds of acts. Rather, they might be committed to views consistent with physicalist approaches to the mind. The main interpretative task in this paper is to clarify how Scotus and Ockham explain moral intentional action in terms of the role and involvement of these kinds of acts respectively. I argue that Scotus’s account is close to contemporary, ‘Anscombian’ accounts, whereas Ockham’s account is incompatible with them. KW - double intentionality KW - intentional action KW - Ockham KW - Scotus KW - interior and exterior acts Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269857 SN - 1572-8749 VL - 41 IS - 1 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Summa, Michela T1 - How are fictions given? Conjoining the ‘artifactual theory’ and the ‘imaginary-object theory’ JF - Synthese N2 - According to the so-called ‘artifactual theory’ of fiction, fictional objects are to be considered as abstract artifacts. Within this framework, fictional objects are defined on the basis of their complex dependence on literary works, authors, and readership. This theory is explicitly distinguished from other approaches to fictions, notably from the imaginary-object theory. In this article, I argue that the two approaches are not mutually exclusive but can and should be integrated. In particular, the ontology of fiction can be fruitfully supplemented by a phenomenological analysis, which allows us to clarify the defining modes of givenness of fictional objects. Likewise, based on the results of the artifactual theory, some assumptions in the imaginary-object theory, which are liable to be interpreted as laying the ground to phenomenalism, can be corrected. KW - phenomenology KW - fiction KW - ontology KW - givenness KW - constitution KW - imagination Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-269845 SN - 1573-0964 VL - 199 IS - 5-6 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Ingerslev, Line Ryberg T1 - Die phänomenologischen Wurzeln der Normativität JF - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie N2 - Kein Abstract verfügbar. KW - Rezension Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-251048 SN - 2192-1482 SN - 0012-1045 N1 - Dieser Beitrag ist mit Zustimmung des Rechteinhabers aufgrund einer (DFG-geförderten) Allianz- bzw. Nationallizenz frei zugänglich. VL - 69 IS - 5 SP - 890 EP - 896 ER -