Organizational cultures' impact on employees' corruption

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Abstract

Although many researchers refer to organizational culture as the key to explain employees' organizational corruption (= corruption on behalf of the organization), literature lacks systematic empirical evidence. Through a mixed-method approach this research tries to shed some first lights on this issue with the questions: what characteristics describe an organizational culture that promotes employees' corruption? Does a certain type of organizational culture shape a positive attitude towards organizational corruption? Does organizational culture differ in its impact on different types of corruption? Does organizational culture interact with employees' sex to promote employees' corruption? And, is there a main effect of sex on corruption?

A qualitative study investigates the characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture in both general and in particular for managers and employees (Study 1). 14 experts of different occupations were asked about underlying assumptions, values, and norms of a corrupt organizational culture coding the frequency and relationship of their answers. The results showed specific underlying assumptions, values, and norms that were shared by the interviewees and provide first insights into their interrelatedness.

In addition, the quantitative field survey (Study 2) analyzed if a corrupt organizational culture shapes a positive attitude towards organizational corruption and if both tangible rewards and lax control mechanism mediate this impact. 131 participants answered questionnaires about their perceived competition in their industry, tangible rewards, lax control mechanism, and their attitude towards both gifting and bribery. Results showed that lax control mechanism (and for gifting also tangible rewards) mediated the positive impact of a corrupt organizational culture on organizational corruption. In addition, men and women did not differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption in a corrupt organizational culture.

Finally a web-based experiment investigates if organizational culture shapes employees' corruption (Study 3). In addition this approach also covers if the impact of organizational culture on corruption depends on the type of corruption (organizational corruption vs. counterproductive), and if employees' sex influence corruption and if there is an interaction of organizational culture and sex on employees' corruption. 563 participants had to decide whether they engage in corruption. Although a corrupt organizational culture raises both types of corruption, there was neither a notable main effect of sex nor a high impact interaction effect of both on both types of corruption. Thus, aspects of a corrupt organizational culture seem to influence employees' corruption.

Zusammenfassung

Obwohl Organisationskultur von vielen Wissenschaftlern als eine Schlüsseldeterminante gesehen wird um *organisationale Korruption* (= Korruption im Sinne der Organisation) zu erklären, fehlt es in der fachwissenschaftlichen Literatur an systematischen empiristischen Belegen: Welche Eigenschaften zeichnen eine korruptionsfördernde Organisationskultur aus? Kann ein bestimmter Typ von Organisationskultur eine positive Einstellung gegenüber organisationaler Korruption formen? Und schließlich: unterscheiden sich die Einflussfaktoren für Korruption zwischen verschiedenen Korruptionstypen? Durch die Anwendung verschiedenere methodischer Zugänge versucht diese wissenschaftliche Arbeit erste Antworten in diesem Forschungsfeld zu geben. Gibt es eine Interaktion zwischen dem Geschlecht der Mitarbeiter und der Organisationskultur und unterscheiden sich Männer und Frauen in ihrem korrupten Verhalten?

Zunächst werden anhand einer qualitativen Analyse von 14 Experteninterviews grundlegende Charakteristiken einer Organisationskultur in korrupten Organisationen analysiert (Studie 1). Die Experten aus verschiedenen Berufsfeldern wurden zu ihrer Wahrnehmung der Organisationskultur von verschiedenen korrupten Organisationen befragt. Die Ergebnisse zeigten, dass es spezifische unbewusste Annahmen, Werte und Normen gibt, die von den verschiedenen Experten berichtet worden sind. Diese Studie ermöglicht erste Einblicke in die Wirkung der und Verbindungen zwischen den von den Experten wahrgenommenen Normen, Werten und Annahmen.

Weiterführend analysierte eine Feldstudie (Studie 2), ob eine korrupte Organisationskultur eine positive Wirkung auf die Einstellung von Mitarbeitern zu organisationale Korruption hat. Weiter wurde untersucht, ob konkrete antizipierte Belohnungen und laxe Kontrollmechanismen bei der Aufgabenerfüllungen den Effekt der korrupten Organisationskultur auf organisationale Korruption mediieren. 131 Probanden beantworteten verschiedene Fragebögen zu ihrer Wahrnehmung von Wettbewerb in ihrer Branche, laxe Kontrollmechanismen von Korruption, zu konkreten Belohnungen in ihrer Organisation und zu ihrer Einstellung zu Geschenke und Bestechung. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass es einen Haupteffekt von der korrupten Organisationskultur auf organisationale Korruption vorhanden ist, dass dieser durch konkrete Belohnungen und laxe Kontrollmechanismen (bei Geschenken) und durch laxe Kontrollmechanismen (bei Bestechung) mediiert wird. Männer und Frauen unterscheiden sich in einer korrupten Organisationskultur nicht hinsichtlich ihrer Einstellung zur Korruption.

Abschließend analysiert Studie 3 als web-basiertes Experiment, ob sich die Organisationskultur auf Korruption auswirkt. 563 Probanden spielten einen männlichen oder weiblichen Angestellten, welcher entweder in einer ethischen oder korrupten Organisationskultur in einer fiktiven Organisation arbeitet. Alle Teilnehmer mussten sich in der Rolle entscheiden, ob er oder sie in verschiedenen Arten von Korruption (organisationale vs. kontraproduktive Korruption) aktiv werden will. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass eine korrupte Organisationskultur einen ähnlich positiven Einfluss auf beide Typen von Korruption hatte. Das Geschlecht hatte weder einen nennenswert signifikanten oder keinen Einfluss auf die Annahme der Korruption. Darüber hinaus gab es keine Interaktion zwischen Geschlecht und Organisationskultur für beide Typen der Korruption.

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1. Introduction

"[…] the morale of the story is that nobody is safe from becoming evil:
under the right conditions anybody can run evil"
(Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2009, p. 110)

In the last five years, the German Chapter of Transparency International listed more than 100[1] particular cases of suspected organizational corruption (= corruption on behalf of the organization; e.g., Siemens, FIFA, EADS, Deutsche Bank, and Gazprom) in their press review. Employees were suspected or found guilty to have paid and accepted bribes to receive project contracts, maintain business relationships, participate in cartels, support insider dealing, or pay kickbacks. In general, through organizational corruption employees hamper market competition, reduce organizational innovation, lower product quality, work inefficiently, undermine market standards, destroy both peoples' belief in economy and institutions, and therefore, harm the society (Graycar & Smith, 2011; Jain, 2001; Transparency International, 2012, 2014).

The amount of suspected employees in more than 100 organizations could indicate that organizational corruption might be a widespread practice that seems to produce an enormous harm globally (Luo, 2005). Another indicator might be the last Bribes Payer Index that reports that all 28 analyzed countries (including all G20 states) engage at least somewhat in bribery and that in all measured industries (e.g., agriculture, forestry, banking, telecommunication, defense, pharmaceutical, or public work) bribery is perceived as a common practice (Transparency International, 2011). Thus, when apparently so many employees are involved in organizational corruption and usually seem not to blow the whistle, it may become important to know why these employees do support organizational corruption. Although a huge range of employees seem to be involved this type of corruption, it is still a largely under-investigated research topic (Beugré, 2010). Literature provides mainly theoretical insights about how and why employees might engage in organizational corruption (Beugré, 2010). Nevertheless, these theories seem to provide an incomplete picture of explanations for why so many employees apparently engage in organizational corruption.

This work tries to figure out first insights by covering the impact of organizational culture on mainly organizational corruption by empirically studying the following questions:

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[1] Retrieved (20.08.2015) from: http://www.transparency.de/index.php?id=559&tx_ttnews[cat]=12. The author counted the reported cases between August 2010 and September 2015 of the German Chapter of Transparency Internationals' press review (German and International press) in the following sections: finance, economy, international, media, and sports. The number of 100 cases can only cover a glimpse about the actual amount of possible organizational corruption cases because the review did not cover systematically highly corrupt industries such as: weapons industry, building sector, lobbyism, or offshore business. Also, the dark field of organizational corruption is suspected to be a lot bigger including tax havens, illegal bank transactions, hedge funds, and criminal organizations that use corporations for money laundering.

Which underlying assumptions, values, and norms are possible characteristics for a corrupt organizational culture? Does a corrupt organizational culture promote a positive attitude towards organizational corruption and does it empirically raise the share of corrupt employees for both organizational corruption and counterproductive? Do tangible rewards and lax control mechanism mediate the impact of organizational culture on employees' attitude towards organizational corruption? And, as a side aspect: are men more corrupt than women? And finally, is there an interaction of organizational culture and employees' sex?

1.1.Corruption

There exists no commonly accepted definition of corruption (Beugré, 2010) that covers the heterogeneity of this phenomenon appropriately (i.e., differences in types, causes, consequences, forms, or heterogenic research field perspectives; Jain, 2001). Each perspective, form, and type etc. might cover particular mechanisms that explain how and why employees/organizations/governments engage in corruption (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Höffling, 2002; Pinto, Leana, & Pil, 2008). Because of this heterogeneity, this work relies on the assumption that corruption is a behavior in the context of work roles in which employees violate morale and ethical values (Luo, 2005). Thus, as a work definition, corruption *is an illegitimate or illegal exchange between two or more participants that enrich an individual employee, a small group of employees, an organization,[2] or third parties* (Anand, Ashforth, & Joshi, 2005; Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Treviño, 2008). *Employees or organizations abuse their entrusted power, authority, or latitude to receive either material benefits (e.g., money or project contracts) or immaterial benefits (e.g., favors or advantages in a competition*; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Pinto et al., 2008; Seleim & Bontis, 2009). According to Rabl and Kühlmann (2008) corruption covers the following characteristics: it's a violation of norms and/or moral values or laws, it is an exchange based on the interaction of at last two individuals who abuse their own power and latitude, there are no direct victims of corruption, and all perpetrators keep corruption as a secret.

Corruption as a white-collar crime (Blickle, Schlegel, Fassbender, & Klein, 2006) covers different types such as petty corruption and structural corruption (see Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Eicher, 2009). While petty corruption covers a single short corrupt exchange on a daily base (e.g., speed money; Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001), structural corruption refers to medium to long-term relationships between participants, who plan corrupt exchanges with a

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[2] The term organization covers all types of organizations that focus on long-term goals and use both formal and informal structures to attain these goals (Schulte-Zurhausen, 2002). Thus, this term is not limited to companies, organizations can be (multi-national) companies, sports clubs, criminal organizations, banks, or civil service departments.

high frequency as well as a high intensity (e.g., Siemens scandal; Bannenberg, 2008; Höffling, 2002). Prof. Dr. Graf Lambsdorff, who developed the Corrupt Perception Index, described structural corruption in the following way: "Corruption is not a one-night-stand, it is a marriage." In this way, petty corruption as a fast, short, and only one time corrupt exchange could be seen as a metaphorical one-night-stand. Petty corruption takes place on a daily base in everyday life forcing everyone in the country to join this type of corruption. On the contrary, structural corruption lasts forever ("till death do them part") because all participants have made themselves guilty of an offence and the counterparts could always report on them. Literature shows that relationships in structural corruption can last between one and more than 30 years (Höffling, 2002).

The work at hand looks at two different types of structural corruption, namely: organizational and counterproductive corruption. In organizational corruption many employees enrich their organization collectively and violate their society through tax manipulation, organizational gifting, price fixing, paying bribes to change the law, quality standards, or rules (Ashforth et al., 2008; Pinto et al., 2008). However, in counterproductive corruption individual employees enrich themselves and harm their organization through private bribery, self-dealing, personal gifting, or nepotism (Darge, 2009; Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008; Zahra, Priem, & Rasheed, 2005; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2009). Organizational corruption was chosen as a main focus because there is only little research about this type compared to counterproductive corruption (Pinto et al., 2008). Counterproductive corruption was only analyzed in Study 3.

Literature seems often not only to report mixed results of different types of unethical behavior but also often to generalize results of counterproductive corruption and (un)ethical behavior towards the whole phenomenon of corruption. Thus, literature about unethical behavior was only used if - to the authors' knowledge - no literature exists with an explicit focus on corruption. In what follows, the terms *corruption, corrupt behavior,* and *employees' corruption,* refer to employees' corruption as both organizational and counterproductive corruption. If only one type is addressed the terms *organizational corruption* or *counterproductive corruption* are used. Moreover, it is difficult to provide a comprehensive overview of all possible work constellations and work routines that could cover all parts of organizational corruption and all roles employees can have in corruption. Therefore, this work relies first on an abstract behavioral pattern of corruption and tries to explain a general possible influence of organizational culture on corrupt behavior (in Study 1). Second, this work relies on the attitude towards organizational corruption (in Study 2) and the behavior of

the perpetrators of corruption as corruption taker (i.e., employees who accept a corrupt offer, in Study 3). The author is fully aware that this picture is still incomplete and cannot be generalized on every particular corruption case. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to restrict this research to this narrow focus in order to conquer the mixed results in literature and to provide comprehensive insights.

1.2.Organizational Culture and Corruption

Many authors refer to organizational culture as a key variable to promote corruption and unethical behavior (e.g., Ashforth et al., 2008; Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Beugré, 2010; Brief, Buttram, & Dukerich, 2001; Dahling, Chau, Mayer, & Gregory, 2012; Gehman, Treviño, & Garud, 2013; Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007; Pinto et al., 2008; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003; Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2009). In addition, some authors connect organizational culture with its impact on anti-corruption (Ashforth et al., 2008). Finally, several meta-analyses showed that ethical organizational culture reduces both unethical behavior and counterproductive corruption (Craft, 2013; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Treviño, den Nieuwenboer, & Kish-Gephart, 2014). Although literature often refer to organizational culture to explain corruption, only little seems to be known about how an organizational culture looks like that increases employees' corruption. Since organizational culture can reduce unethical behavior (Berry, 2004; Kaptein, 2011a) in terms of an organizational "moral tone" (Luo, 2005, p. 145), organizational culture might also increase unethical behavior in terms of an "immoral tone". Employees seem to both learn corrupt behavior[3] and normalize corruption through the organizational culture (Anand et al., 2005). When corruption becomes common, employees could evaluate corrupt behavior as favorable, decent, and good behavior (Anand et al., 2005). Thus, to understand corruption at the work place, one may need to understand the characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture and the way organizational culture could shape employees' behavior first.

Thus, Study 1 takes a perspective on possible characteristics of an organizational culture that supports organizational corruption. Study 2 covers whether aspects of a corrupt organizational culture influence employees' positive attitude towards organizational corruption, and if this effect gets mediated via tangible rewards and lax control mechanism. And finally, Study 3 examines the different impacts of an ethical and a corrupt organizational culture between organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption.

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[3] I.e., all behavior that supports corrupt transactions, covering traces, and uphold corruption.

1.3. Sex, Organizational Culture, and Corruption

As a side aspect this work argues that the often-named main effect of employees' sex on corruption (i.e., men are more corrupt than women; Swamy, Knack, Lee, & Azfar, 2000) might depend on the type of corruption. Although there is a huge amount of research on the impact of sex on corruption, literature provides mixed results without any approaches to clarify some of the main methodological issues.

A transfer bias seems to covers many studies' interpretation of results based on cross-country indexed data as indicators for direct individual corrupt behavior in specific situations. For example, one of the most cited studies by Dollar, Fisman, and Gatti (1999; several times replicated, e.g., by Cheung & Hernández-Julián, 2006 for the U.S.) reports that countries have a lower level of corruption when there had a higher representation of women in their parliament. The authors analyzed correlations between several independent cross-country indexes.[4] Although the indexes were collected by different independent samples, and partly measured in different years, the authors concluded that their data indicated: men are more likely to become corrupt on the individual level. This conclusion seems difficult because the perceived corruptness of countries could depend on other variables that influence both the amount of women in parliament and corruption for example as some studies show: liberal democracy (Branisa & Ziegler, 2011) or culture (Michailova & Melnykovska, 2009). Treisman (2000) reported that countries with a colonial heritage perceived more corruption in their country than countries with less colonial heritage. Often these post-colonial countries score rather lower in gender egalitarianism[5] (Emrich, Denmark, & Den Hartog, 2004) and rather higher in power distance[6] (Carl, Gupta, & Javidan, 2004). Both named value manifestations also affect corruption (Steel & Taras, 2010). In turn, both gender egalitarianism and power distance could be indicators why these countries have a low amount of women in their parliament or higher job positions (Carl et al., 2004; Emrich et al., 2004). Another explanation might be a low economic development that also increases corruption (Treisman, 2000). In countries with low economic development people often face low education possibilities for women and rather traditional family roles (Emrich et al., 2004). Both named aspects could also affect the low amount of good educated women. These could be able to receive higher job positions (e.g., parliament) in which they could face similar opportunities as men to abuse their entrusted power and latitude. Therefore, other variables

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[4] E.g., International Country Risk Guide to indicate the likelihood of corruption by governmental officials and the Index of Women in Parliament to indicate the female involvement in government.

[5] I.e., the degree in which people belief that their sex determines their roles in society (e.g., in private life, business organizations). Countries with high gender egalitarianism try to reduce differences between roles of men and women (Emrich et al., 2004).

[6] I.e., the degree in which people accept inequality in power distance (Carl et al., 2004).

might be more suitable to explain the amount of corruption within a country, and other methods need to be used to infer directional behavioral preferences of men and women about corruption. The current approach tries to make a first step in the analysis of whether men and women differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption, if they differ in their behavior between organizational and counterproductive corruption and whether their corrupt behavior is also influenced by their organizational culture.

1.4. Research Gaps

The first four research gaps concern the main perspective of organizational culture and corruption, where the last two research gaps cover the side issue of sex on both types of corruption.

First, most of the empirical literature deals with the impact of ethical organizational culture on employees' ethical behavior (see Craft, 2013). However, to understand employees' ethical behavior, one also needs to understand employees' unethical behavior, because both ethical and unethical behaviors complement each other. Therefore, the complementary perspective of studying the impact of unethical organizational culture on employees' unethical behavior seems necessary. The present work adopts this shift of perspective and analyzes if organizational culture promote employees' corruption.

Second, the most referred models and theories in literature on organizational corruption seem to provide an incomplete picture about how and why employees engage in organizational corruption. Whereas the models and theories of pressure-opportunity, goal-setting, charismatic leadership, and the normalization of corruption could provide information about when and how employees engage in organizational corruption they seem to not provide enough information about why employees engage in it. Employees of corrupt organizations are assumed to share a positive evaluation of organizational corruption (Asforth & Anand, 2003; Baucus, 1994; DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004) and to not feel guilty about their unethical behavior (Brief et al., 2001; Maruna & Copes, 2004). The theories mentioned above could not explain why employees might have this positive evaluation and how this positive evaluation could affect the mechanism of theories in turn. Organizational culture as a perceptual frame within organizations might provide some ideas about why employees engage in organizational corruption and might supplement the existing knowledge of these theories. Study 1 covers research gaps one and two.

Third, although many authors assume that organizational culture can promote corruption there exist no systematical empirical data testing this assumption (Beugré, 2010). A few case studies and several studies about the positive impact of an ethical organizational

culture on ethical behavior (cf., review by Treviño et al., 2014) are the only current insights to close this gap. This has led Gehman et al. (2013) to call for research that analyzes the practical implications of the impact of organizational culture on unethical behavior. This dissertation covers two first empirical approaches to refer to this call. Study 2 as a web-field-survey covered on whether organizational culture could shape employees' attitude towards organizational corruption and Study 3 as web-based experiment tried to manipulate different organizational cultures and analyzed any directional impact on corruption.

Forth, although Pinto et al. (2008) developed theoretical criteria to very thoroughly distinguish between organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption on the organizational level, research often generalizes results of counterproductive corruption on the whole phenomenon. This work tries to explore if one can generalize the assumptions of the impact of organizational culture and sex on both types of corruption.

The last two research gaps rely on the side issue. Fifth, although many practitioners and institutions assume that men are more corrupt than women, one needs to question this assumption when looking at the mixed results in literature. Literature provides not only information that men are more corrupt than women (e.g., Dollar et al., 1999; Michailova & Melnykovska, 2009; Swamy et al., 2000), but also that sex does not matter (e.g., Alatas, Cameron, Chaudhuri, Erkal, & Gangadharan, 2009; Rivas, 2013). Hence, research that examines the impact of sex on different types of corruption might help to unravel the contradicting results in literature.

Sixth and finally, governments as well as institutions often seem often to lean on studies that report that women donor less corruption than men when - as an anti-corruption method - they employ women in key positions to reduce the acceptance of corruption (e.g., Transparency International, World Bank; see Hartelius & Borgenhammer, 2011). However, although donor (i.e., they offer corruption) and taker (i.e., they accept the corrupt offer) complement one another, differences between the sexes might bring forth a different sex ratio on the donor vs. taker side. For example, both women and men differ in risk aversion (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Croson & Gneezy, 2009), as well as both donor and taker differ in the risk they face during a corrupt transaction. For counterproductive corruption, a donor faces a high risk (i.e., refusal, detection, punishment; Höffling, 2002) when he or she offers a bribe, while the taker is relatively safe (Höffling, 2002). Employees who engage in organizational corruption may have only to fear that outsiders receive information about the corruption and investigate. On the contrary, employees who engage in counterproductive corruption need to fear whistle blowers in and outside the organization. Employees' risk to

get caught and punished within the organization is lower for organizational corruption than the risk to get caught and punished for counterproductive corruption. Therefore, perpetrators could differ in their perception about the risk of detection of their direct environment depending on the type of corruption. In addition, governments mainly rely on surveys that analyze only the donor side of corruption when their anti-corruption method covers actually the taker. Therefore, the work at hand complements the existing literature on sex differences on the donor side by examining sex and gender differences on the taker side. Study 3 refers to the three last named research gaps.

1.5. Design of the Studies and Experiments

This work uses a mixed method approach to address afore mentioned research gaps. In Study 1, characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture were examined. In a next step, a field-survey (Study 2) measured if and how the main characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture could shape employees' attitude towards organizational corruption and finally one experiment (Study 3) measured if a manipulated organizational culture might promote corruption (see Figure 1). The side aspect of sex differences was analyzed in Study 2 about attitude differences and Study 3 about behavioral differences. This mixed method approach allowed to receive first-hand information about a rather unexplored research field (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and to be able to collect systematical data in both the web-survey and the web-experiment.

Figure 1. Study Overview.

Since corruption is illegal or illegitimate (Rabl, 2011) a main or singular reliance on studies as cooperation with real existing organizations is difficult for three main reasons: cooperation bias, limited insights in corruption at the work place, and mutual interaction of many aspects at the work place.

First, it is difficult to cooperate with organizations about the issue of organizational corruption because managers of these organizations often use corruption as part of their organizational strategy (Pinto et al., 2008). Therefore, these managers and their employees usually deny their corruption as they fear damage to their organizations' reputation and various forms of legal punishment. Thus, when collecting data in existing organizations, one might face employees of non-corrupt organizations in the whole sample or employees of organizations who try to deny their behavior and provide biased information in an interview, survey, or an experiment. This could lead to an underrepresentation of employees of organizations who want to continue corruption. This research tried to reduce this possible self-selection bias as effectively as possible. In Study 1, eleven interview experts out of 14 had contact with different employees of different corrupt organizations. Eight interview experts underlie official discretion in their current profession (i.e., investigative journalist, police officer, judge, ombudspersons, and consultants). The contact persons of these experts may have given the experts deeper insights in their organization because these contact persons may have felt less endangered for a damage of their reputation. In the interviews, these experts provided abstract information about particular cases or general insights about their own perception of the insights of their own contact persons. These contact persons did not communicate with the interview experts on purpose for this analysis and therefore, might again provide more detailed insights for the experts to recall in the interview. In addition, two experts had worked as managers in corrupt organizations themselves and experienced first-hand exposure.

In Study 2 participants were asked about their perceptions of several aspects of their organizational culture. These participants had to answer nine questionnaires whereas corruption was only a minor issue of these questionnaires. This open research focus in the recruitment might decrease possible self-selection biases of participating employees. Participants of Study 3 were recruited with a cover story, thus an a priori self-selection because of the issue of corruption might have been less likely.

Second, within corrupt organizations employees may often be engaged in only a small part of a corrupt transaction because the division of labor forks corruption into different tracts (Sims & Brinkmann, 2003). This makes it difficult to recognize and observe corruption within a particular job position and between different job positions. Corruption is also difficult to measure because of its nature of secrecy (Collins, Uhlenbruck, & Rodriguez, 2009). In this context, the manipulation of different types of corruption in a really existing organization and really existing work places would not only affect the daily business of the organizations, it

would also be very difficult to analyze corruption. Therefore, research mainly covers the following approaches to receive insights in this issue: case studies (e.g., Höffling, 2002), correlations of several cross-country indexes (e.g., Dollar et al., 1999) and some behavioral experiments (e.g., Abbink, Irlenbusch, & Renner, 2002). In addition, literature covers also some questionnaire approaches without providing any information on either possible norm samples or external validity of the questionnaires (e.g., Martin et al., 2007), and very often cover self-designed items (e.g., Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2012). Finally, research also covers some cases of interview analysis (e.g., Beenen & Pinto, 2009), or singularly small-scale field experiments (Armantier & Boly, 2011).

Third, the web-based experiment opted to be able to examine the more or less isolated impact of organizational culture on employees' corruption. Corrupt employees in actual organizations need to face encountered confounds such as leadership style, group dynamics, and time pressure that also influences their possible organizational corruption (Anand et al., 2005; Pinto et al., 2008; Rabl, 2011; Treviño et al., 2014).

1.5.1. Studies

As a first step, an explorative qualitative interview analysis examines whether there are distinct characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture that could promote employees' corruption (see Study 1). Different experts were interviewed about their own experiences in corrupt organizations as well as the insights of their contact persons who worked in a corrupt organization. Most experts had first-hand contact with many managers and employees of corrupt organizations in different industries and countries. An analysis of the expert insights of employees' perception of their organizational culture was conducted both in general and separately for managers and employees. The analysis of the semi-structured interviews was done across the interviews. This variety of perspectives on and insights into corrupt organizations from the contact persons of the experts as well as the experts themselves allow generalizing the characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture more than one case study on a particular corruption case or just the perspective of an individual corrupt employee.

Both Study 2 and Study 3 based on the results of Study 1. In Study 2, participants were asked different questionnaires about their general perception of several issues within their organizations, namely: perception of competition, tangible rewards, lax control mechanism, gifting and bribery. Except both participants' attitude towards gifting and bribery, all named aspects were chosen taking the findings from Study 1 into account. The aim of Study 2 was to analyze whether the assumed connections within the different layers of organizational culture as results of Study 1 actually influence employees' attitudes towards

corruption. In Study 3, participants were put in the role of working for a fictitious organization. They then received a corrupt offer, upon which they discussed with a simulated colleague whether to accept it. Finally, participants decided whether they engage in corruption. The organizational culture of the organization was manipulated on two levels according to the amount of ethically supported aspects in the organizational culture. The aim of Study 3 was to analyze if a manipulation of main characteristics of the results of Study 1 could directionally influence corrupt behavior. Via the method mix this works tries to cover whether a corrupt organizational culture could promote employees' corruption.

2. Theoretical Background and Hypothesis

This section provides an overview about the research on corruption, the construct of organizational culture, how organizational culture might influence corruption; and if the impact of sex and the interaction of organizational culture and sex depends on the type of corruption.

2.1. Causes for and Consequences of High Levels of Perceived Corruption

The research of corruption is rather young, interdisciplinary, and very heterogenic, because of the difficulties to measure and manipulate corruption, its' huge variety of manifestations, employees' roles and perspectives (see Table 1 for a short overview). To ensure a better understanding of the partly contradicting findings and assumptions, the literature review is categorized in: causes and consequences of general perceived level of corruption and causes for both organizational and counterproductive corruption. The impact variables from literature will be described on the following levels: macro, meso, and micro level (i.e., national, industrial, organizational, work-group, and individual level) when there are results or assumptions in literature.

On the macro level, the most popular measurement of corruption is the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) that aggregates data from about 175 countries about how experts perceive the corruptness of their own country (Transparency International, 2014).[7] Countries are ranked according to their mean values, the higher the value in the CPI - the less corrupt the country. According to the results in 2014 (see Figure 2), corruption is a widespread and significant problem. However, the CPI does neither differ between certain types or forms of corruption nor does it cover any statistical data about suspected or convicted corruption cases

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[7] It is impossible to receive any information about objective data how many employees face corruption, how many are involved etc. because of its illegal characteristics and secrecy of corruption (Rabl, 2011). This is also a reason why the Corruption Perception Index by Transparency International only covers the perceived corruption within the country in order to get close to the actual numbers.

Table 1.

Heterogeneity of Corruption.

Perspectives of corruption	Explanation	Examples
Causes	The question what causes corruption can be analyzed on several levels that differ in their scope of possible causes.	Reasons of: individuals, governments, economy, organizations, industries, multinational companies, etc.
Consequences	Depending on the level of analysis the consequences of corruption differ.	Jail, career opportunities, changed regulations, impact on democracy, etc.
Research field	Every research field has several own definitions and perspectives on corruption.	Psychology, politics, law, sociology, criminology, economics, etc.
Level of analysis	Differences emerge about how and why corruption occurs depending the level of analysis: micro, meso, and macro level.	Individuals, work-group, organization, industry, national, international, etc.
Types	The types differ in their: transaction frequency, money amount, relationship between participants, social acceptance, or profiteer.	Petty corruption, structural corruption (organizational vs. counterproductive corruption), grand corruption, etc.
Forms	Corruption can manifest in different forms. These forms in turn can differ in their manifestation depending on the types of corruption. It is not clear if all forms work always via the same mechanism.	Gifting, bribery, nepotism, extortion, embezzlement, cartels, price fixing, lobbyism, organ trade, money or goods laundry, doping, etc.

Table 1. *(continued).*

Perspectives of corruption	Explanation	Examples
Participants	There is huge scope of possible participants in corruption depending on the level of analysis. Organizations can participate on corruption as well as individuals with different professions.	Singe professions: police officers, employees, managers, organizations: whole industries, etc.
Roles	There are different employee roles in corruption depending on the contact with corruption.	Donor, taker, silent observer, whistle blower, victim, witness, compliance officer, etc.
Motive for behavior	The motives for corruption can differ between and within the level of analysis.	individuals: greed vs. financial problems Organizations: competing against a cartel in their market, doing business in corrupt countries, etc.

Note. This table is incomplete, there are much more differences in the research of corruption. One need to take into account that all named perspectives might also interact with each other. For example, the roles and motives for corrupt behavior could interact, or also causes for corruption with consequences and the level of analysis. The summary is a result of the authors literature review (e.g., Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Dimant, 2013; Jain, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2005; Tanzi, 1998; Treisman, 2000, and many more).

within the countries. Therefore, the CPI illustrates only a shared subjective perception, which in turn is based on national and cultural norms of the experts. A study reports systematical bias of the perceived corruption influenced by a self-fulfilling prophecy of the interviewed experts, which not only depended on the former reported corruption within the country but also on individual characteristics of the experts (e.g., education, age, and income, Donchev & Ujhelyi, 2009).

Figure 2. Corruption Perception Index 2014[8]

Note. The higher the score (= brighter the color) the less corrupt the country.

The amount of perceived corruption within and between countries is assumed to be influenced by several macro-level variables (see Figure 3). The majority of corruption research covers relations between national level variables and perceived corruption and is mainly based in politics, economics, sociology, or sometimes psychology. Researchers often correlate the CPI with other indexes, state indicators, or other national variables.[9] Although this research relies on correlative macro level data, researchers often interpret the results as directional or generalize the results of the macro-level to predict individuals' counterproductive corrupt behavior. Nevertheless - to the authors' knowledge - there are no studies that systematically cover the real impact of national level variables on the direct corrupt behavior of individuals.

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[8] From "Corruption Perception Index 2014" by Transparency International (2014) p. 2 and 3, Copyright Transparency International (2014), reprinted with permission.

[9] A huge amount of studies are also particular case studies for particular countries (e.g., the corruptness of politicians in the Ukraine, the corruption issue in Kosovo, comparative analysis of laws in different countries). Because each particular case is difficult to generalize these research results are not reviewed.

Figure 3. Relations between Macro-level Characteristics and Perceived High Levels of Corruption.

Note. (+) = increases corruption.

Several studies report how less developed countries perceive higher levels of corruption (Baughn, Bodie, Buchanan, & Bixby, 2010; Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012; Montinola & Jackman, 2002; O'Connor & Fischer, 2011) and two studies report an explicit causal positive relationship between wealth and the perceived corruption (i.e., the more wealthy the country the less corrupt, because of the reverse categorization of the CPI; Mujtaba, Williamson, Cavico, & McClelland, 2013; Treisman, 2000). Perhaps developed countries face only more invisible corruption (e.g., organizational corruption, tax havens, and corrupt politicians),[10] where corruption was less perceived in everyday life. This low amount of visible corruption might influence the experts' low perception of corruption. For example, one study reports that organizations of strong export nations (that usually have low amounts of perceived corruption) seem more likely to pay bribes abroad in developing countries (Baughn et al., 2010). Thus, perhaps wealthier countries might do more foreign organizational

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[10] These countries also face amounts of counterproductive corruption. However, petty corruption is rather low in these countries because it is not socially accepted.

corruption (that stays mostly invisible for the domestic population) than domestic corruption. In turn, domestic experts may become less aware about the foreign corruption by both domestic organizations and individuals.

On the contrary, less developed countries often suffer from petty corruption, counterproductive corruption of powerful elites, and organizational corruption. The counterproductive corruption of elites often becomes visible or a shared open secret. Therefore, the amount of visible corruption could be greater and influence the higher perception of corruption by the experts. Since there is no measurement about what type and form of corruption occurs to which extent in these countries, it may be rather the type than the amount of corruption that is related to the wealth of a country and the perceived level of corruption.

Empirical findings. Research revealed that the following variables often occur together with high levels of perceived corruption (often measured with the CPI): high amounts of bureaucracy (Treisman, 2000), a bad rule of law (Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012), low amount of women in both parliament and labor force (Dollar et al., 1999; Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2014; Swamy et al., 2000), low values in national integrity (Fine, 2010), and an unfree press (Brunetti & Weder, 2003). Many other aspects where referred in different sources as either cause or consequence of corruption. The limited latitude and role of the government (e.g., in Afghanistan), bad or none social welfare (e.g., developing countries), poverty, bad income distribution, globalization, tax rises, inadequate power distribution, not growing GDP, increased shadow economy, bad infrastructure, bad education, brain-drain because of migration, reduction of public investment, environmental pollution, and low or inexistent penalty for corruption are only few examples (see for further details the reviews by Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Dimant, 2013; Jain, 2001; Lambsdorff, 2005; and Tanzi, 1998). Finally, another study analyzed that corruption leads to a reduced trust of people in their government (Richey, 2010). On the contrary, according to one study the following aspects are not related to corruption: population size, dominant religion, ethnic fractionalization, and a communist tradition (Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012). There are different assumptions how political instability (i.e., war, after-war, terrorist groups, huge amount of drug dealing in the country, or other types of instability) might be related to corruption (Elbahnasawy & Revier, 2012). These findings show that corruption is linked to several aspects of bad governance, political instability, and economic wealth that are directly or indirectly related to many general political and economic issues of many countries.

Therefore, one might assume that corruption stays in a multiple connection with mutual influences with several (social) wrongs and could make them worse.

Further findings show that the following cultural dimensions are positively related with corruption among other: high power distance (Baughn et al., 2010; Fine, 2010; Seleim & Bontis, 2009; Steel & Taras, 2010), high uncertainty avoidance (Seleim & Bontis, 2009; Steel & Taras, 2010), high collectivism (Fine, 2010; Li, Triandis, & Yu, 2006; Seleim & Bontis, 2009; Steel & Taras, 2010), high masculinity (Steel & Taras, 2010), high future orientation (Seleim & Bontis, 2009), low gender egalitarianism (Seleim & Bontis, 2009), and finally both high national conscientiousness and low openness to experiences (Connelly & Ones, 2008). The named culture variables influence differrently on many heterogenic aspects within a country that in turn could impact the amount of perceived corruption. Therefore, it is difficult to interpret these variables as causes for or consequences of corruption.

Connection. All named results could indicate how many aspects might be related to the amount of perceived corruption within and between countries. Although literature refers to the named aspects often as either causes or consequences of corruption, in fact their relation seem to be much more complicated: One approach is to view corruption as a state where the named factors could be isolated causes, consequences, or accompany effects of corruption. A second approach is to view corruption as an ongoing process where the named factors can simultaneously be causes, consequences, and accompany effects that are mutually related to each and to corruption. All constellations can also be caused by variables that are not analyzed yet. Although the last approach is much more difficult it also seems more realistic. Therefore, it is very complex to draw conclusions what really influences the really existing amount of corruption on the country level and what are their direct and indirect consequences. Therefore, research on direct behavior of institutions and individuals needs to supplement these general impressions.

2.2. Organizational and Counterproductive Corruption

This research covers organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption in a more detailed manner. On the organizational level Pinto et al. (2008) referred to these types as *corrupt organizations* and *organizations with corrupt individuals*. There are two major differences on the organizational level between both types: the beneficiary and the collusion (Pinto et al., 2008). According to the authors, the beneficiary covers the primary person or institution that benefits from the corrupt action and collusion covers how employees engage together to engage in corruption on the corporate level. In corrupt organizations many employees engage in corruption as group to enrich their organization on the cost of society. In

organizations with corrupt individuals many employees enrich themselves on the cost of their organization. While in the first case corruption is assumed to takes place at the center of the organization, in the last case corruption is assumed to take place at the periphery of an organization (Pinto et al., 2008). Both types could exist simultaneously within an organization. Pintos' et al. (2008) differentiation is transferred to the individual level for this research.

Corrupt organizations are organizations where corruption is a top-down process that covers many employees who engage in coordinated corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Pinto et al., 2008) to receive systematically illicit or illegitimate benefits such as relaxations of political regulations (e.g., Enron, Siemens, or Worldcom). Corruption becomes a part of the organizations' strategy and often managers or employees secure their organization illicit advantages in both the parent company and abroad. They plan and implement corrupt transactions, uphold corrupt relationships, and cover traces to protect their organization from the outside (e.g., police or state attorneys). Thus, many employees are assumed to be in contact with organizational corruption (Anand et al., 2005). In corrupt organizations, employees engage coordinately in organizational expected and rewarded work behavior when they engage in illegal or illegitimate behavior that is in line with the organizational norms, rules, and interests (Pinto et al., 2008). The corrupt behavior benefits the organization directly or indirectly and the organization would protect the corrupt organizational members (i.e., management or employees) when they get caught by external forces. As employees' corrupt behavior covers a (voluntarily) behavior that is in line with significant organizational norms and supports the well-being of an organization, this behavior can be seen as expected organizational behavior (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 2001). The usual term of organizational behavior in literature covers human behavior in organizations with the impact of the individual, work-group, and organizational factors on this behavior (Nerdinger, Blickle, Schaper, & Schaper, 2008). Because corruption is one of many possible behaviors within an organization and all named aspects seem also to impact corruption on behalf of the organization, this behavior is seen as one dark type of organizational behavior. Therefore, this type of corruption on the individual level is addressed with the term *organizational corruption*.

According to Pinto et al. (2008), organizations with corrupt individuals are organizations where corruption is a bottom-up process that covers so many organizational members who engage independently in personal corrupt behaviors (i.e., corruption that benefits the individual) that the whole organization can be seen as corrupt. This means that

the personal enrichment of individual employees through corruption is so widespread within the organization that the organization cannot inhibit this behavior. These organizational members harm their own organization in many ways (e.g., less qualified employees get a leadership position via favoritism, employees accept bribes by contracting parties and preferring more expansive contractors, or embezzling of work material). Often managers or employees of such organizations secure themselves illicit advantages because they plan and implement corrupt transactions, uphold corrupt relationships to outsiders, and cover traces to protect their own actions from the organization. In organizations with corrupt individuals, the individual organizational member engages in counterproductive work behavior because he or she engages in illegal or illegitimate behavior that is against the organizational norms, rules, and interests (Pinto et al., 2008; Robinson & Bennett, 1995). The corrupt behavior harms the organization directly or indirectly and the organization would punish the corrupt organizational member when he or she gets caught. Since this corrupt behavior covers a "voluntarily behavior that violate[s] significant organizational norms and […] threatens the well-being of an organization […]" (definition of work place deviance; Robinson & Bennett, 1995, p. 556), this behavior can be seen as counterproductive to the organization (in terms of property deviance or political deviance, see Robinson & Bennett, 1995). Therefore, this type of corruption on the individual level is addressed with the term *counterproductive corruption*.

The next parts cover on the one hand causes for organizational corruption and causes for corporate criminal behavior that are assumed to work similarly for organizational corruption. And on the other hand, they cover both causes for counterproductive corruption and for unethical behavior that are assumed to work similarly for counterproductive corruption.

2.2.1. Organizational Corruption

Macro- and meso-level variables are assumed to influence organizational corruption (see Figure 4). While theoretical assumptions surpass the amount of empirical evidences in organizational corruption, the main shared theoretical assumptions on corruption get also reviewed. The few existent empirical studies often face some methodological issues (e.g., self-designed items or a particular case analysis), limiting both generalizability and validity of their results. Theories also often mixed up the construct of organizational corruption with the much wider constructs of corporate crime, corporate illegality, or unethical behavior done on behalf of the organization. While the last three named constructs often cover heterogenic and of different intense illegal behavior (e.g., accounting fraud or environmental pollution) organizational corruption itself is a more extreme corporate crime. Therefore, the next

paragraphs first rely on empirical evidence of organizational corruption, and then on a summary about prominent theoretical assumptions for organizational corruption and corporate illegality, corporate crime, and unethical behavior on behalf of the organization. To the authors' knowledge none of the named theoretical assumptions have been tested empirically in the context of organizational corruption, yet.

Figure 4. Impact Variables for Organizational Corruption.

Note. The findings of organizational characteristics are results from four studies, the findings of individual characteristics are taken from two studies (i.e., limited generalization). The theoretical assumptions represent the most shared theoretical assumptions about impact variables; (+) = increases organizational corruption.

Empirical findings. One empirical result of organizational corruption shows that country level variables explained 36 % of the variance of organizational corruption when organizations use bribery as organizational corruption (Martin et al., 2007). The authors used a data pool of interviews with firm representatives of 3.769 companies conducted by the World Bank (World Business Environment Survey). Results showed that individualistic countries show more organizational corruption than collectivistic countries (Martin et al., 2007). This result is on the one hand contrary to the perceived low corruption in individualistic countries and on the other hand in line with the results of more foreign bribery

of export nations (i.e., more individualistic and wealthier, see above). Another result is the interaction of achievement orientation and political constraints. High achievement orientation and high political constraints lead to a low amount of organizational corruption whereas achievement orientation and lower political constraints lead to more organizational corruption (Martin et al., 2007). In addition, welfare socialism also moderates the relation between achievement orientation and bribery. In countries with lower social welfare, high achievement orientation was a better predictor for high levels of organizational corruption than in countries with a higher welfare (Martin et al., 2007). Again these results could be influenced by the development of the country. Developed and less developed countries differ in their possibilities to both install political constraints and to provide social welfare. Finally, less developed countries may provide better opportunities for organizational corruption for foreign organizations than developed countries.

Only four empirical studies have analyzed influencing variables on organizational corruption on the organizational level so far. The above named study analyzed the data of the World Bank (Martin et al., 2007), the second study made semi-structured interviews with 314 Indian executive managers (Collins et al., 2009), the third study analyzed secondary literature documents of the Enron case (Stein & Pinto, 2011) and the last study interviewed Enron's former vice president and whistle blower Sharron Watkins about her impressions and assumptions about the Enron case (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). According to this low amount of empirical evidence, variables that increase the likelihood for organizational corruption are: higher financial constraints (Martin et al., 2007), organizational perception of competition (Martin et al., 2007), managements' good social ties to employees of the government (Collins et al., 2009), top managements' rationalization of corruption as usual behavior (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Collins et al., 2009), larger company size (Collins et al., 2009), a macho and aggressive organizational culture which undermine ethical values (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Stein & Pinto, 2011), huge competition between departments (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Stein & Pinto, 2011), over average salaries and fast promotion when employees attain their goals (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Stein & Pinto, 2011), managements' greed (Beenen & Pinto, 2009), charismatic leadership (Beenen & Pinto, 2009), rewarding of corrupt behavior and finally a huge pressure to achieve high goals (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). On the contrary, there was no impact on organizational corruption by industry (Martin et al., 2007), executives' position, annual revenues of the company, and whether managers perceived corruption as harmful (Collins et al., 2009). Limitations of these studies are: on the organizational level the empirical study combined an index measure of culture with individual interviews (Martin et

al., 2007), and two out of three qualitative analyses were done on the Enron case. It is not known if Enron is an ordinary example for organizational corruption or just one particular unsuccessful example because they got caught. There could be essential differences between the bright and dark field of corruption because literature assumes that less than one percent of all corruption cases appear in the bright field (in Germany, Bannenberg & Schaupensteiner, 2007).[11]

Two studies show that a transformational leadership style increases employees' willingness to engage in unethical behavior on behalf of the organization (Effelsberg, Solga, & Gurt, 2014). These results are in line with the assumption that a charismatic leader can increase organizational corruption. Two sources showed that employees' positive identification with their organization mediates the impact of the leadership/ organization on employees' unethical behavior on behalf of the organization (Effelsberg et al., 2014; Umphress, Bingham, & Mitchell, 2010; respectively). The study by Effelsberg et al. (2014) also concluded that individuals' disposition to ethics impacted employees' unethical behavior on behalf of the organization (i.e., employees with high organizational identification and high amorality tend to become more likely unethical for their organization).

Only two experiments took a perspective on whether certain individual characteristics influence organizational corruption. None of the analyzed characteristics had any impact on organizational corruption of participants - neither achievement motive, conscientiousness, machiavellianism, nor person-organizational-fit (Campbell & Göritz, 2014a). These aspects need to be tested in further research for their stability. In line with these results it seems that situational factors (among other organizational culture) are assumed to be a major impact factor for organizational corruption (Anand et al., 2005). Nevertheless, much more empirical studies are necessary to understand the phenomenon of organizational corruption specifically.

Theoretical assumptions are that corporate crime and organizational corruption are a result of high pressure from organizational environment in terms of: industrial norms of wrongdoing (Apel & Paternoster, 2009; Baucus, 1994), high pressure markets or performance pressure (e.g., a cartel in the market; Baucus, 1994; DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004), high competition (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004), pressure from stakeholder, or media (Baucus, 1994; DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004), complex organizations (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004), poor performing companies (Baucus, 1994), or few organizational resources (Baucus, 1994; Merton, 1968). These variables are assumed to put pressure on the organization, which in turn

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[11]"Bright field" refers to all corruption cases that got criminally prosecuted by institutions of the government (e.g., police or judiciary). The bright field of this issue could only provide limited information about the real scope and form of corruption within a sector, industry or country (Höffling, 2002). It could be assumed that the dark field is often much bigger and differs in its characteristics from the bright field.

impacts the behavior and perceived pressure by the management (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004). Thus, the management is assumed to face high pressure of unrealistic growth expectations and goals, which they pass on to their subordinates (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004) via different management strategies. These strategies may be charismatic leadership that support corruption (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004), reacting positively on or ignore corporate crime (Baucus, 1994; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003), unrealistic high goal-setting (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Brief et al., 2001), and a corruption supporting organizational culture (e.g., Ashforth et al., 2008; Beenen & Pinto, 2009). Employees are assumed to assimilate themselves to the organizational culture and might become *ethically blind* (i.e., unaware of their criminal behavior; Palazzo, Krings, & Hoffrage, 2012). Ethically blind employees shall be non-sensitive of corruption and shall reflect little about their behavior, and therefore, behave in a thoughtless way (Palazzo et al., 2012). Therefore, employees who engage in organizational corruption often seem to violate societal standards rather unintentionally (Moore, 2008).

   Prominent theories. Employees' engagement in organizational corruption may depend on several factors such as his or her department, latitude, and position. For example, employees who work in the purchasing department could have more opportunities to support corruption than desk officers, cleaners, or employees working in the warehouse. Depending on department, latitude, and position employees' contact with corruption might differ between intense contact (e.g., negotiating insider deals) to non-intense contact (e.g., shredding incriminating documents), or no contact at all. Nevertheless, the theories have not differed between the intensity of contract with corruption so far. The most prominent theories to describe employees' organizational corruption are: (1) pressure-opportunity model, (2) to challenging goal-setting, (3) charismatic leadership and (4) the theory of normalization of corruption. (1) The pressure-opportunity model describes the way in which employees will engage in corruption more likely when they face both a huge external pressure to engage in it (e.g., organizational financial problems, huge dynamics in the market; MacLean, 2008) and an opportunity to do so (e.g., no explicit regulations, lax control mechanism; MacLean, 2008). This theory is based on the rational-choice approach (Simon, 1955) and assumes that every individual weighs the costs and benefits of their behavioral choices in a rational and calculated way (MacLean, 2008). The empirical findings and theoretical assumptions of competition and financial constraints might indicate the pressure on managers and employees to engage in organizational corruption, whereas empirical findings and theoretical assumptions of complex and huge companies and the perception of corruption as usual might indicate open opportunities to engage in organizational corruption. There are two main

limitations of this theory. First, not all employees engage in corruption intentionally (Anand et al., 2005; Palazzo et al., 2012), therefore, any unintentional corruption could not be a result of employees' conscious balancing of cost and weights as a consequence of high pressure and opportunity. Second, individuals' behavior is not solely based on rational cognitive choices.

(2) Employees are assumed more likely to engage in corruption when they face a huge pressure to attain the high challenging goals of their superiors or stakeholders (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004). The high challenging goals seem to activate a drive by the employees that might allow them to engage in unethical behavior (i.e., corruption is integrated in the goal-setting; Brief et al., 2001; Sims & Brinkman, 2003). Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinksky, and Bazerman (2009) argue that employees seem to seek for action alternatives (e.g., corruption) or engage in higher risks regarding their behavior to attain their goals if they cannot attain them through common performance. Although there is not enough research to confirm the assumptions by Ordóñez et al., the goal-setting seems to be a remarkable component. Also, the above named theoretical assumptions and empirical findings refer to specific goal-setting as one possibility for organizational corruption. If a high challenging goal-setting might open the possibility for employees to engage in organizational corruption, it might upraise the question of why employees accept these goals?

(3) Some authors argue that a charismatic management can inspire their subordinates to engage in corruption (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004). Through employees' identification with their management they can identify with the goals of their management and the goals and values they stand for. The empirical findings also indicate that the behavior of the management seems very important for organizational corruption. Leaders are also present as role-models and leaders' attention focus can guide employees' behavior in the expected direction (i.e., what they reward and what they punish; Ashforth & Anand, 2003). However, it is not known how managers influence employees' organizational corruption in detail.

(4) The most prominent theory of normalization of corruption describes that corruption gets normalized within organizations and that within these organizations a microcosm occurs that enables employees to engage in organizational corruption (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; see below). The normalization seems to work via three mechanisms: socialization, rationalization, and institutionalization that influence employees' feelings, cognitions, and behavior, respectively (see Anand et al., 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Spicer, 2009). If members of work-groups use social influence strategies to introduce and reinforce colleagues to engage in organizational corruption they engage in *socialization*. For example, one individual employee could get gradually introduced to work tasks including

corruption to an increasing extent (Chang & Lai, 2002). Socialization can enable employees to receive an emotional support to engage in corruption by their direct colleagues. If employees use arguments to both reshape their perception about corrupt work tasks and to reduce their cognitive dissonance about corruption, they engage in *rationalization*. For example, employees might deny any personal responsibility for the organizational corruption because they just performed as the management of the organization instructed them to (cf., Maruna & Copes, 2004). Rationalization seems to enable employees not only in their continuation of corruption but also to feel still as a moral and ethical individual (Anand et al., 2005; Maruna & Copes, 2004). If the management of the organization uses work structures that enable employees to facilitate organizational corruption in their daily business, this process is named *institutionalization* (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). For example, subordinates implement corrupt work tasks into the general work routines.

For their interwoven character, the three mechanisms could form a microcosm called *social cocoon* (Anand et al., 2005; Ashforth & Anand, 2003). According to the authors, the social cocoon consists of managers and employees who differ in their positive attitude towards corruption from the negative attitude of corruption by society. Employees in the social cocoon engage in organizational corruption, expect their colleagues to act corruptly, as well as they punish colleagues who refuse their support of organizational corruption (Chang & Lai, 2002; Greenberger, Miceli, & Cohen, 1987). Whereas this theory describes several mutual working mechanism on the employees, work-group and management base, it could not explain why employees share a positive evaluation of corruption.

Summary. Independent of the real existing number of employees who possible might engage in organizational corruption in different organizations, not all of these employees will share similar personal traits that might explain their organizational corruption. Instead it might be more plausible that many corrupt employees share some situational factors that are conductive to corruption. As empirical findings, theoretical assumptions, and prominent theories above show, the major focus lays on situational aspects that explain organizational corruption.

2.2.2. Counterproductive Corruption

Meso and micro level variables influence counterproductive corruption (see Figure 5). Research mainly takes place in economics, criminology, and sometimes psychology. Besides the generalization of macro-level data of perceived corruption within a country on individual counterproductive corruption, the majority of quoted research in literature (e.g., in Ashforth et al., 2008) is actually research on more general constructs such as unethical behavior,

counterproductive work behavior, workplace deviance, and white-collar crime (all further referred to as *unethical behavior*). There is only a small amount of studies on counterproductive corruption itself. Although it is still not analyzed how similar counterproductive corruption and other less illegal types of unethical behaviors are (e.g., absenteeism, refusal to work, sabotage, theft, sexual harassment, or excessive gossip), counterproductive corruption might rather share aspects with other extreme versions of unethical behavior (e.g., grand theft). Therefore, this literature review will also cover the majorly used results of the wider context of unethical behavior. While results of ethical behavior are often interpreted as the counter side for counterproductive corruption, some major results of ethical behavior are also reviewed. However, the author is skeptical if one might be able to generalize all results of ethical behavior and unethical behavior on all forms of counterproductive corruption. For example Dalal (2005) showed in a meta-analysis that organizational citizenship behavior (what could also cover ethical behavior, or whistle blowing) and counterproductive work behavior are not two ends of one dimension. Therefore, individual employees could show both types of behavior for different work aspects. Only because literature covers these aspects, they will be reviewed here. Another approach is the research on anti-corruption. Often results about general whistle blowing are framed as protective factors to reduce counterproductive corruption. Again, studies are missing to empirically support such conclusions and generalizations for counterproductive corruption. Nevertheless, to complete the review a brief summary is presented of important results in the whistle blowing literature. To ensure a more distinct pattern of understanding, each aspect of research will be presented independently, namely counterproductive corruption, unethical and ethical behavior, and whistle blowing.

Empirical findings of counterproductive corruption. Studies show that counterproductive corruption is more likely when employees perceive a positive reciprocity for the corrupt transaction with the corrupt parties (Abbink et al., 2002), and when employees perceive positive norms for counterproductive behavior and high self-efficacy (Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008). A study by Huberts, Kaptein, and Lasthuizen (2007) showed that police officers engage more often in different forms of counterproductive corruption (the authors named: gifting, corruption, fraud, and favoritism) if they perceive their superior acting unethically too and/or if the superior does not value ethics enough. Also, a study showed that higher penalty reduces counterproductive corruption (Abbink et al., 2002). Thus, situational aspects might influence how employees decide to engage in counterproductive corruption. On the contrary, results show that employees seem to underestimate their discover probability

(Abbink et al., 2002). Finally, the following variables have no effect on the amount of counterproductive behavior: social welfare on the country level (Abbink et al., 2002), the abstractness of the code of ethics, time pressure (Rabl, 2011), and the size of the bribe (Litzcke, Linssen, Schön, & Heber 2014; Rabl, 2011, analyzed behavior with bribe differences of 100.000 Euro).

Figure 5. Impact Variables for Counterproductive Corruption.

Note. The findings are taken from eight studies (i.e., limited generalization); (-) = the variable reduces counterproductive corruption; (+) = increases counterproductive corruption.

On the individual level the following variables increase the likelihood of counterproductive corruption: high machiavellianism (Connelly & Ones, 2008; Hegarty & Sims, 1978), high power motive or more power (Bendahan, Zehnder, Pralong, & Antonakis, 2015; Rosenblatt, 2012) and low social identity, low ethical values, high egoistic and amoral intention (Ntayi, Ngoboka, & Kakooza, 2013). A correlative quasi-experimental study showed that individuals with higher values in psychopathy had less negative ratings on their perception of counterproductive corruption (Litzcke, Linssen, Heber, Schön, 2015). On the contrary, individuals with high values in conscientiousness, high agreeableness and low openness for new experiences perceived counterproductive corruption as more negative than

individuals with the opposite characteristics (small effects; Litzcke et al., 2015). Finally, this study showed that intelligence was not related to the perception of corruption. Since this was a correlative design, one cannot interpret the named individual characteristics as causes that make counterproductive corruption more likely. Furthermore, research often takes a perspective on gender differences in counterproductive corruption. Therefore, women engage less often in counterproductive corruption, blow the whistle more often (Frank, Lambsdorff, & Boehm, 2011), and counterproductive corruption is more likely when the company owner is a man (Ramdani & van Witteloostuijn, 2012). Such results often lead to a generalization that men are always more corrupt than women for all types and forms of corruption (see below).

A study by Bannenberg (2005) described individual characteristics of convicted counterproductive offenders in Germany. This analysis shows that typical counterproductive offenders have legal value assumptions about ethical and unethical behavior, no depts, are of male sex, have a certain amount of power and latitude in their organization, are not previously convicted, used to corrupt practices for ten – 20 years and finally do not see themselves as criminals. This study shows that counterproductive corruption is not a phenomenon for psychopaths or peculators and more a phenomenon of regular employees, who had gone wrong. Limitations of this study are again possible different characteristics of the bright and dark field of corruption and the only German sample.

Empirical findings of (un)ethical behavior. On the organizational level, the following variables increase unethical behavior (see Figure 6 for a general overview): competitiveness within the organization (especially for men; Craft, 2013), egoistic work climate (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), when unethical behavior gets rewarded in the organization (Craft, 2013; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). These results are similar to the results in counterproductive corruption. Also, results of the other direction of ethical behavior are partly in line with the results of counterproductive corruption. Therefore, ethical behavior becomes more likely (higher ethical awareness or more likelihood for whistle blowing; Craft, 2013) when there is an ethical organizational culture (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), or an ethical climate (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005; Treviño et al., 2014).

Literature reports mixed results about the impact of a code of conduct (mixed effects: Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; positive effect on ethical behavior: Craft, 2013; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Some authors assumed that a strong ethical organizational culture undercut the impact of a code of ethics through its ethical norms and incentive systems that increase ethical awareness (Craft, 2013; Treviño et al., 2014) or via peer group sense making of shared

norms (Treviño et al., 2014). Other studies showed that the decision frame (loss vs. gain; money focus vs. ethical focus) influenced the decrease vs. increase of ethical behavior, respectively (Treviño et al., 2014). Another interpretation is that organizational culture mediates the impact of ethical leadership on (un)ethical behavior (Treviño et al., 2014). Therefore, these results might indicate that the organizational culture impacts employees' ethical and unethical behavior via different mechanism.

Figure 6. Impact Variables for (un)ethical Behavior.

Note. The right hand side illustrates impact variables for unethical behavior, the left hand side impact variables for ethical behavior. Not all findings are illustrated; (-) = the variable reduces unethical behavior; (+) = increases (un)ethical behavior.

On the level of management, research shows that the following variables increase unethical behavior: if leaders behave unjust employees tend to more likely engage in unethical behavior, when employees are able to legitimize their own unethical behavior (Treviño et al., 2014), and if employees face unmet goals (Schweitzer, Ordóñez, & Douma, 2004). The little available research showed that ethical leadership reduces the amount of unethical behavior (Treviño et al., 2014). However, as the authors concluded, more insights are necessary to draw better conclusions.

Finally, results on the individual level show that – on the one hand - the following variables increase unethical behavior: low integrity (Connelly & Ones, 2008), external locus of control on the individual level (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Treviño & Youngblood, 1990),

internal locus of control on the workgroup level (Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006), high machiavellianism (Craft, 2013; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; O'Boyle, Forsyth, Banks, & McDaniel, 2012; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), role conflict (Treviño et al., 2006), low cognitive or moral development (Treviño & Youngblood, 1990), high hedonism or high narcissism (Blickle et al., 2006), while a high job satisfaction reduces unethical behavior (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). On the other hand, variables which increase ethical behavior are: higher education and more work experience (Craft, 2013), and internal locus of control (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). Finally there are mixed results for age and conscientiousness (high conscientiousness leads to higher readiness for white collar crime; Blickle et al., 2006; Collins & Schmidt, 1993; mixed results for ethical behavior; Craft, 2013). In addition, there are mixed results if men and women differ in their (un)ethical behavior (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005). While women were found to have a high morale cognitive development (Craft, 2013) that is positively related with ethical judgment (O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005), their unethical behavior depended on the context (Craft, 2013).

This summary shows that some variables cover two sides of the same coin for (un)ethical behavior, for example leadership, aspects of organizational culture and climate, rewarded behavior, and internal vs. external locus of control. Compared with the empirical findings for counterproductive corruption unethical behavior and counterproductive corruption share high machiavellianism as possible individual risk characteristic.

Empirical findings of protective factors of counterproductive corruption. Because of the secrecy of corruption, employees who coincidently witness wrongdoing and report them (blow the whistle) are the most effective tools to detect counterproductive corruption within the organization (Dimant, 2013; Drew, 2003). A free press on the national level, as well as circumstances within the organization increasing the amount of whistle blowing on corruption are also often cited as protective factors for corruption (Dimant, 2013, see Figure 7 for an overview). As the model of Greenberger et al. (1987) illustrates, employees need to go through several phases when they decide if they blow the whistle. Employees have to become aware that a certain behavior is wrong, that they themselves are responsible for telling the wrongdoing, and that they will not face any retaliation of disadvantages in telling. On all steps employees are influenced by group norms of wrongdoing, whistle blowing or other organizational factors.

A study about whistle blowing on counterproductive corruption was done about differences between employees who did not face any counterproductive corruption, who were silent observers, and whistle blowers of counterproductive corruption (Rothschild & Miethe,

1999).[12] The authors analyzed interviews of more than 761 employees in different work industries (e.g., non-profit organizations, petro-chemical plant, or manufacturing companies). In addition, the authors analyzed figures from a database of more than 13.000 federal employees. Results show that whistle blowing on counterproductive corruption rather takes place in the public sector than in private business and that whistle blowers often face retaliation by the management. Participatory work environments and ethical climate had a positive impact on whistle blowing. In addition, there was no particular demographic data that whistle blowers differ from silent observers in sex, age, education, religiosity, number of promotions, self-esteem, and altruism. Only whistle blowers had slightly more universalistic values. However, the study did not describe in detail what kind of universalistic values these were.

Figure 7. Impact Variables for Whistle Blowing.

Note. The right hand side illustrates impact variables for whistle blowing on counterproductive corruption, the left hand side impact variables for whistle blowing on general unethical behavior; (-) = the variable reduces the likelihood for whistle blowing; (+) = increases the likelihood for whistle blowing.

Literature in the context of counterproductive corruption often refers to results of whistle blowing on general unethical behavior, although both need to differ because - as Near, Rehg, van Scotter, and Miceli (2004) reported - whistle blowing is more likely when the costs of the wrongdoing are small. In line with these results, whistle blowing on counterproductive

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[12] Silent observer = passive witness of corruption who remains silence about corruption; whistle blower = witness of corruption who reports the corruption within the organization or to external institutions (e.g., media or police).

corruption might be less likely than whistleblowing on other unethical behavior (e.g., theft). On the national level, the following variables have a positive impact on whistle blowing on general unethical behavior: countries' individualism (Brody, Coulter, & Lin, 1999; Keenan, 2007), high uncertainty avoidance (MacNab et al., 2007), and low power distance (MacNab et al., 2007). These results may stay in line with the results of perceived corruption. When employees in individualistic countries engage more likely in whistle blowing, perhaps less employees might engage in counterproductive corruption because they face a higher risk of detection. The same might count for power distance. High uncertainty avoidance seems to impact both more perceived corruption on the national level as well as whistle blowing. Since high uncertainty avoiding countries often face high levels of bureaucracy, this bureaucracy might explain both types of behavior. While bureaucracy is often assumed as a cause and consequence of counterproductive corruption (provides opportunities to employees to expect speed money) it could also protect whistle blowers from retaliation (Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Literature did not reveal more details about how bureaucracy could shape counterproductive corruption and whistle blowing; however, there might be different approaches or different patterns of bureaucracy that could describe a different influence on both. For example a countries' wealth, political constraints, judiciary regulations, and whistle blower protection might increase particular aspects in bureaucracy and employees' opportunity to engage in counterproductive corruption, whereas a less transparent process might provide more opportunities for counterproductive corruption.

On the organizational level, an ethical organizational culture has a strong positive impact on general whistle blowing (the support by the management, clarity of ethic and unethical behavior, and sanctions of unethical behavior) and decrease in action (see study by Kaptein, 2011b; and reviews by Treviño & Youngblood, 1990; Vadera, Aguilera, & Caza, 2009). Also, Berry (2004) argued that organizational culture has a huge effect on general whistle blowing, because the organizational culture influences how employees reflect on behavior and actions. According to her, the rewarding of ethical and the punishment of unethical behavior, ethical leadership role model, and the salience of ethical standards have positive impact on whistle blowing. Finally, also rewards for right whistle blowing increase the reporting (Xu & Ziegenfuss, 2008).

On the individual level the following variables had a positive impact on whistle blowing against unethical behavior: higher position (Keenan, 2002; Miceli & Near, 2002; Miceli, Near, & Schwenk, 1991), if employees feel more responsible themselves (Miceli et al., 1991), higher educated (Miceli & Near, 1988), internal locus of control (Chiu, 2003), and

high job satisfaction (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005). Several studies report mixed effects whether men or women more likely blow the whistle or if both behave similarly (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Vadera et al., 2009), and whether age impacts whistle blowing (see review by Vadera et al., 2009). These findings might depend on the particular type of unethical behavior or also on the measured manifestation of corruption within the studies (Bowman & Gilligan, 2008). The fear of and the actual retaliation reduce the likelihood for whistle blowing (Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005).

The review by Mesmer-Magnus and Viswesvaran (2005) concluded that situational factors are more important variables than individual characteristics for whistle blowing. Therefore, important variables are the support by the management, the climate and the ethical values within the organizational culture. Also, Sööt (2012) concluded that the implementations of anti-corrupt policies often fail because the management reinforces organizational culture values that downplay the anti-corruption importance. In general, whistle blowing and ethical behavior are both more likely when employees have an internal locus of control and are of higher education. On the organizational level again, ethical organizational culture and the rewarded behavior influences how employees behave.

Prominent theories. The most prominent theories to describe counterproductive corruption are: (1) principal-agent theory, (2) a corrupt relationship, and (3) dark triangle. (1) Principal-agent theory covers the relationships between the employees (i.e., agents) and their organization (i.e., principal) and assumes that employees violate organizational standards intentionally when they engage in counterproductive corruption (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). According to the theory, employees engage in counterproductive corruption as a result of the weighing of costs and benefits of corruption (= rational choice approach). These employees often behave in a criminal way although a more or less non-corrupt environment surrounds them. As a solution for corruption the principal-agent model assumes rewards (e.g., increased payment) to prevent corruption and punishment for corrupt behavior (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). Both approaches should change the cost-benefits weighting of the agent. Employees' perceived positive norms for counterproductive corruption or high perception of reciprocity could influence the cost/benefit weighing. Also, an egoistic work climate, unmet goals, and rewards for unethical behavior could impact an unmoral cost/benefit weight. One problem of this approach is that not all cases of counterproductive corruption are a result of employees' conscious rational choice. This model could not explicitly explain cases where employees got forced to engage in counterproductive corruption (e.g., blackmail), where employees got emotionally frustrated (e.g., because of perceived non-existent organizational justice) at their

workplace so that they use corruption as a personal solution to increase their satisfaction or status needs, or when employees engage in corruption because of their personality (e.g., five percent of convicted offenders were swindler personalities, see Bannenberg, 2005).

(2) Höffling (2002) analyzed the relationship between individuals who engaged in counterproductive corruption in Germany. These individuals often had some kind of pre-corrupt relationship that transferred into a corrupt relationship. At this point, all parties were aware that they were to engage in counterproductive corruption (i.e., illegal or illegitimate behavior for illegal or illegitimate benefits). After the mutual agreement to counterproductive corruption the 'florescence' followed. In this time, all parties automatized their actions for counterproductive corruption, and sometimes they modified aspects of the corrupt transaction (e.g., money amount) followed by the break of the relationship. This break can be both internally induced by one of the perpetrators or externally induced by whistle blowing of a colleague. Höffling's study is the first that tries to unravel behavioral patterns of counter-corrupt employees. Although it provides good information on how corruption might work, it could not provide any information on why employees engage in counterproductive corrupt relationships.

(3) The corruption triangle describes that individuals need three aspects to become corrupt: desire, opportunity, and legitimation (Baucus, 1994; Burke, 2009).[13] Desire to engage in corruption can be individuals' dissatisfaction with their own status or with aspects of their work, personal greed, the desire to receive a better life status, debts, or careers wishes. Former empirical findings show that machiavellianism, low integrity, rewards for unethical behavior or other variables could touch the desire to engage in counterproductive corruption. An opportunity to engage in corruption covers organizational rules and regulations that open opportunities for employees to engage in corruption (e.g., lax auditing). Former empirical findings also reported aspects such as low penalty for corruption, or bad role model of the management. Finally, legitimation refers to individuals' own justification of their criminal or unethical behavior. Since every individual seems to have the desire to feel ethical, any form of justification seems necessary if individuals engage in unethical behavior (Maruna & Copes, 2004). Former empirical findings show that work dissatisfaction, unmet goals, bad role models of management, rewards for unethical behavior, norms that support corruption could be key factors for a legitimation of counterproductive corruption. If individuals have the desire, the opportunity and can justify their own actions, they will be more likely engage in

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[13] Although this theory also applies to explaining organizational corruption, literature currently only uses this theory in the context of counterproductive corruption. In organizational corruption all aspects (desire, legitimacy, and opportunity) should be influenced by only situational factors.

counterproductive corruption. A limitation of this theory is that although it describes the particular aspects why employees engage in counterproductive corruption, it does not explain how the three aspects are related to each other.

Summary. Employees' conscious decision to engage in counterproductive corruption seems to be a result of both employees' individual characteristics and their perceived work environment (Baucus, 1994). While situational factors are assumed to have more of an impact on the (un)ethical behavior of employees, perhaps the interaction with the particular individual characteristics make the difference. This means, although employees might face similar situational environmental circumstances, only some individuals are more vulnerable for counterproductive behavior. This connection could be indicated by the research focus on both individual characteristics and situational factors (Aguilera & Vadera, 2008; Baucus, 1994).

Main conclusion. This brief literature review shows two issues. First, different variables seem to cause and influence different types of corruption. On the national level many aspects such as regulations, wealth, latitude, and power of the government seem to influence what type of corruption could be engaged in primarily. These national level aspects of course build a frame for corruption within organizations. There are some assumed and found similar impact variables between the types of corruption; namely organizational culture, management behavior, goal-setting, rewards, and perceived competition. The impact of all named variables seems to work in both directions of ethical behavior (e.g., also whistle blowing) and corruption. Therefore, the direction of appreciated behavior which is covered by all variables seems to be important to shape employees behavior in the wanted direction. Nevertheless, there are also differences between the types of corruption. While machiavellianism seems to be a good predictor for unethical behavior and counterproductive corruption, the only study in the context of organizational corruption did not report any impact of this variable. In addition, literature provides assumptions that sex might be important for corruption. Nevertheless, differences occur. While sex differences where reported for the general perceived level of corruption and counterproductive corruption, not one study took a perspective of sex differences in organizational corruption. Furthermore, literature reported mixed results for sex for ethical behavior, unethical behavior, and whistle blowing. Therefore, more detailed research on particular types and forms of corruption seems necessary.

In sum, one could assume that organizational corruption depends on mainly/ only situational factors while counterproductive corruption depends on a particular interplay

between situational factors and individual characteristics. However, there are no studies that try to figure out any concrete variable constellation that promotes counterproductive corruption (Ashforth et al., 2008). Therefore, the second issue of this brief review is that more research is needed on the direct issues of corrupt behavior in order to draw more distinct empirically based conclusions. The next paragraph tackles the two chosen issues of organizational culture and sex on corruption.

2.3. The Focus of both Organizational Culture and Sex

This research tries to cover the two literature issues above named: to analyze a situational factor with its impact on both mainly organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption and to analyze how this situational factor interacts with one individual characteristic, namely employees' sex as a first step into a more distinct perspective of corruption.

Organizational culture. Former empirical findings and assumed theoretical relations refer to organizational culture as one situational factor that influences not only organizational corruption but also counterproductive corruption, (un)ethical behavior, and whistle blowing behavior. Also, organizational culture covers many other aspects - such as a relation to management behavior, goals, rewards and punishment, and climate - even more information about the impact of organizational culture can supplement the prominent theories of corruption.

On the one hand, organizational culture is assumed to both increase and legitimate organizational corruption as a positive effect on organizational corruption (Ashforth et al., 2008). Beyond above named prominent theories, organizational culture could provide the following new insights and perspectives. Beyond the rational choice approach, organizational culture might help to explain why employees engage unintentionally in organizational corruption and provide insights in situational factors that could influence employees' perceived pressure and opportunity. Beyond goal-setting theory, organizational culture may explain why employees do not refuse particular goals through their perception frame. Beyond the theory of charismatic leadership, through the organizational culture the management transports their values and norms to their subordinates. When combining the results of charismatic leadership, it seems that charismatic leadership could not only impact ethical but also corrupt behavior. Therefore, charisma seems just as a tool to motivate employees, and the managements' values, norms, and goals manifest the direction where employees are guided to. Therefore, research on organizational culture could supplement the ideas about the impact of the management on organizational corruption. Finally, beyond the theory of normalization

of corruption, organizational culture could provide insights about how the perception of employees' environment could affect the mechanism of the named models; and thus, explain pro-social rule breaking for organizational corruption. Therefore, organizational culture could mainly provide information about why employees engage in organizational corruption and how they perceive their environment.

On the other hand, organizational culture could provide opportunities or reasons for employees to legitimize their counterproductive corruption. Beyond the principal-agent theory, organizational culture could provide insights on whether the organizations' value provides reduced costs for employees' unethical behavior unwillingly (e.g., possible legitimation of corruption, not enough rewards or punishment for the wanted/unwanted behavior, or norms for wrongdoing which is transferred to counterproductive corruption). Beyond the described steps of a corrupt relation, organizational culture could provide knowledge on why employees decide to engage in this relation. Finally, beyond the corrupt triangle, organizational culture could provide aspects that can interact with individual characteristics to increase the likelihood for corruption. It could increase employees' desire via goals and rewards that tolerate wrongdoing, increase the perceived opportunities via norms of wrongdoing and lax punishment, and also might impact the legitimation via a low work satisfaction or an egoistic work culture.

Although literature assumes a theoretical influence of organizational culture as a situational factor on corruption, literature provides no systematic information about possible characteristics of this organizational culture that may explain how it influences different types of corruption (MacLean, 2008). Moreover, there is not any study that tries to systematically measure the impact of organizational culture on corruption. As a first step in this direction, this research takes a perspective on characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture (in a corrupt organization). It analyzes how some aspects are related to one another, and whether some characteristics increase both types of corruption. This is the main focus of this dissertation.

Sex. Because this is an often-used research factor providing mixed results without the approach to categorize the possible results, this variable is chosen as the side aspect of this research. While there is no research on the impact of sex on organizational corruption, the contradicting findings on counterproductive corruption might become clearer if one differences more distinctly between types, forms of corruption and employees' role in corruption. Often studies measure counterproductive corruption in forms of bribery and assume that their results also count for petty corruption, organizational corruption, nepotism

or other manifestations. However, men and women might differ in the way they engage in different corrupt behaviors. Some studies showed that the corruptness of women seems to depend on the context. Women were similarly corrupt than men in some national cultures (e.g., Singapore and India), whereas they were less corrupt than men in Australia (Alatas et al., 2009). In democracies men and women differ more in their tolerance of corruption and their corrupt behavior than in autocracies (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013). Finally, while women less often donor bribes than men, both sexes accept bribes to a similar extent (Rivas, 2013). These studies are just a few examples indicating that situational factors (i.e., culture, political system, or role in corruption, respectively) might be very important to unravel the mixed results for the impact of sex on corruption. Thus, this research is a first attempt to analyze the main effect of sex on both types of corruption and to analyze the interaction of sex with organizational culture for both types of corruption.

2.4. Organizational Culture

Organizational culture covers assumptions, values, and norms that are shared by the majority of the employees of an organization and promotes employees' behavior in their everyday work (Alvesson, 2011; André, 2008; Plakhotnik & Rocco, 2010; Rosenblatt, 2012; Schein, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993). Schein (1990, p. 111) defines organizational culture as *"(a) a pattern of basic assumptions, (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems."* Thus, one can describe culture as a unique cognitive, emotional, and behavioral pattern of all organizational members that differs between members of different organizations (Hofstede & Hofstede, 2006).

Schein's (1992) model of organizational culture consists of three layers: underlying assumptions, values, and behavioral norms. *Underlying assumptions* cover employees' shared taken-for-granted beliefs that address the self-concept of both their organization and the relations of their organization to its environment. The underlying assumptions guide organizational members' thoughts and behavior unconsciously in a fundamental way (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). *Values* refer to employees' shared ideals about work behavior as well as outcomes. These values guide how organizational members act on a daily basis through ideal standards (Stackman, Pinder, & Connor, 2000). Behavioral *norms* refer to the manifestations of values as explicit and implicit rules of accepted behavior. Organizational members communicate and share these norms at their workplace. The

underlying assumptions constitute the foundation of values, and values in turn affect employees' behavioral norms.[14]

In line with the Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1985), organizational members could create a collective identity that can link their self-image to their work-group (André, 2008; Trice & Beyer, 1993). As organizations are both personalized through and associated with work-groups, organizational members who identify with their work-group (may) also identify with their organizations' success and failure (Ashforth & Mael, 1989; Moreland & Levine, 2001). An increased identification with the organization may also increase employees' commitment to their work goals that could lead to more performance, (Chang & Lai, 2002) or criminal behavior on behalf of their organization (see Umphress et al., 2010). As employees identify with their organization, the management of the organization can shape employees' behavior through a complex interaction of unconscious and conscious underlying assumptions, values, and norms (Alvesson, 2011).

2.4.1. How Organizational Culture can Influence Corrupt Behavior

The social cocoon can be seen as a particular organizational culture because it needs to shape assumptions, values, and norms of employees to support organizational corruption (e.g., focus on particular values and euphemistic language, see Anand et al., 2005). This work refers to the manifestation of the social cocoon in terms of organizational cultures' assumptions, values, and norms with the term *corrupt organizational culture*. This corrupt organizational culture shall have *the purpose to ensure employees' tolerance of organizational corruption and influence them to engage in organizational corruption as a usual business* (Anand et al., 2005; Palmer & Maher, 2006). The modified definition of Schein for a corrupt organizational culture is therefore "*(a) a pattern of basic assumptions [that supports corruption], (b) invented, discovered, or developed by a given group, (c) as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (d) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (e) is to be taught to new members as the (f) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems*" (Schein, 1990, p. 111). Therefore, in line with the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), a corrupt organizational culture needs to address work-related values and norms of work-groups, as well as communicate organizations' expectations of organizational corruption to influence employees' corrupt behavior.

According to the Theory of Planned Behavior (Ajzen, 1991), a persons' planned behavior is a result of different factors. The interaction of individuals' attitude towards the

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[14] This paragraph is based on Campbell and Göritz (2014b).

behavior, individuals' subjective norm, and individuals' perceived behavioral control lead to a positive behavioral intention, which is a prerequisite for actual behavior (see Figure 8). Individuals' attitude refers to the positive cognitive evaluation of the result or the issue of behavior. Individuals' subjective norm refers to individuals' aim to behave in line with people of their direct environment (e.g., work-group, peers, management; Dimant, 2013). Finally, individuals' perceived behavioral control refers to individuals' assumptions of how likely they will be able to engage successfully in a certain behavior (i.e., possibilities, obstacles, or own resources). Therefore, a particular behavior becomes more likely when individuals have a positive intention to engage in that behavior. This positive intention depends on individuals' positive attitude towards the behavior, when the behavior is in line with social and group norms, and if the individual assumes to be able to complete the behavior successfully (Ajzen, 1991).

Figure 8. How Organizational Culture might Influence Employees' Corruption.

Note. The black components and connections are the adjusted components of the Theory of Planned Behavior (the original figure was published in Ajzen, 1991; Fig. 1, p. 182). The grey components and connections are assumed aspects of organizational culture that could impact the named components of the Theory of Planned Behavior to promote corruption.

As Ashforth et al. (2008) pointed out, corrupt organizations influence the corrupt behavior of their members via norms and practices. Both aspects are part of the organizational culture and influenced by organizational cultures' values and underlying assumptions. Organizational culture, as a social reality (Alvesson, 2011; Rosenblatt, 2012; Sackmann & Horstmann, 2010), needs to impact employees' attitude towards the preferred behavior, their subjective norm, and their perceived behavioral control to ensure that their intended behavior is in line with organizational goals. The next paragraphs explain how a corrupt organizational culture could influence organizational and counterproductive corruption in line with the aspects of the Theory of Planned Behavior.

For organizational corruption to occur, the organizational culture needs to cover underlying assumptions and values, which are positively related to organizational corruption that allows employees to engage in criminal behavior. These values in turn need to influence norms for management, work-groups, and employees to not only push them to engage in or at least tolerate organizational corruption but also provide opportunities for corruption. The process of normalization and the above mentioned findings that the management considers corruption as usual could be indicators of how organizational culture can promote employees' positive attitude towards organizational corruption. When organizational corruption is 'business as usual' and rooted in daily work-routines, employees seem to become ethically blind. Therefore, employees might not be at all or a least less aware of the criminal nature of their work. As a result, ethical and moral standards/values of the society about corruption might fade into the background within the organizational environment. When employees feel less engaged with societal moral standards and values, they need to feel engaged with other standards and values (because all human behavior seems to be related to some internal or external standards). Some case studies report that employees did not lose their general ethical and moral standards, they only focused less on their own standards within a particular context (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). In addition, employees often do not perceive themselves as criminal when they engaged in organizational corruption (Brief et al., 2001). Thus, employees seem to overwrite their moral standards and values for their organizational corruption in their work context (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). This could be caused by organizational cultures' assumptions, values, and norms in favor of organizational corruption. As a result, ethically blind employees might overemphasize positive aspects of organizational corruption and share a positive attitude towards organizational corruption.

Corruption supporting assumptions, values, and both group and management norms could also reshape employees' subjective norms about corrupt behavior. As Anand et al.

(2005) assumed, employees are gradually socialized into organizational corruption through their colleagues and work-groups. Through this socialization, employees' subjective norms could assimilate to a general positive norm for organizational corruption. Organizational culture tends to shape the norms of work-groups. This could have an impact on how employees carry out their tasks (e.g., social exclusion, retaliation, or mobbing if employees do not support corruption; Henik, 2008; Rehg, Miceli, Near, & van Scotter, 2008; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999). Therefore, organizational culture could shape the social reality for employees providing norms, which support corruption and shape positive subjective norms of the employees for organizational corruption.

Finally, employees' perceived behavioral control could be influenced by norms of punishment, the behavior of the management, and corruption based work routines. When the organization rewards organizationally corrupt behavior (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Stein & Pinto, 2011), employees should perceive low obstacles and low punishment for organizational corruption. Thus, organizational culture may provide a perceptional frame in which employees become confident that they are safe to engage in organizational corruption within the organization. In addition, the management also needs to shape organizational cultures' values and norms to create opportunities for employees to engage in organizational corruption. Finally, work routines are always a product of the particular organization and shaped by organizational culture (Schein, 1992). Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture can provide important aspects that increase employees' assumed success when he or she engages in organizational corruption.

Via individuals' attitude towards corruption, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control a corrupt organizational culture seems to raise employees' intention to engage in organizational corruption or in behavior that supports organizational corruption. This could increase the likelihood of actual organizational corrupt behavior. As some theories assume employees to be ethically blind about their criminal behavior, their intention to engage in organizational corruption might be less explicit. Perhaps employees only have an abstract intention to engage in some particular behavior, to attain their goals, or to support their organization. Nevertheless, employees could develop the intention to engage in particular work processes or behavior that is organizational corruption, without explicitly having the intention to engage in organizational corruption. Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture could influence all aspects of the Theory of Planned Behavior and could increase organizational corruption.

For counterproductive corruption to occur, the organizational culture needs to cover underlying assumptions shaping organizational values that are negatively related to counterproductive corruption. Sometimes organizations could have assumptions, values, and norms that tolerate unethical behavior on behalf of the organization (Pinto et al., 2008). Although, on the one hand, this type of organization engages in unethical behavior, on the other hand they need to be interested in reducing harm against themselves. Perhaps, employees' attitude towards self-serving unethical behavior could be influenced by a general tolerance of the organization's unethical behavior. Another possible approach could be employees' dissatisfaction with aspects of the organization (where characteristics of organizational culture might also be one of several reasons). However, these situational aspects do not seem to work in the same way for all employees. In general, situational factors seem to have a smaller effect on counterproductive corruption (Litzcke et al., 2014). The conscientious decision to engage in counterproductive corruption could therefore be a major result of the positive attitude towards corruption. This positive attitude might be influenced predominantly by above named individual characteristics, such as high machiavellism, need for power, or egoism. Thus, employees' attitudes towards corruption seem to be more of an individual factor than influenced by the organizational culture.

Employees' subjective norms could be influenced by the fact that employees need to behave unethically for the sake of their organization, or if managers or other important persons enrich themselves without punishment. In both cases employees need to become aware that - to a certain extent - there are general positive norms for unethical behavior. Another mechanism could be employees' perception of a positive reciprocal norm for counterproductive corruption. If employees face a potential partner for counterproductive corruption (often outside of the organization) they could assimilate to a positive subjective norm of counterproductive corruption in the corrupt relationship. In the first case, organizational culture itself provides values and norms that tolerate unethical behavior and could influence a positive subjective norm for counterproductive corruption. In the last case, organizational culture might provide an environment that allows individual employees to legitimize their counterproductive behavior.

Finally, employees' perceived behavioral control could be influenced by norms of punishment and intensity and probability of penalty in the organization. Contrary to organizational corruption, aspects of both control and penalty exist inside the organization (e.g., compliance system). The organization needs to provide a perceptional frame in which employees know that the likelihood to get caught is high and that there will be a significant

penalty (e.g., ethical values and norms). If organizations provide a weak control and penalty frame, this could increase employees' perceived behavioral control. When employees behave against their organizational norms, they have to build up work routines for themselves, in which they can engage in counterproductive corruption. These work routines need to be kept confidential between the parties of the counterproductive corruption, and need to be hidden from colleagues and superiors. Furthermore, the behavior of the management could influence the perceived behavior control. A management staff, which enriches themselves, might less likely punish employees for the same behavior.

A study by Rabl and Kühlmann (2008) showed that employees' attitude towards corruption had a high impact on the desire to achieve a goal through counterproductive corruption, whereas employees' subjective norm had a moderate impact. Employees' perceived behavioral control had a medium to high impact on the intention to attain the goal through counterproductive corruption. The desire was highly positively related to the intention which in turn was also highly positively related to corrupt behavior. Organizational culture might influence the subjective norm and the perceived behavioral control as situational factors for counterproductive corruption.

2.4.2. Characteristics of a Corrupt Organizational Culture

General characteristics. Within a corrupt organization many employees tend to face contradictory information along the lines of "We follow ethical values, however, we do not care" (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). Employees working in this ambiguity might need guidelines that could change their perception to support organizational corruption. Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture not only needs to consist of a logical frame that covers the ambiguity in behavior but also to strongly reinforce the message "we do not care". In line with this assumption, research has revealed mixed effects of a code of conduct on ethical perceptions, ethical intentions, and ethical behavior (cf., Craft, 2013; Kaptein & Schwartz, 2008; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; O'Fallon & Butterfield, 2005) as well as no effect on counterproductive corruption (Rabl, 2011). In addition, researchers call for a strong organizational culture to reduce unethical behavior implying that a corrupt organizational culture could actually emphasize different values than the code of conduct. This is-ought-discrepancy seems to become more concrete if one considers the following aspects: (1) If there is a huge ethical distance of employees' work and employees' own ethical values, employees seem more likely to engage in corruption (Zyglidopoulos & Fleming, 2008). (2) Rewards, sanction systems, and actual work conditions promote unethical decision-making (Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Treviño et al., 2006). (3) Within their work-group, employees develop unanimity for their

expectations about social order, social relations, work coordination, and the particular roles of employees (Schein, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993). The mixed results on the impact of a code of conduct on ethical perceptions, intentions, and behavior might be explained if one takes into account that the organizational culture tends to actually support organizational corruption.

Work-group unanimity in turn could promote the assimilation of new employees with the norms and values of the organizational culture as well as managerial values and norms. The work-group sense-making could provide a frame that might affect how employees vary in their awareness of the ethical status of corruption. Thus, employees could be very aware of whether their behavior is unethical (i.e., *ethical awareness*; see Treviño et al., 2006) or could be fairly unaware of whether their behavior is unethical (i.e., *ethical blindness*; see Palazzo et al., 2012). Since different corrupt organizations are assumed to establish and maintain the social cocoon with similar mechanisms (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), the organizational cultures of these organizations need to resemble each other in underlying assumptions, values, and norms to a certain extend. However, it is not clear yet how a corrupt organizational culture looks. Therefore, similarities of corrupt organizations might be an indicator for characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture. The first research question deals with this issue.[15]

> *Research question I (RQ1). What are the characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture?*

Managers' and employees' perspective of a corrupt organizational culture. Although managers and employees need to perceive their organization's culture in the same way in their daily work, they also tend to face unique aspects through their position that shape their behavior differently (Trice & Beyer, 1993). Thus, managers and employees might differ in their general perception of organizational culture (Schein, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993) and in turn these perception differences could also influence differences in their ethical and unethical behavior (Treviño et al., 2001). Managers and employees not only differ in their latitude and position, but are also assumed to differ in their possible tangible contact with corruption (Collins et al., 2009; Palmer & Maher, 2006). While managers usually seem to carry out abstract tasks of organization wide regulations (Pinto et al., 2008; Treviño, Butterfield, & McCabe, 2001), employees could face corruption directly when they carry out concrete work tasks (Payne, 2000). Therefore, managers and employees could share some aspects, but also differ in other aspects of their perspective of a corrupt organizational culture depending on their role.

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[15] The research question derivation is based on Campbell and Göritz (2014b).

In their role, managers need to provide an environment in which they enable their employees to identify with their organization (Payne, 2000). As a consequence, managers need to define targets and create visions to ensure employees' commitment to both their working tasks and their organization (Schein, 1992). Thus, in corrupt organizations, many managers might communicate and reinforce values that could allow their employees to attain corrupt goals. Managers could reinforce corruption as decent and customary behavior via their focus of attention, through how they react and behave, and through whom they reward (Schein, 1992; Shover & Hochstetler, 2002). Again, both incentive systems and sanction structures have to be in line with the organizational culture values to guide employees' behavior (Schein, 1992).

This work uses the term *managers' perspective* to address managers' perspective of a corrupt organizational culture. The managers' perspective of corrupt organizational culture is defined as *all top-down processes that affect employees' behavior to engage in organizational corruption.* All levels of managers (i.e., top, middle, and low-level managers) were included as well as all managerial behavior influencing organizational corruption. This perspective includes three layers of organizational culture, namely (1) managers' underlying assumptions, (2) managers' values, and (3) managers' norms.

In their role, employees may engage in organizational corruption as part of their work routines. Via collective sense-making in their work-group, employees could reframe and reshape managers' expectations and values (Treviño et al., 2001; Trice & Beyer, 1993). By doing so, employees develop their own underlying assumptions, values, and norms that - among other factors - appear to shape employees' engagement in corruption. This sense-making seems not only to cover characteristics of the organizational culture (Schein, 1992) but also to include corruption because in corrupt organizations, employees may need to ensure their own moral self-image and at the same time continue their organizational corruption. Employees might assimilate to group norms that all employees can rationalize their wrongdoing and feel less criminal (Cohen, 1995; Lok & Crawford, 1999; Spicer, 2009).

This work uses the term *employees' perspective* to address employees' perspective of a corrupt organizational culture (for Study 1). This perspective includes all employees in corrupt organizations except managers. Employees' perspective of a corrupt organizational culture includes three layers of organizational culture, namely (1) employees' underlying assumptions, (2) employees' values, and (3) employees' norms. The norms prescribe employees' behavior to reinforce and punish colleagues on the same hierarchical level. Because of their special position, employees might perceive a corrupt organizational culture

in terms of assumptions, values, and norms that help them to overcome a possible image of being criminal. The second research question addresses the issue of how managers and employees perceive a corrupt organizational culture.[16]

> *Research question II (RQ2). What are managers' and employees' perspectives of a corrupt organizational culture?*

RQ1 and RQ2 were analyzed in Study 1.

> *2.4.3. Corrupt Organizational Culture and Employees' Attitude towards Corruption*

Since there is no systematical empirical research on whether a corrupt organizational culture raises organizational corruption, the work at hand starts with some simple general hypotheses. As described above, a corrupt organizational culture shall influence employees' positive attitude towards corruption. Therefore, the first hypothesis is that a corrupt organizational culture increases employees' positive attitude towards organizational corruption for different forms of corruption, namely gifting and bribery.

Gifting covers presents, tips, or other favors (e.g., tickets for a soccer game, payed visits in brothels, or luxury vacations) that are exchanged in order to build up reciprocity for organizational corruption or as part of organizational corruption (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). Gifting covers either illegal or illegitimate gifts or illegal or illegitimate favors in turn (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). Bribery covers illegal monetary payments for favors (e.g., percentage of a contract, kickback, pay-off, or other financial favors) that are exchanged for many different reasons (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). Although both forms are widespread, gifting is both socially more accepted and sometimes necessary to do business in foreign countries (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001; Frank et al., 2010). Excessive gifting could be used to increase aspects of loyalty or reciprocity of the taker for a corrupt exchange, however, as a study showed this connection is less strong than if participants used bribes to introduce a corrupt exchange (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011).

On the contrary, bribery expects an explicit illegal reciprocity (Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011). Nevertheless, organizational culture should shape employees' perception for both forms of corruption in a similar way. Thus, H1 postulates that a corrupt organizational culture shall influence a positive attitude towards organizational corruption for both gifting and bribery.

> *Hypothesis 1 (H1). A corrupt organizational culture influences employees' positive attitude towards organizational corruption.*

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[16] The majority of this research question derivation based on Campbell and Göritz (2014b).

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(H1a) A corrupt organizational culture influences a positive attitude of gifting.

(H1b) A corrupt organizational culture influences a positive attitude of bribery.

As the Theory of Planned Behavior describes, individuals' attitude towards their behavior, their subjective norm, and their perceived behavioral control do actually influence each other (Ajzen, 1991). Therefore, aspects that influence the subjective norm and the perceived behavioral control could also influence employees' attitude towards organizational corruption. Schein (1992) described that underlying assumptions build a frame for values and that values influence the manifest norms within an organization (more manifest layers of organizational culture). Therefore, aspects such as goal-setting, rewards, punishment, and controls could be seen as a manifestation of both values and underlying assumptions (Trice & Beyer, 1993). Thus, goals, rewards, and punishment are therefore not only elements of the organizational culture that influence employees' behavior but also these manifestations are influenced by the underlying layers of values and underlying assumptions. Through this relation, the key underlying assumptions of an organizational culture might influence employees' corrupt behavior directly via its frame for shared understanding of the environment and indirectly via its manifest norms. While the direct impact might be less intense the indirect effect of organizational culture might be much more effective (Schein, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993).

Rewards of organizational corruption (as Stein & Pinto, 2011 found) and lax control of corruption (as assumed) within the corrupt organization could influence both the increased behavioral control of employees to intentionally engage in corruption but also employees' attitude towards corruption. If corrupt behavior is rewarded, this might also influence employees' ethical blindness about their criminal behavior. Rewards could be one explanation of why employees might overemphasize positive effects of organizational corruption. Also, lax control mechanism might explain why employees do not perceive corruption as criminal behavior. Both aspects might influence a more positive attitude towards corruption. In turn, rewards and lax control need to be settled and influenced by the main underlying assumptions of a corrupt organizational culture. Therefore, the main underlying assumptions of a corrupt organizational culture shall influence the positive attitude towards organizational corruption, and this impact shall be mediated by both tangible rewards and lax control mechanisms. Again, this assumption shall be similar for gifting and bribery.

Hypothesis 2 (H2). The impact of the main underlying assumption of corrupt organizational culture on organizational corruption is mediated through both lax control mechanisms and tangible rewards for corruption.

(H2a) The impact of the main underlying assumption of a corrupt organizational culture on gifting is mediated through both tangible rewards and lax control mechanisms.

(H2b) The impact of the main underlying assumption of a corrupt organizational culture on bribery is mediated through both tangible rewards and lax control mechanisms.

H1 and H2 were analyzed in Study 2.

2.4.4. Organizational Culture and Employees' Corruption

The social reality of the organizational culture could determine if and how employees recognize corrupt behavior (Palazzo et al., 2012; Treviño et al., 2006), what subjective norms they perceive and how confident they are to attain their actions successfully. Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture needs to provide a social reality with assumptions, values, and norms that can undermine conventional ethical values and legitimate corruption (Ashforth et al., 2008; Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Brief et al., 2001; MacLean, 2008; MacLean & Behnam, 2010; Martin et al., 2007; Schweitzer et al., 2004) or shape values and norms in a more positive way (i.e., positive individual attitude toward corruption). These other assumption, values, and norms (e.g., corruption supporting values, or goal-setting) need to cover aspects that lead employees to engage in organizational corruption (as described above: attitude towards corruption, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control).

On the contrary, an *ethical organizational culture* needs to provide a social reality with assumptions, values, and norms that delegitimize unethical and corrupt behavior (Ardichvili, Mitchell, & Jondle, 2009; Craft, 2013; Treviño et al., 2001; Sweeney, Arnold, & Pierce, 2010). Employees need to share a negative attitude as well as negative social norms of corruption and finally a low perceived behavioral control (i.e., huge risk of detection and punishment). Therefore, the ethical organizational culture needs to provide ethical values and goals, relying on sustainability, fairness, responsibility, honesty, and process orientation (Ardichvili et al., 2009; Craft, 2013; Treviño et al., 2001; Sweeney et al., 2010), as well as rewards and sanctions to either reward ethical behavior or punish an unethical one (Craft, 2013) in order to reduce unethical behavior.

Employees' sense-making about the "shared understanding of organizational standards" within the organization (Berry, 2004, p. 3; Maruna & Copes, 2004) could lead to different results depending on the social norms of the organizational culture. A corrupt organizational culture might raise employees' ethical blindness about their own corrupt behavior (Johnson, Martin, & Saini, 2011; Palazzo et al., 2012) and provide good

opportunities to engage in organizational corruption. On the contrary, an ethical organizational culture shall raise employees' ethical awareness and a sense of responsibility of their own behavior (Craft, 2013; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Palazzo et al., 2012) and control and punishment as difficult opportunities to engage in corruption. These aspects should influence the components of the Theory of Planned Behavior explained above. Ethically blind employees shall more likely engage in corruption or unethical behavior, while ethically aware employees shall more likely engage in ethical behavior (Craft, 2013; Gino, Ayal, & Ariel, 2009). Shu, Mazar, Gino, Ariely, and Bazerman (2012) reported that ethical awareness promoted by an ethical organizational culture increases employees' self-observation, which in turn reduces unethical behavior. Therefore, employees' likelihood to engage in organizational corruption might be a result of the main assumptions, values, and norms within the organizational culture. Thus, more employees in a corrupt organizational culture shall engage in organizational corruption than employees in an ethical organizational culture.

> *Hypothesis 3 (H3). Employees' corruption is more likely in a corrupt organizational culture than in an ethical organizational culture.*

The type of corruption might moderate the impact of organizational culture on employees' corruption, because both types of corruption are assumed to have different causes. While organizational corruption is assumed to be a consequence of mainly situational factors within the organization (Anand et al., 2005; Brief et al., 2001) counterproductive corruption is assumed to be a consequence of the interaction of individual characteristics and situational factors. When only the situation seems to matter for organizational corruption, this situation needs to have a tremendous influence on many different corrupt employees, whereas for counterproductive corruption, the situation alone might have a lower influence on corrupt employees (see Figure 8).

Thus, an ethical organizational culture might not be the notable factor for organizational corruption and a possible conjoint factor for counterproductive corruption, whereas a corrupt organizational culture might be the main factor for organizational corruption and again a conjoint factor for counterproductive corruption. Therefore, in an ethical organizational culture, more employees shall engage in counterproductive corruption than organizational corruption, while in a corrupt organizational culture more employees shall engage in organizational corruption than counterproductive corruption.

Hypothesis 4 (H4). The type of corruption moderates the impact of organizational culture on employees' corruption. In an ethical organizational culture employees' counterproductive corruption is more likely than employees' organizational corruption, and in a corrupt organizational culture employees' organizational corruption is more likely than employees' counterproductive corruption.

H3 and H4 were analyzed in Study 3.

2.5. Sex, Organizational Culture, and Corruption.

Employees' sex is an interwoven characteristic of the biological sex of employees and their social gender role within their society. While the individuals' sex influence individual differences between men and women, social gender covers social and cultural expectations of how individuals of the particular sex are and how they are supposed to behave (Eagly & Wood, 1991; Feingold, 1994). Biological sex and learned gender role expectations are interdependent because gender expectations are often based on associations with the biological sex that in turn is assumed to cover some particular traits or individual characteristics for both sexes. In turn, men and women also try to confirm the social exceptions on their gender. Thus, some biological differences might become more manifest via social education what both could lead to behavioral differences between men and women (Bem, 1981).

Although there is much research on the impact of sex on corruption/ (un)ethical behavior, literature does not provide any theory on why men and women behave differently. The work at hand, tries to argue why men and women might (not) differ in their corrupt behavior with the link to above named Theory of Planned Behavior. In general, the impact of sex is assumed to differ between the types of corruption. On the one hand, all employees within corrupt organizations seem to face a similar perception frame (organizational culture), similar expectations (by the management) and similar socialization, which might lead them to perceive a shared ethical blindness. Therefore, men and women should not differ in their organizational corruption. On the other hand, both biological sex differences and gender expectations need to influence employees' traits, motives, and behavior that in turn could shape the individual attitude, and therefore impact their conscious decision to engage in counterproductive corruption (i.e., subjective attitude towards corruption).

2.5.1. Sex and Organizational Corruption

Although currently there are no studies analyzing sex differences in organizational corruption, two theoretical assumptions might explain why men and women shall be similar in their

organizational corruption: (1) organizational environment, and (2) socialization. (1) Corrupt organizations expect all of their employees to tolerate and support organizational corruption in a similar way. Therefore, all employees face more or less the same expectations from the management regarding corruption. All employees need to be within the social cocoon, face similar goal-setting, and work under the same management within the same organizational culture. As described above mainly situational factors seem important for organizational corruption. For example, all employees shall face high goals and job loss if they fail (Brief et al., 2001). Therefore, if both sexes share the same situational factors at their workplace these factors need to impact both sexes similarly. Thus, these particular occupational role expectations may overwrite gender specific expectations and thus eliminate the impact of gender on organizational corruption - even more so - if employees are surrounded by a network or environment with a huge expose to corruption or explicit expectations to engage in corruption (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013).

(2) Men and women are assumed to undergo the same socialization into the social cocoon (Anand et al., 2005). Therefore, employees in key positions will face similar mechanism to get used to corruption. According to Ashforth and Anand (2003), all employees are gradually introduced to corruption, face rewards for corrupt behavior, and corruption gets introduced as a solution for problems. Through this socialization, usual expectations about women (who should be more ethical then men) might be overwritten and allow women to engage as much in corruption as men. Although the assumption of the same socialization is not tested with the current study, it might be a possible explanation.

The same expectation and socialization could shape similar attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioral control for both sexes. This assumption could be supported by some empirical findings that show that women engage similarly often in corruption as men, when corruption was perceived as accepted and tolerated behavior in their environment (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013) and when there is a low detection rate of corruption (Armantier & Boly, 2008; Schulze & Frank, 2003). Since within corrupt organizations organizational corruption is perceived as usual behavior that is not punished or detected within the organization, men and women shall not differ in their attitudes towards organizational corruption (i.e., gifting and bribery).

As described above, perceived behavioral control, subjective norms and individuals' attitudes are in mutual relations. Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture shall influence all aspects and also shape employees' positive attitude towards organizational corruption. A corrupt organizational culture means that employees perceive an intense degree of the key

assumptions of a corrupt organizational culture (for Study 2). On the contrary, a low corrupt organizational culture means that employees perceive non-intense degree or not at all the key assumptions of a corrupt organizational culture. When a corrupt organizational culture can shape employees' attitudes towards corruption, and if men and women face the same expectation and same socialization about organizational corruption, they should share a similar attitude towards organizational corruption. When a non-corrupt organizational culture does not shape employees' attitudes towards corruption at all or just to a small extent, and if men and women do not face the same expectation and same socialization about organizational corruption, men and women shall differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption. Therefore, men and women shall not differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption in an intense corrupt organizational culture while they shall differ in a non-corrupt organizational culture. Organizational corruption is operationalized (as above) with two forms of corruption, gifting and bribery.

> *Hypothesis 5 (H5). Sex differences in the attitude towards corruption depend on the corrupt organizational culture.*
>
> *(H5a) Men and women shall not differ in their attitude of gifting in an intense corrupt organizational culture.*
>
> *(H5b) Men and women shall not differ in their attitude of bribery in an intense-corrupt organizational culture.*
>
> *(H5c) Men and women shall differ in their attitude of gifting in a non-intense corrupt organizational culture.*
>
> *(H5c) Men and women shall differ in their attitude of bribery in a non-intense corrupt organizational culture.*

H5 was analyzed in Study 3.

2.5.2. Sex and Counterproductive Corruption

Several studies report sex differences in counterproductive corruption. These studies were mostly experiments, sometimes with sample sizes between 102 (Rivas, 2013) and till 1326 participants (Alatas et al., 2009) and often compare behavior between different countries. The results show that men offer more often and higher bribes (in India, see Alatas et al., 2009; Rivas, 2008), the highest bribes were offered between male participants – the lowest between female participants (in individualistic countries; see Rivas, 2008), and that bribes were accepted more frequently if they were offered by a men (Alatas et al., 2009). Two experimental studies report no sex difference in Burkina Faso (Armantier & Boly, 2011) and in collectivistic countries, such as India, Indonesia and Singapore (Alatas et al., 2009). Thus,

although there are some mixed results men seem to engage more likely in counterproductive corruption.

Approaches to explain why men might be more prone to counterproductive corruption than women could be (1) differences in individual characteristics, (2) differences in risk aversion, (3) differences in perception about ethical and unethical behavior, and (4) social expectation towards gender. (1) Men are assumed to have specific individual characteristics that are risk-factors for counterproductive corruption and unethical behavior, for example higher machiavellism, higher dominance, higher assertiveness, higher testosterone, higher risk-taking, stronger love of money, low integrity, and low moral development (Bendahan et al., 2015; Connelly & Ones, 2008; Eckel & Grossmann, 2002; Feingold, 1994; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Rosenblatt, 2012; Tang & Chen, 2008). These individual characteristics could impact different preferences in the individuals' subjective attitude towards corruption, the acceptance and need to behave in line with subjective norms and the perceived behavioral control.

(2) While counterproductive offenders face a higher risk of detection and punishment the difference in risk aversion between men and women might explain differences in their corrupt behavior (see studies by Alatas et al., 2009; Esarey & Schwindt-Bayer, 2014). For example, men – more often than women - assume that their corruption will be successful (Rivas, 2008). This might be related to an increased perceived behavioral control. If men assume to be more successful, they might more often engage in this behavior than women.

(3) Men and women seem to differ to some degree in as how intensely they categorize behavior as corruption. One study reports that while women tend to evaluate gifting, favoritism, and nepotism as more corrupt than men, in turn men see the acceptance of bribery as more corrupt than women (Bowman & Gilligan, 2008). In addition, both sexes have similar negative perceptions for the following forms of corruption: party donations, gifts for governmental employees, bribing in the judicial system, or the abuse of official business for private gain. Also, some studies about unethical behavior report sex differences in the awareness of unethical behavior (Craft, 2013). Thus, when women have stronger negative perceptions of unethical behavior, they might engage less in this behavior than men. This might also explain the more opportunistic behavior of women in some studies for counterproductive corruption (Frank et al., 2011; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Rivas, 2013).[17] Sex differences in perception could also influence sex differences in the positive attitude towards counterproductive corruption and sex differences in corrupt behavior.

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[17] Opportunistic means that the addressed potential taker could take the money but not provide the favor in turn; or that the potential taker reports the corrupt offer.

(4) Men and women face different social expectation about their behavior. While women are expected to behave more ethically and decently (Esarey & Chirillo, 2013) men are expected to behave more willing to engage in corruption. These gender expectations could influence different opportunities for men and women to engage in counterproductive corruption. A study reported that men more often offered a bribe to other men than to women, and women did not differ in this sex preference (Rivas, 2008). In addition, bribes where more successful for male companies, while female takers received a bribe offer less often (Rivas, 2008). Finally, the study reported that both women and men less often assumed other women to accept a bribe, although men and women did not differ in their acceptance (Rivas, 2008). Therefore, social expectations could promote different opportunities for men and women to engage in counterproductive corruption.

2.5.3. Sex, Type of Corruption, and Organizational Culture

While employees in corrupt organizations face the same expectations, low detection risks and the same socialization, both differences in sex and gender could influence employees' traits, motives, and behavior that impact the likelihood to engage in counterproductive corruption. Therefore, sex differences in corruption shall depend on the type of corruption.

> *Hypothesis 6 (H6). The impact of sex on employees' corruption depends on the type of corruption.*
>
> *(H6a) Male employees engage in organizational corruption as much as female employees.*
>
> *(H6b) More male employees engage in counterproductive corruption than female employees.*

There might be an interaction of organizational culture and sex for corruption depending on the type of corruption. While the interaction of sex and organizational culture shall not impact the organizational corruption, it shall impact counterproductive corruption. The interaction of organizational culture and sex shall not impact organizational behavior because only situational aspects are assumed to influence this behavior. In both an ethical organizational culture and a corrupt organizational culture men and women face the same expectations and the same perception frame that influence their organizational corruption. Therefore, their subjective norms, attitudes, and their perceived behavioral control should be influenced from their organizational culture to a similar extent. In an ethical organizational culture men and women may be reinforced similarly to engage in ethical behavior, while in a

corrupt organizational culture men and women may be reinforced to engage in organizational corruption.

A study by Alhassan-Alolo (2007) with 136 public servants in Ghana showed that women and men did not differ in their welcome of gifts to influence their decision-making or in their attitude towards building up a network that harms their organization. The author assumed that the shared attitude is a reason of similar predisposition of corruption and low penalty risk. Thus, women might perceive a change in attitudes towards the organizational culture that might increase their corruption. Another argument might be that women tend to be more compliant to their organization (Torgler & Valev, 2006). Therefore, women might be more willing to engage in organizational corruption to support their organization and to be compliant and loyal to it. Thus, there should be no interaction of organizational culture and sex for organizational corruption

On the contrary, the interaction of organizational culture and sex shall impact counterproductive corruption because counterproductive corruption seems to be a result of individual characteristics and situational factors. When men are more prone to counterproductive corruption, this behavior needs to interact with the situational factor of organizational culture. While individual characteristics might influence different subjective attitudes about corruption, subjective norms and perceived behavioral control seem more influenced by situational factors. As men seem to have more positive perceptions of corruption (Bowman & Gilligan, 2008) and about a successful transaction (Rivas, 2008) they might perceive more positive attitudes towards counterproductive corruption and a higher perceived behavioral control. Due, perhaps the organizational culture impacts the likelihood for counterproductive corruption, whereas an ethical organizational culture may provide low subjective norms to engage in counterproductive corruption and might also reduce the perceived behavioral control. A corrupt organizational culture could increase both aspects. Thus, male employees who have a positive attitude towards corruption might be more likely to face opportunities for counterproductive corruption when they work in a corrupt organizational culture than when they work in an ethical organizational culture.

While the unethical behavior of women is assumed to be deepened contextually, the organizational culture might also influence their behavior. Whereas women shall not engage in counterproductive corruption at all in an ethical organizational culture because of negative norms of corruption and the reduced perceived behavioral control, more women shall engage in counterproductive corruption in a corrupt organizational culture.

Where the interaction of both organizational culture and sex shall not influence organizational corruption, this interaction shall influence counterproductive corruption.

> *Hypothesis 7 (H7). The impact of the interaction of sex and organizational culture on employees' corruption depends on the type of corruption.*
>
> *(H7a) There is no impact of the interaction of sex and organizational culture on employees' organizational corruption.*
>
> *(H7b) The interaction of sex and organizational culture do influence employees' counterproductive corruption. In an ethical organizational culture men shall engage in counterproductive corruption more often than women, while there shall be no sex differences for organizational corruption in a corrupt organizational culture.*

H6 and H7 got analyzed in Study 3.

3. STUDY 1[18] [19]

Study 1 takes a perspective on some characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture to figure out what characteristics might promote employees to engage in organizational corruption. The perspective lies on both general characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture (RQ1) and particular characteristics of the perspective of both managers and employees (RQ2).

3.1. Method

This study was a qualitative analysis across different expert interviews. While the majority of codes were developed from literature and analyzed about their emerging in the interviews, also prominently repeated issues emerging in the interviews were coded and analyzed. The verbal connection of the different issues made by the interviewed experts got illustrated as code connection.

While quantitative research mainly relies on the strength of empirical relations of research aspects, qualitative research tries to gain an overall view of both the existence and

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[18] This chapter based on Campbell and Göritz (2014b), impact factor 2014: 1.33. The current chapter goes beyond the article, for example in the described method section (e.g., interview structure and analysis). It also presents more example quotations in the results section and has more elaborated limitation than the article. The article (Campbell & Göritz, 2014b) also covers aspects about how corrupt organizational culture influences whistle blowing and silent observers, these aspects are not in focus here.

[19] Qualitative research implies two main differences in writing compared to quantitative research: (1) Results aim to "drew [the reader] into the text and engaged [the reader] so deeply that [the readers think they] were there" (Bansal & Corley, 2011, p. 235). Instead of knowing all aspects of research right from the start, written qualitative studies uncover the issues stepwise often documented with a balanced citations of sources (see editor letter of Academy of Management Journal; Pratt, 2009). (2) Instead of writing in a neutral tone with less meta communication, qualitative research needs to "exhibit […] the authors' voice [visible in the text]" (p. 233) to demonstrate the author explicit subjective role in research (Bansal & Corley, 2011). Thus means, that the author should not only show the data but also interpret the data (Pratt, 2009). Study 1 is written in line with these and other expectations (see Bansal & Corley, 2011) of qualitative research.

relations of research aspects in a new or difficult-to-study research fields (Miles & Huberman, 1994; Witt, 2001). The aim of qualitative research is to figure out possible similarities within a pool of maximum heterogenic data (Witt, 2001). Therefore, a representative sample in qualitative data analysis is a small sample of directly connected individuals or experts of the particular issue of interest. In line with this, the author did not take a perspective on one corruption case to compare the insights of different experts on this case. With the case focused approach all discovered characteristics might be a result of particular circumstances of the chosen particular organization or might depend on the particular corruption case. Instead, the author opted to gain many different insights of many different organizations to apparently become able to receive a glimpse of the allover perspective about shared general characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture. Therefore, the chosen expert sample can be less described in terms to be representative for the general population (e.g., sample size, demographic background, profession, or experience) - because the majority of the population does not have any contact with and spare knowledge of organizational corruption. Instead, the sample aims to represent the research criterion with wide-spread knowledge about different corrupt organizations (Witt, 2001).

There were three main reasons the author opted for this qualitative approach: first, the author deemed it necessary to gain a deep understanding about this unexplored topic. The qualitative approach could help the author to study the difficult field of organizational culture in corrupt organizations because qualitative research enables the researchers to receive a deeper understanding or a new perspective of a known or new phenomenon (Bansal & Corley, 2011). Through the experience of the experts and their contact to employees of corrupt organizations, the author gained some insight into different corrupt organizations that allowed the author to analyze and compare their different conditions. Furthermore, only the qualitative approach allowed the author to stick to the original data as closely as possible in order to gain unexpected insights (Russel, 2000) for this new research context.

Second, another goal was to be able to generalize results beyond particular corrupt organizational case studies. Any case analysis provides information about only one or several particular cases that depend on the particular conditions of those organizations. Often these case studies are done in corrupt organizations in which some employees have already been convicted for organizational corruption (among other: Siemens by Graeff, Schröder, & Wolf, 2009; Enron by Beenen & Pinto, 2009). However, the majority of corrupt employees in corrupt organizations seem to be unreported cases. It could be possible, that the perceived organizational culture might differ between convicted employees and employees who still

engage in organizational corruption. Differences in the organizational culture could be a reason why the convicted employees get caught while the others do not. Thus, any generalization of these specific organizational conditions of particular case studies in the bright field of corruption seems difficult.

A different approach could be to figure out similarities in employees' perception in organizational culture between many different heterogenic employees and organizations. If there are some similarities between the perceptions of several different employees these similarities could possibly indicate some general mechanisms in corrupt organizations. By means of this cross-corruption case approach of the wide array of experts and their scope of contact persons, it was possible to get a glimpse of possible similarities among different corrupt organizations (Miles & Huberman, 1994). And, to extract first possible indicators of general situational conditions that seem more independent of particular organizations.

Third, the author realized the difficulty of securing cooperation with members of corrupt organizations to take part in quantitative studies about this sensitive topic. Besides the above mentioned difficulties in research of corruption, it also proves challenging whether employees of corrupt organizations might provide restricted or embellished information that could focus on less important aspects of the organizational culture. Therefore, except of two, all interviews were conducted with independent experts about their experience with employees' perception of corrupt organizations to reduce the possible danger of willful disinformation by employees when interviewing employees of corrupt organizations directly. The advantage of independent experts is their contact to and knowledge of different contact persons in different corrupt organizations and their ability to compare these different perceptions of the contact persons of their particular organizations. In addition, independent experts face no threat of damage to their own job reputation or the reputation of their current employer and in turn to endanger their further employment.

3.1.1. Interviews

Interviewee acquisition was designed to obtain wider-ranging insights into different corrupt organizations. 14 independent experts were interviewed with heterogeneous professions (see Table 2). The interviewees were on average 53 years old (range: 32 - 67 years) and eleven of these experts were men. They had contact with corrupt employees or with the topic corruption for 12 years averagely (range: 1 - 28 years) and they differed in their specific experiences with employees in corrupt organizations (see Table 3)[20].

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[20] Some experts underlie their professional discretion and made more general and anonymous statements about their perception of their contact persons. Other experts could get released of their professional discretion for the interview.

Table 2.

Expert Characteristics (N = 14)[21]

Current profession	*n*	Country	Former profession(s) [a]
Consultant	2	Germany	State attorney, judge
Investigative journalist	2	Germany	
Judge	1	Germany	State attorney
Member of Transparency International, German Chapter	1	Germany	
Ombudsman	2	Germany	State attorney, president of the police
Police officer	1	Germany	
Scientist (from the research fields: management, sociology, and economics)	3	Germany	
Unknown	2	Austria, USA	CEOs of a corrupt organization [b]

Note. This table presents the different former and current professions of the experts. Not specified information refers to the lack of information about former or current job positions.

[a] Refers to professions that one or both interviewed expert had had in the past. In each of these professions, they had contact with different corrupt organizations.

[b] To ensure anonymity the table includes no name of any organization.

The semi-structured interviews (45 min. to 2.5 h) were designed with the intention to address the managers' and employees' perspectives of organizational culture with their different organizational culture layers (see below). The interview questions were discussed in a plenum consisting of one professor, two doctoral candidates, and some master students in the field of organizational psychology. Interviews (face-to-face or via Skype) were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed between January 2011 and June 2011.

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[21] This table is published in Campbell and Göritz (2014b), Tab. 1, p. 298.

Table 3.

Experts' Experience with Corruption.

Experts' experience with corruption	Experts (*n*)
Contact with issue corruption	
- Only indirect contact with corruption (i.e., read literature or do research about corruption)	2
- Only direct contact with corruption (i.e., worked in a corrupt organization, had contact or worked or is still having contact or working with employees of corrupt organizations)	4
- Both indirect and direct contact with corruption	8
Contact with employees of corrupt organizations [a]	
- Lower, middle, and upper level managers	11
- Employees	7
- Freelancers or consultants	8
- Corrupt business associates, suppliers, entrepreneurs, politicians, or others	4
Contact with corrupt employees of organizations in the following industries [a]	
- Civil service	13
- Private business in different industries for example: sports, media, electronics, and production	13
Contact with employees/knowledge about corruption in the following countries [a]	
- Europe (e.g., Germany, Greece, & Italy)	14
- Asia (e.g., China, India, & Thailand)	6
- The Americas (e.g., USA, Brazil, Argentina, & Mexico)	4
- Balkan countries and former GUS states (e.g., Ukraine, Kosovo, & Rumania)	4
- Other countries (e.g., African countries & countries in the Middle East)	6

Note. [a] multiple answers were possible.

Each interview covered the following issues: (a) warm-up, (b) possible characteristics and similarities of corrupt organizations, general shared statements, values, and working norms of both the (c) managers and the (d) employees, (e) possible differences between organizations with counterproductive corruption and organizational corruption, and (f) open questions. The warm up aimed at receiving information about the experts' experience with corruption and if

he or she gets insights and contact to employees who work or have worked in corrupt organizations. Some interviews took a perspective on mainly one corruption case (i.e., two managers of a corrupt organization reported only from their own company), the majority of the interviews relied on the experts' general perception which he or she revered through his or her many contacts with different employees. The referred fields were for example corruption in the soccer business, waste industry, building industry, the casesEnron and Siemens[22]. All following questions (questions three to 17, see Appendix A) got transferred on the particular concrete cases/organizations/industries, the expert offered in the warm up or during the explication of their experiences with corruption. In addition to Appendix A, the author asked non-standardized questions to receive detailed information about how the shared statements, values, and norms look like, who is affected by them etc. Thus, Appendix A provides the abstract frame of the interview whereas experts received also more detailed questions depending on their particular experiences. Although underlying assumptions got analyzed, they were not asked explicitly in the interviews because the author assumed that the experts were not familiar with this construct. Therefore, the author chose to ask for general assumptions and statements to receive indicators for possible underlying assumptions.

3.1.2. Data analysis

The author chose a deductive approach to analyze organizational culture. Deductive qualitative analysis covers to analyze how a priori codes emerge within the data. Thus, theoretical knowledge about corruption (see for example Anand et al., 2005; Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961; Pinto et al., 2008) was transferred into codes and it was analyzed if and how often these codes emerged in the interviews (see Table B1 in Appendix B for the final code book). Every possible underlying assumption, value, and norm in corrupt organizations was a focus of this analysis. The author formulated six theory-driven code categories (see Table 4) referring to the organizational culture layers: underlying assumptions, values, and norms (Schein, 1992) broken down by managers' and employees' perspectives (Treviño et al., 2001). This was done analog to the construction of the interviews. The author not only described theoretically based codes, but also used open coding to remain responsive to emerging issues. This method mixture might allow the author to analyze the interviews in a more systematic frame and to also discover new issues (Miles & Hubermann, 1994; Namey, Guest, Thairu, & Johnson, 2008). As part of a university course, psychology students tested

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[22] Enron and Siemens are so popular cases that some experts were in contact with whistle blowers, employees or managers of both companies to receive first-hand information. This kind of information possibility is rather unusual for research on corrupt organizations.

the established codes as well as the newly developed codes[23]. Students were briefed about the issue of both organizational corruption and methods of qualitative data analysis within the course. They also received the information about the coding units and rules as written below. The author instructed the students to code every possible code combination (every formulated possible underlying assumptions, values, and norms for either managers or employees) if they emerged within one interview. The students coded aspects of different interviews within this course and discussed their found codes. If a student team figured out new possible themes that were not a priori formulated as code, the course decided if they admitted this new code for the final coding procedure.

Table 4.

Code Categories According to the Perspective and Layer of Organizational Culture[24]

Perspective	Underlying assumptions	Values	Norms
Managers' perspective	Underlying assumption held by managers	Value of managers	Behavioral norm of managers
Employees' perspective	Underlying assumption held by employees	Value of employees	Behavioral norm of employees

For the final analysis student-teams of two persons coded every interview using the word or word phrases as code units. Therefore, each student had to code his or her assigned interview and compare the codes with the other student of the team. As a final step, the program MAXQDAplus Version 10 was used to compare the codes about their congruence (i.e., which words got coded with which code) obtained in the university course with the codes independently obtained by the author. Therefore, only codes were included in the analysis that occurred for all three coders. This step was done to reduce the subjectivity of single coders within the process to some extent. Table B1 in Appendix B reports all codes with their description and the number of references made to these codes.

The amount of references (if it comes to a mainly quantitative outlook) provides only limited information on the importance or validity of single codes because (1) heterogeneous

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[23] This work was done under the guidance of the author in the seminar "Qualitative Datenanalyse von Experteninterviews zu Korruption in Organisationen" in the summer term 2011 at the Julius-Maximilians Universität Würzburg.
[24] This table is published in Campbell and Göritz (2014b), Tab. 2, p. 298.

experts were interviewed who differ in their profession and their insights about the perception of their possible contact persons in corrupt organizations. In addition, the author chose experts who seem to complement each other. (2) The experts had insights with different depths depending on their profession and their contact with corrupt employees. This shapes some codes (e.g., underlying assumptions) in particular. Because underlying assumptions are taken-for-granted entities, it is often difficult to verbalize them or to perceive them in the first place. Thus, it is not known how explicitly the contact persons of the interviewed experts could communicate these and if and how the experts could extract these. Both reasons may explain why not all experts referred to all codes.

In line with the goals of qualitative analysis, the analysis focused on which code occurred in the interviews and how the codes might be related to each other. It was distinguished between the coding and the analysis of code connections. To reduce researcher bias, the author decided to stick to the original interview data as close as possible. First, words and word phrases were chosen as the code unit for all codes (see Table B1). For example, the following sentence: Expert no. 5: "If we did not join in [corruption], we could announce our bankruptcy straight away." The words "in" for corruption got coded as *corruption* and the word "bankruptcy" got coded as *security need.* Second, after all interviews were coded, the code connections got analyzed in a second step according to the way the experts connected those in their own words. The analysis was in line with the following pattern:

(1) If experts combined two codes with an *and,* this was seen as an indicator that both codes seem to be related.

(2) If experts combined two codes with *if ...then* or *because,* this was seen as an indicator that both codes could be directionally related.

(3) If experts combined two codes with an *or,* this was seen as an indicator that both codes could be two non-related constructs.

In above named example, the expert linked both codes with an "if…then"; therefore, both codes were assumed to be directional related. Any code connection could be established within one sentence or within two or three following sentences if they were verbally connected with each other.

3.2. Results[25]

The extracted glimpse of possible general underlying assumptions of corrupt organizations were described for both managers and employees followed by a more particular focus on possible values and norms separately for managers and employees.

3.21. Underlying Assumptions

According to the experts, employees of corrupt organizations seem to perceive themselves to *fight in a competition war*. This assumption is based on two recurring themes of the experts: first, half of the interviewees (7 out of 14) quoted some war metaphors to describe usual work circumstances of employees in corrupt organizations. These war metaphors might possibly imply that the experts perceived employees in corrupt organizations virtually to see themselves more as a military force than as employees of a civil causal organization. According to the experts, employees seem to perceive their organizations as fighting about contracts (further referred to as *competition war*). It seems that many employees tend to discern other employees of competing organizations as enemies who need to be defeated to secure the continuity of their own organization. According to the perception of the experts, these war-metaphors seem to be used almost on a daily basis by employees. If this experts' assumption actually meets reality, these war-metaphors could shape employees' perceptions of both their work circumstances and their work attitudes. Thus, everything seems to be allowed in times of war, as long as it could serve the employees' own survival. In line with this, employees in corrupt organizations apparently change their preferences for particular values to some extent. According to the perception of the experts, values such as *morality* and *ethical judgment* seem to decrease in importance, while values such as *security* and *success* seem to rise in importance. Employees' perception of a competition war might be a result of the known market conditions of corruption prone industries such as: high-pressure markets combined with low levels of control (Brief et al., 2001; Cohen, 1995). The following sample quotations of the interviewees refer to or quote war metaphors:

> Expert no. 2: "We have to kill to eat. [...][the organization] puts executives under extreme pressure to meet earnings targets and it is almost like the fog of war. When you are in the middle of the battle, you are trying to defeat the enemy..."
>
> Expert no. 1: "My people at [name of organization] are soldiers..."
>
> Expert no. 1: "[Compliance] [...] is not what is crucial for winning a war."

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[25] All quotations are presented in English. Furthermore, to ensure anonymity all organization names got removed and all experts received an anonymous indication number. The indication numbers were randomly assigned independent of the experts' importance, knowledge, or experience of corruption and finally independent of the order of the interviews.

Second, almost half of the interviewees (6 out of 14) described how the management of corrupt organizations seems to provide a win-win situation, through apparently a connection of the organization's survival to the continuous employment of their employees. Many managers in corrupt organizations tend to link employees' success to organizational success, thus organizations can take advantage of corrupt employees winning contracts just as employees can assure themselves of a secure workplace. If these assumptions that every illegitimate advantage seem to support the survival of the organization and its employees is true, then it could become necessary for the employees to secure as many advantages as possible. In turn, every employees' failure might jeopardize the existence of the organization that in turn might jeopardizes employees' continued employment. According to the experts, this possible connection could put high pressure on all employees to attain their targets. Literature also assumes that the mentioned working conditions seem common in corrupt organizations (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Cohen, 1995).

Employees' assumed perception of fighting in a competition war (i.e., a continuous threat of job loss) combined with assumed loose market regulations may reshape employees' perceptions of organizational corruption. The work at hand refers to this possible reshaping as an *employees' perception shift*. In this context, perception shift refers to a decrease of employees' moral and ethical concerns. Employees' assumed concern at survival (i.e., a continuous employment) might overwrite ethical concerns and might lead to a positive perception of organizational corruption. The possible threat of the competition war could somewhat boost an organization's performance expectations to border on the unrealistic to apparently ensure that the organization wins the war. Employees' perception of a possible competition war may be due to an external pressure that could allow them to keep their positive image of the organization because the organization apparently needs to win the competition war to ensure employees' jobs. This assumed positive image might increase employees' identification with and commitment to their organization, which in turn could make it more likely that employees support organizational corruption.

> *Expert no. 11: "I assume the first inducement for many people is their high level of identification towards the company they are surrounded by and a prevailing high pressure in the company. Therefore, there are external influences which cause people to act corrupt, since fear of losing one's job, threats applying to personal matters and other factors of influence are prevalent."*
> *Expert no. 11: "Corruption is a good thing [...] because it supports the organization. And the rules prevailing on the outside [outside the organization, e.g., in the market] are against the organization and are directed to harm the organization. In addition, a feeling is generated that confers to employees a*

sense of doing-the-right-thing for their organization instead of considering their actions as morally wrong."

Expert no. 7: "[…]it is a relatively common position that processes of giving bribes are quite normal. […] It serves the company because of increases of revenues and other people / companies are doing it as well. This is a very important point. I do not do anything extraordinary, but (act corruptly) involving areas like waste deposit or international businesses, acquisitions, nuclear power and stuff like that. This means, when there are businesses concerning infrastructure it is appropriate and we are doing it, just add it to the marketing expenditures like in other areas."

The experts indicate an underlying assumption called *the end justifies the means* (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; see Table B1). This underlying assumption emphasizes not only the importance of work outcomes but also the non-importance of the process of obtaining them. *The end justifies the means* apparently influence how employees seem to fail to scrutinize both organizational goals and work targets (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). In line with that, employees may seek the most effective way to attain their goals (Merton, 1938). The reported primary perspective on outcomes in corrupt organizations by the experts may undermine employees' moral standards which in turn could enable them to engage in organizational corruption without feeling guilty. Moreover, an outcome related focus may permit employees every possible behavior to a certain extent as long as it may serve organizational goals because only success seems to count (Cohen, 1995; Merton, 1938).

Expert no. 2: "Well, I have to reach these results and nobody is interested in how I do it; it is just important that I reach them."

Expert no. 2: "[…] if you ask anyone in [name of the organization] what was the most important thing, it would be meeting the earnings targets."

Expert no. 12: "[…] we had a system of bonuses for growth. I administered about 50 to 80 sales representatives and some heads of countries or regions and they had a system of bonuses applying to them and they told me they needed those funds [the bribes], otherwise they did not have a chance of accomplishing the targets of revenue."

Expert no. 9: "Well, they had a very achievement-oriented culture, which was related towards [name of the organization] very much, along with intense processes of identification, but also coupled with a high pressure for achievement."

Expert no. 7: "[People are claiming], to have no awareness of wrongdoing, but acting in the course of their business model to get in contracts."

The general perceptions of the experts about all employees in corrupt organizations were analyzed according to the underlying assumptions of two cultural dimensions by Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1961): (1) *human nature* and (2) *human relations to the natural environment* (see Table B1). First, the human nature dimension pertains to the goodness of human beings. According to the experts, many employees in corrupt organizations seem to

perceive human beings as evil. These employees seem to assume that all individuals play unfairly and this perception might explain why employees in turn often expect everyone to behave corruptly. Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's (1961) second dimension refers to the relation of humans with their natural environment (i.e., mastery, balance, or submission). The original dimension was transferred to the organizational setting (i.e., how organizations perceive their relation to their market in terms of control and power). Many experts (9 out of 14) indicated a submissive relationship of employees of corrupt organizations to their market. The experts referred to employees who felt dependent on and trapped by the power of competitors, market conditions, and organizational corruption. According to the interviewees, both underlying assumptions may rouse employees' fear that competitors will snatch away important contracts or gain other advantages. Many experts (9 out of 14) stated that employees seem to not see any alternative to organizational corruption in attaining their goals to help their organization. Employees' assumed existential fear may be an important reason why ethical values remain out of consideration.

> Expert no. 3: "[...] if we don't get this contract, if we don't get that one, then our financial statement will be a bad one. And then jobs are endangered and therefore also their [the employees'] existence, which sets up a quite threatening background."
> Expert no. 5: "[...] I cannot change [the market conditions]. And if we would change them, we would [...] cease to exist."
> Expert no. 4: "The alternative of carrying out business there, is to reduce jobs here. This means the argument of job conservation is an important point contributing to the legitimation of [corrupt] action, which is simply a realistic view."
> Expert no. 6: "If we want to have this contract in order to secure our jobs and everything which is associated with that, and we are situated in a corrupt country, so everyone is doing it then we have to join in."

As a final point, employees of corrupt organizations seem to perceive themselves as a *community of fate*[26]. According to the descriptions of the experts, this community tends to share the same environmental conditions and seems to need for its members to rely on each other for securing its own continuity in the competition war. This possible interdependence of the group might increases (1) employees' commitment to the group and its values and norms, and (2) employees' pressure to support organizational corruption and to assimilate to the group (see empirical results for mobbing of whistle blowers; Rothschild & Miethe, 1999;

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[26] The community of fate was not coded explicitly within the interviews. It is more of an interpretation of the author to which some codes could be seen as indicators such as: "we are a team and compete against others", "we are fighting in a war", "team spirit", "coercion": see Appendix B.

Turner & Haslam, 2001). Experts also indicate that employees' intolerance of organizational corruption might be taken as an indication of being against the community.

3.2.2. Managers' Perspective

The experts suggested that both managers' values and behavior seem largely detached from ethical values. Some experts indicated this disconnection explicitly:

> Expert no. 8: "[...] usually, these organizational values [...] are not linked to reward and motivation programs. [Through reward and motivation programs] the company regulates direction and performance of their employees [...]."
>
> Expert no. 10: "Missions are up there in the sky, whereas our business goals like sales agreements are central."
>
> Expert no. 7: "[...] there is absolutely no correlation between implications of the code of conduct and the organization's real culture. [...] the official culture is uncoupled from corruptive acting."

When managers really do not enforce and reinforce ethical values, their employees might not take these values seriously. Within this context, any lip-serviced value might not have any virtual consequences. Therefore, perhaps to live up to the competition in the market and to support corruption indirectly, managers could appear to not guide their employees into following ethical values (Brief et al., 2001; Cohen, 1995). A reason for this corrupt environment might be the great pressure managers seem to perceive (Baucus, 1994; DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004). In line with literature, the experts described the way employees in corrupt organizations seem to face a huge pressure and focus on the value of *performance* (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Pinto et al., 2008; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003). Performance seems important because it tends to be necessary to attain goals. In turn, the organizational bonus system ought to boost managers' pressure to perform (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004). Accordingly, bonuses seem to be granted to only a few managers as well as punishment if managers fail to meet their targets (cf., Sims & Brinkmann, 2003). Furthermore, the underlying assumption *the end justifies the means* could inform managers' norms of *punishment*. This could mean that many managers may punish employees if they do not attain goals with any means they can use (Conger & Kanungo, 1998). Chang and Lai (2002, p. 28) named this "hope for reward and fear of punishment". Through the management bonus system, some organizations can encounter competition among different managers at the same level, and managers own promotion ought to depend largely on the results of their subordinates. Therefore, some managers may use rewards and punishment for their employees in order for them to attain their results. This huge pressure to perform combined with a focus on outcomes is assumed as antecedents of corruption and unethical behavior in literature (e.g., Pinto et al., 2008; Schweitzer et al., 2004).

Expert no. 2: "[Name of the organization] did a performance review system […]. What that was, was a forced [INAUDIABLE] where 5 % were the top group, 15 % in the second group, 25 % in the third group and of course the other 55 % were in the bottom groups. The bonuses went to the first and second group, the third group got [INAUDIABLE] bonuses but the point is that it was a forced [INAUDIABLE]. If there were a hundred vice presidents, only 5 could be in the top group, only 15 could be in the second group."

Expert no. 5: "[…] the bonuses […] [of management] are made dependent on goal attainment. And […] executives […] pass this onto their employees, since without their employees they cannot gain their bonuses […]."

Expert no. 9: "[…] management is pressurized to produce the relevant outcomes of revenue and profitability, regardless of how this is attained."

Expert no. 10: "These [fixed goals] are reaching from the very highest position of command down to quite low status. If goals for management are very ambitious, this implies a high pressure on all levels to attain these goals."

Expert no. 9: "[…] Management by objectives is the common tool, […], where goals are fixed up, usually revenue targets, and by that means pressure to act is set up."

Outcome orientation was regarded as a central value for managers because first, experts emphasized its importance and second, it seemed to be a manifestation of the underlying assumption *the end justifies the means*. Both concepts seem to rely only on outcomes, tend to be disconnected from ethical values to a certain extent, and might enable employees to engage in organizational corruption. Furthermore, the experts suggested in which way the value outcome orientation might be connected to other important values such as *success* and need for *security* (see Figure 9, see Table B1).

The experts indicate that managers could pass on their values of outcome orientation, success, performance, and security and therefore their own pressure to their subordinates virtually through goal-setting, rewarding, and punishing. According to both experts and literature, managers seem to not only to set goals that are sometimes only attainable through corruption, but also their rewarding behavior tends to support organizational corruption (Pinto et al., 2008). If targets are crucial and only attainable through organizational corruption, then corruption virtually becomes instrumental to employees (i.e., perception shift). Two experts mentioned that they had contact with employees of organizations which pay a low basic salary and that way these contact persons seem to depend more on bonuses. Such extreme combinations could increase the pressure on employees to engage in organizational corruption. Nevertheless, it is not clear how often employees face such more extreme situations. Another perception of the experts was that many managers seem highly interested in outcomes, while they seemed less interested in how their employees attain these outcomes. In addition, managers tend to punish unsuccessful employees.

Expert no. 11: "[...] the connection of goals and corruption [is] a subtle one, namely they [employees] have a very low base income and based on that, very high wages, depending on success. And since they [employees] are on minimum subsistence or below without being successful, in terms of their wage, then through their own initiative, they will try to increase their sales."

Figure 9. Managers' Perspective of a Corrupt Organizational Culture.[27]

Note. The figure illustrates the reported connections of how the experts perceived the managers' perspective on the different levels of organizational culture through their contact with different employees. The figure illustrated the codes and possible indicators for code connections. The code connections depend on the verbal code connections of the sample and give a first idea about how the different aspects might be related. The left hand side shows the layers of organizational culture, the right hand side illustrates the codes of the underlying assumptions, values, and norms (for code descriptions see Table B1). The gray boxes designate important (very oft named) codes.

Figure 9 illustrates the verbal connections of the experts about organizational layers of the managers' perspective. The *end justifies the means*, outcome orientation, and goal-setting were evaluated as the main managerial underlying assumptions, values, and norms, because they had the most connections with other norms and values. The key findings for managers' corrupt organizational culture seems to be the absence of ethical values combined with assumed huge pressure, outcome-focused rewards as well as punishment norms. Nevertheless,

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[27] This figure is published in Campbell and Göritz (2014b), Fig. 1, p. 303.

the sample was very small and therefore these results could only provide an idea of the important constructs and their relations.

3.2.3. Employees' Perspective

The main findings are that the experts reported how their contact persons seem to perceive huge pressure to attain targets and tend to use many rationalizations. Some experts described how employees are not allowed to fail or turn down unattainable goals lest they lose their jobs or harm their career:

> Expert no. 2: "[…] so they [= employees] see that to not accept this high target, that's almost unattainable, is a career terminating move. So I must accept the target, now I've accepted the target there is extreme pressure to make it. And it becomes so intense and there's also a sense of urgency, just running so fast and furious that you're not taking the time to go 'oh my goodness, look, this [is] unethical and immoral, against the law'."
>
> Expert no. 9: "If they [= employees] do not attain their goal they get a negative feedback and are probably not being promoted or are put under even more pressure, in doubt they are threatened with a restructuring of positions, and where are they left then […]"

These experts referred to different kinds of pressures coercing employees such as goal, time, and work-group pressures. Work-group pressure might affect employees as well as *coercion* to engage in organizational corruption, because a corrupt organization seems to connect employees' targets to the targets and jobs of their colleagues. Furthermore, if one takes into account the perception of fighting in a competition war and the community of fate employees' intensity in attending to their tasks can become more plausible. If employees' goals may be only attainable through organizational corruption, then employees could require much more rationalization to reduce the cognitive and moral dissonance of their behavior.

> Expert no. 10: "Strategies of justification [= rationalization strategies] among the employees are quite common. For example, the assumption that corruption supports the company's interests and serves market laws […][the perception] that employment is ensured by corrupt behavior and similar excuses."

According to the experts, employees seem mostly to use the following rationalization strategies to normalize organizational corruption: s*ocial weighting, corruption is a matter of course,* and *appeal to higher loyalties* (see Table B1). Because rationalization strategies address more or less taken-for-granted assumptions about basic circumstances these were seen as additional underlying assumptions and coded as those. The perception of the experts were that the main underlying assumption of *the end justifies the means* seems to constitute a guiding principle connected with a social weighting strategy, which in turn tends to have multiple connections to other underlying assumptions (see Figure 10). The underlying assumptions seem to frame a social reality in which employees might evaluate corruption as

useful, which can support employees to interpret their own behavior in a positive way (Brief et al., 2001). Because seemingly everyone is engaged in corruption, corruption might not only be a common phenomenon but also could be seen as important to secure advantages for the employees' organization. These possible relations are indicated in three underlying assumptions, namely: w*e are a team and fight against the others, appeal to higher loyalties,* and *we have always been corrupt* (see Table B1). The reported high amount of employees' rationalization by the exports might explain why employees could become ethically blind.

*Figure 10.* Employees' Perspective of a Corrupt Organizational Culture.[28]

Note. The figure illustrates the reported connections of how the experts perceived the employees' perspective on the different levels of organizational culture through their contact with different employees. The figure illustrated the codes and possible indicators for code connections. The code connections depend on the verbal code connections of the sample and give a first idea about how the different aspects might be related. The left hand side shows the layers of organizational culture, the right hand side illustrates the codes of the underlying assumptions, values, and norms (for code descriptions see Table B1). The gray boxes designate important (very oft named) codes.

Experts indicate that employees seem to be afraid of the insecurity of market conditions and the risk of losing continuous employment. Thus, most of the contact persons of the experts seem to share the main values of *security* and *team spirit*. Security refers to employees' need to keep their job and team spirit refers to a manifestation of the assumptions

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[28] This figure is published in Campbell and Göritz (2014b), Fig. 2, p. 305.

to be part of a community of fate. Through the uncertain conditions of the competition war, employees might feel the need to stick together, which in turn could increase work-group coercion. Through this coercion, employees can face higher pressure to assimilate to work-group norms and to punish deviant behavior if the deviant behavior could possibly harm the group. This finding is also present in the recent literature (Brucke, Tomlinson, & Cooper, 2010), and as the following experts describe it:

> Expert no. 1: "[…] 'it is one for all and all for one'. If you are a military or a structured unit, you say one ought not to do things like that [i.e., whistle blowing]."
>
> Expert no. 11: "[…] It is a sense of community, a feeling of togetherness, a confirmed fellowship, the pursuit of a common goal, […] so that there is a communal spirit, because these actions allow a better financial endowment for everyone."
>
> Expert no. 5: "It's as simple as: If our company is fine, we are all fine. Therefore, I just behave as it is common and as I am expected to, that's what I do. And it's still below things like murder or homicide, or generally injuring people. [INAUDIBLE] It's just some kind of manipulation to fill in a document which isn't real, now and then."

The work-group seems to become so important that one expert indicated that employees build up a *close shop* (i.e., a community that stays focused on themselves and encapsulate themselves from outsiders). Thus, while employees seem to share their *open secret* of corruption within the group they also might *separate* themselves from non-corrupt individuals. Perhaps, employees may use various rationalization strategies and in turn avoid talking about corruption-related work issues. Experts' indicated speechlessness of the employees might be a result from employees' unawareness when corruption begins and whether they might speak about a taboo topic. Therefore, many employees may avoid talking about work-related issues in general (i.e., work regulations or work solutions), which could lead to *organizational silence* (cf., Wolfe-Morrison & Milliken, 2000). This organizational silence seems to go along with the team spirit and the perception of employees competing against each other. Some experts described the communication among employees about work-related issues this way:

> Expert no. 5: "It is some kind of unexpressed code not to write it [corruption] down in e-mails or things like that and that nobody is having a closer look at. But not because people are saying: 'Gee, that is criminal!' - Of course, they do know that things around them are not quite correct, but they do not want that stuff to be talked about and to be leaked as a consequence."
>
> Expert no. 4: "Everyone is remaining silent, because everyone is afraid of losing one's job by speaking up."
>
> Expert no. 6: "Yes. Often only a few people do really know it, implicitly a lot of them do. […] The whole thing [corruption] always has to be based on a secret."

Figure 10 indicates possible connections among organizational layers of the employees' perspective as the experts referred to them. Some experts indicated that the assumption of evil human nature could inspire the underlying assumption of social weighting. Assuming it to be true, this could be because if employees perceive every human as evil in turn everyone in the market supports corruption. Such a perspective could make it more urgent for employees to compete against other organizations. Again code connections depend on the small sample of this study and could only provide first insights.

3.3. Discussion

The results of this study suggest three main characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture: the underlying assumption of *the end justifies the means*, the value security, and the assumption that employees punish deviant (i.e., non-corrupt) behavior (RQ1). In addition, results indicate that while managers seem to perceive a corrupt organizational culture in terms of performance, employees seem to discern it in terms of rationalization (RQ2).

3.3.1. Characteristics of a Corrupt Organizational Culture

The results of this study suggest the following main characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture on the basis of the perception of the interviewed experts: (1) employees of corrupt organizations seem to perceive themselves as fighting in a competition war instead of facing ordinary market competition. Due to this competition war, one consequence could be that it becomes more important for employees to receive contracts, relax regulations, or glean other benefits for their organization. In addition, wartime could degrade values such as fairness and sustainability, and therefore, organizational corruption could become an attractive behavioral alternative. Thus, employees apparently undergo a perception shift that tinges corruption in a positive light. (2) Many employees seem to perceive that they are a community of fate and that every member who fails to support organizational corruption tends to harm this community and needs to be punished. (3) In line with former research and backed up by the current findings, the author assumes that the underlying assumption *the end justifies the means* seems to be the key characteristic of a corrupt organizational culture (see Sims & Brinkmann, 2003). This teleological assumption merely considers outcomes while disregarding means. This assumption directly and indirectly seems to touch most underlying assumptions, values, and norms to a certain extent. (4) Under the threat of unemployment, employees of corrupt organizations might more easily justify organizational corruption to bring about a win-win situation: if employees show corrupt behavior, then they are assumed to attain benefits for their organization, which in turn may ensure employees' continuous

employment. An indicator for this could be the perception of the experts that employees' tend to value both their job and organizational security and a virtually indirect connection of these values to organizational corruption. (5) Within a corrupt organizational culture, ethical values appear to not get reinforced on a daily basis in any connection to reward or punishments.

3.3.2. Managers' and Employees' Perspective on Organizational Culture

Experts indicated differences in the perspectives of managers and employees of a corrupt organizational culture. Managers are assumed to perceive a corrupt organizational culture in terms of high performance values, outcome orientation, and security needs while employees are assumed to perceive a corrupt organizational culture in terms of rationalization, team spirit, and work-group norms.

The experts indicate that managers seem to create a pro-corrupt environment which seem to mainly refer to the threat of fighting in a competition war and seem to cover the underlying assumption *the end justifies the mean*. According to the experts, these perceptions may allow managers to promote an employees' perception shift, also justifying unrealistic goals including corruption. Because managers' could install and reinforce values that might justify those unrealistic goals through their communication, rewarding and punishment practices (see Collins et al., 2009), managerial goals appear to be the key component in corruption. These values seem to be outcome orientation, performance, success, and security. Furthermore, if managers might not link ethical values to the rewards and punishment they mete out, this focus can support organizational corruption in a top-down manner. The possible disconnection between organizational reality and ethical values may indicate a possible explanation for the mixed results in research on the effects of codes of ethics.

Experts suggest that employees seem to be able to uphold a positive, moral self-image despite their support of corruption because of the assumption that their organization is fighting in a competition war. This experts' assumption could indicate that employees might more likely get accustomed to corruption in an environment that on the one hand seems to include a threat of a competition war and on the other hand appears to leave only corrupt behavior as the only option to fight this war. Within this context, employees might use rationalization strategies to justify their engagement in corruption (Maruna & Copes, 2004) in their collective sense-making at work. According to the 14 conducted interviews these rationalization strategies tend to influence each other, may address the perception shift, and can suppress deviant opinions (i.e., non-corrupt behavior). Consequently, most employees might consider corruption as necessary, customary, and permissible, and therefore can facilitate organizational corruption with ethical blindness (cf., Maruna & Copes, 2004).

The experts assumed that employees emphasize two values, namely: team spirit and security. Both values might derive from the underlying assumption that all employees are members of a community of fate and socialize employees into organizational corruption. Many employees might feel the urge to assimilate with pro-corrupt values and norms, because they may face pressure to conform within their work-group which represents the community of fate in daily business (see Joshi, Anand, & Henderson, 2007). This pressure might also urge employees to introduce newcomers to corruption and to reward corrupt behavior (see Anand et al., 2005). The value team spirit could influence employees' organizational silence and coercion. Organizational silence implies that employees do not talk about work-related issues (e.g., they do not receive feedback about their own work). Coercion implies punishment if employees show non-corrupt behavior and it increases employees' assimilation to organizational assumptions, values, and norms. The experts indicate that employees may presume that the organization has always been corrupt, and they separate some employees engaging in tasks covering organizational corruption. An indicator for this might be the experts' perception how many employees seem to keep organizational corruption as an open secret throughout the organization and do not feel like that they support criminal behavior.

To sum up the perceptions of the 14 interviews about managers and employees in corrupt organizations, the author suggests that managers and employees might play different roles in the process of normalization of corruption (see Anand et al., 2005). While experts' perception about managers indicate that managers seem to install an environment to support organizational corruption, employees were perceived to implement corrupt related work tasks. According to the process of normalization of corruption, managers seem to rely on institutionalization and employees seem to rely on socialization and rationalization (cf., Anand et al., 2005). Employees' rationalization, the value team spirit, and the norms of both coercion and punishment may be manifestations of socialization and rationalization because through them, employees could reduce cognitive dissonance and may increase social support. The reported norms of managers' goal-setting, rewarding, and punishing may be a manifestation of the institutionalization mechanism, because all of these norms pertain to organizational daily routines and structures which are presumed to support organizational corruption (Anand et al., 2005). This might indicate that corrupt organizational culture could be a manifestation of the three mechanisms of the normalization of corruption socialization, rationalization and institutionalization that may render employees' behavior supportive of corruption.

3.3.3. Limitations

Because this study was a qualitative analysis there are general limitations depending on the method: (1) data analysis as well as (2) generalizability of results. In addition, further particular limitations exist of this study exist, such as (3) sample size and (4) expert status. (1) Qualitative approaches are on purpose a rather subjective method (Ormston, Spencer, Barnard, & Snape, 2013). Within qualitative analysis the researcher uses neither standardized/normed questionnaires nor 100 per cent standardized interpretation possibilities (Ormston et al., 2013). In addition, the knowledge of the researcher influences the interview questions, analysis, and interpretation (Bansal & Corley, 2011) to a certain extent. The author tried to reduce personal influence in the coding procedure through the support of the university course. Nevertheless, there will remain a subjective influence, which needs to be borne in mind.

(2) The samples of qualitative research are often much smaller than samples of quantitative research (Guest, Bunce, & Johnson, 2006). Thus, validity and the possibility of generalizing these results depend on the sample constellation and are lower than in quantitative analyses (Witt, 2001). A total different sample constellation might lead to different results (in codes, relations, and focus). To reduce this issue at a minimum the author tried to interview a mostly heterogenic expert sample. Nevertheless, the reported insights can only cover indicators of possible important characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture with their assumed relations perceived by the experts.

(3) Literature does not provide any shared and empirical based guidelines for the best sample size in qualitative research (Guest et al., 2006). The number for minimum sample sizes differs between five to 15 depending on the particular qualitative analysis. The authors named 15 interviews as general minimum for a general qualitative analysis (Guest et al., 2006). The current samples counts 14 experts, which is lower than the assumed minimum of a qualitative analysis. Therefore, there might be some non-developed important characteristics or possible relations that might become more visible if more experts were interviewed.

(4) Primarily, German experts were interviewed. This raises the question as to whether the results primarily pertain a German-shaped perspective of a corrupt organizational culture, or if these characteristics are transferable to other countries. In addition, only two experts worked themselves as managers in a corrupt organization themselves. All other experts did not engage in corruption themselves. They mainly gained their experience and insights in corrupt organizations through other contact persons who worked or still work in corrupt organizations. Thus, almost all experts received subjective perspectives of corrupt

organization via their own contact persons. These contact persons could underlie a systematical bias since most experts had and have contact with employees of corrupt organizations in terms of the legal framework (i.e., judges, police officers, and ombudsmen) what could lead to field dependence. Thus, the contact persons of the experts might most likely be perpetrators,[29] who have contact with the police or prosecution, or be silent observer, or whistle blower, who seek contact to ombudsmen because they witnessed corruption in their organization. Thus, the experts might have less contact with employees of corrupt organizations who perhaps like to support corruption, who might do not feel huge pressure or employees who support other values than the shown in corrupt organizations. The perspective of the experts is more or less a classical one, which looks for prevention, intervention, or punishment of corruption. Even one of the interviewed managers blew the whistle on his/her own organization. Although many heterogenic experts shared most of the named connections, still one need to keep in mind the way most of the experts are still outsiders who receive in some ways limited insights in corrupt organizations. In addition, no employees who worked in a corrupt organizational culture got interviewed. This might reduce the representation of employees' perspective to a certain extent.

3.3.4. Conclusion and Implications

This study indicates that a perception shift undermines ethical values and norms within corrupt organizations and suggests how this perception shift might explain employees' organizational corruption. Besides possible dysfunctional circumstances inside an organization (e.g., high pressure goals and no connection to a code of conduct) also possible external forces (e.g., highly competitive markets) tend to be reasons why employees of corrupt organizations might change their structures, processes, and frameworks to normalize corruption. According to the experts, employees' perception of a competition war could resound with these external forces, at least in the eyes of their contact persons within the social cocoon. Therefore, this study might provide new insights on how employees perceive the normalization of corruption. Johnson et al. (2011) reported two strategic organizational culture dimensions that promote dysfunctional organizations, namely strategic aggressiveness and short-term horizon. Strategic aggressiveness means that organizations exclusively focus on outcomes not on means. Short-term horizon means the way in which organizations focus primarily on short-term goals. The values and norms of outcome orientation and goal-setting seem to correspond to the dimensions of strategic aggressiveness and short-term horizon. The

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[29] Perpetrator = active engagement in corruption.

reported perception of a competition war perhaps explain why employees feel committed to these dimensions and how they perceive the social cocoon.

Research should focus on whether these first insight patterns emerge repeatedly in different contexts, and rely on questions such as when, why, and by what mechanisms a certain perception shift takes place among employees in the process of an organization turning corrupt. In addition, research also needs to trace the value and norm changes that take place in both managers and employees during the process of normalization. As a general outlook on research, when studying corrupt behavior researchers could examine how employees' values and norms influence subjective perceptions of locus of control, risk taking, and ethical blindness that all seem important for corruption.

The perception shift within a corrupt organizational culture needs to address employees' subjective attitude towards corruption, in line with above modified aspects of the Theory of Planned Behavior. Also, the named ethical blindness might influence individual behavior in terms of individuals' attitude towards corruption. Therefore, as a second empirical step, Study 2 analyzes if a corrupt organizational culture can shape employees' (positive) attitude towards organizational corruption. Therefore, Study 2 covers the main results of Study 1: that the main underlying assumption is a perception of a competition war, which leads to organizational culture manifestations as rewards and punishment for corrupt behavior. When the underlying assumption of a corrupt organizational culture manifests itself via concrete norms, then these norms need to mediate the impact of the underlying assumption on employees' subjective norm, perceived behavioral control, and individuals' attitude towards corruption. Nevertheless, all named aspects are still elements of the organizational culture. Study 2 analyzes whether the different layers of organizational culture influence each other to shape employees' attitude towards organizational corruption. In addition Study 2 analyzes if a corrupt organizational culture might reduce any sex differences in organizational corruption. Therefore, Study 2 provides first ideas whether the findings in Study 1 also can be measured in reality and if they can really influence corrupt behavior.

4. STUDY 2

Study 2, as a cross-sectional field-survey, covers the analysis if a corrupt organizational culture influences employees' attitude towards organizational corruption, (H1) namely gifting (H1a) and bribery (H1b). In addition, this study covers whether the impact of the main underlying assumption of a corrupt organizational culture on employees' attitude towards organizational corruption is mediated via tangible rewards and lax control mechanism (H2)

for both gifting (H2a) and bribery (H2b). Finally, men and women's attitude towards organizational corruption shall differ depending on the corrupt organizational culture. While in a high corrupt organizational culture men and women shall not differ in their attitude towards gifting (H5a) and bribery (H5b), in a low corrupt organizational culture men and women shall differ (H5c and H5d, respectively).

In this survey, the corrupt organizational culture was operationalized via the main underlying assumption that employees perceive their organization as fighting in a competition war (as a result of Study 1). Positive incentives for corrupt behavior were operationalized with tangible rewards and low risk of punishment was indirectly operationalized with lax control mechanism (when an organization has lax control mechanism, both employees' likelihood to get caught and the risk of penalty for corruption decreases). Employees' attitude towards organizational corruption was operationalized through participants' attitudes towards both gifting and bribery. This study was in a cooperation with a master thesis (see Semineth, 2015) and therefore covers some variables which are not analyzed in this dissertation. These variables are only listed in the correlation table for the sake of completeness; only variables relevant for the hypothesis were analyzed and discussed in detail.[30]

4.1. Method

Sample. The sample consisted of 131 Germans between the ages of 20 and 64 with a mean age of 37.86 years ($SD = 12.56$, see Table 5). Participants were recruited via forums, newsgroups, Facebook, and black boards (between 6.11.2013 and 01.05.2014). They were invited to participate in a master thesis survey about "employees' perception about their organization" where corruption was measured as one of many other perceptional aspects. Participants could not receive any rewards, money, or other incentives when they participated in this survey. Because of afore discussed problems of organizational cooperation this survey opted to gain data of individual employees without knowing their particular organizations. Therefore, data was collected on the base of individuals and covered many different organizations. Participants could anonymously report their perceptions of several aspects of their organization. Participants worked in heterogenic industries[31]: consulting and service (28.2 %), education (14.5 %), industrial production (10.7 %), trade (8.4 %), finance and

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[30] The master thesis was done under the guidance of the author and takes a perspective on whether a possible impact of perceived organizational justice on corruption differs between German and Japanese employees. Because the Japanese sample consisted only out of 43 participants who were mainly students, the author decided to only analyze the German sample.
[31] Participants could indicate in which of the named industries they work.

Table 5.

Sample Study 2 (*N* = 131).

Descriptive data	
Age in years (*SD*) [a]	37.86 (12.56)
Women in the sample (%)	64 (48.9)
Students in the sample (%)	20 (15.3)
Educational level (%)	
finished PhD	10 (7.6)
finished studies	56 (42.7)
high school	15 (11.5)
vocational diploma	14 (10.7)
middle school	25 (19.1)
lower school	5 (3.8)
other	6 (4.6)
Job position (%) [b]	
owner, partner of the organization	1 (4.6)
management (lower, middle, and upper)	30 (22.9)
employee	80 (61.1)
freelancer	9 (6.9)
Work experience in years (*SD*) [c]	13.80 (12.04)

Measurements		
	M(*SD*)	Range (min., max.)
Corruption I (gifting)	2.38 (1.19)	1, 5
Corruption II (bribery)	1.93 (1.19)	1, 5
Corrupt organizational culture	2.81 (.76)	1, 4.33
Tangible rewards	3.07 (1.10)	1, 5
Lax control mechanism	2.36 (.89)	1, 5
Social desirability	2.70 (.74)	1, 4.50

Note. min. = minimum mean; max. = maximum mean.

[a] Skewness = .44 (*SE* = .21), Kurtosis = -1.24 (*SE* = .42), Shapiro-Wilk (*df* = 131, *W* = .90, *p* < .001).

[b] Other positions: worker, trainee (two participants), phd candidate, student, and pupil.

[c] Range work experience: 1 year - 42 years.

insurance (6.9 %), civil service (6.1 %), media and journalism (0.8 %), non-governmental organizations (0.8 %), and other (23.7 %).[32]

Procedure. Participants faced questionnaires to the following topics in the named order: national culture practices, perception of organizational justice, attitudes towards gifts, perceived goal-setting and tangible rewards, perception of a corrupt organizational culture, attitudes towards bribery, lax control mechanism, and finally social desirability. This study only takes a perspective on: attitudes towards gifs, tangible rewards, perception of a corrupt organizational culture, attitudes towards bribery, lax control mechanism, and social desirability. The general questionnaire order opted to cover a huge range of participants' perceptions of their organization where corruption is just one of many aspects. In addition, several distractor questions were put in place between the questions of gifting and bribery to reduce possible reactance of the participants.

4.1.1. Measurements

Corrupt organizational culture (= independent variable) was measured with a six-item modified version of the seven-item Attitude of War Scale (see Hill, 1953 as cited in Edwards, 1994, p. 32[33]). The Attitude of War Scale covers individuals' attitude of the necessity to win the Korean War. This measurement was used as a first attempt to measure the underlying assumption of fighting in a competition war as one of the key findings of Study 1. The original items were transferred from the Korean War into a competition war between organizations in their industry (see Table C1 in Appendix C to compare both original and modified items). Since employees seem to perceive their organizational competition as a war (Study 1) participants were asked to indicate how they perceive the competition in their industry. A sample item is: "I suppose the organization has no choice but to continue the competition war." The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'I disapprove the statement' to (5) 'I approve the statement'. Because the confirmatory factor analysis revealed on item as cross loading (see results) only six of the seventh modified items were used for analysis. Cronbach's alpha was .84.

Organizational corruption I: gifting (= dependent variable I) was measured with the three-item sub-scale of the Ethics Position Questionnaire (see Tian, 2008). This sub-scale measures individuals' attitude towards gifting for organizational benefit. A sample item is "I'll accept the lodging, transportation, entertainment, travel or other similar free entertainments

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[32]12 participants employed in computer science and telecommunication, 3 engineers, 2 employed in health care, 2 employed in the pharma industry, 2 employed in social facilities, 2 employed in the event technology, and individual participants employed in: chemistry industry, sport journalism, fitness industry, property management, aviation, and navigation.
[33] Please note that because these items where not published in the original article by Hill (1953), this indirect citation is used.

provided by the firms because of my decision right." The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'strongly disagree' to (5) 'strongly agree'. Cronbach's alpha was .74.

Organizational corruption II: **bribery** (= dependent variable II) was measured with two items of the three-item[34] sub-scale of the Ethics Position Questionnaire (see Tian, 2008). This sub-scale measures individuals' attitude towards bribery for organizational benefit. The two items were: "Bribery is an implicit rule and smoother in doing business." And, "Bribery has its reason to exist in business transactions." The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'strongly disagree' to (5) 'strongly agree'. Cronbach's alpha was .70.

Tangible rewards (= mediator variable I) were measured with the three-item subscale of Tangible Rewards of the Goal Setting Questionnaire (see Kwan, Lee, Wright, & Hui, 2013). This scale measures employees' anticipated positive results if they attain their targets. This connection was also reported in Study 1: employees perceive promotion or job security (created win-win situation by organizations) if they attain their goals via organizational corruption. A sample item is "If I reach my goals, I feel that this will enhance my job security". The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'I totally disagree' to (5) 'I totally agree'. Cronbach's alpha was .76.

Lax control mechanism (= mediator variable II) was measured with a modified version of the seven-item scale of Reward Context Scale (see Mitchell, Daniels, Hopper, George-Falvy, & Ferris, 1996). The Reward Context Scale looks at sanctions of organizational violations (e.g., monitoring of particular behavior, sanctions of unethical behavior, strategic ignorance of the management). All named aspects of this scale are in line with the findings in Study 1 about managers' rewards and punishment as well as organizational silence. The items were modified to match the explicit controls of corruption (see Table C1 to compare both original and modified items). A sample item is "There is poor or infrequent monitoring of what people do." Cronbach's alpha was .85.

Control variables were age, sex, education, and participants' working industry. Because some industries seem to be more prone to organizational corruption than others, industries was used as a control variable. Finally, social desirability was also treated as control variable although the scale had low relatabilities scores. Therefore, the reader can make their own conclusions about the possible impact of social desirability. Social desirability was measured with four items of the original five-item scale of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Paulhus, 1991). A sample item is: "I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught." Because of the bad intern consistency values on item was

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[34] Because Chronbach's alpha raised from $\alpha = .55$ to $\alpha = .70$; when the third item was excluded, only two-items were used. The removed item was: "Bribery is against rules."

removed from the analysis.[35] The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'not true' to (5) 'very true'. Cronbach's alpha was .59.

4.1.2. Analysis

A confirmatory factor analysis was done on the two modified questionnaire to analyze whether they differ in their loadings. The factor analysis focused on the main components, the factors were limited to two factors a priori, and a varimax rotation was conducted on the factors. H1 was tested with two independent linear regressions that were similar except for their dependent variable (gifting (H1a) vs. bribery (H1b)): Step 1 covered the control variables age, sex, education, industry, and social desirability. Step 2 covered the main effect of corrupt organizational culture.

Two independent mediation analyses were conducted for H2 (in line with MacKinnon, Lockwood, Brown, Wang, & Hoffmann, 2007) and analyzed with the Macro[36] for Multiple Mediation (to receive better power than usual mediation analysis with regressions; see Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). The control variables were age, sex, education, industry, and social desirability, the independent variables was corrupt organizational culture, the mediator variables were both tangible rewards and lax control mechanism, and the dependent variables was either gifting (H2a) or bribery (H2b).

Two independent MANOVAs were conducted to analyze whether men and women differ in their attitudes towards gifting/bribery. One MANOVA was conducted for participants who scored highest on a perceived corrupt organizational culture (higher than 75 percentile for H5a and H5b) representing the extreme intense corrupt organizational culture subgroup. One MANOVA was conducted for participants who scored lowest on a perceived corrupt organizational culture (lower than 25 percentile, for H5c and H5d) representing the extreme low to non-corrupt organizational culture subgroup. The independent variable was sex, the dependent variables were gifting and bribery. The analysis was conducted with SPSS 23.

4.2. Results

Half of the sample consists out of women, the majority of the sample had a rather higher educational degree, there was a small amount of students in the sample, and the majority worked as employees without leadership tasks (see Table 5 for sample characteristics).

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[35] The item "If people talk about private issues, I try not to listen to them" was excluded from analysis because this item lowers the intern consistency of the scale to a huge extent.

[36] Source for the INDIRECT macro (retrieved 18.11.2014 from): http://www.afhayes.com/spss-sas-and-mplus-macros-and-code.html. On the web-site the macro is described: "[…] This macro is far superior to SOBEL, as it allows for more than one mediator and adjusts all paths for the potential influence of covariates not proposed to be mediators in the model […]" For further information see Preacher and Hayes (2008).

Participants' attitudes towards gifting and bribery correlate on a medium level with each other. Older participants with more work experience had a more negative attitude towards gifting than younger participants with less work experience. Lax control mechanism correlated with positive attitudes towards gifting (medium correlation) and bribery (high correlation), whereas an intense perception of a competition war and rewards only correlated with gifting and not with bribery (see Table 6 for the correlation of all measures scales, although only the ones used are discussed here).

The control variables age and industry had a significant impact on gifting. Thus, younger participants and participants of the consulting and service, education, and trade perceived gift getting as less negative than participants of other industries. Social desirability went almost non-significant ($p = .05$) in the mediation analysis for bribery. There was a positive effect of social desirability, the more social desirable participants were the more positive were their attitude towards bribery. This influence needs to be seen with caution, because the measurement of social desirability received bad intern consistency, which might explain this logic relation and the overall non-impact on organizational corruption. In general, the majority of participants had a negative attitude towards organizational corruption for both gifting and bribery. A t-test for dependent samples showed that participants' perceived gifting ($M = 2.38$, $SD = 1.19$) significantly better than bribery ($M = 1.93$, $SD = 1.19$; $t(130) = 3.66$, $p < .001$). Although the major attitude was moderately negative to very negative, some participants also had a more positive attitude towards gifting and bribery. Therefore, there was no extreme case for the attitude towards both forms of organizational corruption (see Figure 11, for the box plot for both).

Table 6.

Correlation Matrix (N = 131).

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.
						Variables in analysis													
1. Age																			
2. Sex	.23††																		
3. Education	-.14	-.07																	
4. Job Position	.22††	.12	.10																
5. Work experience	.94***	.17	-.27**	.20*															
6. Corruption I (gifting)	-.30†††	-.13	-.12	-.02	-.22††														
7. Corruption II (bribery)	.05	.11	.01	-.03	.07	.30†††													
8. Corrupt organizational culture	.03	.05	.01	-.10	-.01	.15a	.09												
9. Lax control mechanism	-.02	.05	.07	-.04	-.01	.23**	.45***	.17											
10. Tangible rewards	-.10	.01	.10	.11	-.17	.36***	.05	.20*	-.07										
11. Social desirability	-.11	-.06	-.03	.00	-.10	.11	.17*	-.07	.09	.10									

Table 6. *(continued).*

	1.	2.	3.	4.	5.	6.	7.	8.	9.	10.	11.	12.	13.	14.	15.	16.	17.	18.	19.
									Variables not in analysis										
12. Goal-setting [b]	-.03	.08	.75	-.03	-.03	.13	.11	.30***	.26	.16	.02								
Organizational Justice [c]																			
13. Procedural	.06	.04	.07	.19*	.08	.12	-.24**	-.07	-.38***	.38***	.01	-.19*							
14. Distributive	-.05	-.17	-.07	.05	-.03	.16	-.11	.06	-.24**	.28†††	.03	-.16	.45***						
15. Interpersonal	-.01	-.02	.07	.08	-.04	.05	-.08	-.02	-.35***	.19*	-.09	-.23**	.48***	.20*					
16. Informal	.02	.03	.02	.04	.02	.13	-.27**	.07	-.45***	.39***	-.12	-.20*	.73***	.47***	.63***				
National Culture [d]																			
17. Power distance	.09	.06	.03	.10	.06	.02	-.60	.05	.01	.13	-.10	.18*	-.06	.00	.01	.08			
18. Individualism	-.02	.09	-.01	.08	.02	.16	-.25**	.11	-.27**	.32***	-.03	.05	.41***	.25**	.19*	.34***	-.04		
19. Uncertainty avoidance	.09	.02	-.25**	.15	.15	.01	-.02	.05	-.30†††	.18*	-.02	.12	.26**	.22††	.25**	.33***	.06	.31***	

Note. *p < .05; **p < .01; ††p = .01; ***p < .001; †††p = .001, two-tailed Pearson correlation. Only the variables from 1 – 11 were analyzed in the current study.

[a] one-tailed significance perception of war and gifting: p = .04.

[b] measured with subscale goals of the Goal Scale by Kwan et al. (2013), Chronbachs' α: .50

[c] measured with scales by Colquitt (2001), Chronbachs' α in above named order: .82, .89, .44, and .92.

[d] measured with the scales by the GLOBE project by House, Javidan, Hanges, and Dorfman (2002), Chronbachs' α in above named order: -.28, .22, and .59.

Figure 11. Boxplot of Participants' Attitude towards Organizational Corruption (1 negative to 5 positive).

Factor analysis of the modified scales. The confirmatory factor analysis of 14 items shows that the items of both modified scales (the scale perception of a competition war, and the scale lax control mechanism of corruption within organizations) loaded mostly as expected on the two different factors (see Table 7). Both factors explained 51.33 % of the variance together whereas the factor 'lax control mechanism' explained 26.80 % and the factor 'perceived competition war' explained 24.53 %. One item of the scale perceived competition war had a similar loading on both factors and the lowest communality of .12. Therefore, this one item was removed from further analysis. All other items loaded between .61 and .84 on one factor and less than .30 on the other factor. In consequence, both scales have one dimension. The lowest item loadings on the preferred factor where .67/ .68 by two items of the scale of perceived competition war and .61/ .62 by two items of the lax control mechanism scale (all loadings rounded to two decimal figures). According to Garson (2013) loadings higher than .70 are ideal standard criteria for good loading and lower than .40 or .30 show a low loading. In addition, Hair, Anderson, Tatham, and Black (1998) referred to factor loadings higher than .60 as "high" and factor loadings lower than .40 as "low". According to the first criteria nine of the remaining 13 items have the ideal loadings, while according to the last criteria all remaining items have ideal loadings. Moreover, in line with Bortz (2005), the factors can get interpreted in a general way, independently of the sample size because more than four items loaded higher than .60. Ergo, the two factors of lax control mechanism and perceived

Table 7.

Factor Analysis of the Modified Questionnaires for Perception of Competition war and lax Controls of Corruption with their factor loadings (*N* = 131).

Items	Factor 1	Factor 2
Eigenvalues	3.752	3.434
Measurement of the perception of a competition war		
1. I suppose the organization has no choice but to continue the competition war.	-.105	**.840**
2. We should be willing to give our allies more money if they need it.[a]	.254	.235
3. Withdrawing our troops from the market at this time would only make matters worse.	.103	**.766**
4. The competition war might not be the best way to stop sales problems, but was the only thing we could do.	.215	**.678**
5. Winning the competition war is absolutely necessary whatever the cost.	.046	**.669**
6. We are protecting the organization by fighting in the competition.	.105	**.759**
7. The reason we are in competition is to defend the security of the organization.	.026	**.738**
Measurement of lax control mechanism		
1. There is poor or infrequent monitoring of what people do.	**.761**	-.077
2. No one checks up on anyone else.	**.608**	-.095
3. Organizational punishments don't exist for corruption.	**.751**	-.005
4. Organizational punishments are never used for corruption.	**.748**	.071
5. Superiors look the other way when this happens.	**.766**	.139
6. Superiors may on occasion encourage corruption.	**.752**	.085
7. The culture emphasizes the bottom line no matter what.	**.617**	.113

Note. Factor 1 explains 26.80 % of the variance and Factor 2 explains 24.53 % of the variance.

[a] Because of the low and similar values on both factors this item were excluded from analysis.

competition war distinguished the modified items very well and the modification of both scales was successful.

Organizational culture. H1 postulated that a corrupt organizational culture increases employees' positive attitude towards organizational corruption in terms of gifting (H1a) and bribery (H1b). Participants with a higher perceived corrupt organizational culture have a more positive attitude towards gifting ($\Delta R^2 = .03$ for this step) while a corrupt organizational culture did not impact the attitude towards bribery (non-significant impact of corrupt organizational culture with $\Delta R^2 = .01$; see Table 8 for both). Thus participants that scored higher than the 75 percentile of perceived corrupt organizational culture have a more positive attitude towards gifting ($M = 2.60$, $SD = 1.16$) and bribery ($M = 1.93$, $SD = 1.19$) than participants that scored lower than the 25 percentile of perceived organizational culture (gifting: $M = 2.29$, $SD = 1.41$; bribery: $M = 1.78$, $SD = 1.14$). Figure 12 illustrates the attitude differences. Therefore, H1a is supported, although the impact of the explained variance is small, and H1b is not supported.

Figure 12. Participants' Attitude of Organizational Corruption Depending on their Perception of a Corrupt Organizational Culture (1 negative to 5 positive).

Table 8.

Regression of a Corrupt Organizational Culture on Organizational Corruption (H1).

	Organizational Corruption ($N = 131$)											
	Gifting						Bribery					
	Modell 1			Modell 2			Modell 1			Modell 2		
Variables	B (SE)	β	p	B (SE)	β	p	B (SE)	β	p	B (SE)	β	p
1 Intercept	4.43 (.64)		<.001	3.73 (.70)		<.001	.79 (.68)		.25	.40 (.76)		.60
Age	-.03 (.01)	-.34	<.001	-.03 (.01)	-.34	<.001	.00 (.01)	.04	.67	.00 (.01)	.04	.69
Sex	-.07 (.20)	-.03	.72	-.09 (.20)	-.04	.64	.28 (.21)	.12	.20	.27 (.21)	.11	.21
Education	-.12 (.06)	-.16	.06	-.12 (.06)	-.16	.06	.01 (.07)	.02	.84	.01 (.07)	.02	.84
Industry	-.07 (.03)	-.21	.02	-.08 (.03)	-.22	.01	-.02 (.03)	-.06	.50	-.02 (.03)	-.07	.45
Social desirability	.04 (.11)	.03	.73	.05 (.12)	.04	.06	.24 (.13)	.17	.06	.25 (.13)	.17	.05
2 Corrupt organizational culture	$R^2 = .17$			.26 (.12)	.18	.02	$R^2 = .05$			.15 (.13)	.10	.25
				$\Delta R^2 = .03$						$\Delta R^2 = .01$		
				$R^2 = .20$						$R^2 = .06$		

Note. B = regression coefficient; SE = standard error of B, β = standardized regression coefficient, p = significance level, ΔR^2 = explained variance through the new variable, R^2 = explained variance, gifting: Model 1: $F(5,125) = 5.00$, $p < .001$; Model 2: $F(6, 124) = 5.13$, $p < .001$, $\Delta F(1,125) = 5.19$, $p = .03$; bribery: Model 1: $F(5,125) = 1.33$, $p = .26$; Model 2: $F(6, 124) = 1.34$, $p = .25$, $\Delta F(1,124) = 1.36$, $p = .25$.

Table 9.

Mediation of Tangible Rewards and lax Control Mechanism on Gifting and Bribery (H2).

	Employees' attitude towards organizational corruption, $N = 131$					
	Gifting			Bribery		
	B(SE)	*t*	*p*	*B(SE)*	*t*	*p*
Control variables on organizational corruption.						
Age	-.03 (.01)	-3.72	<.001	.01 (.01)	.79	.43
Sex	-.14 (.18)	-.78	.43	.20 (.19)	1.01	.31
Education	-.13 (.06)	-2.87	.02	.03 (.06)	.55	.58
Industry	-.05 (.03)	-2.07	.04	-.01 (.03)	-.19	.85
Social desirability	-.00 (.10)	-.09	.93	.19 (.11)	1.67	.10
Corrupt organizational culture on mediators (a paths).						
Tangible rewards	.28 (.11)	2.45	.02	.28 (.11)	2.45	.02
Lax control mechanism	.19 (.09)	2.01	.05	.19 (.09)	2.01	.05
Direct effects of mediators on organizational corruption (b paths).						
Tangible rewards	.36 (.08)	4.30	<.001	.07 (.09)	.77	.44
Lax control mechanism	.28 (.10)	2.77	<.01	.58 (.11)	5.30	<.001
Total effect of corrupt organizational culture on organizational corruption (c path).						
Corrupt organizational culture	.26 (.11)	2.28	.02	.14 (.12)	1.16	.25
Direct effect of corrupt organizational culture on organizational corruption (c' path).						
Corrupt organizational culture	.11 (.11)	.97	.34	.02 (.12)	.14	.89

Note. B = regression coefficient; *SE* = standard error of *B,* β = standardized regression coefficient, *p* = significance level, R^2 = explained variance; Model: gifting $R^2 = .28$, $F(8,122) = 7.47$, $p < .001$; bribery $R^2 = .18$, $F(8,122) = 4.72$, $p < .001$. Based on the results of the Regression analysis Macro for Multiple Mediation by Preacher and Hayes (2008).

Tangible rewards and lax control mechanism. H2 postulated that both tangible rewards and lax control mechanism mediate the impact of a corrupt organizational culture on organizational corruption for both gifting (H2a) and bribery (H2b). Results show, that both tangible rewards and lax control mechanism fully mediated the impact of corrupt organizational culture on gifting ($R^2 = .28$, $F(8,122) = 7.47$, $p < .001$). The mediation effect of

rewards was a bit higher than the mediation effect of lax control mechanism (see Table 9). On the contrary, there was only a partial mediation effect for bribery.[37] Lax control mechanism mediated the impact of corrupt organizational culture on bribery. However, although a corrupt organizational culture influences the amount of tangible rewards, tangible rewards did not influence the attitude towards bribery. The huge impact of lax control mechanism on the attitude towards bribery seems to explain the huge decrease of the direct impact of corrupt organizational culture on organizational corruption ($R^2 = .18$, $F(8,122) = 4.72$, $p < .001$, see Table 9). Thus, H2a is confirmed whereas H2b is only partly confirmed.

Table 10.

Men and Womens' Attitude towards Organizational Corruption for the Extreme Perceptions of Corrupt Organizational Culture (H5).

		Low corrupt organizational culture		High corrupt organizational culture	
		n	*M(SD)*	*n*	*M(SD)*
Gifting	male	11	1.48 (.81)	21	2.65 (1.24)
	female	15	2.82 (1.47)	19	2.54 (1.10)
Bribery	male	11	1.27 (.65)	21	2.21 (1.31)
	female	15	2.10 (1.28)	19	1.68 (1.00)

Note. Only participants lower than the 25 or higher than the 75 percentile were analyzed.

Sex differences in organizational corruption. H5 postulated that men and women differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption dependently on the intensity of the perceived competition war. Men and women with high values in a corrupt organizational culture shall not differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption for both gifting (H5a) and bribery (H5b). Contrary, both sexes shall differ in their attitude towards both gifting (H5c) and bribery (H5d) when they have low values in a corrupt organizational culture. As postulated, men and women do not differ in their attitudes towards organizational corruption when they perceive a high intensity of a corrupt organizational culture (gifting: $F(1,38) = .11$, $p = .78$; bribery: $F(1,38) = 2.93$, $p = .61$; MANOVA for both: $F(2,37) = 1.17$, $p = .32$; see Table 10). When men and women have low values in a perceived corrupt organizational culture, women had a more positive attitude towards gifting than men ($F(1,24) = 7.37$, $p = .01$, $\eta^2 = .24$) while both sexes did slightly not differ in their attitude towards

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[37] As Preacher and Hayes (2008) argued a significant c path from the independent variable to the depended variable is not necessary for mediation. It is more important that the impact of the independent variable is reduced when the mediators are in the model.

bribery ($F(1,24) = 3.82$, $p = .06$, MANOVA for both: $F(2,23) = 5.02$, $p = .02$ $\eta^2 = .30$; see Table 10).

4.3. Discussion

This study analyzed if a corrupt organizational culture influences employees' attitude towards organizational corruption (in terms of gifting (H1a) and bribery (H1b)), if the impact of a corrupt organizational culture is mediated through tangible rewards and lax control mechanisms (H2a, H2b) and if men and women differ in their attitude depending on the perceived intensity of corrupt organizational culture (H5). As assumed, a corrupt organizational culture increased a more positive attitude towards gifting (confirmation H1a). However, it did not increase/influence a more positive attitude of bribery (rejection H1b). Also, the mediation effects differed depending on the form of corruption: while both tangible rewards and lax control mechanism mediated the impact of a corrupt organizational culture on gifting (confirmation H2a), only a lax control mechanism mediated the impact on bribery (partly confirmation H2b). Finally, as assumed, men and women did not differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption when they perceived a high corrupt organizational culture while they differed in their attitude for gifting in a low corrupt organizational culture. Both sexes did not differ in their attitude towards bribery when they perceived low levels of a corrupt organizational culture (confirmation H5a, H5b, and H5c, rejection of H5d).

4.3.1. Attitude Towards Organizational Corruption

Participants reported a generally negative attitude towards organizational corruption that could be a result of the German sample, social desirability, and the explicit items of corruption. As the Corruption Perception Index above illustrates, western countries perceive less corruption than non-western countries. German experts perceive corruption in Germany with a stable mean value of 8.4 in the last years (with 10 = not corrupt at all, Germany rank on place 12 of 175, Transparency International, 2014). Thus, the majority of types and forms of corruption are rather unaccepted in the German society. Perhaps, samples in non-western countries would reveal higher mean values in their attitude towards organizational corruption.

Because of this rather negative attitude and tolerance about corruption in the German society participants might face a general high social desirability need. Although the current measure of social desirability fails in statistical demands to indicate the real impact of social desirability, the real impact of social desirability may be much more intense; also, because participants answered explicit questions about their attitude towards organizational corruption. Through direct questions, participants had to reflect on their own behavior and if some participants possibly had a positive attitude towards corruption they needed to

rationalize their answer and balance their own attitude with the demands and norms of the society. While in corrupt organizations employees are assumed to share their positive attitude within their organization, the same employees are assumed to share general negative attitudes of corruption outside their organization (Anand et al., 2005). Therefore, participants with a perhaps more positive attitudes towards corruption might rather report these lower than they actually are. This self-report bias might be based on participants wider reference context (society with negative attitude about corruption), whereas they might have a more positive attitude in a very narrow reference context (for example at their work). Thus, the explicit items about corruption could only indicate what participants wanted to share about their attitude. This is a general limitation of all questionnaire studies in the context of corruption, because every explicit question needs to trigger participants' rationalization, social desirability, and the need to keep their own corruption as a secret.

Legal regulations and social acceptance might explain the different attitudes between gifting and bribery. Gifting is within a more legal limbo than bribery. Since 1998 German organizations can no any longer set their foreign bribes off against tax liability and since 2002 all foreign bribery is a criminal offence (domestic bribery was considered a criminal offence even before 1998). The penalty for bribery in Germany can take up to five years of prison and additional fines (§ 332 and § 334 Strafgesetzbuch[38]). On the contrary, there are not any laws about the monetary amount of illegal gifting. Therefore, the regulations for gifts differ depending on industry and organizations. While in the civil service employees are allowed to accept gifts up to ten euro, other industries accept gifts up to 30 € or more. The perception of legal gifts also differs between countries. For example, in Switzerland one can accept gifts as long as one can eat and drink them in one day. This could be cheap fish and chips around the corner vs. an expensive dinner with champagne in a Michelin-starred restaurant. However, both are legal and in some countries organizations have to give gifts to build up a business relationship (e.g., in China). Therefore, regulations about gifts are very heterogenic and less strict than the regulations about bribery. Because of that, gifts may be more accepted than bribery. These legal and social differences might explain participants more positive attitude towards gifting than towards bribery.

4.3.2. Organizational Culture and Different Forms of Organizational Corruption

Results indicate that different aspects within a corrupt organizational culture could influence employees' attitude towards organizational corruption. Although participants report a

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[38] Bundesministerium der Justiz und für Verbraucherschutz. Strafgesetzbuch (Stgb) § 334 Bestechung [donor of bribes]. Retrieved from (19.8.2015): http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__334.html, and § 332 Bestechlichkeit [taker of bribes], Retrieved from (19.8.2015): http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/stgb/__332.html.

generally negative attitude towards organizational corruption, a highly corrupt organizational culture could decrease negative attitudes to some extend and also some participants showed rather positive attitudes towards organizational corruption. While the underlying assumption (competition war) of the corrupt organizational culture, had a rather small direct impact on employees' attitude towards organizational corruption, its' manifest characteristics as tangible rewards and lax controls had a more intense impact on employees' attitude towards organizational corruption. Since both manifest characteristics are related to the underlying assumption of a competition war, this results support the experts' assumed relations in Study 1. Therefore, employees' behavior seems to be mainly influenced by the manifest characteristics in the norm layer of Scheins' (1992) model. However, as Schein (1992) argued, the values and underlying assumptions influence the manifest characteristics. Although the sample is rather small, the mediation analysis revealed 28 % and 18 % explained variance for gifting and bribery, respectively. Such results for a small cross-sectional sample with only a few characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture can indicate that the real impact might be more intense.

While rewards for work targets and lax control mechanisms can impact a more positive attitude towards gifting, only lax control mechanisms influence a more positive attitude towards bribery. As explained above, gifts are socially more accepted and only regulated on the organizational level (compliance regulations), organizations' lax control mechanisms might be an indicator how sensitive the management of the organization is about the organizational corruption of their employees. If only the compliance system is a risk factor for penalties, it seems obvious that lax control mechanisms set a frame that influences employees' perceived behavioral control, subjective norms at the workplace, and finally, also their attitude towards gifts. The same mechanism seems to take place for bribery. However, lax control mechanisms are much more important for bribery than for gifting, perhaps because of the explicit legal regulations and the penalty for bribes. Employees, who accept bribes face a greater risk to lose their job, pay a fine, get in jail, and other penalties than employees who accept gifts. Thus, lax control mechanisms in a corrupt organizational culture might have a huge impact on the perceived behavioral control of the employees, which in turn also influences employees' attitude towards bribery. How organizations handle criminal behavior might be one important mechanism to influence employees' attitude towards criminal behavior.

Rewards only influence employees' attitude towards gifting. Perhaps employees' attitude towards gifting might be similar to their need of rewards for good work. Since both

aspects are some kind of reward for the individual, the positive connection might be explained by individual employees' need for remuneration. However, this assumption should be analyzed through further studies.

Finally, this study was the first that measured one of the key underlying assumptions of a corrupt organizational culture with a metric scale. The modification of both scales (perceived competition war and lax control mechanism for corruption) revealed satisfactory results for their dimensions. Although the current sample was smaller than usual minimal samples for scale constructions (e.g., rule of ten, rule of 200 etc.[39], see Garson, 2013) the sample size is higher than 50. As Garson (2013) notes, 50 is minimal sample size for factor analysis. Nevertheless, disregarding the small sample size, the results of the factor analysis showed very good results for the items and explained an acceptable amount of the variance. Therefore, both modified instruments might be good measurements for further studies.

4.3.3. Sex, Organizational Culture, and Corruption

Results indicate that the perception of an intensely corrupt organizational culture could influence sex differences in corruption. While above named literature often referred to men as more corrupt than women, men and women only differed in their attitude towards bribery when they worked in a non-corrupt (or low corrupt) organizational culture. The results for a low corrupt organizational culture are in contrast to former empirical findings by Bowman and Gilligan (2008). While the authors reported that women tend to evaluate (counterproductive) gifting as more corrupt than men in an Australian sample, in the current study women had more positive attitudes towards gifting. In addition, the authors reported that men evaluate the acceptance of (counterproductive) bribery as more corrupt than women do, while this study revealed a partly non-significant difference between men and women. Perhaps with a bigger sample, the results for bribery in a low corrupt organizational culture might also get significant. Nevertheless, on the descriptive level, women perceived bribery as more positive than men. Therefore, these results show that empirical findings of counterproductive corruption do not always seem the same for organizational corruption. In addition, men and women might differ in their attitude depending on the form and type of corruption. More research is needed to compare individual behavior for different forms and types of corruption in specific situations. In addition, women and men did not differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption in a high corrupt organizational culture. These

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[39] Rule of ten: at least ten cases for each item of the questionnaire; rule of 100: sample size needs to be five times larger than the number of items; rule of 150, 200, or 300: at least 150, 200, or 300 participants in the sample, respectively (Garson, 2013).

results could indicate that similar expectations and assumptions might explain a similar attitude towards organizational corruption.

4.3.4. Limitations

There are three main limitations of this study: (1) scale measurement, (2) sample size, and (3) nature of organizational culture. (1) As described above, it is difficult to measure corruption with questionnaires. Corruption is a matter of social desirability and illegal behavior that could bias the explicit answers of participants. Therefore, there do not exist any questionnaires about corruption which are standardized with a norm sample, nor does literature provide any information about the external validity of the questionnaires. Since corruption is a matter of social desirability, researchers can never be sure if and to which extent participants provided social desired biased answers. This is a general limitation for the measurement of corruption with questionnaires, which also tackles the measurement of organizational corruption, perception of competition war, and lax control mechanism in this study.

In addition, the used two items of the sub-scale for bribery might underestimate the different aspects of bribery. Therefore, there could be more intense effects of organizational culture on bribery, and also the assumed mediation effect might be more intense with a better questionnaire or other measurements. The measurement of social desirability received a bad intern consistency. This might explain why this variable mainly did not show any impact on the organizational corruption (or a counter logical impact). Perhaps, it is better to either use other tools to measure social desirability or to create settings in which participants face a reduced social desirability to receive better information about their attitudes towards corruption. Therefore, results might show more realistic results for gifting, because social desirability then has a lower impact on this form of corruption, than for the results of bribery.

(2) The design was only a cross-sectional analysis of the impact of a corrupt organizational culture on organizational corruption. Thus, this limits the predictability whether a corrupt organizational culture could promote employees' positive corrupt attitudes. This design could only show how there is a relation between an intense corrupt organizational culture and a more positive attitude towards organizational corruption. Also, some effects might be significant with a slightly higher number of participants (e.g., sex differences in counterproductive bribery). Even more, the sub-samples of both extreme groups (intense vs. low corrupt organizational culture) covered only very small sample sizes, so both effects might be underestimated.

(3) As Study 1 described, a corrupt organizational culture is much more than its underlying assumptions and some more manifest norms. Therefore, these results only indicate the intensity of relations, because underlying assumptions, values, and norms are mutually related and influence each other in many ways, which are much more than just two manifestations of norms. Perhaps the ordering of the influence of latent to more manifest characteristics could also be different within a complex corrupt organizational culture that covers the whole organization. These aspects might also differ depending if an organization starts to become a corrupt organization vs. a corrupt organization exists for many years.

4.3.5. Conclusion and Implications

Results indicated that a corrupt organizational culture could influence a kind of ethical blindness (perception shift) via more positive attitudes towards organizational corruption. Although more manifest characteristics of the corrupt organizational culture also influence this attitude the latent underlying assumptions seem important. This perception shift assimilates the perception of male and female employees to a similar outcome of a positive attitude towards organizational corruption. However, this is a first study about such effects, all results need to be tested for other forms of organizational corruption (e.g., lobbyism, cartels, price fixing, money or goods laundry) and whether men and women differ in their attitude towards these forms. Moreover, further aspects of a corrupt organizational culture also need to be analyzed with their impact of corrupt behavior and how the characteristics of the organizational culture are explicitly related to each other.

Because this study only analyzed whether a corrupt organizational culture can shape employees' attitudes and because attitudes are only one aspect that could increase the likelihood of corrupt behavior, a third study aim to test if employees' corrupt behavior depends on their organizational culture. Therefore, as the final step, Study 3 takes a perspective on whether a manipulated organizational culture can shape corrupt behavior. The corrupt organizational culture is manipulated in line with results of Study 1. As the current study show, rewards and lax control mechanism are important. Study 3 covers rewards vs. no-rewards for the wanted vs. unwanted behavior of the employees. In addition, Study 3 covers a situation with no explicit control mechanism and no punishment in order to address the strong impact of lax control mechanisms in Study 2. Instead of individuals' attitude towards corruption, individual behavior is measured. In addition, Study 3 also measures a directional effect instead of offering only a cross-section analysis of organizational culture on corruption. The similar sex attitudes towards organizational corruption might be a matter of attitude as well. Perhaps women and men do not differ that much in their attitude; however, they might

differ in their corrupt behavior. Study 3 analyzes if a corrupt organizational culture also influences more corrupt behavior of its employees than a non-corrupt organizational culture. Thus, Study 3 provides a sort of conceptual replication of whether a corrupt organizational culture promotes more corrupt behavior and if there are no sex differences in corrupt behavior.

5. STUDY 3[40]

This study is a web-based experiment that aims to test whether organizational culture shapes employees' corruption. The share of corrupt employees shall be higher in a corrupt organizational culture than in an ethical organizational culture (H3) and the type of corruption shall moderate this impact. More employees should engage in *organizational corruption* than *counterproductive corruption* when they work in a corrupt organizational culture (H4). In addition, the main effect of sex and the interaction effect of sex and organizational culture shall differ between the types of corruption. There shall be neither a main effect of sex (H6a) nor an interaction effect of sex and organizational culture on employees' organizational corruption (H7a). Whereas male participants shall more likely engage in counterproductive corruption (H6b) and there should be an interaction of sex and organizational culture for counterproductive corruption (H7b). In eight independent pre-studies ($N = 488$) the final experimental procedure and material was developed and tested (see Appendix D).

5.1. Method

Sample. The sample consisted of 563 Germans between 18 and 65 years. Participants were recruited in forums, discussion groups (e.g., yahoo newsgroups), and virtual black boards (between 04.06.2013 and 31.07.2013). Because anyone can face corruption at work, the aim was to recruit a heterogeneous sample in terms of age, education, work experience, and working industry. 1069 participants visited the first page, 611 participants stayed to the last page (retention rate: 68.75 %). 48 participants were deleted because they did not took enough time (less than a minute) or they took too long (more than eight minutes) to read the manipulation.

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[40] Aspects of this chapter are partly based on the unpublished manuscripts Campbell and Göritz (2014a, 2014c). The current chapter differs from the analysis in the correspondent manuscript (Campbell & Göritz, 2014c) in several ways: (1) there are many more details about the procedure which also impacted huge differences in the discussion, (2) in contrast to the manuscript gender and the interaction of gender and sex were not analyzed, instead (3) the interaction of sex and organizational culture was analyzed. Since Prof. Dr. Göritz explicitly expressed the idea to measure the impact of a played social gender role for the manuscript Campbell and Göritz (2014c) in an e-mail on 05.04.2013, this issue is not part of the current analysis. Therefore, the played social gender role is treated as control variable. And (4) the analysis of the other hypothesis differ from the analysis within the manuscript. This covers the current hypothesis (vs. number of hypothesis in the manuscript) about the main effect of organizational culture (current H1 vs. H3 of the manuscript); moderating effect of type of corruption (H2 vs. H4); main effect differences of sex on organizational corruption vs. counterproductive corruption (H4 vs. H1).

Table 11.

Sample Study 3.

Type of corruption		Organizational corruption			Counterproductive corruption		
Organizational culture	All	Sub-sample	Ethical	Corrupt	Sub-sample	Ethical	Corrupt
	$N_{TOTAL}=$	$n_1 = 286$	culture	culture	$n_2 = 277$	culture	culture
	563		$n = 146$	$n = 140$		$n = 144$	$n = 133$
Descriptive data							
Age in years (*SD*)[a]	27.47 (8.4)	27.47 (8.7)	26.73 (7.87)	28.24 (9.52)	27.45 (8.10)	27.70 (8.57)	27.18 (7.60)
Women in the sample (%)	363 (64.5)	185 (64.7)	96 (65.8)	89 (63.6)	178 (64.3)	89 (61.8)	89 (66.9)
Played female gender role (%)	293 (52.0)	144 (50.3)	77 (52.7)	67 (47.9)	149 (53.8)	80 (55.6)	69 (51.9)
Students in the sample (%)	363 (64.2)	189 (66.1)	92 (63.0)	97 (69.3)	174 (62.8)	89 (61.8)	85 (63.9)
Educational level (%)							
finished studies	162 (28.8)	70 (24.5)	35 (24.0)	35 (25.0)	92 (33.2)	45 (31.3)	47 (35.3)
high school	276 (49.0)	149 (52.1)	80 (54.8)	69 (49.3)	127 (45.8)	72 (50.0)	55 (41.4)
finished professional training	36 (6.4)	18 (6.3)	8 (5.5)	10 (7.1)	18 (6.5)	6 (4.2)	12 (9.0)
vocational diploma	34 (6.0)	19 (6.6)	8 (5.5)	11 (7.9)	15 (5.4)	8 (5.2)	7 (5.3)
middle school	41 (7.3)	22 (7.7)	11 (7.5)	11 (7.9)	19 (6.9)	8 (5.2)	11 (8.3)
other	14 (2.5)	8 (2.8)	4 (2.7)	4 (2.9)	6 (2.2)	5 (3.5)	1 (0.8)
Corrupt participants (%)	201 (35.7)	104 (36.4)	28 (19.2)	76 (54.3)	97 (35.0)	34 (23.6)	63 (47.4)

Note. [a] Distribution of participants' age: whole sample (skewness = 2.11, *SE* = .10; kurtosis = 4.70, *SE* = .21) sub-sample organizational corruption (skewness = 1.94, *SE* = .14; kurtosis = 3.49, *SE* = .29), sub-sample counterproductive corruption (skewness = 2.35, *SE* = .15; kurtosis = 6.40, *SE* = .29); test of normal distribution: Shapiro-Wilk (*df* = 563, *W* = .76, *p* < .001).

More than half of the sample consists of students and women and had a higher educational degree. The distribution of sample characteristics is similar in the different sub-groups (see Table 11). Participants work in heterogenic industries:[41] education (13.1 %), health and social system (11.5 %), information and communication (7.8 %), consulting and service (7.1 %), arts and media (3.9 %), trade (3.6 %), civil service (2.1 %), construction business (2.3 %), industrial production (1.1 %), finance and insurance (0.9 %), energy and water supply (0.7 %), others (8.9 %), not working (35.2 %) and no information (1.7 %). Because the sample covered many students, this amount could also cover the huge amount of non-working participants. In addition, participants indicated their employee duration: less than one year (8.7 %), between one and five years (15.3 %), between six and ten years (6.9 %), between eleven and 15 years (3.4 %), more than 15 years (7.8 %) and 57.7 % did not answer.

Design. The study had a 2 x 2 x 2 x 2 design, thus resulting in 16 cells. Men or women (= sex) played either a male or female employee (= played gender role), in an ethical or corrupt organizational culture (= organizational culture) and received either an organizational or counterproductive corruption offer (= type of corruption). Sex was a quasi-experimental factor, while participants were randomly assigned to a combination of the three other factors: organizational culture, type of corruption, and played gender role. Although participants' played gender role was manipulated this impact is not a focus of this analysis, and therefore treated as control variable.[42]

Procedure. Participants were invited to a web-based experiment about a cover story issue and instructed to work for a fictitious federal department (I). Although all participants assumed to work for the same fictitious federal department, this department had either an ethical or a corrupt experimental varied organizational culture (II). In both cultures, participants played either a male or female employee, who had to decide whether he or she accepts bids offered by different companies about federal paid projects. Participants assumed they had been randomly assigned to particular two independent decision-making tasks and to another study participant to work within a two-person team (III). In fact, all participants worked on the same two decision tasks with the same simulated colleague and discuss and decided which company (one out of two) got awarded for a project contract. While Task 1 was a warm-up trail, Task 2 covered one corrupt offer (IV). Only Task 2 got analyzed.

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[41] Participants could indicate in which of the named industries they work.
[42] Participants who played a male gender employee engage almost significant more often in counterproductive corruption (p = .05), however the played social gender roles explained less than one percent of the variance (ΔR^2 = .004). On the contrary; there was no main effect of played social gender role on organizational corruption (see Campbell & Göritz, 2014c).

Finally, participants received a debriefing (V). The following paragraphs capture the particular aspects (referred to with Roman numerals) in detail (see Figure 13).

Figure 13. Procedure of Study 3.

Note. Although participants got sorted into different cultures (i.e., organizational culture manipulation) and male vs. female employee roles (i.e., played gender role) all participants worked under the same cover story on the same two decision tasks. In both tasks, participants had to discuss and decide which company (one out of two) got awarded for a project contract. While in task one participants got introduced to the process (warm-up trial), in task two participants received a corrupt offer. The corrupt offer either benefited both the participants and the organization or only the participants (i.e., manipulation of the type of corruption). Only task two was analyzed. In task two, participants had to discuss with a simulated colleague which company should receive the contract and to award their prefered company. Analogue to the type of corruption, participants had to discuss either if the team shall accept the corrupt offer (i.e., organizational corruption) or why the corrupt company shall get the project (= counterproductive corruption). Finally, participants received a debriefing. The Roman numerals illustrate the different described and explained steps of the procedure.

(I) Participants faced three main cover stories: a cover story about the issue of research, a cover story about the situation of their fictitious organization, and a cover story about a competition between the participants. First, participants got invited to a web-based experiment about "communication and decision-making in virtual teams". This cover-story aimed to reduce the social desirability influence on corruption (see Bernardi, Delorey, LaCross, & Waite, 2011) and to reduce a possible self-selecting bias to participate on the study. Second, participants received information of the situation of their employer. The

employees' department competed for a federal reward against sister departments. This reward was important for the department for its continuance. To get the federal reward the department had to deliver good work results (i.e., good decisions). Therefore, participants assumed to earn points for their decision when they supported their organization (see below).

Third, participants competed either as a team with their simulated colleague or solely against all other participant teams/participants. In the condition of organizational corruption, participants were instructed that the best participant team receives 100 € as a team reward (50 € for the participants and 50 € for the simulated colleague) if the team attained the highest number of points. On the contrary, in the condition of counterproductive corruption, participants were instructed that the best participant received 50 € for him/herself if the participants attained the highest number of points. Participants could voluntarily report their e-mail at the end of the study to receive the reward in reality. For this competition, participants again assumed that their points for their decisions were important. The last two cover stories aimed to increase the perceived competition by the participants because employees' perception of market competition seems to be an important factor for their organizational corruption (Agnew, Piquero, & Cullen, 2009; Brief et al., 2001; see Study 1, Study 2).

(II) Participants faced a threefold manipulation of their either ethical or corrupt organizational culture. This manipulation covered combinations of pictures and value statements, goal-setting of their superior, and instructions how they could earn points for their decision (see below).

(III) Independently of the type of corruption, participants received the same non-corrupt bids by two companies in the first task. A direct start with a corrupt offer was assumed to cause an increased drop out based of participants' irritation or rejection of the subject of this study. Therefore, Task 1 was used as a warm-up trail in order to get participants used to the procedure. To avoid a direct start with corruption after the warm-up trail, the author decided to not-inform participants about the warm-up characteristic of Task 1. Thus, participants assumed they had to work on two tasks that both were taken under consideration.

(IV) In the second task, the participants again received bids from two companies where one bid included a corrupt offer. Both bids offered the same work quality, however the company with the corrupt bid was more expensive (referred to as *corrupt company*). The corrupt offer of this company was either organizational corruption or counterproductive corruption. After the corrupt offer and the presentation of both company bids, participants

discussed via given communication sentences with their simulated colleague which company shall get awarded for the project.[43][44] Participants received a priori programmed neutral answers of their simulated colleague after a fix amount of time (that differed between the answers, see Meyer, 2012). In the condition of organizational corruption the colleague was aware of the corrupt offer whereas in the condition of counterproductive corruption the colleague was unaware of the corrupt offer. All participants were told that in the case of dissent with their colleague their own favored company's bid gets accepted. That way, participants might feel more powerful and committed to their task as they had more responsibility than their colleague. As some experiments show more power could lead to more corruption (Bendahan et al., 2015; DeCelles, DeRue, Margolis, & Ceranic, 2012). After the discussion with their colleague, participants awarded the contract to the preferred company (i.e., measurement of corruption).

(V) Finally, participants received a debriefing about the cover-stories, the randomized manipulation that all participants worked on the same tasks, the simulated colleague, the measurement, and their false final feedback on their performance at the end of the experiment (which just differed between corrupt vs. non-corrupt participants). Participants were explicitly debriefed that the manipulation of organizational culture aimed to influence their decision behavior. Since participants received different criteria about what makes a 'good decision' depending on their organizational culture, the author chose to do a lottery over all study participants at the end of the survey (of 50 € for one person) for the money reward. Participants were also informed about this decision in the debriefing.

The general procedure was based on the theory of the corruption triangle. In the experiment, organizational culture aimed to trigger different intensities of a participants' possible desire to engage in corruption (ethical organizational culture vs. corrupt organizational culture). Via the corrupt offer and the non-existent risk of detection, participants were given the opportunity to engage in corruption. Finally, participants were able to legitimize their corrupt decision via a conversation tree including rationalization strategies. Therefore, the experimental procedure enabled participants to engage in corruption in line with theory.

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[43] For the discussion, participants had to choose between four given sentences (three in favor and one against corruption). Through these sentences participants could discuss their opinion in task one and rationalize their own behavior in task two. All conversation possibilities were developed and tested in four pre-studies mainly by Meyer (2012; Pre-studies 4 – 7, see Table D2 in Appendix D for some example sentences).The use of rationalization in task two was measured and analyzed in two master theses by Meyer (2012) and by Zaus (2013). Both master theses were done under the guidance of the author.
[44] Participants' corrupt behavior in Pre-study 8 did not depend on their assumptions about the artificiality of their team-colleague (χ^2 (2, 95) = 1.89, p = .39, V = .15; see Appendix D).

5.1.1. Independent Variable and Control Variables

This study covered three independent variables: organizational culture, types of corruption and sex. While participants' sex was treated as a quasi-experimental factor, organizational culture and the type of corruption were manipulated.

Organizational culture. Participants were assigned randomly to one of two organizational cultures: ethical or corrupt. The ethical organizational culture aimed to cover ethical values and assumptions, process orientated goals, and rewards that focused on process orientation and both ethical and moral behavior. Literature showed that process orientation leads to higher non-financial outcomes (Škrinjar, Bosilj-Vukšic, & Indihar-Štemberger, 2008), an ethical culture leads to more ethical judgements by accountants (see Douglas, Davidson, & Schwartz, 2001) and an enforcement of an ethical code is related to reduced unethical behavior (see review by Treviño et al., 2014). Therefore, this manipulation aimed to enforce ethical awareness and behavior. On the contrary, the corrupt organizational culture aimed to cover values, assumptions, goals, and rewards that focus on maximum output goals and provide a feeling that the end justifies the means. The manipulated perception frame (as results of Study 1) was supposed to establish that ethical aspects of decision can fade in the background and rule bending was seen more positive (e.g., ethical blindness, Palazzo et al., 2012; ethical fading, Tenbrunsel & Messick, 2004) as some case analysis described these aspects in corrupt organizations (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Graeff et al., 2009).

Underlying assumptions, values, and norms of an organizational culture are interrelated and interwoven in many different complex ways (Ashforth et al., 2008; Grieger, 2009; Plakhotnik & Rocco, 2010; Schein, 1992; Sööt, 2012). Goals and rewards are at least partly a manifestation of important values of an organization, which in turn are based on the underlying assumptions. The extraction of aspects (e.g., the manipulation of only underlying assumptions) might not provide realistic insights about how intense an organizational culture might be, since the impact of organizational culture is a result of the complex interwoven interplay of all cultures' characteristics. As underlying assumptions seem to cover and guide employees in fundamental way, and values seem to be more manifest ideals of the employees, both could be described as a perception frame that influences the general perception and evaluation of employees (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961). Both aspects seem to influence more manifest norms within an organization. Thus, assumptions and values might enable employees to accept, tolerate, and become committed to their goals and rewards - whereas goals and rewards could shape behavioral directions of employees. As Study 2 showed, the impact of employees' perceived competition war was mediated via more manifest

organizational culture aspects (i.e., tangible rewards and/or lax control mechanism). Thus, a connection of underlying assumptions, values, goals and rewards may have a greater impact on employees' behavior, than unrelated goals and rewards.

Thus, organizational culture was manipulated threefold: (1) pictures and value statements ought to trigger values and assumptions, (2) a letter from the superior ought to trigger different goals, and (3) different anticipated points depending on how good participants attain their goals ought to illustrate the connection between goals and rewards. Since goals seem to be a manifestation of the key values of an organizational culture (e.g., to influence ethical behavior; Treviño et al., 2014) and in turn goals seems to be more or less connected with rewards, this connection was also established through the possible points participants thought they were collecting.

(1) Three pictures matched by three value statements that represent either an ethical or a corrupt organizational culture were each displayed for 15 seconds (randomized presentation). Participants should imagine that these pictures and statements hung in the hallway near their office in their organization. In line with assumptions, values, and norms of an ethical organizational culture the value statements and pictures in the ethical organizational culture ought to reinforce assumptions and values of honesty (Treviño et al., 2014), sustainability, and process orientation. In line with the results of Study 1, the value statements in the corrupt organizational culture ought to cover the positive association of rule bending, the perception that the end justifies the means and that there was an external threat. The pictures of each organizational culture aimed to stimulate more unconscious feelings about the environment for example competition, outcome vs. process orientation, danger vs. peace (see Pre-study 1 & 2 in Appendix D). Figure 14 depicts all picture and value statement combinations. All used pictures of this study were creative commons licensed pictures from the internet. In an independent pre-study participants perceived it similarly difficult to imagine to work for the specific department for both organizational cultures. Although these participants reported this difficulty, participants differed significantly in their perception of climate and moral, goal commitment, perceived competition, and outcome orientation between the organizational cultures (see Pre-study 3, in Appendix D).

| Ethical culture | It's not only the score that makes you win but the right way towards it | Honesty is the best policy | A bird in the hand is worth two in the bush |

| Corrupt culture | Money won't mind moral | The end justifies the means | What doesn't fit it made to fit |

Figure 14. Picture and Value Statement Combinations for the Manipulation of Organizational Culture.

(2) Participants received a letter from their superior to clarify what the organization regards as a 'good decision'. In the ethical organizational culture employees were expected to make decisions with honesty and fairness regardless of the number of points they would receive. In the corrupt organizational culture employees were expected to obtain the highest quantity of points no matter how. See the different letters:[45]

> *"Dear Mr./Mrs. Wagner, dear Mr./Mrs. Fischer,*
> *The department for traffic, construction and city development informed us, that there are supplementary budgets for high-performing public procurement offices. I, as your head, want to achieve that part of that supplementary money flows into our procurement office. It's very important to me that we position ourselves in matters of our business. Therefore it is important, that we show our key skills in dealing with the awarding of contracts."*

The next paragraph differed between the organizational cultures:

> *Ethical organizational culture condition:*
> *"The management wants to use that opportunity to accentuate, that **our focus is on qualitative and good decisions of your team.** For us, the goodness of your decision is more important than the final score of your team! Don't forget: we are competitors with all the other procurement offices. We expect you to reach the qualitative best decision - since the outcomes of our decisions are important. As manager of this department I want to ask you to keep in mind, while working on the following exercises, that the most important thing is the code of ethics. As you know, we operate in accordance with the*

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[45] Participants received a German version of this letter.

*guiding principle **"The journey is the destination!" Reach your decisions to the best of your knowledge and belief while also considering sustainability**."*

<u>Corrupt organizational culture condition:</u>

*"The management wants to use that opportunity to accentuate that **our focus is on the final score of your team**. The final score is crucial to us! Don't forget: we are competitors with all the other procurement offices. We expect you to achieve the maximum score of credits. As manager of this department I want to ask you to keep in mind while working on the following exercises, that **the most important thing for us is the final result. Get the maximum score out!**"*

Participants read this letter on average between 2.52 min and 3.06 min in the different manipulated conditions. Participants who read less than a minute and more than eight minutes were excluded from the sample because this duration seemed inappropriate for either a good manipulation or for an appropriate comparison of motivation for the study. In a pre-study, participants found the letter of the superior to some extent authentically (ethical organizational culture: $M = 2.88$, $SD = 1.32$; corrupt organizational culture: $M = 2.53$, $SD = 1.12$ with (1) 'not authentically at all' (5) 'total authentically'). The organizational cultures did not differ in this perception (see Pre-study 3 in Appendix D).

(3) After the letter, participants received information about possible points the teams could earn depending on their decisions. These points were only a fictitious incentive structure as participants did not receive any points depending on their decision behavior nor did they get any feedback about their performance during their tasks. Therefore, participants could only anticipate how many points they might have gotten during their decision process. This connection between reward and decision aimed to increase participants' commitment to their organizational culture and to illustrate that organizational culture could manifest in rewarding and punishment structures (Schein, 1992). However, contrary to many corruption experiments (e.g., Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Rivas, 2013) not all participants were rewarded according to their behavior. Participants' anticipated number of points only raised participants' assumed possibility to receive the promised 50 €, it did not guarantee any actual monetary reward. Thus, the reward behavior relation might have been weaker than in other experiments.

Participants could assume to receive (A) ten points depending on how well their decision matched the organizational expectations of good work results. Accordingly, participants assumed to receive points if they behaved in line with the values and expectations of their organization. In the ethical organizational culture, participants ought to assume to attain the maximum number of points if the non-corrupt bid was accepted. In the corrupt organizational culture, participants ought to assume to attain the maximum number of points

if the corrupt bid was chosen. Therefore, participants could assume to receive ten points when they declined both types of corrupt offers in the ethical organizational culture and if participants declined the counterproductive offer in the corrupt organizational culture. In the three mentioned constellations the acceptance of the offer harmed the organization. Therefore, employees could assume to get rewarded when they declined the offer. On the contrary, participants could assume to receive ten points for their organization when they accepted the organizational corruption offer in the corrupt organizational culture because they supported their organization.

(B) Each participant thought they could earn additional seven points for a unanimous team decision (= both team partners independently awarded the same company for the contract). The points that were seemingly awarded for unanimous team decisions aimed at heightening participants' effort to persuade their colleague and to increase their commitment to their own decision. Participants thought that they and their colleague made an independent blind decision on the companies. Since participants only received a manipulated feedback about their final points at the end of the experiment, participants could only guess their potential points during the experiment. (C) Finally, participants were offered ten points with the corrupt offer. These additional ten points were offered as team points (in organizational corruption) or as individual person points (in counterproductive corruption). In general, participants could assume to receive between zero and 27 points in Task 2 (including the corrupt offer, the organizational culture, and the unanimous decision, see Table 12).

There was no direct manipulation check in this study. Asking participants during the experiment "whether their particular organizational culture might force corruption?" was considered problematic because participants' explicit answers were assumed to be in relation with their behavior. An explicit manipulation check directly after the manipulation could have triggered participants' need for social desirability and their ethical awareness. However, the manipulation of organizational culture aimed to trigger different degrees of ethical awareness, and the cover-study aimed to reduce social desirability. Thus, any explicit reference to corruption at the start of the experiment might be able to destroy or undercut both manipulation and cover-story and produce a Hawthrone effect (i.e., participants behave in the way they assume they should behave because of their assumed goal of the experiment, Bracht, & Glass, 1968).

Table 12.

Possible Anticipated Points by the Participants.

Type of corruption	Organizational corruption (team points)				Counterproductive corruption (individual points)			
Organizational culture	Ethical		Corrupt		Ethical		Corrupt	
	Task 1 (no corrupt offer)							
Decision	unanimous	non unanimous	unanimous	non unanimous	unanimous	non unanimous	unanimous	non unanimous
Best decision [a]	17	10	17	10	17	10	17	10
Not best decision	7	0	7	0	7	0	7	0
	Task 2 (corrupt offer)							
Non-corrupt company	17	10	7	0	17	10	7	0
Corrupt company	17	10	27	20	17	10	17	10

Note. Although several cells have the same amount of possible points, the structure of why participants could anticipate these numbers of points could differ. Participants could anticipate to get (1) ten vs. zero points for a good vs. non-good decisions for their organization, respectively; (2) seven vs. zero points if they anticipated a unanimous vs. non unanimous decision, respectively; and in task two (3) they could anticipate additional ten vs. zero points for the corrupt offer (for their team or themselves depending on the type of corruption).

[a] Participants best decision can be quality in the ethical organizational culture vs. quantity in the corrupt organizational culture. Since both presented companies were presented with different aspects the table does not cover any company names.

A manipulation check at the end of the experiment was seen as possibly be biased by participants' decision behavior. Corrupt participants' agreements to a corrupt organizational culture could also be seen as an indicator for their use of a rationalization strategy. For example two possible rationalization strategies are: appeal to higher loyalties or denial of responsibility. Both rationalization strategies allow employees to deny their own active part in corruption and to either argue that their behavior stands in line with their loyalties to a higher institution or that a higher institution made the decision to engage in corruption while their own part was only the implementation, respectively (Anand et al., 2005; Maruna & Copes, 2004). Thus, there seems to be a higher risk that such a manipulation check might represent participants' a priori perception of the organizational culture less than possibly more of their need for rationalization. As rationalization strategies are an interwoven part of criminal behavior that could take part during or after a criminal act (Maruna & Copes, 2004) the risk to measure rationalization through a direct manipulation check cannot be excluded fully. For both named reasons, any form of a direct manipulation check was excluded.

Instead an independent pre-study (N = 85; see Pre-studies 3, see Appendix D) was used to do an indirect manipulation check. The manipulation check measured how likely participants perceive that in a specific organizational culture (manipulated with pictures, values statements, and the superior letter) employees might become corrupt. For this analysis both organizational cultures were compared to a control group. Results indicated - as expected - that corruption was seen as more likely in a corrupt organizational culture (M = 4.33; SD = .94) than in the control group (M = 3.24; SD = 1.03) and in turn more likely in the control group than in an ethical organizational culture (M = 2.69; SD = 1.25; $F(2, 73)$ = 17.23, $p <$ .001; see Pre-Study 3 in Appendix D). Although this manipulation check was done on an independent sample and it covers an indirect question about the corruptness of the organizational culture these results might indicate that the manipulation of organizational culture could actually shape differences in the perception of the participants of this study to some extent.

Type of corruption was manipulated through a corrupt offer that included either an advantage for the participant - the colleague as well as the organization (i.e., organizational corruption) - or an advantage only for the participant (i.e., counterproductive corruption). For their decision in Task 2, participants received the information on two companies, the company names (W and S), their quality (two stars each)[46] and their costs (96.338 € vs. 95.384 €, respectively). The corrupt company was chosen to be one percent more expansive to have a

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[46] There was no information about the continuum of stars a company could have. Participants only saw in the warm-up trial that one company had one and the other three stars.

negligible harm to the tax payers. Before the company information, participants received a letter from the owner of company W. In the letter, the owner referred to a personal relationship (joint vacation) with the employee which each, participant played (as pre-corrupt connection, see Höffling, 2002). The owner informed the employee in the letter that his/her company had applied for a project, now in the participant's responsibility, and that it was important for his/her company to get this contract. In the condition of organizational corruption the owner offered to use his/her contacts in higher positions to support the department in their competition and he/she offered ten points for the team in case of a positive return (= win-win situation). In the condition of counterproductive corruption the owner offered ten points for the individual participant (not the participants' team). The owner also did not offer any benefit for the department. The letter of the company owner was identical for both types of corruption except the sentence about the abstract offer of corruption. The organizational corruption involved ten points for the participants' team and an advantage for the participants' organization in the competition for the federal reward to simulate the provided win-win situation in corrupt organizations (Brief et al., 2001; see Study 1). The counterproductive corruption involved ten points for the participant in order to increase the likelihood for him/her to receive the real monetary reward of 50 € with the highest amount of points. For this sole benefit participants harm their organization. A decision in favor of the corrupt offer would harm the organization, because the organization needed to pay a higher price for the contract without any benefits:

> *„Dear Mr./Mrs. Wagner,*
>
> *when I was informed that you are in charge of the decision about the placing of the tile work at the town hall [the current task of the participants], I instantly thought of our common short vacation at my house in Italy. We had a great time!*
>
> *As you have probably already noticed, we are all forced to tighten our belts according to the recent economic situation. My **company W** has applied for your tender with a cost estimate of 96.338 € and it would be crucial for us to get this order."*

The next paragraph differed depending on the type of corruption[47]:

> *organizational corruption condition:*
>
> *"If you take a positive decision for **company W** we could also accommodate you and affect your final score positively (about 10 additional points). Furthermore, we have close contacts to the department for environment awards that will decide soon about supplementary budgets ..."*

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[47] The term 'corruption' itself is rather seldom used as an explicit word in a corrupt offer (Höffling, 2002). Often euphemistic language is used that indicate the possible corrupt transaction in an abstract manner (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Höffling, 2002). The letters tries to indicate an illegitimate favor in return without explicitly explaining what kind of favor this might be. This letter is translated in English for this dissertation.

counterproductive corruption condition:

"If you take a positive decision for **company W** *we could also accommodate you and affect your personal final score positively (about 10 additional points)."*

Kind regards, Peter/Petra Müller

Control variables. Given that in previous research age actually influenced employee corruption (Torgler & Valev, 2004), this variable was treated as control variable. In addition, education was also treated as control variable because corruption is primarily a white collar crime and white-collar status correlates with education (Holtfreter, 2005). As participants' played gender role was not analyzed but manipulated, participants' played gender role was treated as control variable to control its possible impact on participants' corruption. For the analysis, age was centered about the mean, and education was dummy-coded with 'finished studies' as the reference category (see Jaccard, 2001). 'Finished studies' was used as the reference category because corruption is more a higher education phenomenon. Therefore, this category shall take a perspective if participants with other educational levels differ in their behavior from participants who finished their study. Since very few participants fell in the educational categories 'no education', 'other education', and 'lower secondary education', these three categories were collapsed into one category (= 'other'). Played employee gender roles were manipulated in the design via a male or female gender employee role. This employee had a simulated colleague, a fictitious superior, and a fictitious donor - all of the same gender as the employee. The same gender condition was chosen for both genders to reduce behavioral biases. Since some experiments showed mixed gender teams in corruption differ in their corrupt output (Frank et al., 2011; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Rivas, 2013), this study opted to reduce any mixed gender effects with this design. The reference category for social gender role was 'female'.

5.1.2. Dependent Variable

Employees' corruption was measured through the participants' decision for the corrupt versus non-corrupt bidding company. This was a binary variable - either participants chose the non-corrupt company (= not-corrupt participants) or they chose the corrupt company (= corrupt participants). Corruption was measured through their behavior in a decision task because there is merely a weak connection between unethical behavioral intentions and unethical behavior (Gonin, Palazzo, & Hoffrage, 2012; Webb & Sheeran, 2006). In addition, a behavioral variable reduces any social desirability biases that could influence results of ethical self-report (see Bernardi et al., 2011). Finally, although it is difficult to operationalize corruption (see above), participants' decision to offer or accept bribes is an frequently used indicating measure for corruption in research (e.g., Armantier & Boly, 2011; Frank et al.,

2011; Rivas, 2013). In research, the victim of corruption is often the abstract citizen who is symbolized via federal tax loss or federal officers who get corrupt offers and harm the society when not deciding in favor of the government (e.g., Alatas et al., 2009; Frank et al., 2011; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011; Rivas, 2013). Since this kind of operationalization is a more or less usual state in research, corruption was operationalized via a decision making task and the harm by corruption via the reference to decisions about tax money, bearing in mind that corruption covers more complex aspects.

The participants worked for a federal department and their decisions concerned tax money. To spend the tax money in the best way, the appropriate decision in this case should have been to choose the cheaper company with the same quality to save some tax money. If participants choose company W, these participants abused their entrusted power to overreach a corrupt company which did not have any chance under regular market conditions. In the condition of organizational corruption, participants enriched their own department and raised their own chance of receiving the monetary reward (i.e., points). In this case the victim of corruption is the citizen. Although the department had to pay a higher price for the contract the department received more money because they received a benefit in the competition between the departments (i.e., in line with the second cover story). In the condition of counterproductive corruption, participants enriched only themselves through the increased points when they awarded the corrupt company for the contract. Their department and the citizens were the victims of this corruption because tax money was spend needlessly and the department had a lower budget for other projects. Thus, participants were regarded as *corrupt* when they chose the corrupt company (company W), and as *non-corrupt* when they chose the non-corrupt company (company S).

5.1.3. Analysis

A hierarchic logistic regression was conducted to analyze the main effect of organizational culture on corruption (H3) and whether the impact of organizational culture depended on the type of corruption (H4). This hierarchic logistic regression was conducted on the whole sample and also covered a post-hoc analysis about a possible interaction of sex and played gender role in this study. Step 1 included the control variables age and education. Step 2 included the main effects of sex and played gender role, Step 3 include the interaction of sex and played gender role, Step 4 include the main effects of organizational culture (H3) and the type of corruption, and finally Step 5 included the interaction effect of organizational culture and the type of corruption (H4). Sex and played gender role were both entered as simple contrasts with 'female' as reference category and were tested two-tailed. Because H3

postulates that more employees will engage in corruption in a corrupt organizational culture, organizational culture was entered as an indicator contrast with 'ethical organizational culture' as reference category and analyzed one-tailed in Step 4. In addition, type of corruption (in Step 4) as well as the interaction of organizational culture and the type of corruption interaction (in Step 5) were analyzed directionally with indicator contrasts (reference categories were 'ethical organizational culture' and 'counterproductive corruption', respectively) and analyzed one-tailed.

To analyze the impact of organizational culture, sex, and their interaction for the particular type of corruption, two independent hierarchic logistic regression analyses were conducted, one for each type of corruption. Both logistic regression analyses had the same main structure. Step 1 included the control variables age, education, and participants' played gender role. The main effect of sex was entered in Step 2 (H6a, H6b), the main effect of organizational culture in Step 3, and the interaction of organizational culture and sex were added in Step 4 (H7a, H7b). The control variables were treated as described above. Analog to the hypothesis sex was treated differently depending on the type of corruption. As H6a postulates no sex differences in organizational corruption, sex was entered as a simple contrast and analyzed two-tailed. Because H6b postulates that men are more corrupt than women in counterproductive corruption, sex was entered as an indicator contrast, using the category 'female' as reference category, and analyzed one-tailed. For both regressions organizational culture was treated the same way as an indicator contrast with 'ethical organizational culture' as reference category and analyzed one-tailed. The interaction effect was again treated differently in both regression analyses: for organizational corruption it was measured two-tailed (analog to no sex difference in H7a), and for counterproductive corruption it was measured one-tailed (analog to the assumed interaction effect in H7b). All results of the logistic regression were interpreted in line with Jaccard (2001), according the values of Odds Ratio (OR). SPSS 23 was used for these analyses.

5.2. Results

In general, 290 participants were in an ethical organizational culture (51.5 %) and 273 were in a corrupt organizational culture (48.5 %). 95 male participants (16.9 %) and 188 female participants (33.4 %) played their own social gender in the different conditions. 105 male participants (18.7 %) and 175 female participants (31.1 %) played the opposite social gender. In general, almost no control variable influenced participants' corruption. Only participants with a high school degree engaged almost twice as likely as participants with finished studies

in counterproductive corruption. In the following, results of the last step of the regression analysis are presented.


Figure 15. Participants' Corruption depending on their Organizational Culture (*N* = 563).

Organizational Culture and Corruption. H3 postulated that more employees engage in corruption (both types) in a corrupt organizational culture than in an ethical organizational culture. While 139 participants (50.9 %) in the corrupt organizational culture engage in corruption (compared to 134 non-corrupt participants), only 62 participants (21.4 %) in the ethical organizational culture engage in corruption (compared to 228 non-corrupt participants, see Figure 15). Thus, corruption is three times more likely in a corrupt organizational culture than in an ethical organizational culture (see OR[48], Table 13). Therefore, H3 received support.

H4 postulated that the type of corruption moderates the impact of organizational culture on employees' corruption. Thus, employees' engagement in the different types of corruption shall depend on their organizational cultures. More participants engage in corruption in the corrupt organizational culture (54.3 % and 47.4 %) than in an ethical organizational culture (19.2 % and 23.6 %) for both organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption, respectively. While within an ethical organizational culture participants more often engaged in counterproductive corruption than in organizational corruption, this pattern turned around within a corrupt organizational culture (see Figure 16).

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[48] Jaccard (2001) describes that the Odds Ratio of 'one' in logistic regression shows that both compared Odds Ratios are the same. This means that the behavior of both compared groups does not differ. If the behavior of the two groups differs, the Odds Ratio diverges from 'one'. If the Odds Ratio gets lower than 'one' the behavior of the analyzed group can be interpreted as less likely compared to the reference group. While if the Odds Ratio gets higher than 'one' the behavior of the analyzed group can be interpreted to be more likely than the behavior of the reference group.

Table 13.

Organizational Culture, Corruption Type (H3, H4); Interaction of Sex & Gender

Variables	Employees' corruption (no = 0, yes = 1); $N = 563$					
	B	*SE*	Wald	OR	*LL*	*UL*
1 Intercept	-1.57***	.27	35.01	.21		
Age[a]	-.03*	.01	5.00	.97	.94	1.00
Education						
high school	.62*	.25	6.24	1.85	1.14	3.00
finished professional training	.23	.42	.30	1.26	.55	2.87
vocational diploma	.23	.43	.29	1.26	.54	2.95
middle school	.15	.41	.13	1.16	.52	2.56
other	-.65	.82	.63	.52	.11	2.59
	R² = .04			$\chi^2 = 17.29$**		
2 Sex (female = 0, male = 1)	-.17	.20	.67	.88	.57	1.26
Played gender role (female = 0, male = 1)	-.09	.20	.22	1.00	.74	1.63
	Δ*R*² = .003			$\chi^2 = 2.40$		
3 Sex * played gender role	-.79†	.41	3.79	.45	.21	1.01
	Δ*R*² = .006			$\chi^2 = 2.63$		
4 Organizational culture (ethical = 0, corrupt = 1)	1.13***	.27	17.28	3.10	1.98[b]	
Type of corruption (counterproductive = 0, organizational = 1)	-.34	.29	1.76	.71	.44[b]	
	Δ*R*² = .13			$\chi^2 = 59.23$***		
5 Organizational culture*type of corruption	.63†	.39	2.68	1.89	1.00[b]	
	Δ*R*² = .001			$\chi^2 = 2.69$		
	Model: *R*² = .19			$\chi^2 (12,95) = 84.28$***		

Note. † $p = .05$; * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$; *B* = regression coefficient; *SE* = standard error of *B*; Wald = Wald χ^2; OR = Odds Ratio; *LL* = 95% Lower limit; *UL* = 95% Upper limit; *R*² = Nagelkerkes *R*²; χ^2 = Chi square test of model fit for each block; Reference value: education = 'finished study'. All regression coefficients were taken from the last step of regression analysis. Step 1: $df = 6$, Step 2: $df = 2$, Step 3: $df = 1$, Step 4: $df = 2$, Step 5: $df = 1$. Step 5: Hosmer-Lemeshow-Test: $\chi^2(8, 95) = 2.70$, $p = .95$. Neither the main effects of sex and gender did

change between Step 2 and Step 3, nor the main effects of organizational culture and type of corruption between Step 4 and Step 5.

[a] centered around the mean age of 27.5 years.

[b] one-sided confidence limit.

Both Odds Ratio of Table 14 show that organizational corruption is almost six times more likely within a corrupt organizational culture than within an ethical organizational culture, whereas counterproductive corruption is only four times more likely. Directly compared organizational corruption is almost twice more likely in a corrupt organizational culture than counterproductive corruption in an ethical organizational culture (see OR = 1.89 in Table 13). Although there seem to be an almost statistical difference ($p = .05$) in the amount of corrupt participants in the different organizational cultures between the types of corruption, this result has no impact on the explained variance of corruption (see in Table 13). Therefore, although there is a significant interaction (H4 statistically supported) this difference is not important.

Figure 16. Interaction Effect of Organizational Culture and Type of Corruption.

Sex and Corruption. H6a postulated that men and women engage similar often in organizational corruption. While 31 (30.7 %) of 101 male participants engage in organizational corruption, 73 (39.5 %) of 185 female participants engage in organizational corruption. Although on the descriptive level, men engage somewhat less likely in organizational corruption (OR = .61), there was no significant difference between men and women in organizational corruption (see Table 14). A post hoc power analysis with the program G*power version 3.1[49] (two-tailed) showed a test-power of = .99 with $df = 1$. Thus,

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[49] As described in Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, and Lang (2009), with: $n = 286$, binominal distribution, the OR for the main impact of sex on organizational corruption = .61 as Table 14 shows, Pr (Y=1| X=1) H0 = .50, α err Prob: = .95 (in line with

the sample size was large enough to figure out possible small effects, and showed no effect for sex on organizational corruption. Therefore, H6a seems supported.

H6b postulated that men shall more likely engage in counterproductive corruption than women. While 35 (35.4 %) of 99 male participants engaged in organizational corruption, 62 (34.8 %) of 178 female participants engaged in organizational corruption. Although on the descriptive level, men engage somewhat more likely in organizational corruption (OR = 1.65), there was no significant difference between men and women in counterproductive corruption ($p = .065$, see Table 14). Therefore, H6b is rejected.

Sex and organizational culture. H7a postulated no interaction of sex and for organizational corruption. As assumed, male and female participants engaged similarly in organizational corruption for both organizational cultures (ethical organizational culture: male = 14 % vs. female = 21.9 %; corrupt organizational culture: male = 47.1 % vs. female = 58.4 %; see both Figure 17 and Figure 18). Therefore, H7a is supported.

H7b postulated an interaction of sex and organizational culture for counterproductive corruption. While male participants engage more likely in counterproductive corruption than female participants in an ethical organizational culture (male = 29.1 % vs. female = 20.2 %), female participants engage in counterproductive corruption more likely than male participants in a corrupt organizational culture (male 43.2 % vs. female = 49.4 %, see both Figure 17 and Figure 18). There was an almost significant ($p = .05$) interaction between sex and organizational culture for counterproductive corruption. However, this possible interaction had only a small impact on counterproductive corruption (see Table 14, less than one percent explained variance). Therefore, H7b is rejected.

Figure 17. Interaction Effect of Organizational Culture and Sex (corrupt participants).

Table 14.

Main and Interaction Effects of Organizational Culture and Sex on Employees' Corruption (H6 & H7).

	Employees' corruption (no = 0, yes = 1)											
	Organizational corruption (n_1 = 286)						Counterproductive corruption (n_2 = 277)					
Variables	*B*	*SE*	Wald	OR	*LL*	*UL*	*B*	*SE*	Wald	OR	*LL*	*UL*
1 Intercept	-1.85***	.36	26.35	.16			-1.81***	.35	26.29	.16		
Age [a]	-.03	.02	2.0	.97	.94	1.01	-.04	.02	2.82	.96	.92	1.01
Education												
high school	.43	.37	1.39	1.53	.75	3.14	.71*	.34	4.54	2.04	1.06	3.94
finished professional training	-.18	.63	.08	.83	.24	2.29	.55	.58	.90	1.73	.56	5.34
vocational diploma	.36	.60	.37	1.44	.44	4.67	.09	.66	.02	1.10	.30	3.97
middle school	.40	.56	.50	1.49	.50	4.47	-.11	.60	.04	.89	.27	2.90
other	-1.16	1.14	1.03	.32	.03	2.96	-.01	1.15	.00	.99	.10	9.52
Played gender role (female = 0, male = 1)	.10	.27	.14	1.11	.65	1.88	.35	.27	1.63	1.42	.83	2.41
	R^2 = .03			χ^2 = 7.57			**R^2 = .07**			χ^2 = 14.30*		

Table 14. *(continued)*

Variables	Organizational corruption (n_1 = 286)						Counterproductive corruption (n_2= 277)					
	B	*SE*	Wald	OR	*LL*	*UL*	*B*	*SE*	Wald	OR	*LL*	*UL*
2 Sex (female = 0, male = 1)	-.49	.48	1.03	.61	.24	1.58	.50	.41	1.49	1.65	.84[b]	
	ΔR^2 = .01		χ^2 = 1.76				ΔR^2 = .00		χ^2 = .00			
3 Organizational culture (ethical = 0, corrupt = 1)	1.76[***]	.31	33.19	5.70	3.51[b]		1.47[***][b]	.35	17.12	4.33	2.42[b]	
	ΔR^2 = .19		χ^2 = 42.74[***]				ΔR^2 = .08		χ^2 = 18.13[***]			
4 Organizational culture*Sex	.11	.50	.03	1.11	.34	3.64	-.85[b]	.56	2.26	.43	.17[b]	
	ΔR^2 = .00		χ^2 = .03				ΔR^2 = .02		χ^2 =2.28			
	Modell: R^2 = .23		$\chi^2(10,95)$ = 52.12[***]				**Modell: R^2 = .16**		$\chi^2(10,95)$ = 34.74[***]			

Note. [*] $p < .05$; [***] $p < .001$; B = regression coefficient; SE = standard error of B; Wald = Wald χ^2; OR = Odds ratio; LL = 95% Lower limit; UL = 95% Upper limit; R^2 = Nagelkerkes R^2; χ^2 = Chi square test of model fit (for the particular blocks and the whole model). Reference value: education = 'finished studies'. Step 1: df = 7, Step 2: df = 1, Step 3: df = 1, Step 4: df = 1. Step 4: Hosmer-Lemeshow-Test: organizational corruption: $\chi^2(8, 95)$ = 5.08, p = .75; counterproductive corruption: $\chi^2(8, 95)$ = 5.42, p = .71. The main effects did not change between Step 3 and Step 4.

[a] centered around the mean age of 27.5 years.

[b] directional tested analog to the hypotheses, therefore one-tailed test and one-sided confidence limit.

Figure 18. Participants' Corruption According to their Organizational Culture and Sex for both Types of Corruption.

A post hoc analysis of an interaction effect on sex and played gender role showed an almost significant difference ($p = .05$). Participants engage somewhat more likely in corruption when they acted the opposite gender role (male sex and female gender role = 34.3 %; female sex and male gender role = 41.7 %) than when they acted their own gender role (male = 31.6 % female = 33 %). The explained variance of the interaction of sex and played gender role was very small (less than one percent, see Table 13). Thus, this influence is considered unimportant.

5.3. Discussion

To the authors knowledge this was the first study that (1) tried to empirically manipulate organizational culture, (2) analyzed sex difference in organizational corruption, and (3) tried to compare the influence of both organizational culture and sex on organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption. This study showed that more employees engage in corruption when they work in a corrupt organizational culture than when they work in an ethical organizational culture (confirmation of H3). The type of corruption actually moderated somewhat the intensity of corruption in line with the organizational cultures. However, the additional explained variance was very small (only statistical confirmation of H4). Therefore, the type of corruption seems negligible for considering it as an influential variable. In addition, male and female participants did not differ in both their organizational and their counterproductive corruption (confirmation H6a and rejection of H6b). Both results had small effect sizes. There was no interaction of sex and organizational culture in both organizational corruption (confirmation of H7a) and in counterproductive corruption (rejection of H7b).

5.3.1. Organizational Culture and Different Types of Corruption

The results indicate that organizational culture could raise employees' organizational corruption to some extent. The combination of assumptions, values, goals, and rewards of the organizational cultures did shape employees' corrupt behavior moderately. Ergo, the manipulation of a corrupt organizational culture seems so effective that the amount of corrupt employees was in general three times more likely than in the ethical organizational culture. In addition, employees seem to become almost six times more likely to engage in organizational corruption and more than four times more likely to engage in counterproductive corruption in a corrupt organizational culture - compared to an ethical organizational culture (especially, because there were no rewards for counterproductive corruption). Since the manipulation of this study does not allow distinct conclusions about the impact of the particular manipulated characteristics of organizational culture, this discussion relies on both an assumed particular

impact of the characteristics and how the characteristics might be interwoven: (1) assumptions and values of an organizational culture, (2) goals, and (3) rewards.

(1) Assumptions and values of an organizational culture might provide a perception frame for all actions within the organization (Schein, 1992). This perception frame is assumed to shape employees' view of the world. While in an ethical organizational culture employees might face a perception frame that allows them to question their behavior in terms of ethical awareness, in a corrupt organizational culture employees might fail to question not only their own targets and behavior (Moore, 2008; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003) but also the assumptions and values of their organizational culture. This could lead to an ethical blindness. Ethically blind employees seem to distance their work behavior from "their own values and principles" (Palazzo et al., 2012, p. 325). Thus, ethical blindness may allow them to both continue their behavior and keep their moral self-image. Therefore, ethical blindness could be one essential grounded mechanism how a corrupt organizational culture might support employees' corruption (Cohen, 2008) on a more or less unconscious base.

Although in corrupt organizations, employees may differ in their ethical blindness depending on the sense-making in their department, profession, and work-group, all employees might share a reduced ethical awareness to some extent. The potential differences in ethical blindness might explain a turnover of non-corrupt employees or why some employees recognize suspicious moments during their work. However, the shared underlying assumptions and the normalization of organizational corruption might overpower most suspicious moments because there is only a low amount of organizational corruption whistle blowing (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001). The perception of a competition war, to be a community of fate, and that the end justifies the means could be a base to legitimate high goals in corrupt organizations (Brief et al., 2001) and might increases both employees' commitment to and acceptance of these high goals (Levine, 2005). As Study 2 indicates, underlying assumptions seem to have a small direct impact on corruption, which got mediated via more manifest characteristics of organizational culture. Thus, assumptions and values might shape the perception frame of employees of which goals and rewards get settled in and increase their influence on employees.

(2) In general, goal-setting theory shows that specific and challenging goals increase the performance of individuals (Locke & Latham, 2002). Among others, individuals develop a task specific focus of attention and develop task specific strategies to attain their goals (Locke & Latham, 2002). These processes increase the performance of individuals. Although literature provides wide-spread evidence of the positive effects of goals on performance (see

Locke & Latham, 2002), research on possible backlashes is still rare (Ordóñez et al., 2009). Thus, there are only a few studies or mainly theoretical arguments that take a perspective on possible negative aspects of goal-setting. One argument is that if goals are too specific individuals' attention focus might be too narrow so that employees think only of aspects that are directly connected to their task (Ordóñez et al., 2009). As an example the authors refer to inattentional blindness. This argument might allow the assumption that ethical aspects or long-term consequences of actions might fade in the background when employees have a too-narrow-focus of attention on only financial outcomes. A too-narrow task focus could rather enable employees to figure out which behavior enables them best to attain their targets (Brief et al., 2001) than to question some possible unethical aspects of their behavior. For example, within the experiment the corruption taker could become aware that organizational corruption might be help to support their own organization because of the explicit maximum outcome goals setting.

On the contrary, participants in the ethical organizational culture received the goal to decide for quality, to focus on the process of decision making, and to decide at their best knowledge. This is a rather unspecific goal because participants could only compare their results with an abstract ideal value and derived abstract behavioral expectations. Thus, their attention focus might be wider (also covering ethical aspects) when they worked on the task in the study than the focus of participants in the corrupt organizational culture. Literature covers some results that might indicate this wider focus of attention. Thus, an employees' process focus (vs. outcome) lead to higher non-profit outcomes (Škrinjar et al., 2008), and participants provided more qualitative results when they were asked to do so (on the cost of their quantitative output, compared to an outcome focused group and a goal conflict group with both a qualitative and an outcome focus; Locke, Smith, Erez, Chah, & Schaffer, 1994).

Another argument for possible negative aspects of goal-setting is that too-challenging goals could lead to unwanted individual behavior (Ordóñez et al., 2009). One study showed that taking higher risks in negotiations could be a result of too challenging goals (Larrick et al., in press as cited in Ordóñez et al., 2009). Another study by Schweitzer et al. (2004) showed that employees engaged in unethical behavior more often if they failed to meet their challenging goals (cheating behavior). If goals and performance are only related in a linear positive relationship (Locke & Latham, 2002; Staw, 1984) and if individuals face too challenging goals in corrupt organizations (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004), these individuals might come to a threshold where they might feel forced to take the risk to engage in unethical behavior in order to attain the goals.

The connection of a possible ethical blindness with specific and too challenging goals (Brief et al., 2001; Sims & Brinkman, 2003) in a corrupt organizational culture might narrow the task-attention focus of participants and might increase their risk-taking and their focus on proximal consequences in their decision making. Thus, combination may reduce any ethical concerns to a certain extent or increase a more positive attitude towards corruption. Contrary, the connection of a possible ethical awareness with a non-specific, moderate challenging goal in the ethical organizational culture might enable participants to have a wide task-attention focus as well as to be able to take long-term consequences and ethical aspects into their decision making. Thus, there might be a connection of assumptions, values, and goals in both manipulated organizational cultures that could explain the difference in behavior. Since there seem to be very little literature and only a few studies about these assumed possible negative aspects of goal-setting, more research is needed to reach greater confidence about the assumed possible relations.

(3) Participants assumed a different reward structure in line with their behavior. The assumed rewards for corrupt behavior in a corrupt organizational culture were much higher than the assumed rewards in an ethical organizational culture. This connection might be equivalent to reality in which corrupt organizations are assumed to reward the corruption of their employees while ethical organizations are assumed to reward ethical behavior and punish unethical behavior (Brief et al., 2001; Craft, 2013). Nevertheless, the possibility to receive different indirect incentives could trigger participants' desire for maximum points differently. While participants assumed to receive points for their decisions, they were aware that these points could only increase their likelihood to get the money, it did not guarantee the money reward. This reward structure could have the most tangible impact on participants. They voluntarily participated in the survey and could increase their possibility to receive real some money. One study showed that rewards for ethical behavior raises employees' outcome expectancy for ethical behavior what in turn increases ethical behavior (Treviño & Youngblood, 1990). For corrupt organizations, literature often refers to employees who seem trapped in incentive systems (earning more than in other companies; e.g., Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Joshi et al., 2007; Sims & Brinkmann, 2003), which might make it difficult for these employees to resign from their job or to refuse organizational corruption. Within these incentive systems employees seem to get rewarded directly or indirectly for organizational corruption and seem able to both rationalize their behavior and attribute their corruption externally to that incentive system (Beenen & Pinto, 2009).

Since in reality organizational culture influence many different aspects of employees' daily work via several different ways, it seems appropriate to manipulate more than one aspect. Nevertheless, it might also be interesting to extract particular aspects to figure out how intense their singular is. Although a corrupt organizational culture seems to raise not only organizational corruption but also counterproductive corruption, both types of corruption could work via different mechanisms. Thus, a corrupt organizational culture might shape behavior differently.

Organizational culture and organizational corruption. According to Banduras' (1999) moral disengagement theory, for organizational corruption a corrupt organizational culture might reshape employees' cognitive categorization about ethical behavior (Moore, 2008). Employees are assumed to distance themselves from their own corruption and the induced harm (Moore, 2008) by rationalizing and reframing their organizational corruption (Asforth & Anand, 2003; Moore, 2008; Palazzo et al., 2012). This could be the above mentioned ethical blindness. Thus, a corrupt organizational culture may reduce the perceived responsibility of employees for organizational corruption and restructure what employees perceive as decent behavior (Anand et al., 2005). The different aspects of a corrupt organizational culture like assumptions, values, norms, goals, and rewards could enforce a cognitive categorization and may allow employees to engage in organizational corruption more easily. This might explain why it was almost six times more likely that employees engage in organizational corruption in a corrupt organizational culture.

Organizational culture and counterproductive corruption. According to Rabl and Kühlmann's (2008) model of counterproductive corruption, corrupt behavior depends on both employees' subjective attitudes and norms. Through the assumed perception shift (see Study 1), a corrupt organizational culture might change the employees' subjective norms ("everybody does it", norms of coercion and organizational silence), and may reduce the risk of detection (the end justifies the means, norms of separation and open secret, see Study 1). This potential ethical blindness might affect employees' social norms and perceived behavioral control for counterproductive corruption. According to Rabl and Kühlmann (2008), subjective attitudes and norms increase employees' intentions to achieve their goals through counterproductive corruption. Moreover, employees' willingness to engage in counterproductive corruption could rise, because employees work in an unethical work-group (Gino et al., 2009). This work-group could support corruption and therefore, it can shape the attitudes and norms of every individual employee (Gino et al., 2009). Since desire, opportunity, and legitimation of organizational corruption seem to be a part of the corrupt

organizational culture and may be part in employees' everyday sense-making, general ethical standards might lose their validity to hinder employees' engagement in counterproductive corruption (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; MacLean & Behnam, 2010). As results showed, participants also engaged in counterproductive corruption much more often when they worked in a corrupt organizational culture. Thus, in a corrupt organization, employees might engage more likely in counterproductive corruption when they witness how colleagues do not get sanctioned for their organizational corruption on an everyday basis. As a study showed, employees behave more unethically if they witnessed unpunished unethical behavior in their in-group (Gino et al., 2009). Also, the case Enron showed that many employees enriched themselves (counterproductive corruption) although they were supposed to engage only in organizational corruption (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). The current FIFA scandal in 2015 also could be an indicator for such kind of behavior because members of the FIFA seem not only to enrich their own organization but also many high level managers are suspected to enrich themselves. Therefore, the potential perception shift of the corrupt organizational culture may promote different types of unethical behavior and also explains why both types of corruption can exist within one organization (Pinto et al., 2008).

5.3.2. Sex, Organizational Culture, and Corruption

Male and female participants engaged in both organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption to a similar extend. Therefore, although many studies refer to sex and gender differences in corruption, sex seems to have no relevant impact on the taker side of both types of corruption. Compared to the huge amount of studies referring to the impact of sex on corruption none of these studies, to the authors' knowledge, report any effect sizes. Thus, the effect sizes of these studies might be similar small as the effect size in this study or the smallness of the sex effects might be a matter of methodology. Although women tend to self-report unethical behavior less than men, there seem to be fewer differences in their ethical behavior to men (Dalton & Ortegren, 2011) than assumed. This study covers behavioral data and no self-reports. This might explain the equal behavior of both sexes that might be less pronounced than the self-reported behavior. Another explanation might be that the sample was averagely elder and had more work experience than the often used simple student samples in literature.

Organizational corruption. Although women engaged in organizational corruption somewhat more likely than men, both sexed did not differ in their impact on organizational corruption. In addition, there was no interaction effect of sex and organizational culture on employees' corruption. Although it is difficult to support a H0 hypothesis, the power analysis

indicated that the sample was big enough to detect even small effects. Since both H0 hypotheses received support and in addition the explained variance was very small, the impact can be assumed as fairly unimportant. Thus, these results might indicate that - although several studies reported that women tend to be more ethical than men (ten out of 38 studies, see review by Craft, 2013) - there might be less differences when the criminal behavior is on behalf of the organization. The mixed results in sex difference in ethical behavior (Craft, 2013) indicate that it still proves difficult to generalize an overall more ethical tone for women. These results are also in line with the non-sex differences in the attitude towards organizational corruption in Study 2 and replicate this finding with another method and an independent sample. Furthermore, these results could again indicate that the interpretation of same role expectation in corrupt organizations possibly explain this behavior. Within this study participants received values, assumptions, goal expectations and reward treatment depending on their organizational culture for a short amount of time. Thus, one might say that the combination of values, assumptions, goals, and rewards could possibly enforce same sex behavior within organizations to a certain extent. Nevertheless, there could be motivational differences between the sexes for why they behave in a similar manner. While male employees might be more driven by monetary motives, are more risk-taking, and more unethical (Eagly & Wood, 1991; cf., Eckel & Grossman, 2002; Rivas, 2013), female employees might be more driven by motives like commitment or loyalty. These assumptions need to be tested in future studies as well as the stability of this non-difference.

Counterproductive Corruption. Men and women did not differ in their counterproductive behavior. This was surprising since Rivas (2013) reports not only that men received both more often and higher bribe offers than women, but also that women are expected to refuse counterproductive corruption more often than men. In addition, literature assumes that men and women might differ in their tolerance of corruption because of their different exposure to counterproductive corruption (Alatas et al., 2009; Sung, 2003). An indicator for different exposure could be that female participants' counterproductive corruption drops about 30 % between the corrupt and the ethical organizational culture while the amount of corrupt male participants decreased by only about 14 %. This could indicate the way in which organizational culture might influence women slightly more than men, or that men might have more individual characteristics that are prone for counterproductive corruption.

5.3.3. Limitations

The limitations of this study are mainly in six different fields: manipulation of organizational culture, manipulation checks, low risks for the participants, and possible difference in motives, single-decision of corruption, and external validity. First limitation, no experiment can simulate the omnipresence, pervasiveness, and complexity of organizational culture. If research only tackles particular aspects, these aspects need to underestimate the whole impact. Since organizational culture shapes employees' entire work environment for years, the real-world impact of organizational culture cannot be anticipated by any experimental study. The threefold manipulation in this study aimed to simulate the complex influences of organizational culture on employees' corruption in order to get an idea of the possible real impact. Nevertheless, the possible effect of an organizational culture on organizational corruption may be indicated in this study. However, the threefold manipulation of organizational culture also covers a backlash: it is impossible to draw distinct conclusions about what particular aspect of the organizational culture have what kind of effect on employees' behavior. It could be that the different assumed rewards by participants that might influence their behavior more than the assumptions and values they saw before (as Study 2 also indicates). Therefore, it becomes unclear whether the effects of accepting the corrupt offer are a result of the combination of the three aspects of manipulation (pictures and values, goals, and rewards), or if the results are mainly based only of the different goals and anticipated reward structures of the cultures. However, this interwoven impact also takes place in reality. Thus, these results could only allow drawing a general conclusion about the cumulative impact of all manipulated aspects.

Finally, the manipulation of both the ethical and corrupt organizational culture covers only some characteristics of the assumptions, values, and norms. These cultures are more complex in real life. While the manipulation of the ethical organizational culture based on results of several meta-analysis, the manipulation of the corrupt organizational culture based mainly on the results of Study 1 and literature. Thus, there could be some key characteristics of a both organizational cultures, which are not manipulated in this context at all because of the state of research in this field.

Second limitation, there were no (direct) manipulation checks for many aspects of the study. First, if the manipulated organizational culture covers corruption, if participants believed the cover stories, and if participants understood the letter of the superior. Second, if and how participants anticipated their assumed points, if they behave on their anticipation, and how much impact the different assumed points could have on participants' behavior.

Third, if participants identified with their organizational culture, if the different manipulation of the types of corruption were different - which could also explain the non-significant difference in corruption between the types, if participants were motivated to receive hypothetical benefits for their fictitious organization and finally if some participants could imagine to play an employee of the opposite gender. The most important manipulation check whether the different organizational cultures promotes corruption was only done indirectly on an independent sample. It cannot be excluded that the perceptions of these participants (see Pre-Study 3, Appendix D) measured more their perspective if humans are good or evil because they were only asked indirectly if they belief that the organizational culture could raise corrupt behavior. In turn, participants' perspective of human nature could also be manipulated through the picture. Therefore, it is not clear if the manipulation check did really measure the assumed amount of corruption influenced by the manipulation or the (possibly manipulated) view of the world of the participants.

As a third limitation, unlike some experiments on the impact of sex on the donor of counterproductive corruption that have varied the risks of detection and punishment (e.g., Frank et al., 2011; Lambsdorff & Frank, 2011), this study was a low-risk scenario for both types of corruption because unlike the donor the taker faced a low risk to get reported (cf., Höffling, 2002). Through playing the role of an employee, participants might have had more distance to their behavior than if they had received a corrupt offer in reality. Therefore, participants might have played at a greater risk than they would have in reality. In addition, since the bid of the corrupt company was more expansive only by one percent this was also a low hurdle for participants to engage in corruption. This low amount was chosen to simulate a low risk and low hurdles for corruption in corrupt organizations. This low-risk scenario might on the one hand have overestimated the amount of counterproductive corruption, while on the other hand underestimating the sex difference. Research on the donor side of corruption is needed for this case. In addition, if women engaged less in corruption because of their fear of detection and punishment, women in corrupt organizations could engage more easily in organizational corruption than women in non-corrupt organizations in counterproductive corruption. This could lead to a rather good estimation about the amount of female employees engaging in organizational corruption and an overestimation about female employees' engagement in counterproductive corruption in this study.

For a forth limitation, participants' played for a reward, it seems that in corrupt organizations employees more often face existence problems if they do not participate in organizational corruption (Brief et al., 2001; Lange, 2008). If the anticipated external threat of

a competition war in a corrupt organizational culture has a real influence, this threat might have more impact on employees' motives (e.g., security motive or existence motive, see Study 1) while this experiment might trigger other kinds of motives (e.g., to get rewarded for good work, to grain money, to be a good participant, to be social etc.). Although literature refers to different types of motivational approaches (threat to engage in corruption, Brief et al., 2001; vs. rewards for corruption, Anand et al., 2005; vs. punishment for not support of corruption, Ashforth & Anand, 2003) that seem to exist in corrupt organizations there is no research that connects these different approaches to their effectiveness in employees' corrupt behavior. Different approaches possibly work on different hierarchical levels (e.g., bonuses for higher level managers, threat and bonuses for the middle management - see "rank and yank" system by Enron, Beenen & Pinto, 2009), and rewards and punishment for the employees. Nevertheless, differences in approach and avoidance motives might influence not only differences in goal-setting and performance (Elliot & Chruch, 1997) but may also influence differences in corrupt behavior. The fear to lose ones job might be a more intense avoidance motivator than the approach to receive an experimental benefit. Therefore, the experiment rather triggered the approach performance motive and might underestimate the real effect of a corrupt organizational culture.

Fifth limitation was that corruption was measured only by one decision. Therefore, it was not possible to analyze the intra-individual stability of corrupt behavior. It seemed problematic to give the same participants two corrupt offers in a row, since participants could become suspicious or recognize the real purpose of the study. A longitudinal survey seemed also difficult because in this case participants had to believe in the cover story for a longer time, might reflect about their behavior and engage in contrary behavior to balance their behavior. Nevertheless, it would be insightful to test the stability in the impact of manipulated organizational culture on participants' corrupt behavior or whether this behavior is just a one-short result.

Sixth limitation, these results do not give any information about any risen external validity of the manipulations (Francis, 2012). This is a general methodological limitation of experimental studies (Tsang & Kwan, 1999). Although there exists no data about what kind of employees work in corrupt organizations and not all industries are endangered to become highly corrupt, the sample seems a bit younger and the amount of women could be overestimated compared to reality.

5.3.4. Conclusion and Implications

The results indicate that certain aspects of an organizational culture might have an impact on employees' corruption. It seems useful to repeat such a web-experiment with a much less complex procedure. A good starting point for further experiments could be to manipulate particular values and assumptions, goals, and rewards independently in order to specify their distinct impact. Since sex seems to have a minor impact on the take of corruption, further attempts may cover whether there are differences of the type of corruption for the donor. As mentioned above, while the donor perceives more risk of detection and rejection of their corrupt offer, the taker is relatively safe. So the similarities in men and women could be restricted to the behavior of the taker of corruption. As a final outlook on research, a distinction between structural corruption and petty corruption might also shed a light on the mixed results of sex differences.

For practical purposes, governments need to partially reconsider the increased employment of women in key positions as an anti-corruption method. Although employed women are assumed to reduce counterproductive corruption, this study could not support this assumption. Especially when governments employ women to reduce the acceptance of counterproductive corruption, for the taker this seems to be an inefficient approach. Perhaps the employment of individuals with particular characteristics seems more suitable as an anti-corruption method (e.g., high integrity, moral development, commitment, and work satisfaction).

6. General Discussion

The present work aimed to shed light onto the impact of organizational culture on employees' corruption. A mixed method approach was used firstly to try to analyze characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture, secondly to analyze if a manipulated organizational culture influences a positive attitude towards organizational corruption, and finally to analyze whether a corrupt organizational culture increases corrupt behavior. In addition, the work at hand analyzed if men and women differ in both their attitude towards organizational corruption and their corrupt behavior for organizational corruption and counterproductive corruption. This work is the first which tries to systematically figure out empirical results in terms of organizational culture and sex differences for different types of corruption. Results indicate that the investigated characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture (Study 1) could not only shape employees' attitude towards organizational corruption to some extent (Study 2) but could also shape employees' corrupt behavior for both types of corruption

(Study 3). Men and women did not differ in their attitude towards organizational corruption when they worked in an intense corrupt organizational culture. In addition both sexes accept organizational corruption to a same extent as well as counterproductive corruption when they worked in a corrupt organizational culture.

The mixed method approach (i.e., qualitative analysis, questionnaire survey, and experiment) aimed to receive first information of a rather unexplored research field and then to try analyzing in a more systematic way whether the findings can influence employees' attitude and behavior. The mixed approach was chosen because corruption is very difficult to both measure and analyze. Literature on corruption only provides ideas about the phenomenon of corruption because explicit information is biased through social desirability and the perpetrators' need of security, official statistics only provide information about the unsuccessful cases (because participants got convicted), experiments could only figure out some kinds of behavior. They are often analyzed from student samples that have less work experience, used questionnaire face problems of external validity, experts' insights depend on experts' experiences and their reflection, and particular case studies are often difficult to generalize. Thus, every method has its own very narrow limitations within this research field. The mixed method approach aimed to tackle the restricted limitation of a single method to some extent. Thus, the experts' assumptions of all forms of organizational corruption, the operationalization of two forms of organizational corruption (gifting and bribery) and the corrupt decision possibility tried to come closer to the real phenomenon of corruption from various directions.

The same applies for organizational culture. Similar to corruption, organizational culture is a heterogenic phenomenon that is difficult to analyze. Since there was no systematical information on how a corrupt organizational culture might look like and whether it really impacts corrupt behavior, the mixed methods aimed to figure out similarities between many different corrupt organizations and to make first steps in the analysis if aspects of a corrupt organizational culture could really influence corruption. Thus, the modified questionnaires (in Study 2) were a first attempt to operationalize the findings of Study 1 and the manipulation of Study 3 was a first attempt to analyze if a corrupt organizational culture could directionally increase corrupt behavior. As Stroebe and Strack (2014) argued, a conceptual replication with different approaches to operationalize the independent and dependent variable might increase the "trust in the underlying theory" (p. 63). Therefore, because results of the three studies cover an impact of a corrupt organizational culture on corruption, the corrupt organizational culture seems to promote corruption.

6.1. Organizational Culture and Corruption

Although, the studies did not test the connections between organizational culture and the explicit aspects of the Theory of Planned Behavior, the studies could indicate as first steps that there seems to be an impact of a corrupt organizational culture on employees' corruption. Study 1 revealed the way a corrupt organizational culture covers a perception of a competition war that may lead to a perception shift towards a positive attitude towards corruption. This perception shifts may cover aspects of ethical blindness; however, the current literature only provides some theoretical assumptions what ethical blindness is and how it might work. The results of Study 1 confirm former empirical findings about an aggressive organizational culture and huge competition between the department of the case study by Enron (Beenen & Pinto, 2009; Martin et al., 2007; Stein & Pinto, 2011) and are also in line with former theoretical assumptions about organizations' huge competition pressure (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004). Thus, there seem to be some characteristics that many corrupt organizations apparently share. The main underlying assumptions that the end justifies the means, a major outcome orientation, rewards, and punishment if employees do not attain their goals (of Study 1), are also in line with the results of the Enron case study (Beenen & Pinto, 2009) and theoretical assumptions. Therefore, the experts' insights of many different organizations show that the named characteristics do not appear to be limited to the Enron case. Thus, an ethical and a corrupt organizational culture seem to differ in their process vs. outcome orientation. While some studies report a positive effect on process orientation on the quality of non-financial performance (see for a review: Kohlbacher, 2010; Škrinjar et al., 2008) the main outcome orientation might provide a huge pressure on employees to attain their unrealistic goals. Completely new insights were those on the employees' perception to be a community of fate in which they need to fight together, justification of unrealistic goals, and the pressure on all employees to support organizational corruption.

Via collective sense-making the corrupt organization do not need to cover all of the above mentioned characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture to the same extent. The possibly different perceptions of organizational culture could be based on the different sense-making of organizational processes between departments, professions, and work-groups and may also promote many different facets of the organizational culture (e.g., sub-cultures; Plakhotnik & Rocco, 2010; Schein, 1992). Each sub-culture may cover a unique pattern of assumptions, values, and norms that more or less include the general characteristics of the overall organizational culture (Schein, 1992; Trice & Beyer, 1993). Thus, there might be choir characteristics that may be shared by the majority of the employees and edge

characteristics that may differ between particular departments, hierarchies, and professions. Departments affected by corruption might encourage key characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture to ensure organizational corruption (i.e., outcome orientation, success, or rationalization). Departments with no or only indirect contact with corruption (e.g., warehouses, corrupt free subsidiaries) might reinforce edge characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture to ensure both the secrecy and the general tolerance of corruption (i.e., open secret, coercion, or organizational silence). Employees of non-corrupt departments could have an indirect benefit if employees in corrupt departments engage in organizational corruption. Thus, they may share the secrecy and tolerate corruption in the organization. Because of the low amount of studies within the field of organizational corruption further research needs to analyze these aspects with the relations with a corrupt organizational culture.

Organizational corruption. Employees' perception shift seems to address individuals' attitudes towards corruption and might provide arguments or perspectives on how employees perceive a more positive attitude towards organizational corruption. Study 2 seems to back up this assumption with the results that participants who perceived an intense amount of corrupt organizational culture had a more positive attitude towards organizational corruption than participants who perceived a low intense amount or no corrupt organizational culture at all. In addition, the underlying assumption of a competition war seems to be connected with more manifest aspects of a corrupt organizational culture (rewards for corrupt behavior and lax control mechanism of corruption) which seems to shape employees' attitude towards organizational corruption. However, Study 2 indicates that different manifestations of a corrupt organizational culture might influence employees' attitude for particular forms of organizational corruption in a different way.

The community of fate (out of Study 1) could be an attractive in-group that shares the same boat to survive (in line with Tajfel & Turner, 1985). According to Ashforth and Kreiner (1999) employees reframe, redefine, and reinforce work values that differ from societal standards in their work-group and compare themselves with other organizations or professions or groups to enhance a positive self-identity. The corrupt organizational culture seems to cover all important aspects of this assumptions, such as a strong work-group identity through the community of fate, the reframe and redefinition of corruption in the perception shift as well as the reinforcement of corruption via norms of reward, punishment, climate of silence, and the importance of social comparisons (see Beenen & Pinto, 2009). Therefore, the sense-making in the work-group may also create a positive identity of individual employees

with their work-group and at the same time force employees to behave as a prototypical good member of this group (Darley, 2005; Stein & Pinto, 2011). Results of norms such as coercion and team spirit might indicate a possible relationship and influence the subjective norm of individual employees. Although the work at hand did not measure or test the impact of organizational culture on employees' subjective norms, three experimental studies by Körbis, van Prooijen, Tighetti and van Lange (2015) might indicate their effect. The authors report that perceived external norms for corruption influence employees' positive norms of corruption and increase the likelihood for corrupt behavior.

Lax control mechanism, strategical ignorance of organizational corruption, and rewards for unethical behavior (as results of Study 1) can influence employees' perceived behavioral control. Also, literature reported positive rewards for corrupt behavior, punishment for no-corruption (Beenen & Pinto, 2009). As Study 2 has shown, lax control mechanism and rewards for unethical behavior can influence a positive attitude towards corruption. Especially control mechanisms seem to be an important variable in this context to back up the legal frame. Finally, results of Study 3 indicate that manipulated aspects of a corrupt organizational culture promote employees' organizational corrupt behavior. This study consequently indicates that there seems to be an allover impact of organizational culture on corrupt behavior.

Counterproductive corruption. As Study 3 shows how a corrupt organizational culture could also influence counterproductive corruption. When the general norms and rationalization about organizational corruption may shape employees' subjective norm for organizational corruption (and they might be ethically blind to some extent) they might also more likely engage in counterproductive corruption. As literature reports counterproductive corruption is more likely to occur when employees perceive a positive reciprocity for the corruption action (Abbink et al., 2002) or when they perceive positive norms for counterproductive behavior (Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008). A corrupt organizational culture might influence such perceptions. Also, the potential general lax control mechanism within a corrupt organization may ease employees into engaging in counterproductive corruption and increase their perceived behavioral control. Thus, a corrupt organizational culture might in combination with some individual characteristics influence counterproductive corruption as well.

6.2. Sex and Corruption

Results indicate that sex differences in corruption might depend on the particular context. While the attitude differences of men and women seem to depend on the situational factors

(low vs. intense corrupt organizational culture) and the form of corruption (gifting vs. bribery, see Study 2), their acceptance of corruption did not differ between the types of corruption (Study 3). The attitude differences seem to be in line with the mixed results about the impact of sex on unethical behavior. Although both sexes had a similar attitude towards bribery, women on the descriptive level had a more positive attitude towards gifting. The latter is contrary to the results by O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005), who reported a higher ethical judgement by women. If women perceived an unethical behavior as less negative they might also show less ethical judgements for this behavior. However, while the review by O'Fallon and Butterfield (2005) took a perception on all forms of unethical behavior perhaps gifting might be a particular case in corruption. The general more positive attitude of women towards gifts might be a result of women's higher involvement of (non-corrupt) general gifting, and their more positive remembering of the gifts they receive (Areni, Kiecker, & Palan, 1998). This general attitude might also influence women's attitude towards corrupt gifting.

To the authors knowledge the current work is the first that analyzed sex differences in organizational corruption whereas the non-behavioral differences between men and women in the acceptance of counterproductive corruption replicated the results of Rivas (2013). Thus, womens' corruption might depend on the environmental tolerance and low risk of punishments, similar expectations or perhaps socialization within corruption. Although the interaction of organizational culture and sex was non-significant, on a descriptive level, men engaged slightly more often in counterproductive corruption in an ethical organizational culture while women engage slightly more often in counterproductive corruption in a corrupt organizational culture, whereas there were no sex differences for organizational corruption. This might indicate that situational factors may influence more intense the behavior of female than male employees. More research seems in order to receive more information about (potential) sex differences for the particular type, form and role in corruption.

Organizational corruption. Since the work at hand aimed at analyzing whether certain sex differences occur for organizational corruption and between the types of corruption, further studies may also measure sex differences with particular differences in individual characteristics to receive more information about why men and women may or may not differ. Two approaches could be useful: a systematical analysis of individual characteristics that are prone for counterproductive corruption and individual characteristics that support employees' behavior in line with organizational expectations. First, the following individual characteristics for counterproductive corruption can perhaps influence organizational corruption, such as self-efficacy, integrity, and work satisfaction. Higher self-

efficacy might influence employees' perceived behavioral control that they might more likely engage in organizational corruption. Integrity may influence employees' general positive attitude towards organizational corruption and how easy they might assimilate to corruption supportive norms within the organization. And, work satisfaction might influence if employees want to engage in organizational corruption. These individual characteristics might interact differently with the situational factors of a corrupt organizational culture for men and women. Thus, research might focus on main and interaction effects for possible explanations of sex differences.

Second, organizational corruption is assumed to be a behavior in line with organizations' expectations (Ashforth & Anand, 2003), individual characteristics that increase organizational expected behavior might explain organizational corruption, such as loyalty towards the organizations, obedience, organizational citizenship behavior, identification with and assumed reciprocity of the organization, or individual security needs. Loyalty, obedience, and organizational citizenship behavior may influence employees' desire to support the own organization through organizational corruption as extra role behavior and might allow employees to execute their own corrupt behavior independently from their own values (Murphy & Dacin, 2011). Umphress et al. (2010) showed that employees engage in pro-organizational unethical behavior when they had both a high identification with their organization and they assumed a positive reciprocity of their organization (i.e., rewards for the behavior). Corrupt organizations seem to create win-win situations with organizational corruption (Brief et al., 2001) that might sufficiently supplant employees' identification with the organization and provide a positive reciprocity expectation to enable employees' organizational corruption. Literature reports that women tend to engage in organizational citizenship behavior more likely in some types of jobs (gender neutral or male type jobs; Allen & Rush, 2001) and also differ from men in the type of organizational citizenship behavior they perform (Kidder, 2002). If one sees organizational corruption as a kind of organizational citizenship behavior, women might be more influenced by situational factors to engage in this organizational expected wrongdoing than men. Finally, employees' "fear of falling" (Coleman, 2002) as a possible manifestation of employees' need for security might be an important individual characteristic that could influence organizational corruption. Since corrupt organizations address employees' existential fears (i.e., job loss) this motive might interact with organizational culture to predict organizational corruption.

Counterproductive corruption. Some of the above named empirical findings of individual characteristics for counterproductive corruption and unethical behavior might be

risk factors for (only/mainly) the donor of corruption (e.g., machiavellianism, egoism, and low integrity) because almost all studies in literature focus on the donor of counterproductive corruption and employees who engage actively in unethical behavior. Machiavellianism, egoism, and low integrity can have a bigger influence on the perceived behavioral control which influences the intension if employees engage in counterproductive corruption. Low integrity and low moral development might influence a rather positive attitude towards counterproductive corruption. Perceived behavioral control might be more important for counterproductive corruption compared to organizational corruption because of the higher risk of detection and punishment. In addition, perceived behavioral control might also be more important for the donor of counterproductive corruption because the donor makes the first move to open a corrupt relationship.

Some other individual characteristics may be a good start to analyze their influence on the taker of counterproductive corruption: psychopathy and narcissism; because as Bannenberg (2005) reported five percent of the convicted offenders were swindler personalities. Since participants of the third study did not face high risk in detection or punishment, this non-existent risk might cause negated risk preferences between men and women and explain their similar behavior in counterproductive corruption. Especially women seem descriptively to engage more likely in a corrupt organizational culture in counterproductive corruption whereas men engaged more in an ethical organizational culture. This might indicate a potential situational influence on both sexed that needs to be analyzed with better manipulations or in reality. Therefore, more research is needed on the taker side of corruption to prove whether some individual characteristics are a universal risk for all types, forms, or roles of corruption or if they are more a risk for particular types, forms or roles in corruption.

6.3. Add on Value of a Corrupt Organizational Culture on Existing Theories

As described above, there are several shared theories to explain organizational and counterproductive corruption. This paragraph explains in a short way, how aspects of a corrupt organizational culture might supplement these known theories. For organizational corruption these theories are: pressure-opportunity, goal-setting, charismatic leadership and normalization of corruption. For counterproductive corruption these theories are: principal-agent theory, corrupt relationship, and dark triangle.

Organizational corruption. A corrupt organizational culture could shape the perceived pressure (desire) and the perceived opportunities (e.g., legitimation; MacLean, 2008). Employees seem to perceive pressure from fighting in a competition war, coercion

among work-groups, and from the community of fate. In addition, employees can perceive opportunities to support corruption because of their perception shift and the win-win situation corrupt organizations offer. In general, employees seem to become ethically blind within a corrupt organizational culture and engage rather unintentionally in organizational corruption. Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture could not only provide insights about the concrete pressures and opportunities employees perceive in corrupt organization but also indicate reasons for rather unintentional engagement in organizational corruption.

The context in which particular goals are set (e.g., to beat a competitor no matter how) can be another mechanism of how a corrupt organizational culture could shape organizational corruption. While goals foster employees' preparedness and willingness to realize the goal (Locke & Latham, 2002), organizational culture provides the frame in which employees recall assumptions, values, and norms to select their actions for goal realization (Schein, 1992). Employees' behavioral direction toward their goals is not always conscious (in general and especially in corrupt organizations; Anand et al., 2005; Locke & Latham, 2002). Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture could provide incentives that corruption becomes a favored action.

Charismatic leaders could set up visions that refer to war conditions as underlying assumptions to create a pro-corrupt environment. Through their visions employees could get enabled to tolerate and accept organizational corruption as an organizational solution. Moreover, managers can connect their performance values to unrealistic goals and put this pressure on their subordinates (DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004). While both leadership and goals are assumed to influence how and when employees engage in corruption (Baucus, 1994), a corrupt organizational culture could support those assumptions with aspects of why employees engage in corruption. For example, whereas transformational leaders increase employees' commitment to engage in unethical behavior that benefits their organization (Effelsberg et al., 2014), organizational culture shapes leadership as a soft component that in turn reshapes employees' reality and thus might enable corruption (Schein, 1992).

As described in Study 1, a corrupt organizational culture covers aspects of the normalization of organizational corruption. It provides insights in why employees share a higher tolerance about corruption, how they rationalize their behavior and how routine work tasks are backed up with underlying assumptions, values, and norms to support organizational corruption (see detailed discussion Study 1).

Counterproductive corruption. Results indicate that a corrupt organizational culture also influences counterproductive corruption. Through the unethical values and norms, a

corrupt organizational culture might also shape employees' perception about wrongdoing, which could increase their counterproductive corruption (Rabl & Kühlmann, 2008). This might explain why employees willingly behave against their original principals (i.e., principal-agent theory). In addition, lax control mechanism and general norms might influence employees' perceived behavioral control and subjective norms for counterproductive corruption. It could make counterproductive more likely if employees also have particular individual characteristics to engage in a corrupt relationship (e.g., via an increased perceived reciprocity or the perception of positive norms for wrongdoing). The ethical blindness might also influence how employees feel less criminal when they build up a corrupt relationship (Höffling, 2002). Finally, a corrupt organizational culture could shape employees' desire, their legitimation, and their opportunity (i.e., corrupt triangle) to engage in organizational corruption via employees' wishes to attain rewards, through the rationalization (e.g., the end justifies the mean). In addition, within the corrupt organizational culture it might also be easier to legitimize their own counterproductive corruption, and lax control mechanism could also provide opportunities for counterproductive corruption, respectively. Thus, the results indicate that a corrupt organizational culture could also shape counterproductive corruption to a certain extent.

6.4. Limitations

The main limitations of this work are the operationalization of organizational culture, corruption, and the German samples. Since both organizational culture and corruption are two complex constructs and they encompass many different actions, perceptions, and feelings over a longer time, the questionnaires used in Study 2 and the manipulation used in Study 3 focused on selective characteristics of an organizational culture. The overall effect and the complex detailed structure of a corrupt organizational culture can hardly get analyzed with several experts' insights, some questionnaires, or a manipulation of value statements, goal-setting, and reward structure. As each method is very restricted for this issue, the mixed method approach aimed to cumulate different approaches into one better picture. Nevertheless, the results might just indicate a possible impact of a corrupt organizational culture on corruption. This indicated impact could be an underestimation because some core characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture were neither measured in questionnaires nor manipulated. These were the community of fate, the existential threat, and employees' need for security. The named characteristics might also have a more intense impact on employees' behavior than the measured and/or manipulated facets (i.e., perception of competition war, outcome orientation, 'the end justifies the means', maximum profit goals, and rewards for

corrupt behavior). In addition, because web-experiments face more distraction possibilities than laboratory experiments the data could include more distractors that lower the effect sizes.

Corruption consists of more than an attitude towards the behavior or a simple decision. There are often small actions that support corruption, and employees are not always aware of the profiteer of their work actions. However, external validity of research on corruption is a general issue in literature concerning all used method because this behavior is complex and illegal. Also, social desirability makes it difficult to measure explicit behavior and attitudes.

Finally, the sample consisted of only Germans. Therefore, it is unknown whether results generalize to other cultures. In collectivist cultures organizational culture might have an even stronger impact than in individualistic cultures such as in Germany. Because the definition, legislation, regulation, social acceptance and social norms of corruption differ between countries

6.5. Conclusion and Implications

This is the first work on characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture. It was a first try to quantify the impact of organizational culture in three independent studies. Thus, Study 1 answered the research gaps of possible systematical characteristics of a corrupt organizational culture and Studies 2 and 3 supported the assumptions that organizational culture matters empirically. The first research gap asked for an understanding of what promotes unethical behavior of employees. The results in Study 1 show that organizational culture seems to link the external threats to basic needs of employees, and the criminal behavior seems to provide a solution to overcome the threat and addresses these needs. Thus, there is a kind of unethical context that influences unethical behavior, which is worth to research further. The second research gap addressed the limits of several prominent corruption theories in order to explain why employees engage in corrupt behavior. As described above, organizational culture could provide insights beyond the most used theories, especially in its answer to why employees engage in corruption. The third research gap asked for systematic empirical data about the impact of organizational culture on organizational corruption. Studies 2 and 3 provided the first empirical data of its kind and indicated repeatedly that organizational culture seems to be an important variable. Research gap four asked how one can generalize results of counterproductive corruption on organizational corruption. As Study 3 indicated, not all results are always the same for the different types of corruption. Thus, subsequent research in this direction will be useful. Addressing the side aspects of this thesis, Study 2 and 3 indicated that sex and gender differences seem to depend on the type and form of corruption (i.e., research gap five). Finally, research gap six asked whether the governmental method to

employ women in potential taker positions to reduce corruption is successful. Results indicate that women and men are similar corrupt as takers. Thus, governments might need to reconsider this particular anti-corruption strategy.

The next paragraphs address the four most important research perspectives and the two main practical implications in detail. First, research could tackle some questions that are both easy to ask and difficult to operationalize: how does a corrupt organizational culture interact with leadership styles? How can one change a corrupt organizational culture into an ethical organizational culture? How long does the process of normalization take to create a corrupt organizational culture? How are goals related to the aspects of a corrupt organizational culture? Second, research could analyze whether some of the following characteristics mediate the impact of a corrupt organizational culture on employees' organizational corruption, namely ethical blindness, goals, work-groups dynamics, employees' duration within the organization, perception shift, or group cohesion. Third, research could cover similarities and differences between different types (petty vs. structural corruption) and forms of corruption (i.e., cartels, bribery, or gifting) as well as different roles (donor vs. taker) in the corrupt transaction to shed light on mixed results and generalized conclusions (e.g., sex, individual characteristics, whistle blowing aspects, or situational factors). Forth, as identity seems to be a major issue in literature about corrupt organizations, research could also tackle the questions if and how employees identify with their work-group to engage in organizational corruption. Employees showed more extra role behavior when they had a good work-group identity than when they had a good organizational identity (see meta-analysis by Riketta & van Dick, 2005). For organizational corruption could be seen as extra role behavior (Ashforth & Anand, 2003) the work-group identity might explain why employees get committed to goals that violate their own values.

The two practical implications try to explain why many anti-corruption strategies possibly fail (Andvig & Fjeldstad, 2001) and indicate ways to strengthen anti-corruption approaches from an organizational psychology perspective. The majority of anti-corruption approaches are based on the principal-agent model for counterproductive corruption (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Beside the many difficulties rational choice approach bears, the current work takes a perspective on two main problems of anti-corruption strategies. First, all anti-corruption mechanisms imply that corrupt employees work for ethical organizations. As many examples indicate, there seem many multinational and national organizations that engage in organizational corruption. These organizations often install compliance systems and ethical codes that are decoupled with the daily business of the organization (MacLean & Behnam

2010; Sackmann & Horstmann, 2010). Thus, as results indicate a corrupt organizational culture may also delegitimize any anti-corruption strategies for counterproductive corruption. Therefore, a corrupt organizational culture might explain why so many anti-corruption measures fail. Second, there is no prominent anti-corruption strategy in use to reduce organizational corruption in corrupt organizations (Claussen, 2010). Although organizational corruption harms economy and society, important anti-corruption institutions (e.g., Transparency International or World Bank Group) concentrate mainly on counterproductive corruption. However, organizational corruption is also an issue that needs to be tackled with different approaches.

Anti-corruption strategies need to consider a change management process of a corrupt organizational culture to be more effective (Misangyi, Weaver, & Elms, 2008). During this process organizations should analyze which values and assumptions are connected to which reward, punishment, and control mechanism in order to become more effective. Managers and stakeholders should question and redefine their general perceptions. According to the theoretical model of reintegration (see Pfarrer, DeCelles, Smith, & Taylor, 2008) questioning and redefining general perceptions can take place in the stage of explanation. In this stage, organizations are assumed to ask themselves why corruption is happening. To obtain an adequate answer to this question, it may be necessary to question the perception the organization has of its environment as well as the corresponding values and norms. Only a deep reflection of underlying assumptions may be able to spark a new ethical beginning. For this beginning, a total overhaul of organizational identity seems necessary (Misangyi et al., 2008). One important point in this process, according to Pfarrer's et al. (2008) model, is that after mete out the reasons of why corruption occurred in an organization, stakeholders need to figure out what punishment needs to follow that crime. Any decision about punishment needs to be made carefully. As employees seem to support corruption in line with their social environment, they might not understand why their behavior is suddenly deemed as wrong. When employees are punished for behavior they have internalized as decent, they might reject the punishment, and they might become even more committed to their old values. Thus, organizations need to establish alternative values and norms about corruption and transition slowly from old values to new ones. In this stage, it could become important to develop behavioral alternatives to corruption with the management of the organizations to master the pressures of their market.

Moreover, reward and punishment systems need to be connected to ethical practice. Since goals and behavior always work within the context of organizational culture (Gonin et

al., 2012) it gets difficult to resettle these aspects without taking other aspects of the organizational culture into account. In addition, all different approaches to get control over corruption (e.g., punishment, incentive alignments, social sanctioning, self-controls, see Lange, 2008) may need to be connected to organizational cultures' assumptions, values, and norms in terms of identifying corrupt behavior, reinforcement or incentives (Lange, 2008). Thus, since organizational culture seems to provide the daily reality that frames not only reward and punishment mechanisms but also shows what the organization expects from its employees, organizational culture is the key arena for anti-corruption measures (Schein, 1992).

As a result of the change management, organizational culture may need to transform into a culture that enables every employee to question existing standards and rules about their ethical concerns in their daily business (Claussen, 2010). There needs to be a continuous ethical discussion within the whole organization. This would increase the ethical awareness and the behavioral focus of employees. Transparency International or the World Bank Group could provide self-audits that allow organizations to more explicitly figure out their underlying assumptions and values and to help to change them. Since these organizations mainly perceive themselves forced to engage in corruption (Baucus, 1994; DeCelles & Pfarrer, 2004), the incentives to change this behavior need to come from regulation. A starting point could be the SEC (= American Stock Exchange Supervision) with their Sentencing Guidelines. These guidelines force organizations (if they are listed) in the U. S. to pay huge penalties if they have cases of corruption in their organization. As Bicchieri and Rovelli (1995) reported that higher costs for corruption could decrease participants' cooperation for corruption. Thus, perhaps also on the macro level, penalty might be a good anti-corruption method. Organizations are only able to reduce the penalty if they prove that they installed particular anti-corruption mechanisms. Thus, if the used anti-corruption mechanisms enable a change of aspects of a corrupt organizational culture (e.g., 'the end justifies the means', lax control mechanism, rewards for corruption), and trainings, reward structures etc. enable a change in values, these mechanism might be more effective.

Corruption is always embedded in a social context (nation, market, industry, organization, work-group; Gephart, 2009) that provides assumptions, values, and norms and where this unethical behavior gets introduced, installed, reinforced and not sanctioned. Within organizations, it seems to be the organizational culture that urges many people to become evil (and often feel good about it).

7. References

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Appendix A

Interview guideline:[50][51]

Topic: warm up.

1. How did you get in contact with corruption?

2. How long is your experience with the issue corruption?

Topic: organizational culture in corrupt organizations.

3. Are there specific values and assumptions in corrupt industries?

4. Which similarities have you seen in different corrupt organizations?

Topic: managers' perspective on organizational culture.

5. What are the most important values of the managers in corrupt organizations?

  - Why?

6. Are there differences between management values shared within the organization and those presented to the outside?

  - What are the differences like?

7. Do you know if there were some norms within the group of the management which support the corruption?

8. Do you know something about the common sayings they had on the management level?

Topic: employees' perspective on organizational culture.

9. Are there any recurring unusual statements of employees in corrupt organizations, about their work conditions, their self-concept etc.?

10. Are there similar group or working norms in different corrupt organizations? Which ones?

11. Are there group or work values supporting corruption at the workplace? Which ones?

12. Imagine a corrupt organization. What kind of working norms do you expect to find on the level of employees?

  - Which norms do you not expect?

Topic: corrupt organization vs. counterproductive corruption.

13. Did you get any clues that the organizational culture differs depending on whether only a small group of employees engage in corruption or the whole organization does?

14. Are there any forms of corruption that are more common in particular industries?

Topic: final questions.

15. Do you know other issues or characteristics of corrupt organizations that we have not already focused?

16. Is there anything you want to add?

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[50] All questions are translated into English.
[51] This interview is partly published in Campbell and Göritz (2014b, p. 309).

Appendix B

This appendix covers the code book of Study 1 (see Table B1).

Table B1.

Codes of Organizational Culture[52]

	Underlying assumptions		
Code name	**Code description**	**Code unit**	**Number of codes** [a]
Appeal to higher loyalties	Employees and managers argue that norm violation fulfills the purpose of realizing a higher-order value (Ashforth & Anand, 2003).	[b]	40/7
Corruption is a matter of course	Employees and managers take corruption as a matter of course. They see corruption as usual business practice (Anand et al., 2005).	[b]	38/10
Ethical Blindness	Employees and managers have a low level of awareness that corruption is unlawful. They do not feel guilty when they engage in corruption (Maruna & Copes, 2004).	[b]	26/6
Human nature is evil	Employees and managers refer to the circumstances that the human being is evil and behaves evil (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961).	[b]	16/4

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[52] This table is published mainly in Campbell and Göritz (2014b), Tab. 3, pp. 299-300.

Table B1. *(continued).*

Code name	Code description	Code unit	Number of codes [a]
Humans have a submissive relationship to their environment	Employees and managers describe circumstances in which, employees and managers do not have any control about their environment (e.g., markets, within their own organization). Employees and managers feel that they need to tolerate their environment because forces within this environment have higher power than they do (Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck, 1961).	[b]	7/3
Social weighting	Employees and managers compare themselves with other corrupt organizations to reduce the focus of unmoral behavior. This comparison can emerge in two forms: condemn the condemner or selective social comparisons (Anand et al., 2005). Condemn the condemner means that employees and managers condemn other individuals who tell them that corruption is wrong. Selective social comparison means that employees and managers compare themselves with individuals and organizations who are worse than they are, so that they do not need to change anything.	[b]	22/7
The end justifies the means	Employees and managers argue or mention that results are more important than the path to attain the results. Statements that goals justify the means.	[b]	14/9

Table B1. *(continued).*

Code name	Code description	Code unit	Number of codes [a]
We have always been corrupt	Employees and managers refer to a tradition of corruption in their organization. They claim they have always worked this way.	[b]	18/6
We are a team and compete against others	Arguments and statements that employees and managers of the organizations need to stick together in a team to compete against other organizations.	[b]	19/9
We are fighting in a war	Employees and managers use war metaphors to describe the working conditions in their organization.	[b]	30/7

Managers' Perspective on Organizational Culture

Managers' Values

Code name	Code description	Code unit	Number of codes
Performance	Managers expect their employees to accomplish high standards and goals.	[c]	20/7
Outcome orientation	Managers focus on the results of behavior, tasks, and projects. They do not focus on how employees attain these results. Managers refer to the importance to attain results.	[c]	13/5

Table B1. *(continued).*

Code name	Code description	Code unit	Number of codes [a]
Security	Managers refer to security needs of the organization. Security addresses the continuity of the organization and of employees' jobs.	[c]	14/8
Success	Managers refer to success as employees' goal attainment. This success is associated with profit, expansion, and victory.	[c]	41/9
Managers' Norms			
Goal setting	Manager norms of goal setting. This includes goal setting for employees on all levels of the organization. The naming and description of goal characteristics as well as the reference to goal setting on a more abstract level got coded.	[d]	42/13
Punishment	Managers punish employees who do not facilitate corruption.	[d]	19/8
Rewards	Managers reward employees to act corruptly by means of material and immaterial incentives (e.g., bonuses or promotions).	[d]	37/9

Table B1. *(continued).*

Employees' Perspective on Organizational Culture			
Employees' Values			
Code name	**Code description**	**Code unit**	**Number of codes** [a]
Security	Employees' security need includes their job security, the security of the jobs of other employees, and the continuity of the organization as a whole.	[d]	16/9
Team spirit	Employees rate team spirit for their own work-group or organization as important.	[d]	16/7
Employees' Norms			
Separation	Employees separate their in-group (corrupt employees) from the out-group (non-corrupt employees). In-group employees avoid sharing information about corruption with the out-group.	[d]	57/10
Open secret	Most of the employees note corruption within the organization but they treat it as a secret. Employees avoid talking about corruption and support the secrecy of corruption through language and behavior.	[d]	27/7

Table B1. *(continued).*

Employees' Norms			
Code name	**Code description**	**Code unit**	**Number of codes** [a]
Organizational silence	Employees avoid talking about certain things. They do not want to receive feedback on certain results or discuss topics related to corruption. A code of silence within the organization leads employees to cease speaking about lots of things (Wolfe Morrison & Milliken, 2000).	[d]	24/9
Coercion	Employees force their colleagues to act corruptly or to support corruption in one of two ways: (1) Employees force colleagues not to question the corruption or similar themes. (2) Colleagues are replaced if they are whistle blowers. This is brought about by job quitting, relocation etc.	[d]	8/6
Corruption	Interviewed experts referred to corruption directly or indirectly. They used the term corruption, named or refered to particular types and forms of corruption, or described corrupt transactions.	single word	[e]

Note: This table shows the most frequent codes according to the perspective of organizational culture and the organizational culture layer in alphabetical order. To separate both perspectives of organizational culture, key words were used that were found in the interviews. If the interviewees referred to top-down processes, leaders, leadership, CEO,

management, manager etc. these were regarded as an indicator of the managers' perspective. If the interviewees referred to bottom-up processes, employees, work-groups, colleagues etc. these were regarded as an indicator of the employees' perspective. Every sentence got categorized about its organizational culture perspective within the university course.

[a] This column refers to (a) the sum of all references to the single codes and (b) the number of interviewees who referred to this code. The total number of interviewees is 14. The numbers are presented in the following order: sum of all code references/number of all interviewees referring to the code.

[b] Code unit was the word. If the interviewees named or described the codes or used example of the codes, they got coded. The author categorized the codes according to the level of organization culture in managers and employees' perspective.

[c] Single words or word phrases got coded if they referred to any managers' perspective keyword such as top-down, middle management, upper management, management, etc.

[d] Single words got coded if they referred to any employees' perspective keyword such as bottom-up, work-group, colleagues and employees

[e] Since this was the main issue, all interviews referred to this issue repeatedly. Therefore, the amount of these codes was not counted.

Appendix C

This appendix covers the original and modified items of two scales used in Study 2 (see Table C1).

Table C1.

Original and Modified Items of Study 2.

Measurement of the perception of a competition war: original scale: Attitude of War scale (Hill, 1953 as cited in Edwards, 1994, p. 32[53])

Original item	**Modified item**
I suppose the [United States] has no choice but to continue the [Korean] war.	I suppose the [organization] has no choice but to continue the [competition] war.
We should be willing to give our allies [in Korea] more money if they need it.	We should be willing to give our allies [] more money if they need it.
Withdrawing our troops from [Korea] at this time would only make matters worse.	Withdrawing our troops from [the market] at this time would only make matters worse.
The [Korean] war might not be the best way to stop [communism], but was the only thing we could do.	The [competition] war might not be the best way to stop [sales problems], but was the only thing we could do.
Winning the [Korean] war is absolutely necessary whatever the cost.	Winning the [competition] war is absolutely necessary whatever the cost.
We are protecting the United States by fighting in [Korea].	We are protecting the [organization] by fighting in [the competition].
The reason we are in [Korean war] is to defend [freedom].	The reason we are in [competition] is to defend [the security of the organization].

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[53] Please note that because the items where not published in the original article by Hill (1953), this indirect citation is used.

Table C1. *(continued).*

Measurement of lax control mechanism: original scale: Reward Context Scale (Mitchell et al., 1996, p. 448)	
Original item	**Modified item**
There is poor or infrequent monitoring of what people do.	There is poor or infrequent monitoring of what people do.
No one checks up on anyone else.	No one checks up on anyone else.
Organizational punishments don't exist for [violation].	Organizational punishments don't exist for [corruption].
Organizational punishments are never used for [violation]	Organizational punishments are never used for [corruption]
Superiors look the other way when this happens.	Superiors look the other way when this happens.
Superiors may on occasion encourage [violation].	Superiors may on occasion encourage [corruption].
The culture emphasizes the bottom line no matter what.	The culture emphasizes the bottom line no matter what.

Note. […] = marked the modifications of the items to bring them more in the context of corruption, [] = there was no word entered in this space

Appendix D

This appendix covers all pre-studies for the stimulus material of the Study 3. The aim of these pre-studies was to receive similarly rated surnames for all employees roles within the experiments, to assemble six pictures and value statements for the manipulation of an ethical and a corrupt organizational culture, to develop a discussion tree for participants' communication in the experiments, and finally to check the manipulation.

D.1. Pre-study 1 (November, 2011) & Pre-study 2 (December, 2011)

Both pre-studies aimed to get surnames for four characters in the experiment and nine pictures for the manipulation of three organizational cultures (ethical, corrupt, and control group). The neutral organizational culture manipulation in these pre-studies was used to analyze if both organizational cultures differ from a control group. The control group was only used in the pre-studies. In Pre-Study 1, 75 participants (77.3 % women, 52.4 % students, mean age 23.24 years (SD = 5.0)) rated randomly presented German surnames and pictures. All participants indicated their associated emotions for eleven surnames[54] on a five-point Likert scale ranged from (1) 'positive' to (5) 'negative' as well as the surname popularity on a five-point Likert scale ranged from (1) 'surname is very popular' to (5) 'surname is seldom'. In addition, participants indicated their associations for 13 pictures between two poles on a five-point Likert scale (ethical organizational culture vs. corrupt organizational culture, see below). Since Pre-Study 1 only provided two final pictures for each the ethical and corrupt culture and three final ones for the control group, Pre-study 2 aimed to get the additional two pictures, one for the corrupt and one for the ethical organizational culture. In Pre-Study 2, 61 participants (77 % women, 86.9 % students, mean age 23.80 years (SD = 7.23)) rated five randomly presented pictures about the same associations as in Pre-Study 1 (see below). The web-based surveys were conducted via Unipark. For analysis, two psychologists compared the means of the surnames and pictures on different analysis conditions to choose the appropriate stimulus material.

Surnames. The first aim was to get four positive as well as popular surnames for the characters in the experiment: participants' employee role, simulated colleague, superior, and corruption donor. The surnames should reduce negative associations based on the surnames which could bias the behavior in the experiments. Thus, a negative surname was assumed to reduce participants' (1) identification with their employee role, (2) openness to discuss with their colleague whether to accept the corrupt offer (3) commitment to their superior or (4)

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[54] The analyzed surnames were: Arndt, Berger, Fischer, Lentz, Mahler, Müller, Schneider, Schulz, Roth, Wagner, and Weber. These surnames were the result of a brainstorming by different psychologists.

acceptance of the corrupt offer since they might not trust the donor. The four surnames with the most similar emotional associations[55] (range: 2.38 - 2.69, with (1) 'positive' to (5) 'negative') and similar popularity (range: 1.89 - 2.25) were used in the experiments: *Wagner, Fischer, Weber*, and *Müller*. These names did not differ in their emotional associations (χ^2 (16,95) = 20.62, p = .19). Wagner and Fischer received more similar ratings, therefore the employee was named Wagner and the simulated colleague was called Fischer. The superior's name was Mr. Weber and the most positive and popular surname, Mr. Müller, was chosen for the donor.

Pictures. The second aim was to assemble nine pictures that cover associations in line with the particular organizational cultures (three pictures for each organizational culture). Chosen pictures fulfilled two criteria, first an associative homogeneity with pictures of the same organizational culture, and second an associative heterogeneity with pictures between the different organizational cultures (p < .001). The association measures covered several environmental conditions of a corrupt organizational culture (see Figure D1), taken from the managers and employees' perspective of a corrupt organizational culture of Study 1. The perception of a competition war was illustrated via the perception on aggression, the claim "we fight against other", the perception that humans are evil, and the perceived danger. The perception of a competition war also ought to entail the need for security which was assumed to be central for corrupt organizations (see results of Study 1). Associations with the main condition in corrupt organizational cultures that 'the end justifies the means' tried to indicate via the focus on the outcome orientation in 'results are important', strive to success in 'goals are important' and finally in 'special norms for our group' (see results of Study 1, see Table B1 for code description). Pictures in the corrupt organizational culture were supposed to refer to associations such as 'aggressive', 'goal is important', 'humans are bad', 'results are more important than the process, 'we fight against the others', and 'special group norms for our group' to cover some of the characteristics of Study 1. Pictures in the ethical organizational culture should emphasize sustainability, fairness, responsibility, honesty, and process orientation (Ardichvili et al., 2009; Craft, 2013; Treviño et al., 2001; Sweeney et al., 2010), and should refer to associations such as 'defensive', 'the importance of the process to perceive the goal', 'humans are good', 'the process to attain a result is more important than the results', 'we work together with the others', and 'all groups share the same group norms', respectively. Pictures of the control group referred to none extreme values.

[55] Participants had to rate every surname on one scale with the two poles: positive and negative.

Figure D1. Picture Associations.

Note. Figure D1 illustrates participants' picture associations for the different organizational cultures. The figure covers participants' mean evaluations of all used pictures in one organizational culture for Pre-Study 1 and the mean for the picture in Pre-Study 2. Each dimension is represented by the pole for corrupt organizational culture on the axes. The poles of the dimensions are (read clockwise from the top): 'humans are bad' vs. 'humans are good'; 'results are more important than the process' vs. 'the process to attain a result is more important than the results'; 'we fight against the others' vs. 'we work together with the others'; 'special group norms for our group' vs. 'all groups share the same group norms'; 'negative' vs. 'positive'; 'dangerous' vs. 'peacefully'; 'aggressive' vs. 'defensive'; 'the goal is important' vs. 'the process to perceive the goal is important'.

Results. Seven pictures of Pre-Study 1 were used, two for each the corrupt and ethical organizational culture and two pictures of Pre-Study 2 were used in Study 3. The pictures in the corrupt organizational culture cover a war situation, a sport situation, and a parking offender.[56] According to the ratings, these pictures cover team spirit, need for security, the drive to win and to change shared rules for one's personal benefit (i.e., values and norms of a corrupt organizational culture, see Study 1). The pictures of the ethical organizational culture cover a stone bridge over water, a monk, and a jogger.[57] According to the ratings, these pictures cover an ethical and pure spirit; focus on the process, not the results, and to be fair. The pictures of the control group - which were only used in the pre-studies - cover a light

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[56] All pictures were taken from Wikimedia commons and are in the public domain.
[57] All pictures were taken from Wikimedia commons and are in the public domain.

bulb, a stool, and a carabineer clasp[58]. According to the ratings, these pictures were neutral (see Figure D2).


Figure D2. Picture and Value Statement Combinations for the Manipulation of Organizational Culture and the Control Group.

D.2. Pre-study 3 (December, 2011)

This pre-study aimed to test if the manipulation of organizational culture (ethical and corrupt) differs from the control group in terms of a corrupt vs. ethical organizational culture. 85 participants (74.1 % women, 61.2 % students, with a mean age of 27.72 years ($SD = 10.61$)) were randomly sorted into one out of three organizational cultures: either ethical organizational culture ($n = 16$), corrupt organizational culture ($n = 47$), or control group ($n = 22$)[59]. In each organizational culture, participants faced three randomized combinations of both a picture and a value statement (each for a duration of 12 seconds), and read a letter of a fictitious superior (see method section Study 3).[60] On the contrary, to the method of Study 2, participants of this pre-study did not receive any information about possible points and there

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[58] All pictures were taken of the picture data base IAPS.
[59] Since participants were sorted into the organizational cultures depending on their month of birth, there were no equal sized sub-samples.
[60] Compared to the letters in the manipulated conditions, the control group did not received any information about a competition, nor about what was considered a good decision.

was a control group in this pre-study. The used pictures were taken from Pre-Studies 1 and 2. The value statements consisted of German sayings that were rated by six PhD-candidates (industrial psychology) about their fit into the particular organizational culture. This was the manipulation that was also used in the Study 3 for both the ethical and corrupt organizational culture. After the manipulation participants had to answer general questions (i.e., how well fit value statements and pictures, how authentic was the letter of the superior, whether they wanted to commend on the pictures or the letter) to adjust particular aspects of the manipulation. Afterwards, participants had to rate their organizational culture in terms of perceived ethical climate and moral, goal commitment, perceived competition, and goal orientation. Finally participants had to indicate how likely they assumed that employees of the particular organization might become corrupt.

Manipulation check material.

- Participants indicated that they found it rather difficult to imagine to work for the organization ($M = 2.23$, $SD = .94$; with (1) 'very difficult' to (5) 'very easy') these assumptions did not differ between the organizational cultures (ethical organizational culture: $M = 2.71$, $SD = .99$; corrupt organizational culture: $M = 2.09$, $SD = .87$; control group: $M = 2.17$, $SD = .99$; ANOVA: $F(2,75) = 2.78$, $p = .07$).

- Participants found the letter of the superior authentically to some extent ($M = 2.63$, $SD = 1.22$; with (1) 'not authentically at all' (5) 'total authentically') these assumptions were similar between the groups (ethical organizational culture: $M = 2.88$, $SD = 1.32$; corrupt organizational culture: $M = 2.53$, $SD = 1.12$; control group: $M = 2.61$, $SD = 1.38$; $F(2,75) = 0.49$, $p = .61$).

- Participants' perception of how well pictures and value statements fit together differed between the organizational cultures: participants perceived the best fit between picture and value statements in the control group ($M = 4.61$, $SD = 1.04$; with (1) 'very good' to (6) 'unsatisfactory' = German school grades) while the fit for pictures and statements was perceived similarly for the ethical organizational culture ($M = 3.06$, $SD = 1.30$) and the corrupt organizational culture ($M = 3.07$, $SD = 1.14$; $F(2,75) = 12.39$, $p > .001$). 60 participants of the sample did not answer the last question (= 43.5 %).

Different perception of organizational culture. Participants' perceptions of four different aspects of organizational culture got measured: (1) climate and moral, (2) competition, (3) goal commitment, and (4) goal orientation. (1) Joshi et al. (2007) referred to employees' trust in their organization as one key variable for the efficiency of a code of ethics. Therefore, participants' perception of climate and moral within their organization was

measured to analyze whether the organizational cultures differ in this part. Participants' perception of organizational climate and moral was measured with the five item sub-scale Climate and Morale of the Organizational Culture Survey (Glaser, Zamanou, & Hacker, 1987). A sample item is: "This organization treats people in a consistent and fair manner." The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'to a very minor extent' to (5) 'to a very great extent'. Cronbach's alpha was .85.

(2) Since Study 1 indicates that participants in corrupt organizational cultures seem to face a competition war, the perception of competition was measured to analyze if the organizational cultures differ according to participants' perceived competition. Participants' perception of competition was measured with the four-item scale of Competitiveness by Wagner (1995). A sample item is "Doing your best is not enough; it is important to win." The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'strongly disagree' to (5) 'strongly agree'. Cronbach's alpha was .88.

(3) Goal commitment was used to figure out if participants differ in their commitment to the goals only depending on the pictures, value statements and the letter of the superior. Participants' goal commitment was measured with the five-item Goal commitment questionnaire by Klein, Wesson, Hollenbeck, Wright, and Deshon (1989). This measure question was if employees were more committed to corrupt goals than to non-corrupt goals because they engaged in criminal behavior (Ashforth & Anand, 2003). A sample item is: "I am strongly committed to pursuing this goal." The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'strongly disagree' to (5) 'strongly agree'. Cronbach's alpha was .80.

(4) Because corrupt and ethical organizational culture seems to differ in their approach of outcome vs. process orientation this scale aimed to measure the amount of outcome orientation. Participants' outcome orientation was measured with the six-item Goal commitment questionnaire by van Muijen et al. (1999). A sample item is: "How often is individual appraisal directly related to the attainment of goals?" The Likert scale ranged from (1) 'never' to (4) 'always', with (5) 'not specified'. The answer condition (5) 'not specified' was added to the original scale to address the needs of the participants of the control group. Cronbach's alpha was .75.

Participants differed in their perception of the four named dimensions (MANOVA $F(8,146) = 146$, $p > .001$, $\eta^2 = 32$). Participants perceived climate and moral more intensely in the ethical organizational culture and were more committed to the goals of this culture than participants of both the control group and the corrupt organizational culture. Competition was mostly perceived in the corrupt organizational culture compared to the other cultures. And

finally, participants perceived goal orientation in the control group most strongly (see Table D1, left hand side). Participants' values in goal commitment in the control group come close, what might be explained by the amount o (5) with 'not specified' what could lead to that high amount. In addition, contrasts were analyzed between the steps between corrupt organizational culture and the control group (Step 1) and between the Step 1 and the ethical organizational culture (Step 2). Results indicate that climate and moral as well as perceived competition differed between all cultures. The corrupt organizational culture and the control group were similar in how participants perceived goal commitment and goal orientation (see Table D1, right hand side). Both of these last aspects might show that participants had difficulties with the outcome orientated goal (maximum profit, no matter how) and the non-clarified goals of the control group. Participants of the corrupt organizational scored lowest in goal commitment.

Table D1.

Organizational Culture Differences as an indirect Manipulation Check.

	Organizational culture			p-values	Contrast Step 1 (p-value)	Contrast Step 2 (p-value)
Scales: means *(SD)*	Corrupt ($n = 44$)	Control group ($n = 18$)	Ethical ($n = 16$)			
Climate and morale	2.24 (.73)	3.14 (.64)	3.28 (1.00)	< .001	< .001	.01
Competitiveness	3.90 (.98)	3.25 (.80)	2.69 (.84)	< .001	.01	< .001
Goal commitment	2.97 (.87)	3.27 (.57)	3.66 (.61)	.01	.17	.02
Goal orientation	3.90 (.59)	4.09 (.64)	3.43 (.80)	< .01	.29	< .001

Note. The contrast analysis included Step 1 with the difference between corrupt organizational culture and the control group; Step 2 with the difference between Step 1 and the ethical organizational culture.

The likelihood of corruption. Participants were asked about their assumptions on how likely they assume that an employee of their presented particular organization with its values and requirements would accept a corrupt offer. Participants could indicate their perceived likelihood on a five point Likert-scale ranged between (1) 'really unlikely' to (5) 'really likely'. Participants differed in their assumptions how likely employees might become corrupt between the organizational cultures (ANOVA: $F(2, 73) = 17.23$, $p < .001$, see Figure D3). A planned linear contrast showed that employees were perceived as more likely to become corrupt in a corrupt organizational culture ($M = 4.33$; $SD = .94$) than in the control

group ($M = 3.24$; $SD = 1.03$) and in turn more likely to become corrupt in the control group than in an ethical organizational culture ($M = 2.69$; $SD = 1.25$): $t(73) = 5.41$, $p < .001$. Thus, this manipulation check indicated that the manipulation of both a corrupt and an ethical organizational culture was successful.

Although participants had trouble to imagine to work within such an organization, the indirect manipulation check indicated differences in line with the measured scales and the assumption about corruption. Since both ethical organizational culture and corrupt organizational culture differed in the perception of climate and moral and competitiveness from the control group, the manipulation was used in Study 3. Therefore, little adaptations were made to influence the organizational culture in the wanted directions and the method was used similarly in the Study 3.


Figure D3. Perceived Likeliness of Corruption within the Particular Organizational Culture.

D.3. Pre-studies 4, 5, 6, and 7 (December, 2011; January, March, June, 2012, respectively)
These four pre-studies aimed to develop a conversation tree for a canned discussion between the two colleagues in the experiments. Participants had to choose between given sentences to communicate with their colleague. The answers of the colleague were programmed a priori and participants got to see them after a different amount of time. Under the guidance of the author two master students of psychology developed and modified a conversation tree for the different experimental tasks (see Meyer, 2012; Zaus, 2013). All four pre-studies included a

total amount of 183 participants, who rated the conversation tree - among others - about its plausibility. In general, the simulated colleague answered with neutral statements. For further information about the construction and the pre-studies see Meyer (2012) and Zaus (2013; see some example sentence Table D2).

Table D2.

Example Discussion Sentences of Study 3 Task 2.

1. communication exchange; Given sentence[a]: Company W informed us that we will get ten additional credits if we decide in favor for them/ Company W informed me that they would be very glad if we decide in favor for them.

In favor of corruption

Ledger	[We should accept the offer/ We should accept the offer of company W]. I know about the quality of our work. If this isn't recognized we will take care of a just payment through adequate credits ourselves.
Loyalties	We should accept the offer. In competition we should express solidarity with our public procurement office and reap profits - no matter how.
Neutral	[We should accept the offer/ We should give company W the contract]. It is the easiest way to come by some credits.

Against corruption

We don't know enough about the companies. Therefore, we should decide based on the price and should not be governed [by such an offer / by such a statement]

2. Answer team partner: However, we lose many valuable credits, [if we refuse the offer / if we do not take company W].

In favor of corruption

Ledger	We make sure the commissioning runs smoothly. Therefore it is justified to make some additional credits for our team.
Loyalties	We should accept the offer of company W for the survival of our public procurement office in competition - less for our own profit.
Neutral	I don't see any problem to accept the offer of company W.

Against corruption

On the other hand, it isn't right to prefer company W [only because we get additional credits then].

Note. Sentences are presented depending on the type of corruption: organizational corruption/counterproductive corruption. If there is only a sentence, participants in both conditions saw the same sentence; Ledger = balancing the ledger; Loyalties = appeal to higher loyalties; Neutral = no rationalization (see Anand et al., 2005). Company W was corrupt, company S was non-corrupt.

[a] Participants had to communicate via the given sentence and could choose between a second to open the discussion. In the condition of organizational corruption this sentences covered the corrupt offer whereas in the condition of counterproductive corruption the corrupt offer was not explicitly named in the discussion.

D.4. Pre-study 8 (June - July 2012)

This pre-study aimed to analyze whether participants behavior depended on their perception that their team-partner is real. 84 participants (59.5 % women, mean age of 29.19 years ($SD =$ 11.07)) were randomly sorted into one out of two organizational cultures: ethical organizational culture ($n = 42$) and corrupt organizational culture ($n = 42$) with the same manipulation as in Study 3 for both organizational cultures, respectively. This pre-study covered a similar procedure as Study 2 (cover story, values, and picture manipulation, cover letter, assumed points etc.). Participants worked in two-person-teams and had to decide whether they accepted a corrupt offer (organizational corruption). At the end of the study participants were asked if they felt like they had communicated with a real existing partner as colleague ('yes', 'no', or 'do not know'). 83 participants answered this question. Data collection was conducted with an online survey (Unipark) and analysis was done with SPSS 17. Results indicated that participants' corruption did not depend on the participants' believe that their colleague was real (χ^2 (2, 95) = 1.89, p = .39, V = .15, see Figure D4). About half of the participants who assumed to work with a real team partner accepted the corrupt offer, about 41 % who believed to work with a simulated team partner engaged in corruption and about 75 % participants who did not know if their team partner was real engaged in corruption.


Figure D4. Participants' Corruption Depending on their Perception of their Team Partner.