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We assessed the relation of creativity and unethical behaviour by manipulating the thinking style of participants (N = 450 adults) and measuring the impact of this manipulation on the prevalence of dishonest behaviour. Participants performed one of three inducer tasks: the alternative uses task to promote divergent thinking, the remote associates task to promote convergent thinking, or a simple classification task for rule-based thinking. Before and after this manipulation, participants conducted the mind game as a straightforward measure of dishonesty. Dishonest behaviour increased from before to after the intervention, but we found no credible evidence that this increase differed between induced mindsets. Exploratory analyses did not support any relation of trait creativity and dishonesty either. We conclude that the influence of creative thinking on unethical behaviour seems to be more ambiguous than assumed in earlier research or might be restricted to specific populations or contexts.
Just do it! Guilt as a moral intuition to cooperate - A parallel constraint satisfaction approach
(2011)
After a long dominance of rational models of judgment and decision-making in moral psychology (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969) there is now a strong interest in how intuitions and emotions influence moral judgments and decisions (e.g. Greene, 2007; Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). In the literature, the influence of emotions on moral decisions is explained by heuristic or non-compensatory information processing (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010; Sunstein, 2005; Tobler, Kalis, & Kalenscher, 2008). However, the process of emotion elicitation is ignored. Appraisal theories postulate that emotion elicitation is due to the incoherence (or discrepancy) of behavioral representations like goals and actions (Moors, 2009). Emotion elicitation and intuitive decision-making can be combined if both processes apply a connectionist information processing structure (e.g. Barnes & Thagard, 1996). The current work contrasts both perspectives of intuitive-emotional decision-making with respect to guilt and cooperation.