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In an Arrow-Debreu world of unrestricted access to perfect and competitive financial markets, there is no need for accounting information about the financial situation of a firm. Because information is costless, share- and stakeholders are then indifferent in deposits and securities (e.g., Holthausen & Watts 2001; Freixas & Rochet 2008). How-ever, several reasons exist indicating a rejection of the assumptions for an Arrow-Debreu world, hence there is no perfect costless information. Moreover, the distribu-tion of information is asymmetric, causing follow-through multi-level agency prob-lems, which are the main reasoning for the variety of financial and non-financial ac-counting standards, regulatory and advisory entities and the auditing and rating agency profession. Likewise, these agency problems have been at the heart of the accounting literature and raised the question of whether and how accounting information can help resolve these problems. ...
The present dissertation analyzes whether bank debt lending influences certain managerial decisions of borrowers, and if so, how. More precisely, the thesis investigates the influence of bank debt lending on the cost of debt and capital structure of firms, and on the accounting behavior of borrowers prior to borrowing new bank debt. The major aim of the dissertation is to deliver empirical evidence that central managerial decisions of companies are not only made by managers and equity owners but also driven by important debt investors. The objects of discussion are German small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). These firms are particularly suitable for this analysis, as they commonly have high bank debt proportions.
The dissertation comprises three separate empirical analyses, which investigate selected aspects in the above mentioned context. Section 3.1 inspects the impact of the Basel II Capital Accord and the financial crisis on the cost of debt of German SMEs. Basel II formalized the credit assessment of debtors. This might have led to higher costs and a higher risk awareness of banks. Banks might have tried to refinance those additional costs by imposing tighter credit terms on debtors. Especially SMEs might face a higher cost of debt, as they tend to have comparably high proportions of bank debt, low equity ratios, and consecutively lower ratings than big companies. The results presented in Section 3.1 indicate a significant rise of the cost of debt since 2007. Unfortunately, the amendment of Basel II was followed by the financial crisis. It is difficult to separate the effect of the reform and the one of the crisis on the costs of debt capital of German SMEs. The presented analysis controls for several possible interdependencies be-tween credit costs, credit shortage and the insolvency risk of companies. However, none of the analyzed facts indicates a significant change in the extent of bank credit granting to SMEs during the financial crisis that would justify higher costs of debt capital. The results might point out that banks made use of the special situation of the financial crisis and raised credit standards for SME loans.
Section 3.2 examines whether bank debt financing drives certain accounting choices of Ger-man SMEs. At least since Basel II, banks have to base their credit assessments on objective, quantitative ratings, which commonly rely on financial statement data. As loan interest rates account for a significant proportion of the cost of capital of SMEs, their incentive to optimize loan conditions is obvious. Under the assumption that SMEs are aware of the importance of financial statements data in credit assessments, they might have an incentive to direct their financial statements at banks. More precisely, SMEs might strive to exploit their asymmetric information advantage over banks by manipulating earnings with the intention to achieve decent credit terms. The results presented in Section 3.2 show that SMEs have significantly higher total accruals in the period prior to borrowing new bank debt than in other periods. Moreover, a higher bank debt proportion is accompanied by higher total accruals. Hence, particularly bank-dependent firms seem to alter their accounting behavior prior to the important corporate financing event of bor-rowing new bank debt. Finally, the study investigates whether earnings manipulation is detected by banks or whether it is effective and influences the cost of debt of German SMEs. Empirical results in Section 3.2 indicate that SMEs, which report positive discretionary accruals are re-warded in terms of a lower cost of debt. This might imply that banks do not see through earnings manipulation.
Section 3.3 contains results of a comprehensive survey of German SMEs, which intends to further analyze the research questions posed in Section 3.1 and 3.2. First, the survey aims to verify or falsify the results concerning the impact of Basel II on the cost of debt and the re-quirements to obtain a loan for SMEs since 2007. A large proportion of survey respondents complained about a higher effort needed to obtain a new bank loan since 2007. Moreover, for the majority of survey participants both the collateral demanded by banks and the strictness of covenants increased since Basel II. In addition, almost half of surveyed SMEs experience higher costs of bank debt since the amendment of the reform. The second part of the survey aims to investigate whether SMEs apply measures of earnings manipulation in the period prior to bor-rowing new bank debt. The majority of SMEs admit that they would use both certain means of real activities and accrual manipulation in order to achieve decent credit terms in the subsequent debt contract negotiation.
Taking these empirical results into consideration, the dissertation shows that certain manage-rial decisions of German SMEs are influenced by debt holders. Results in Sections 3.1 and 3.3 indicate that SME bank lending was affected by Basel II and the financial crisis. The cost of debt of German SMEs is significantly higher since Basel II, even after controlling for potential influences of the financial crisis. These higher costs of debt might have additional side effects on further corporate financing and/or investment decisions. Furthermore, results in Sections 3.2 and 3.3 indicate that bank debt lending influences accounting choices of German SMEs, particu-larly in the period before borrowing new bank debt. SME use both means of real activities and accrual management in order to achieve decent credit terms. This change of accounting behavior might be accompanied by effort, additional effects on other corporate contracts, and notable economic costs.
The present dissertation includes three research papers dealing with the following banking topics: (dis-) incentives and risk taking, earnings management and the regulation of supervisory boards.
„Do cooperative banks suffer from moral hazard behaviour? Evidence in the context of efficiency and risk“:
We use Granger-causality techniques to evaluate the intertemporal relationships among risk, efficiency and capital. We use two different measures of bank efficiency, i.e., cost and profit efficiency, since these measures reflect different managerial abilities. One is the ability to manage costs, and the other is the ability to maximize profits. We find that lower cost and profit efficiency Granger-cause increases in liquidity risk. We also identify that credit risk negatively Granger-causes cost and profit efficiency. Most importantly, our results show a positive relationship between capital and credit risk, thus displaying that moral hazard (due to limited liability and deposit insurance) does not apply to our sample of cooperative banks. On the contrary, we find evidence that banks with low capital are able to improve their loan quality in subsequent periods. These findings may be important to regulators, who should consider banks’ business models when introducing new regulatory capital constraints.
„Earnings Management Modelling in the Banking Industry – Evaluating valuable approaches“:
Accounting research has separately studied the field of Earnings Management (EM) for non-financial and financial industries. Since EM cannot be observed directly, it is important for every research question in any setting to find a verifiable proxy for EM. However, we still lack a thorough understanding of what regressors can add value to the estimation process of EM in banks. This study tries to close this gap and analyses existing model specifications of discretionary loan loss provisions (LLP) in the banking sector to identify common pattern groups and specific patterns used. Thereupon, we use an US-dataset from 2005-2015 and apply prevalent test procedures to examine the extent of measurement errors, extreme performance and omitted-variable biases and predictive power of the discretionary proxies of each of the models. Our results indicate that a thorough understanding about the methodological modelling process of EM in the banking industry is important. The currently established models to estimate EM are appropriate yet optimizable. In particular, we identify non-performing asset patterns as the most important group, while loan loss allowances and net charge offs can add some value, though do not seem to be indispensable. In addition, our results show that non-linearity of certain regressors can be an issue, which should be addressed in future research, while we identify some omitted and possibly correlated variables that might add value to specifications in identifying non-discretionary LLP. Results also indicate that a dynamic model and endogeneity robust estimation approach is not necessarily linked to better prediction power.
„Board Regulation and its Impact on Composition and Effects – Evidence from German Cooperative Bank“:
This study employs a system GMM framework to examine the impact of potential regulatory intervention regarding the occupations of supervisory board members in cooperative banks. To achieve insights the study proceeds in two different ways. First, the author investigates the changes in board structure prior and following to the German Act to Strengthen Financial Market and Insurance Supervision (FinVAG). Second, the author estimates the influence of Ph.D. degree holders and occupational concentration on bank-risk changes in consideration of the implementation of FinVAG. Therefore, the sample consists of 246 German cooperative banks from 2006-2011. Regarding bank-risk the author applies four different measures: credit-, equity-, liquidity-risk and the Z-Score, with the former three also being addressed in FinVAG. Results indicate that the implementation of FinVAG results in structural changes in board composition, especially at the expense of farmers. In addition, the implementation affects all risk-measures and relations between risk-measures and supervisory board characteristics in a risk-reducing and therefore intended way.
To disentangle the complex relationship between board characteristics and risk measures the study utilizes a two-step system GMM estimator to account for unobserved heterogeneity, and simultaneity in order to reduce endogeneity problems. The findings may be especially relevant for stakeholders, regulators, supervisors and managers.
The dissertation at hand focuses on the enforcement of accounting standards in Germany. The legal basis of the external enforcement of accounting standards in Germany was created by the „Bilanzkontrollgesetz” (Financial Reporting Enforcement Act) at the end of 2004. An enforcement mechanism was installed to enforce accounting standard compliance by regular reviews of disclosed financial statements. The system was established as implementation of EU guidelines. Since 2005, International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) shall be applied for consolidated financial statement of firms listed on a regulated market segment within the European Union (EU) (Regulation EC No. 1606/2002). Simultaneously to the harmonization of accounting standards, the EU fostered the standardization of enforcement systems to ensure compliance with international accounting standards. Par. 16 of the so-called “IAS Regulation” mandates the “Committee of European Securities Regulators” (CESR) to “develop a common approach to enforcement". Germany’s unique two-tiered system operates since July 2005; it involves the “Deutsche Pruefstelle fuer Rechnungslegung” (Financial Reporting Enforcement Panel), a newly established private organization primarily assigned to conduct the reviews. As the second tier, the „Bundesanstalt fuer Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht” (Federal Financial Supervisory Authority) has the sovereign authority to order the publication of errors („error announcements“) and if necessary, to force the cooperation of firms in the review process.
The dissertation is structured as follows. A general introduction focuses on the theoretical background and the reasoning for the need of external enforcement mechanisms. The common approach to enforcement in the European Union is described. Building on this, the thesis consists of three individual essays that analyze three specific questions in the context of the enforcement of financial reporting standards in Germany.
The first paper focuses on the systematical evaluation of the information contained in 100 selected error announcements (from a total population of 151 evaluable announcements). The study finds that error announcements on average contain 3.64 single errors and 77% affect the reported profit. Relatively small as well as big, highly levered and rather unprofitable firms are overrepresented in the sample of misstatement firms. In a second step, the essay investigates the development of censured firms over time; the pre- and post-misstatement development of the firms in terms of balance sheet data, financial ratios and (real) earnings management are tracked. The analysis detects increasing leverage ratios and a decline in profitability over time. In the year of misstatement firms report large total and discretionary accruals, indicating earnings management. Compared to matched control firms, significant differences in profitability, market valuation, earnings management and real activities manipulations are observable. A major contribution of this first study is the examination of trends in financial data and (real) earnings management over a number of years surrounding misstatements as well as the elaboration of the distinction to non-misstating firms. The results show the meaning of the enforcement of IFRS for the quality of financial reporting to standard setters, policy makers, and investors in Germany.
The second paper examines the interrelation of enforcement releases, firm characteristics and earnings quality. Prior literature documents the correlation between underperformance in financial ratios and the probability of erroneous disclosure of financial statements; this study provides evidence for differences in characteristics between firms with enforcement releases and control firms as well as a broad sample of German publicly traded firms (4,730 firm-year observations). Furthermore, research affirms the connection of financial ratios to earnings quality metrics. The accuracy of financial information is considered to be correlated with its quality and therefore the differences in earnings quality between various sub-samples is examined. Overall, the results document the underperformance in important financial ratios as well as indicate an inferior earnings quality of firms subject to enforcement releases vis-a-vis the control groups. These results hold with regard to both different earnings quality specifications and different periods observed. This study appends the earnings quality discussion and contributes to develop a comprehensive picture of accounting quality for the unique institutional settings of Germany. The paper shows that a conjoint two-tier public and private enforcement system is effective and might be an adequate model for other countries. Implications for the regulation of corporate governance, the enforcement panel and the auditor are identified.
The third essay additionally considers the role of the auditor. The firms subject to error announcements are used to evaluate the consequences of increasing earnings management over time on enforcement releases and their recognition in audit fees. Prior literature provides evidence on a phenomenon called „balance sheet bloat” that is due to income increasing earnings management and later influences the disclosure of misstated financial statements. The evidence of earnings management recognition in audit fees and findings on the content of future information in audit fees leads to the hypothesis that auditors recognize increasing audit risk in fees before the enforcement process starts. The study extends related earnings management and audit fee literature by modeling the development of earnings management within the misstatement firms and systematically link it to auditor reactions. Significant predictive power of different commonly used accrual measures for enforcement releases in the period prior and up to the misstatement period are found by the study. In the same period of time an increase in audit fees, e.g. the recognition of increased audit risk, can be observed. A possible audit fee effect after the misstatement period is investigated, but no significant relation is obtained.
The dissertation closes with a summary of the main findings, a conclusion to the connection of the three essays as well as subsumption of findings in the accounting literature.