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In dieser Dissertation untersuchten wir die neuronalen Korrelate des Training-Effektes einer auditorischen P300 Gehirn-Computer Schnittstelle mittels fMRI Analyse in einem prä-post Design mit zehn gesunden Testpersonen. Wir wiesen in drei Trainings-sitzungen einen Trainingseffekt in der EEG-Analyse der P300 Welle nach und fanden entsprechende Kontraste in einer prä-post Analyse von fMRI Daten, wobei in allen fünf Sitzungen das gleiche Paradigma verwendet wurde. In der fMRI Analyse fanden wir fol-gende Ergebnisse: in einem Target-/ Nichttarget Kontrast zeigte sich verstärkte Aktivie-rung in Generatorregionen der P300 Welle (temporale und inferiore frontale Regionen) und interessanterweise auch in motorassoziierten Arealen, was höhere kognitiver Pro-zesse wie Aufmerksamkeitslenkung und Arbeitsspeicher widerspiegeln könnte. Der Kon-trast des Trainingseffektes zeigte nach dem Training einen stärkeren Rebound Effekt im Sinne einer verstärkten Aktivierung in Generatorregionen der P300 Welle, was eine ver-besserte Erkennung und Prozessierung von Target-Stimuli reflektieren könnte. Eine Ab-nahme von Aktivierung in frontalen Arealen in diesem Kontrast könnte durch effizientere Abläufe kognitiver Prozesse und des Arbeitsgedächtnis erklärt werden.
Gambling is a popular activity in Germany, with 40% of a representative sample reporting having gambled at least once in the past year (Bundeszentrale für gesundheitliche Aufklärung, 2014). While the majority of gamblers show harmless gambling behavior, a subset develops serious problems due to their gambling, affecting their psychological well-being, social life and work. According to recent estimates, up to 0.8% of the German population are affected by such pathological gambling. People in general and pathological gamblers in particular show several cognitive distortions, that is, misconceptions about the chances of winning and skill involvement, in gambling. The current work aimed at elucidating the biopsychological basis of two such kinds of cognitive distortions, the illusion of control and the gambler’s and hot hand fallacies, and their modulation by gambling problems. Therefore, four studies were conducted assessing the processing of near outcomes (used as a proxy for the illusion of control) and outcome sequences (used as a proxy for the gambler’s and hot hand fallacies) in samples of varying degrees of gambling problems, using a multimethod approach.
The first study analyzed the processing and evaluation of near outcomes as well as choice behavior in a wheel of fortune paradigm using electroencephalography (EEG). To assess the influence of gambling problems, a group of problem gamblers was compared to a group of controls. The results showed that there were no differences in the processing of near outcomes between the two groups. Near compared to full outcomes elicited smaller P300 amplitudes. Furthermore, at a trend level, the choice behavior of participants showed signs of a pattern opposite to the gambler’s fallacy, with longer runs of an outcome color leading to increased probabilities of choosing this color again on the subsequent trial. Finally, problem gamblers showed smaller feedback-related negativity (FRN) amplitudes relative to controls.
The second study also targeted the processing of near outcomes in a wheel of fortune paradigm, this time using functional magnetic resonance imaging and a group of participants with varying degrees of gambling problems. The results showed increased activity in the bilateral superior parietal cortex following near compared to full outcomes.
The third study examined the peripheral physiology reactions to near outcomes in the wheel of fortune. Heart period and skin conductance were measured while participants with varying degrees of gambling problems played on the wheel of fortune. Near compared to full outcomes led to increased heart period duration shortly after the outcome. Furthermore, heart period reactions and skin conductance responses (SCRs) were modulated by gambling problems. Participants with high relative to low levels of gambling problems showed increased SCRs to near outcomes and similar heart period reactions to near outcomes and full wins.
The fourth study analyzed choice behavior and sequence effects in the processing of outcomes in a coin toss paradigm using EEG in a group of problem gamblers and controls. Again, problem gamblers showed generally smaller FRN amplitudes compared to controls. There were no differences between groups in the processing of outcome sequences. The break of an outcome streak led to increased power in the theta frequency band. Furthermore, the P300 amplitude was increased after a sequence of previous wins. Finally, problem gamblers compared to controls showed a trend of switching the outcome symbol relative to the previous outcome symbol more often.
In sum, the results point towards differences in the processing of near compared to full outcomes in brain areas and measures implicated in attentional and salience processes. The processing of outcome sequences involves processes of salience attribution and violation of expectations. Furthermore, problem gamblers seem to process near outcomes as more win-like compared to controls. The results and their implications for problem gambling as well as further possible lines of research are discussed.
Biased cognitive processes are very likely involved in the maintenance of fears and anxiety. One of such cognitive processes is the perceived relationship between fear-relevant stimuli and aversive consequences. If this relationship is perceived although objective contingencies have been random, it is called an (a posteriori) illusory correlation. If this relationship is overestimated before objective contingencies are experienced, it is called an (a priori) expectancy bias. Previous investigations showed that fear-relevant illusory correlations exist, but very few is known about how and why this cognitive bias develops. In the present dissertation thesis, a model is proposed based on a review of the literature on fear-relevant illusory correlations. This model describes how psychological factors might have an influence on fear and illusory correlations. Several critical implications of the model were tested in four experiments.
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that people do not only overestimate the proportion of aversive consequences (startle sounds) following emotionally negative stimuli (pictures of mutilations) relative to neutral stimuli (pictures of household objects), but also following highly arousing positive stimuli (pictures of erotic scenes), because arousal might be an important determinant of illusory correlations. The result was a significant expectancy bias for negative stimuli and a much smaller expectancy bias for positive stimuli. Unexpectedly, expectancy bias was restricted to women. An a posteriori illusory correlation was not found overall, but only in those participants who perceived the aversive consequences following negative stimuli as particularly aversive.
Experiment 2 tested the same hypothesis as experiment 1 using a paradigm that evoked distinct basic emotions (pictures inducing fear, anger, disgust or happiness). Only negative emotions resulted in illusory correlations with aversive outcomes (startle sounds), especially the emotions of fear and disgust. As in experiment 1, the extent of these illusory correlations was correlated with the perceived aversiveness of aversive outcomes. Moreover, only women overestimated the proportion of aversive outcomes during pictures that evoked fear, anger or disgust.
Experiment 3 used functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) to measure biased brain activity in female spider phobics during an illusory correlation paradigm. Both spider phobics and healthy controls expected more aversive outcomes (painful electrical shocks) following pictures of spiders than following neutral control stimuli (pictures of mushrooms). Spider phobics but not healthy controls overestimated the proportion of aversive outcomes following pictures of spiders in a trial-by-trial memory task. This a posteriori illusory correlation was correlated with enhanced shock aversiveness and activity in primary sensory-motor cortex in phobic participants. Moreover, spider phobics’ brain activity in the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was elevated in response to spider images. This activity also predicted the extent of the illusory correlation, which supports the theory that executive and attentional resources play an important role in the maintenance of illusory correlations.
Experiment 4 tested the hypothesis that the enhanced aversiveness of some outcomes would be sufficient to causally induce an illusory correlation. Neutral images (colored geometric figures) were paired with differently aversive outcomes (three startle sounds varying in intensity). Participants developed an illusory correlation between those images, which predicted the most aversive sound and this sound, which means that this association was overestimated relative to the other associations. The extent of the illusory correlation was positively correlated with participants’ self-reported anxiety. The results imply that the previously found relationship between illusory correlations and outcome aversiveness might reflect a causal impact of outcome aversiveness or salience on illusory correlations.
In sum, the conducted experiments indicate that illusory correlations between fear-relevant stimuli and aversive consequences might persist – among other factors - because of an enhanced aversiveness or salience of aversive consequences following feared stimuli. This assumption is based on correlational findings, a neural measure of outcome perception and a causal influence of outcome aversiveness on illusory correlations. Implications of these findings were integrated into a model of fear-relevant illusory correlations and potential implications are discussed. Future investigations should further elucidate the role of executive functions and gender effects. Moreover, the trial-by-trial assessment of illusory correlations is recommended to increase reliability of the concept. From a clinical perspective, the down-regulation of aversive experiences and the allocation of attention to non-aversive experiences might help to cure anxiety and cognitive bias.