@book{OPUS4-28950,
  title     = {Climate Changes Global Perspectives},
  editor    = {Pfeifer, Lena and Klingler, Molina and Nelson-Teutsch, Hannah},
  publisher = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  address   = {W{\"u}rzburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-95826-194-5},
  issn      = {2939-9912},
  doi       = {10.25972/WUP-978-3-95826-195-2},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-289501},
  publisher      = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  pages     = {195},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {Climate Changes Global Perspectives brings together creative approaches to representing environmental crises in a globalized world, which originated in an eponymous symposium hosted virtually by the University of W{\"u}rzburg in August of 2021. This volume, and the unruly texts that claim space here, are written not only to question and challenge standardized patterns of representation, but also to contribute to undisciplining the genres and practices of traditional academic writing by exploring alternative representational form(at)s. Climate Changes Global Perspectives is the first publication in the Challenges of Modernity series, which seeks to collect and make available projects of engaged scholarship in the humanities.},
  subject      = {Environment},
  language  = {mul}
}
@book{Glasgow2018,
  author    = {Glasgow, Rupert},
  title     = {Minimal Selfhood and the Origins of Consciousness},
  edition   = {1. Auflage},
  publisher = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  address   = {W{\"u}rzburg},
  isbn      = {978-3-95826-078-8 (Print)},
  doi       = {10.25972/WUP-978-3-95826-079-5},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-157470},
  publisher      = {W{\"u}rzburg University Press},
  pages     = {260},
  year      = {2018},
  abstract  = {The aim of the book is to ground the logical origins of consciousness in what I have previously called the 'minimal self'. The idea is that elementary forms of consciousness are logically dependent not, as is commonly assumed, on ownership of an anatomical brain or nervous system, but on the intrinsic reflexivity that defines minimal selfhood. The book seeks to trace the logical pathway by which minimal selfhood gives rise to the possible appearance of consciousness. It is argued that in specific circumstances it thus makes sense to ascribe elementary consciousness to certain predatory single-celled organisms such as amoebae and dinoflagellates as well as to some of the simpler animals. Such an argument involves establishing exactly what those specific circumstances are and determining how elementary consciousness differs in nature and scope from its more complex manifestations.},
  subject      = {Selbst},
  language  = {en}
}