@article{RoemeisHerwegMueller2022,
  author    = {R{\"o}meis, Fabio and Herweg, Fabian and M{\"u}ller, Daniel},
  title     = {Salience bias and overwork},
  series = {Games},
  volume    = {13},
  journal   = {Games},
  number    = {1},
  issn      = {2073-4336},
  doi       = {10.3390/g13010015},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-255213},
  year      = {2022},
  abstract  = {In this study, we enrich a standard principal-agent model with hidden action by introducing salience-biased perception on the agent's side. The agent's misguided focus on salient payoffs, which leads the agent's and the principal's probability assessments to diverge, has two effects: First, the agent focuses too much on obtaining a bonus, which facilitates incentive provision. Second, the principal may exploit the diverging probability assessments to relax participation. We show that salience bias can reverse the nature of the inefficiency arising from moral hazard; i.e., the principal does not necessarily provide insufficient incentives that result in inefficiently low effort but instead may well provide excessive incentives that result in inefficiently high effort.},
  language  = {en}
}
@article{MuellerSchmitz2016,
  author    = {M{\"u}ller, Daniel and Schmitz, Patrick W.},
  title     = {Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm},
  series = {European Economic Review},
  volume    = {87},
  journal   = {European Economic Review},
  doi       = {10.1016/j.euroecorev.2016.04.013},
  url       = {http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-188042},
  pages     = {92-107},
  year      = {2016},
  abstract  = {The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.},
  language  = {en}
}