TY - THES A1 - Liesner, Marvin Paul T1 - I control it, but does it mean it is part of me? How the relationship between body movements and controlled object movements influences the sense of agency and the sense of ownership T1 - Ich kontrolliere es, aber ist es deshalb ein Teil von mir? Wie die Umsetzung von Körperbewegungen in Bewegungen von kontrollierten Objekten Sense of agency und Sense of ownership beeinflusst N2 - The “active self” approach suggests that any object we manipulate voluntarily and foreseeably becomes part of our “self” in the sense that we feel control over this object (sense of agency) and experience it as belonging to our own body (sense of ownership). While there is considerable evidence that we can indeed experience both a sense of agency and a sense of ownership over a broad variety of objects when we control these through our actions, the approach has also been criticized for exaggerating the flexibility of the human self. In this thesis, I investigate the influence that the relationship between the body movements controlling an object and the movements of the object itself has on the process of integrating an object into the self. I demonstrate that fully controlling an object is not sufficient for it to be integrated into the self since both explicit and implicit measures of the sense of agency and the sense of ownership indicate less or no integration when body movements are transformed into inverted object movements. Furthermore, I show that such inversions lead to the downregulation of sensory signals either from the body or from the controlled object in order to deal with the conflicting multisensory information when performing such actions. I argue that this downregulation is the underlying factor behind the diminished or eliminated integration of inverted body and object movements and I discuss further pathways for possible future studies building up on these findings. N2 - Der “Active Self”-Ansatz sagt aus, dass jedes Objekt, welches wir willentlich und vorhersehbar manipulieren, Teil unseres „Selbst“ wird in dem Sinne, dass wir Kontrolle über dieses Objekt empfinden (Sense of agency) und es als zu unserem eigenen Körper zugehörig erleben (Sense of ownership). Während es eine beträchtliche Menge an Evidenz dafür gibt, dass wir tatsächlich sowohl Sense of agency als auch Sense of ownership für eine breite Vielfalt an Objekten empfinden können, wenn wir diese durch unsere Handlungen kontrollieren, wurde der Ansatz auch dafür kritisiert die Flexibilität des menschlichen Selbst über zu strapazieren. In dieser Arbeit untersuche ich den Einfluss, den die Beziehung zwischen den Körperbewegungen, welche ein Objekt kontrollieren, und den Bewegungen des Objekts selbst auf den Integrationsprozess eines Objekts in das Selbst hat. Ich demonstriere, dass ein Objekt vollständig zu kontrollieren nicht ausreichend ist, damit es in das Selbst integriert wird, da sowohl explizite als auch implizite Maße für Sense of agency und Sense of ownership weniger oder keine Integration zeigen, wenn Körperbewegungen in invertierte Objektbewegungen transformiert werden. Darüber hinaus zeige ich, dass solche Invertierungen zur Herunterregulierung sensorischer Signale entweder vom Körper oder vom kontrollierten Objekt führen, um mit der konfligierenden multisensorischen Information umzugehen, wenn solche Handlungen ausgeführt werden. Ich argumentiere, dass diese Herunterregulierung der zugrundeliegende Faktor ist für die verringerte oder eliminierte Integration invertierter Körper- und Objektbewegungen und ich diskutiere weitere Richtungen für mögliche zukünftige Studien, die auf diesen Befunden aufbauen. KW - Experimentelle Psychologie KW - Kognitive Psychologie KW - Ideomotorik KW - Sense of agency KW - Sense of ownership KW - Ideomotor KW - Active self KW - Multisensory integration KW - Tactile suppression KW - Tactile gating Y1 - 2022 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-287030 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Liesner, Marvin A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Suppression of mutually incompatible proprioceptive and visual action effects in tool use JF - PLoS One N2 - Movements of a tool typically diverge from the movements of the hand manipulating that tool, such as when operating a pivotal lever where tool and hand move in opposite directions. Previous studies suggest that humans are often unaware of the position or movements of their effective body part (mostly the hand) in such situations. It has been suggested that this might be due to a "haptic neglect" of bodily sensations to decrease the interference of representations of body and tool movements. However, in principle this interference could also be decreased by neglecting sensations regarding the tool and focusing instead on body movements. While in most tool use situations the tool-related action effects are task-relevant and thus suppression of body-related rather than tool-related sensations is more beneficial for successful goal achievement, we manipulated this task-relevance in a controlled experiment. The results showed that visual, tool-related effect representations can be suppressed just as proprioceptive, body-related ones in situations where effect representations interfere, given that task-relevance of body-related effects is increased relative to tool-related ones. KW - movement KW - tool use KW - effects Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-231250 VL - 15 IS - 11 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Rodrigues, Johannes A1 - Liesner, Marvin A1 - Reutter, Mario A1 - Mussel, Patrick A1 - Hewig, Johannes T1 - It's costly punishment, not altruistic: Low midfrontal theta and state anger predict punishment JF - Psychophysiology N2 - Punishment in economic games has been interpreted as “altruistic.” However, it was shown that punishment is related to trait anger instead of trait altruism in a third‐party dictator game if compensation is also available. Here, we investigated the influence of state anger on punishment and compensation in the third‐party dictator game. Therefore, we used movie sequences for emotional priming, including the target states anger, happy, and neutral. We measured the Feedback‐Related Negativity (FRN) and midfrontal theta band activation, to investigate an electro‐cortical correlate of the processing of fair and unfair offers. Also, we assessed single‐trial FRN and midfrontal theta band activation as a predictor for punishment and compensation. We found that punishment was linked to state anger. Midfrontal theta band activation, which has previously been linked to altruistic acts and cognitive control, predicted less punishment. Additionally, trait anger led to enhanced FRN for unfair offers. This led to the interpretation that the FRN depicts the evaluation of fairness, while midfrontal theta band activation captures an aspect of cognitive control and altruistic motivation. We conclude that we need to redefine “altruistic punishment” into “costly punishment,” as no direct link of altruism and punishment is given. Additionally, midfrontal theta band activation complements the FRN and offers additional insights into complex responses and decision processes, especially as a single trial predictor.  KW - altruistic compensation KW - costly punishment KW - FRN KW - midfrontal theta activation KW - third party dictator game Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-214696 VL - 57 IS - 8 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Liesner, Marvin A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Environment-Related and Body-Related Components of the Minimal Self JF - Frontiers in Psychology N2 - Perceptual changes that an agent produces by efferent activity can become part of the agent’s minimal self. Yet, in human agents, efferent activities produce perceptual changes in various sensory modalities and in various temporal and spatial proximities. Some of these changes occur at the “biological” body, and they are to some extent conveyed by “private” sensory signals, whereas other changes occur in the environment of that biological body and are conveyed by “public” sensory signals. We discuss commonalties and differences of these signals for generating selfhood. We argue that despite considerable functional overlap of these sensory signals in generating self-experience, there are reasons to tell them apart in theorizing and empirical research about development of the self. KW - active self KW - exteroception KW - ideomotor theory KW - interoception KW - minimal self KW - self-construction KW - sense of agency KW - sense of ownership Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-250007 SN - 1664-1078 VL - 12 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Liesner, Marvin A1 - Hinz, Nina-Alisa A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - How Action Shapes Body Ownership Momentarily and Throughout the Lifespan JF - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience N2 - Objects which a human agent controls by efferent activities (such as real or virtual tools) can be perceived by the agent as belonging to his or her body. This suggests that what an agent counts as “body” is plastic, depending on what she or he controls. Yet there are possible limitations for such momentary plasticity. One of these limitations is that sensations stemming from the body (e.g., proprioception) and sensations stemming from objects outside the body (e.g., vision) are not integrated if they do not sufficiently “match”. What “matches” and what does not is conceivably determined by long–term experience with the perceptual changes that body movements typically produce. Children have accumulated less sensorimotor experience than adults have. Consequently, they express higher flexibility to integrate body-internal and body-external signals, independent of their “match” as suggested by rubber hand illusion studies. However, children’s motor performance in tool use is more affected by mismatching body-internal and body-external action effects than that of adults, possibly because of less developed means to overcome such mismatches. We review research on perception-action interactions, multisensory integration, and developmental psychology to build bridges between these research fields. By doing so, we account for the flexibility of the sense of body ownership for actively controlled events and its development through ontogeny. This gives us the opportunity to validate the suggested mechanisms for generating ownership by investigating their effects in still developing and incomplete stages in children. We suggest testable predictions for future studies investigating both body ownership and motor skills throughout the lifespan. KW - body ownership KW - attentional reweighting KW - children KW - haptic neglect KW - ideomotor theory KW - ontogeny KW - perception and action Y1 - 2021 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-241869 SN - 1662-5161 VL - 15 ER - TY - JOUR A1 - Liesner, Marvin A1 - Kirsch, Wladimir A1 - Pfister, Roland A1 - Kunde, Wilfried T1 - Spatial action-effect binding depends on type of action-effect transformation JF - Attention, Perception, & Psychophysics N2 - Spatial action–effect binding denotes the mutual attraction between the perceived position of an effector (e.g., one’s own hand) and a distal object that is controlled by this effector. Such spatial binding can be construed as an implicit measure of object ownership, thus the belonging of a controlled object to the own body. The current study investigated how different transformations of hand movements (body-internal action component) into movements of a visual object (body-external action component) affect spatial action–effect binding, and thus implicit object ownership. In brief, participants had to bring a cursor on the computer screen into a predefined target position by moving their occluded hand on a tablet and had to estimate their final hand position. In Experiment 1, we found a significantly lower drift of the proprioceptive position of the hand towards the visual object when hand movements were transformed into laterally inverted cursor movements, rather than cursor movements in the same direction. Experiment 2 showed that this reduction reflected an elimination of spatial action–effect binding in the inverted condition. The results are discussed with respect to the prerequisites for an experience of ownership over artificial, noncorporeal objects. Our results show that predictability of an object movement alone is not a sufficient condition for ownership because, depending on the type of transformation, integration of the effector and a distal object can be fully abolished even under conditions of full controllability. KW - action–effect compatibility KW - agency KW - body ownership KW - ideomotor theory KW - proprioceptive drift KW - spatial binding KW - tool use Y1 - 2020 U6 - http://nbn-resolving.de/urn/resolver.pl?urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-232781 SN - 1943-3921 VL - 82 ER -