

Würzburger
Arbeitspapiere zur
Politikwissenschaft und
Sozialforschung

Julius-Maximilians-

**UNIVERSITÄT
WÜRZBURG**

WAPS 7

Philipp Gieg/Timo Lowinger/
Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet
(eds.)

Exploring Emerging India

Eight Essays

2015

Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung

Um seine aktuellen Forschungsergebnisse verstärkt sichtbar zu machen, hat das Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Soziologie zu Jahresbeginn 2012 die Online-Schriftenreihe WAPS (Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung) ins Leben gerufen. In WAPS spiegelt sich die gesamte Bandbreite der Forschungsleistung des Instituts wider.

Neben MitarbeiterInnen des Instituts steht die Schriftenreihe auch hervorragenden Studierenden offen, die über die Veröffentlichung ihrer beachtlichen Beiträge an das wissenschaftliche Publizieren herangeführt werden.

Prof. Dr. Hermann Dülmer
(Quantitative Sozialforschung)

Prof. Dr. Andreas Göbel
(Allgemeine Soziologie)

Prof. Dr. Hans-Joachim Lauth
(Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft)

Prof. Dr. Christian Meyer
(Spezielle Soziologie)

Prof. Dr. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet
(Internationale Beziehungen)

© Julius-Maximilians-Universität Würzburg
Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Soziologie
Wittelsbacherplatz 1
97074 Würzburg
Tel.: +49 (0) 931 - 31-84863
Fax: +49 (0) 931 - 31-84890
<http://www.politikwissenschaft.uni-wuerzburg.de>
Kontakt: andreas.goebel@uni-wuerzburg.de
Alle Rechte vorbehalten.
Würzburg 2015.

Dieses Dokument wird bereitgestellt durch
den Publikationsservice der Universität
Würzburg.

Universitätsbibliothek Würzburg
Am Hubland
D-97074 Würzburg
Tel.: +49 (0) 931 - 31-85906
opus@bibliothek.uni-wuerzburg.de
<http://opus.bibliothek.uni-wuerzburg.de>

ISSN: 2193-9179

Zitation dieser Publikation:

Gieg, Philipp / Lowinger, Timo / Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisela (eds.) (2015):
Exploring Emerging India - Eight Essays. Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur
Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung, Nr. 7, 2015. Würzburg: Universität
Würzburg. URN: [urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-119973](http://nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-119973)

Bisher publizierte Bände in dieser Reihe:

Dickopf, Simon / Hassan, Mira / Künzler, Jan / Renner, Regina (2012):

Gerechtigkeitsurteile in einer unterfränkischen Großstadt vor und nach der Finanzkrise. Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung, Nr. 1, 2012. Würzburg: Universität Würzburg. URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-69396

Lauth, Hans-Joachim / Kauff, Oliver (2012):

Demokratiemessung: Der KID als aggregiertes Maß für die komparative Forschung. Empirische Befunde der Regimeentwicklung von 1996 bis 2010. Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung, Nr. 2, 2012. Würzburg: Universität Würzburg. URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-73033

Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisela (2013):

Was vom europäischen Projekt übrigbleibt... Zerfall oder Neustart? Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung, Nr. 3, 2013. Würzburg: Universität Würzburg. URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-83565

Rodrigues, Valerian (2014):

Elections and Civil Society in India. Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung, Nr. 4, 2014. Würzburg: Universität Würzburg. URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-105007

Sackmann, Rosemarie (2014):

Bürgerbeteiligung in Stadtentwicklungsprozessen - Wundermittel oder Mogelpackung? Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung, Nr. 5, 2014. Würzburg: Universität Würzburg. URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-107185

Lauth, Hans-Joachim (2015):

The matrix of democracy: a three-dimensional approach to measuring the quality of democracy and regime transformations. Würzburger Arbeitspapiere zur Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung, Nr. 6, 2015. Würzburg: Universität Würzburg. URN: urn:nbn:de:bvb:20-opus-109665

Exploring Emerging India

Eight essays

Philipp Gieg/Timo Lowinger/Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (eds.)

Abstract

India's economic rise since the 1990s has been followed by a more prominent global role for the country. Despite economic setbacks in recent years and huge domestic challenges like poverty, caste issues, and gender inequality, India today is almost universally characterised as an “emerging power”. At the same time, the country continues to show an enormous diversity. Thus, exploring emerging India can surely not be confined to economic analysis only. Instead, it is vital to take current developments in domestic and international politics, society, culture, religion, and political thinking into consideration as well. Following an interdisciplinary approach, contributions from Political Science, International Relations, Indology, Political Theory, and Economics are fundamental in order to grasp the country's diversity. This collection assembles eight essays which, individually, serve as working papers reflecting the authors' various research focuses, while collectively composing a multifaceted and multidisciplinary picture of emerging India. It thereby reflects the approach the University of Würzburg's *Centre for Modern India* and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology's *India Forum* are committed to: bringing together different academic disciplines in order to generate nuanced insights into India's manifold diversity.

Published online: October 9, 2015

© 2015 Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Soziologie (IPS)

Editors

Philipp Gieg and **Timo Lowinger** are Lecturers and Researchers at the University of Würzburg's Institute for Political Science and Sociology. E-Mail: philipp.gieg@uni-wuerzburg.de; timo.lowinger@uni-wuerzburg.de.

Prof. Dr. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet is Professor for European Studies and International Relations at the University of Würzburg's Institute for Political Science and Sociology. E-Mail: mbb@uni-wuerzburg.de.

Exploring Emerging India

Acht Essays

Philipp Gieg/Timo Lowinger/Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet (eds.)

Abstract

Indiens wirtschaftlicher Aufstieg seit Beginn der 1990er Jahre geht mit einer immer prominenteren globalen Rolle des Landes einher. Trotz ökonomischer Rückschläge und gewaltiger innerer Herausforderungen wie Armut, Kastenwesen und Geschlechterungleichheit wird Indien heute einhellig als „Emerging Power“ charakterisiert. Gleichzeitig ist das Land weiterhin von enormer Vielfalt geprägt. „Exploring Emerging India“ – dieses Unterfangen kann daher nicht auf wirtschaftliche Aspekte beschränkt bleiben. Unverzichtbar ist vielmehr, auch aktuelle Entwicklungen in Gesellschaft, Kultur, Religion, politischem Denken und nationaler wie internationaler Politik in den Blick zu nehmen. Um die indische Vielfalt zu erfassen, ist daher ein interdisziplinäres Zusammenspiel von Beiträgen aus Politikwissenschaft, Internationalen Beziehungen, Indologie, Politischer Theorie und Wirtschaftswissenschaft essentiell. Dieser Band versammelt acht Essays, die zum einen als Arbeitspapiere die Forschungsschwerpunkte ihrer jeweiligen Autoren widerspiegeln, zum anderen aber in ihrer Gesamtheit ein facettenreiches und multidisziplinäres Bild des aufstrebenden Landes zeichnen. Der Band folgt damit dem Ansatz, dem sich das *Zentrum Modernes Indien* der Universität Würzburg und das *Indien-Forum* des Instituts für Politikwissenschaft und Soziologie verschrieben haben: dem Zusammenführen verschiedener akademischer Disziplinen, um differenzierte Einblicke in Indiens reichhaltige Vielfalt zu gewinnen.

Contributions

I.	Introduction: Exploring Emerging India Philipp Gieg and Timo Lowinger	4
II.	Modi Government: A Year in Office Valerian Rodrigues	10
III.	Indian Economy after the Fourteenth Lok Sabha Election: Risks and Opportunities Amitabh Kundu.....	17
IV.	Turbulences in India's Path of Democratization Matthias Gsänger	21
V.	India – an Emerging Economic Power and its Foreign Policy: A Perspective S. Shaji.....	28
VI.	India as a Member of BRICS and its Relations with South Africa Aparajita Biswas	34
VII.	The EU-India Strategic Partnership: Achievements, Shortcomings, Prospects Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet	39
VIII.	Religion within the Secular State – Some Theoretical Remarks Michael Becker	45
IX.	(Trans-)Gender Issues in Contemporary Indian and German Society Elisabeth Schömbucher-Kusterer	51
	Contributors	58

I. Introduction: Exploring Emerging India

Philipp Gieg and Timo Lowinger

India rising

Despite its status as the world's second most populous country, India was never considered an important economic power in the first decades after independence. To the contrary, the term "Hindu growth rate", referring to the sluggish economic expansion averaging at about 3.5% per year, symbolised the unflattering image of the country's economy. However, following economic liberalisation in 1991, India's growth rate rapidly increased, averaging at almost 7% in the new millennium (IMF 2015). Combined with the country's continuing high level of demographic growth, international economic interest in the country reached unknown heights in the early 2000s. Most prominently, India was included by Goldman Sachs in its famous 2001 report which popularized the term "BRICs" and labelled India alongside Brazil, Russia, and China as one of the world's most important "emerging markets" (O'Neill 2001). However, after surpassing 9% in 2010, GDP growth dramatically plummeted to below 5% in 2012. With the core indicator of India's perceived "rise" suddenly in dire straits, pessimistic voices gained momentum; analysts discussed "How India is losing its magic" (The Economist 2012) and asked if India was "falling for its own hype" (Sharma 2012, p. 37), having "misread the strong growth of the 2000s as a sign of sure prosperity to come" (Sharma 2013, pp. 12-13). While recent trends indicate that economic growth is slowly getting back on track with the country again boasting a rate of more than 7% in 2014, it is too early to predict whether India will be able to return to breathtaking heights of growth.

Whatever the case may be, even during boom years, many observers have never ceased to point out that, in fact, India should still be considered a developing country. For instance, despite exceptional growth rates, India still ranks only 135th (out of 187 countries) in the Human Development Index (UNDP 2015). This clearly shows that India's rise has to be put into perspective: GDP growth does not necessarily equal human development, and India is still facing severe social challenges (Drèze/Sen 2013, p. 46) like widespread poverty, caste issues, a growing rural-urban divide, and gender inequality, to just name a few.

India's global role

While it proves difficult to decide whether India is still rising, stagnating, or even facing a possible decline as far as economic and social indicators are concerned, the country's political weight has undoubtedly been growing steadily in the post-Cold War era. This can be ascribed to both domestic and external factors. On the one hand, New Delhi has been keen to strengthen its engagement with all centers of global power. Besides reaching out to the USA and the EU, India has tried to reinforce relations with Asian countries through the "Look East" policy (Nadkarni 2013, pp. 131, 147). Furthermore, India was successful in strengthening its ties with African nations and has already become the continent's third most important trading partner. While India's foreign policy has been facing an increasing economisation in order to

bolster trade and investment ties following the economic liberalisation in the 1990s, New Delhi is nevertheless showing an invigorated quest for power and status, too (Nadkarni 2013, p. 131). This quest for power is most visible in India's efforts to change the architecture of global governance with New Delhi taking part in almost all important new forums that have been established in recent years, ranging from the BRICS association to IBSA (*India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum*) and the BASIC group (*Brazil, South Africa, India and China*) in climate negotiations.

On the other hand – and shifting the perspective –, India has been facing a massive increase in international attention, too. Triggered by the rising attractiveness as a sales market and a target for foreign investment, more and more countries identified New Delhi as an ever more important partner regarding economic diplomacy as well as global financial and trade governance. On top of this, India's growing political relevance has gradually transcended to other issues like security, non-proliferation, or global climate governance. A case in point is the so-called US-India Nuclear deal, struck in 2006, which – despite severe setbacks regarding implementation – can be seen as an epitome of Washington's keenness to build stronger ties with New Delhi. Besides, the European Union and India have concluded a Strategic Partnership in 2004, while the German government has identified India as a new global policy shaper (“*Neue Gestaltungsmacht*”) and a major partner in global governance (Bundesregierung 2012). Accordingly, since 2011, the two countries have conducted three intergovernmental consultations. Thus, despite economic setbacks and severe internal problems, New Delhi's self-image as well as its global perception (Bava 2007, p. 2) have without a doubt led to India becoming an important player in international relations today.

Theoretical reflections: Emerging Power India?

The growing political importance of countries like India as well as their breathtaking economic development have triggered a vital discussion in social sciences about how to grasp these developments theoretically. After empirically assessing and analysing the increased power potential of countries like India, China, Brazil, and South Africa with respect to their geographic size, demographic factors as well as economic and military resources (cf. Schirm 2006, p. 2), scholars came up with different labels: “Middle powers” (Cooper/Higgott/Nossal 1993; Schoeman 2003), “regional powers” (Flemes 2007; cf. Huntington 1999), “regional leading powers” (Nolte 2006; Nolte 2012) or “anchor countries” (Stamm 2004). The most influential and most commonly used term, however, proved to be “emerging powers”. This denomination, which was used in mass media first, later found entrance into the fields of political science as well as economics and other related disciplines. It refers to the term “emerging markets” which was coined by World Bank economist Antoine van Agtmael (cf. Agtmael 2007) and describes the economic potential of countries that are developing but have not yet finished this process: These emerging economies have an intermediate income and show a catch-up growth as well as a successive economic opening (Vercueil 2012, p. 232). Based on the empirical observation that these countries often boast growing political influence as well (as was shown above for India), the term “emerging market” became the template for the new

label “emerging power” – a relabelling that encapsulates both the economic and the political rise of these countries. A widely accepted and well established definition is given by Stefan Schirm (2006, p. 2):

“The reasons for the assignment of a new role to these states are their demographic and geographic size, their growing economic and military capacities, and their political aspirations. The countries defined here under the rubric of emerging powers dominate their neighbors in terms of power over resources, that is, population, territory, military capacity, and gross domestic product. In addition, they articulate a wish to change the distribution of power in the international system and assume leadership roles in global governance.”

This definition highlights the classic power resources of a state which, in the case of an emerging power, are founded in their economic and demographic growth: Political actions and behavior are shaped by geographical, economic, and military factors which increase the geopolitical importance of the states. Therefore, the influence of emerging powers in international decisions, international organisations, global governance, and in the international system in general depends on their material resources. India, whose economic as well as political importance has been rising for years, fulfils the criteria set out in the definition above and thus was categorised as an emerging power; Stephen P. Cohen was among the first to apply the term to India (Cohen 2001).

But is the definition really satisfying from a theoretical point of view, especially with respect to India? Is it adequate to reduce the potential and relevance of rising states in the international system to material resources only? As Weiss/Abdenur (2014, p. 1750) point out, the term “emerging power” “is neither carved in stone nor uncontroversial”. Indeed, the case of India shows very strikingly that an analysis of material factors can only be the first step. In order to obtain a comprehensive picture of emerging India, research on immaterial factors has to be conducted, too. India’s international actions are rooted in the long history and culture of the country (cf. Datta/Palshikar 2013, pp. 3 f; Michael 2013, p. 24). In addition, the normative foundations of India’s identity were shaped strongly by the colonial past under British rule, the long struggle for independence, and the influence of iconic leaders like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru (Vivekanandan 2011, p. 10; Chandra/Mukherjee/Mukherjee 2008, p. 189, Ganguly 2012, p. 1). These aspects must not be disregarded when researching emerging India. Moreover, not only the historical evolution of the country’s normative foundations is relevant; current developments in domestic politics, society, culture, and political thinking are important as well to obtain a nuanced picture. Only with such an extended definition is it possible to fully explore India’s diversity.

Grasping India’s diversity

On the one hand, diversity constitutes a fundamental element of Indian society and politics which makes India an extraordinarily fascinating and multifaceted object of research which “gives diversity new meaning” (Zakaria 2013, p. 3): From ancient times till this day, India has maintained its plurality and its vast social variety. Therefore, the country is rightly labelled as

the “epitome of the world” because of the diversity in language, peoples, landforms, flora and fauna, caste, regions, politics, and so on. The contradictions, challenges and opportunities that go along with it are worth to look at in greater detail. On the other hand, diversity should be understood as a normative goal for research, that is: grasping the object of inquiry in its entirety. This demand is directly derived from the multifaceted nature of Indian society and politics – which can only be investigated with an equally manifold and diverse research approach. In practice, this means that diversity as a normative goal of inquiry must be implemented through interdisciplinary research.

The University of Würzburg’s *Centre for Modern India* and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology’s *India Forum* are committed to an approach that combines several academic disciplines in order to generate both multifaceted and nuanced insights as well as help to understand emerging India’s manifold diversity. The collection of essays presented here arose from the University of Würzburg’s profound ties with our Indian partner universities. Since 2010, numerous Indian scholars have visited Würzburg, while many professors and researchers from Würzburg have travelled to India; Political Science, International Relations, Indology, and Economics are only some of the disciplines involved in the cooperation. The cooperation is made possible through the funding initiative *A New Passage to India* and is financially supported by the *German Academic Exchange Service* (DAAD) with funds from the German *Federal Ministry of Education and Research* (BMBF). Both the University of Würzburg’s *Centre for Modern India* and the Institute for Political Science and Sociology’s *India Forum* arose out of this initiative. Furthermore, both institutions take part in the new *M.S. Merian International Centre for Advanced Studies ‘Metamorphoses of the Political’* (MICAS:MP) which is currently being established in New Delhi. The Centre of Advanced Studies combines the benefits of an open, interdisciplinary forum for intellectual exchange with the advantages of a cutting-edge research centre and is supported by the BMBF, too.

Outline of the volume

Following the interdisciplinary approach, this publication assembles eight essays which, individually, serve as working papers reflecting the various research focuses of the respective authors, while collectively composing a multifaceted and multidisciplinary picture of emerging India.

The first essays deal with domestic aspects of emerging India. **Valerian Rodrigues** presents a timely account of the Modi government’s first year in office (chapter II), while **Amitabh Kundu** analyses risks and opportunities for India’s economy after the 2014 elections (chapter III). Focussing on India’s process of democratization, **Matthias Gsänger** identifies turbulences and challenges (chapter IV). Turning towards India’s global role, the following essays deal with the country’s international relations. **S. Shaji** presents a broad perspective on India’s foreign relations and carves out emerging trends in New Delhi’s foreign policy under the new government (chapter V). **Aparajita Biswas** addresses India’s BRICS membership and its relations with South Africa (chapter VI), while **Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet** asks whether the country’s Strategic Partnership with the European Union can be deemed a

success or a disappointment (chapter VII). Finally, the concluding essays take a look at religious and gender issues: **Michael Becker** presents theoretical remarks on the coexistence of secular politics and religion (chapter VIII) and **Elisabeth Schömbucher-Kusterer** discusses how (trans)gender issues are dealt with in India and Germany (chapter IX).

All contributors have taken part in the fruitful exchange between the University of Würzburg and our Indian partner universities – and all have devoted themselves to jointly explore emerging India's diversity.

References

- Agtmael, Antoine van. 2007. *The Emerging Markets Century: How a New Breed of World-Class Companies Is Overtaking the World*. New York: Free Press.
- Bava, Ummu Salma. 2007. *New Powers for Global Change? India's Role in the Emerging World Order* (FES Briefing Paper 4). March 2007.
- Bundesregierung. 2012. *Globalisierung gestalten – Partnerschaften ausbauen – Verantwortung teilen: Konzept der Bundesregierung*. <https://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/cae/servlet/contentblob/608384/publicationFile/169965/Gestaltungsmaechtekonzept.pdf>. Accessed 24.07.2015.
- Chandra, Bipan, Mridula Mukherjee and Aditya Mukherjee. 2008. *India since Independence*. New Delhi: Penguin Books.
- Cohen, Stephen P. 2001. *Emerging Power India*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.
- Cooper, Andrew F., Richard A. Higgott and Kom R. Nossal. 1993. *Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order*. Vancouver: UBC Press.
- Datta, Pradip Kumar and Sanjay Palishikar. 2013. Introduction: Reframing Indian Political Thought. In *Indian Political Thought*, eds. Pradip Kumar Datta and Sanjay Palishikar, 1-27. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen. 2013. *An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Flemes, Daniel. 2007. *Conceptualising Regional Power in International Relations: Lessons from the South African Case* (GIGA Working Paper 53/2007). http://edoc.vifapol.de/opus/volltexte/2009/1613/pdf/wp53_flemes.pdf. Accessed 24.07.2015.
- Ganguly, Sumit. 2012. The Genesis of Nonalignment. In *India's Foreign Policy: Retrospect and Prospect*, ed. Sumit Ganguly. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Huntington, Samuel. 1999. The Lonely Superpower. *Foreign Affairs* 78 (2): 35-49.
- IMF (International Monetary Fund). 2015. *Direction of Trade Statistics*. <http://elibrary-data.imf.org/QueryBuilder.aspx>. Accessed 25.09.2015.
- Michael, Arndt. 2013. *India's Foreign Policy and Regional Multilateralism*. Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nadkarni, Vidya. 2013. India – An Aspiring Global Power. In *Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective: The Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries*, eds. Vidya Nadkarni and Norma C. Noonan, 131-161. New York/London: Bloomsbury.

- Nolte, Detlef. 2006. *Macht und Machthierarchien in den internationalen Beziehungen: Ein Analysekonzept für die Forschung über Regionale Führungsmächte* (GIGA Working Papers Nr. 29). http://www.giga-hamburg.de/de/system/files/publications/wp29_nolte.pdf. Accessed 24.07.2015.
- Nolte, Detlef. 2012. Regionale Führungsmächte: Analysekonzepte und Forschungsfragen. In *Macht, Führung und Regionale Ordnung: Theorien und Forschungsperspektiven*, eds Daniel Flemers, Dirk Nabers and Detlef Nolte, 17-52. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- O'Neill, Jim. 2001. *Building Better Global Economic BRICs* (Goldman Sachs Global Economics Paper No. 66). New York et al: Goldman & Sachs.
- Schirm, Stefan A. 2006. *Leadership in Regional and Global Politics: Why Do Emerging Powers (Sometimes) Fail to Reach Their Goals?* (Paper prepared for the workshop "The Rise of (New) Regional Powers in Regional and Global Politics"). Hamburg: German Institute for Global and Area Studies GIGA. http://www.sowi.rub.de/mam/content/lisp/leadership_paper.pdf, Accessed 30.09.2014.
- Schoeman, Maxi. 2003. 'South Africa as an Emerging Middle Power: 1994–2003'. In *State of the Nation: South Africa 2003–2004*, eds. John Daniel, Adam Habib and Roger Southall, 349-367. Cape Town: HSRC Press.
- Sharma, Ruchir. 2012. *Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles*. London: Allen Lane.
- Sharma, Ruchir. 2013. Breakout or Washout. In *Reimagining India. Unlocking the Potential of Asia's Next Superpower*, ed. McKinsey & Company, 10-16. New York: Simon & Schuster.
- Stamm, Andreas. 2004. *Schwellen- und Ankerländer als Akteure einer globalen Partnerschaft* (DIE Discussion-Paper 1/2004). <http://www.die-gdi.de/uploads/media/1-2004.pdf>. Accessed 24.07.2015.
- The Economist. 2012. Losing its magic, March 24th-30th 2012.
- UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 2015. *Human Development Index and its components*. <http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/table-1-human-development-index-and-its-components>. Accessed 25.09.2015.
- Vercueil, Julien. 2012. *Les pays émergents. Brésil - Russie - Inde - Chine... Mutations économiques et nouveaux défis* (Emerging Countries. Brazil - Russia - India - China.. Economic change and new challenges", in French). 3rd Edition. Paris: Bréal.
- Vivekanandan, Jayashree. 2011. *Interrogating International Relations: India's Strategic Practice and the Return of History*. New Delhi: Routledge.
- Weiss, Thomas G. and Abdenur, Adriana Erthal. 2014. Introduction: emerging powers and the UN – what kind of development partnership? *Third World Quarterly* 35 (10): 1749-1758.
- Zakaria, Fareed. 2013. The Rediscovery of India. In *Reimagining India. Unlocking the Potential of Asia's Next Superpower*, ed. McKinsey & Company, 3-9. New York: Simon & Schuster.

II. Modi Government: A Year in Office

Valerian Rodrigues

On May 26, 2015, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led coalition government, the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), with Narendra Modi as prime minister completed a year in office in India. There was much apprehension when this coalition came to power, particularly on two counts: the overt disposition of the BJP towards Hindu nationalism and the pro-big industry slant of the coalition. Modi was also tainted with the charge of complicity in the large scale Muslim massacre in the Gujarat riots of 2002 when he was the Chief Minister of the state, and the BJP did not have even a single Muslim among its 284 members in the Lok Sabha, made of 543 elected members. Given the commanding strength of the coalition in the Lower House of the Parliament, the Lok Sabha, with the BJP alone enjoying a majority, there was much interest in the direction that public policy will take under the new regime. The coalition also rode to power on the promise of development, employment generation and putting an end to widespread corruption that the previous regime, United progressive Alliance (UPA) led by the Indian National Congress (INC), was mired in. During the election campaign to the House at hugely attended public meetings Modi promised, *achhe din*, good times, for the poor, and effective and efficient government to the country's burgeoning middle classes. What has been the track-record of the government during a year in office?

Foundational Values

India's democratic polity rests on certain foundational values such as liberty, equality of citizenship, secularism, a distinct charter on minority rights and rule of law. While these values have not been directly challenged in the course of the year, there is a widespread apprehension that *Hindutva* or Hindu nationalism has entrenched itself during this period threatening these values. Accounts suggest that the incidence of riots across religious communities, generally termed in India as communal riots, have grown over the year. According to Union Home Ministry data there were 330 incidents of communal violence between January and June, 2015 across the country under this government in comparison to 252 in the first six months of 2014, a period that largely coincided with the earlier regime. While 51 lost their lives in these riots for the first six months during 2015, 33 had lost their lives for the same period during 2014.¹ There have been several well-publicized instances of the curtailment of freedom of religion, with loud outcries of '*ghar vapasi*' or return to the original religious fold, i.e. Hinduism. Intermittent attacks on Christian churches have occurred during this period particularly in and around Delhi with much demonstrative impact, and there were a few attempts to cleanse villages from Christians with negligible presence. Muslim youth have been targeted for practicing *love-jihad*, i.e., ensnaring Hindu girls by love, and falling an easy prey to Islamic fundamentalist groups outside. Militant Hindu organizations have continued to hold

¹ "Communal violence increased in first half of 2015: Home Ministry", *Hindustan Times* (epaper), August 2, 2015, accessed on August 2, 2015.

out the threat of constructing a temple at the site where they had demolished a Mosque claiming it as the birthplace of Lord Ram in 1992. Their chorus in this regard has been louder than the feeble denials of the same by the Government from time to time. Further the year saw Narendra Modi being cleared of all charges of complicity in the Gujarat riots of 2002, when as Chief Minister of the state he presided over an administration that was an onlooker when over a thousand Muslims were slaughtered by frenzy mobs in the name of Hinduism. While the decline of religious tolerance cannot be visited entirely on the NDA regime, and several non-NDA ruled states have also witnessed a surge of violence, if we place issues in perspective, there is definitely a shift towards a public culture of intolerance. Associating Hinduism with nationalism is seeping in rapidly. There is a growing culture of 'othering', of groups belonging to non-Hindu religion. The government itself, however, has not challenged the foundational values of the polity yet. In fact, the Prime Minister, has repeatedly asserted the value of equality of citizenship, and there have been some attempts, although feeble, to rein in the cohorts of Hindu fanatics running rampant in the name of the Hindutva project.

Constitutionalism

Constitutionally, Indian polity rests on three pillars: federalism, separation of powers, and parliamentary democracy. Over the years there has been much violation of the principle of federalism in India by invoking the exceptional powers of the Union government. Against such legacy, Narendra Modi has described his approach to states as 'cooperative federalism', and avoided the language of antagonism towards them. It is largely due to this approach that state leaders such as Mamata Banerjee of West Bengal have shifted their disposition from direct antagonism to critical engagement with the Union government. The government has also made it clear that competition and rivalry across political parties should not be confused with cooperation between governments at different levels. Indirect regulatory hold over states, however, is being reinforced. The Modi government has appointed governors to the states who are strongly devoted to the BJP and the RSS. In India states are also embedded in distinct cultural ethos and linguistic affiliations. A subtle attempt has been underway to dovetail cultural diversity to the demands of all-India Hindu nationalism, by promoting Hindi and Sanskrit, by banning beef-eating in some states, and by encouraging all India cults and deities. There has been a sustained attempt to promote a homogenous pattern of education across India. An all-India economic development pattern is suggested against the plurality of experiments underway in different states. Therefore the stress on federalism remains formal, rather than a commitment to foster diversity. The track-record of the earlier Congress-led regimes in this regard is not commendatory either, since they overtly emphasized on central authority in the name of national unity.

Under the Modi regime, the relationship between the Parliament and the Judiciary is being revisited through the National Judicial Appointment Commission (NJAC), although it was a proposal on the anvil when this regime took over. Over the years, the Judiciary in India had arrogated to itself the power to appoint the judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts through a judiciary-led interpretation of its independence. The new Act, which enjoys wide-

spread support across the political spectrum, lays down a procedure to be followed for recommending persons for appointment as Chief Justice of India, other judges of the Supreme Court, Chief Justices and other judges of the High Courts. As per the Act, the Commission will be headed by the Chief Justice of India and will have as its members, two Supreme Court judges, the Union Minister of Law and Justice, and two eminent persons. The latter would be nominated by a Committee composed of the Chief Justice of India, the Prime Minister, and leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. The NJAC came into force from 13 April, 2015 after being ratified by the requisite number of states. Within the legal parlance, however, there is a deep apprehension with regard to this Act, as it is perceived to be tilted towards the Parliament. The constitutionality of this Act has, therefore, been challenged in the Supreme Court, which is hearing the case, at present. While there has been a consensus across political parties with regard to this Act, the ruling coalition cannot expect much cooperation from the Opposition if the former makes moves that are seen as curtailing the power of the Judiciary.

There has been a growing trend in the Parliamentary Opposition in India to counter the ruling regime not on the floor of the House but by stalling its proceedings. The BJP had perfected this strategy during the UPA II regime (2009-2014). Such a strategy is justified on the ground that the majority enjoyed by a ruling coalition makes it prone to the use of public position or office for graft, partisan pursuits, pursuit of deeply unpopular policies, or compromise on basic public values. But such a resort by the Opposition also betrays a lack of confidence in the fairness of the legislative majority to adhere to the rules of the game, and a tendency to directly appeal to the electorate and undermine its trust in their representatives. Under such a strategy, whether a concern calls for stalling the proceedings of the House, or best be aired at the floor of the House, is not generally decided on the basis of its significance, but its electoral and populist appeal. In the last one year the Opposition-led by the Congress has resorted to mass mobilization on issues such as the Land Bill, and recently on charges of corruption and misuse of office in l'affaire Lalit Modi.² Although the strength of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha has grossly reduced, it still holds the majority in the Rajya Sabha. The stalling of the proceedings of the Lok Sabha, and the inability to pass any bill in the Rajya Sabha has badly affected the normal transaction of business in the Parliament. It is in the Parliamentary arena, the very site of its commendable victory a year ago, that this government is facing its biggest challenge.

Political Process

After the victory of the BJP at the national elections in May 2014, it scored impressive electoral victories in subsequent elections in many states – Jharkhand, Haryana, Maharashtra, Jammu & Kashmir – except in Delhi. These victories were seen as sealing the popular mandate behind BJP in the general elections of May, 2014. The verdict in Delhi went in favour of the Aam Admi Party that rose behind the wave of anti-corruption agitations in India, but did not affect the massive electoral tilt in favour of the BJP a year ago.

² Lalit Modi, a former chief of a Cricket Club in India, is supposed to have used the massive resources of this Club to cultivate close bonds with some of the key functionaries of the BJP.

Has there been a realignment of political forces after the victory of the BJP? India's complex party system remains largely intact, although there have been some stirrings: Those parties with backward caste and peasant support base have tended to forge alliances. It is important to point out that Modi enjoys extensive support among these social groups. The support for BJP has grown among Dalits and ethnic communities as well. While the Communist parties have declined, there is some stirring among them to rally behind a potential left democratic opposition, a space which the Indian National Congress wishes to muster for itself. The big industry which enthusiastically backed the BJP's quest for power, does not seem to share the same excitement about this party today. There are obvious signs of tension between the Government and the phalanx of Hindu organizations avowing different versions of Hindutva. The government has been very reticent to extend support to the demands of these organizations to build a temple in Ayodhya in the name of Lord Ram at the site where they brought down a mosque, scrapping of Article 370 that confers special powers on Jammu & Kashmir, a Muslim dominated state, or enacting a uniform civil code for India. The Government is aware that these measures will exacerbate the sense of otherness that Muslims have been experiencing due to their socio-economic marginality. At the same time the ideological outfits of Hindutva are pushing for their agenda in the civil arena, and it has its impact on ministries and departments susceptible to their influence. There is enough evidence to suggest that, increasingly, the ideological apparatuses of the state, institutions of higher education, bodies regulating the media, cultural centres under the Government, arts and aesthetic forums are brought under the influence of personnel who are oriented towards Hindutva.

Public Policies: Infrastructure, bureaucracy, Land Policy

It may not be an exaggeration to say that providing a spurt to economic growth has been an overriding concern of the Modi government this year. It is seen as the critical solution to meet key domestic concerns such as unemployment or to secure to India its 'rightful' place in the world. Much of the corporate support to the government is premised on this priority. This concern can also explain the ardent attempt to bring changes in the Land Act passed in 2013 which, according to the government, made acquisition of land for industrial, infrastructural and other allied purposes almost impossible. But nearly 60 per cent of the population in India is dependent on land, and the proposed changes in the Act have met with strong resistance from the peasantry. The opposition parties have rallied behind the peasantry in support, and the Government has not succeeded as yet to put a seal of approval from the Parliament on the proposed changes. This government has also laid renewed emphasis on advanced science and technology, and launched a 'make in India' campaign, to launch India as the hub of advanced industry. Modi is deeply aware that the economy is a highly globalised affair today and the terms of engaging with economic exchange across countries are not equitable. But striving for equity has not been his expressed concern, but to ensure favourable terms for India. This stress on national interest is expressed in his slogan, 'India first'. Corporate houses however, do not necessarily share such objectives and have tended to prioritise labour law reforms, privatization, easy and quick acquisition of land, speedy environmental clearances, favourable

credit flows, better infrastructural facilities and tax reforms. Modi and the corporate houses are not on the same wavelength any longer!

It would be suicidal to the government in a competitive electoral democracy if it ignores the demands of the sprawling constituency of the poor and the deprived. The government has quickly moved to embrace enthusiastically several social sector policies that it initially threw scorn at, such as the Mahatma Gandhi National Employment Guarantee scheme, that guarantees 100 days of employment for poor rural households per year. It has also relaunched several initiatives of the previous regime with regard to credit and services to the poor, housing, urban renewal, food subsidies and health schemes. While it has eased environmental restrictions on several counts, it has been cautious, and even apologetic on such initiatives, since they can affect adversely a restive ethnic population whose habitats are likely to be affected by such moves. Besides, a section of BJP's own social base is deeply deferential to environmental integrity. However, the Government has moved very quickly to connect distant Himalayan region and reopen the Northeast India through land routes to the burgeoning markets of Southeast Asia, irrespective of such susceptibilities.

Initiatives such as 'Swatch Bharat' or 'clean India' and 'Clean Ganga', launched with much fanfare are still to take a bite. If pursued with commitment they could be a bridge-head between ethical and moral concerns of the polity on one hand, and popular welfare and economic priorities on the other. These initiatives are deeply embedded in age-old cultural values. India's huge and expanding NGO sector can be roughly classified into two broad pursuits: those which act as the conveyor belts for economic and social development, and those that seek social transformation and committed to human rights. While the government has been favourable to the first set of pursuits it has subjected the latter to intense surveillance. The treatment meted out to Greenpeace is illustrative in this regard!³

It is the social assessment clause and the latitude on public purpose that the Modi government wanted to amend radically in the Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement (LARR) Act, 2013 to facilitate land acquisition. But these were the very clauses that restrained rampant acquisition of land and ensured larger social accountability. The resolute opposition that the proposed amendments have encountered is likely to dampen the enthusiasm for projects requiring large new land acquisitions. The promise of a corruption-free administration has met with its Waterloo in such cases as that of Lalit Modi, and the corruption manifest in public employment and securing seats in higher technical and professional education in BJP-ruled states. Charges of corruption against the previous regime were an important issue in the arsenal of the BJP in its electoral campaign. There is a broad agreement today that while corruption has declined at the higher echelons of the bureaucracy, this is not the case at the other levels of public administration.

It is educational and cultural institutions under the aegis of the central government that have been subjected to an intense exposure to the Hindutva agenda. Senior functionaries of

³ Ms. Priya Pillai, an activist of the Greenpeace foundation, was recently denied permission to travel to the UK, citing national interest.

some these institutions⁴ have already openly stated that their autonomy has been compromised under the new regime. While the freedom of the press has not been directly affected, public media bodies such as Prasar Bharati have been brought under the Hindutva canopy. Modi government also seems to favour the religious spokespersons of minority communities highlighting the stereotyping that such dispositions highlight.

Foreign Policy

A large number of commentators feel that it is in the domain of foreign policy that the Modi Government has credible initiatives. Even after the Cold War Indian foreign policy oscillated between certain fixities, albeit, defended in the name of national interests. A shallow foreign policy bureaucracy thrived on this 'truth'. Modi has tried to make multilateralism on one hand, and cooperation and contention on the other, the cornerstone of his foreign policy. At the same time there has been a perceptible recognition of the globalizing impulses in the world and the necessity to respond to them proactively. Modi has also imparted a strong 'personal touch' to foreign policy by attempting to project intimate bonds with other national leaders. Symbolic gestures such as clothes, venues of meetings, and ceremonial improvisations have been carefully employed for the purpose. Modi has also attempted to actively cultivate Indian Diaspora and reinforced their sense of belonging to India, while at the same time projecting their professional competence and economic success in the country of their adoption.

While there is much national jingoism replete in Indian society, particularly among the middle classes, and the Government has often pandered to such susceptibilities, it has displayed a rare maturity in its relations with its neighbours including Pakistan and China. It has secured its borders with Bangladesh and Myanmar through complex deals of quid pro quo, ensured that Nepal will not tilt itself overtly towards China, not insisted on settlement of territorial dispute with China to engage with it, and ensured that the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka does not become a domestic irritant. While there is no great advance in India's relations with Pakistan, there is no overt spill of Islamic and ethnic reassertions of the immediate Western front in India's domestic arena. Muslim marginality in India is largely kept as a domestic issue rather than let it spill over into the Islamic global upsurge.

Modi has invested much in forging stronger bonds with India's neighbours, both to strengthen existing ties and to counter the growing forays of China in this region. There has been a renewed push to open Northeast India to Southeast Asia and to the burgeoning markets of the ASEAN. India has been trying to project itself as an active participant in East Asia. New partnerships have been forged to meet India's energy needs and strategic concerns, as well as to obtain advanced technology particularly for defense and space. Modi has been an active interlocutor in the global multilateral forums and realizes the significance of active partnership in shaping the emerging global architecture. The West, including the USA, are perceived as partners in this process.

⁴ For instance, at the Indian Institutes of Technology at Mumbai and Delhi.

Conclusion

In spite of much adversarial rhetoric, the constitutional and political architecture of Indian polity has not undergone many significant changes in the course of the year under review. However, there is a noticeable shift in favour of big industry, the city, and the primacy of the idea of nation. There has been a sustained attempt to revamp values, beliefs and public institutions to make place for Hindutva overtones. There are few attempts to reach out to minorities, particularly Muslims and they are asked to fend for themselves under a majoritarian order. The big industry is trying to distance itself from the regime, although they are still closely bonded to each other. The regime has antagonized the powerful lobby of landed interests, and as yet, has little to offer to the youth and the unemployed. It has also displayed much ingenuity in forging bilateral and multilateral ties. It is, however, uncertain to what extent Modi's own government and party colleagues, and Hindutva leaders are in tandem, and there is definitely certain tension visible in this relation. While Hindutva ideology and agenda has succeeded in inserting itself in the public domain much more loudly and prominently, it has proposed little to craft an alternative imagination of India and the world. The basic political frame that Jawaharlal Nehru and his colleagues bequeathed to independent India continues to direct terms of exchange between friends and adversaries to-date.

III. Indian Economy after the Fourteenth Lok Sabha Election: Risks and Opportunities

Amitabh Kundu

The president of India in his address to the joint Parliament session about the policy perspective of the new government noted that Indian economy is facing the worst crisis and it has to be put back on track. I believe this perspective does not match with the long term trend that we see in the economy. It is true that the scenario of income growth, investment, remittances, export, foreign exchange inflows for the last two years is very disturbing but there is no reason to panic. This can be attributed to policy paralysis, misgovernance and corruption of the last five years. The positive trends in the economy are visible from the later part of 2013. Irrespective of election results, the international agencies like the World Bank and IMF have made projections, much before the election dates were announced, that India will come out of its recessionary phase. These projections have been made based on the long term trends, the structural parameters and the demographic dividend factors, working out in favour of the country. These can be easily used by the new government to build a base for long term sustainable development.

The other thing that the President talked about is a predictable, transparent and fair government. I am totally in agreement with this view. I believe that with a high level of public awareness that we see in the country and the BJP getting a comfortable majority on its own and taking a high moral stand on misgovernance and corruption, the government would certainly be more transparent and predictable, particularly as it would have no excuse of coalition politics.

Sidharth Vardharajan, one of the strong critics of the BJP government, mentioned these two very words „stability“ and „predictability“ without mentioning fairness. He puts this as a strong criticism of the functioning of the new government. He argues that the Vibrant Gujarat conclave in 2009 clearly revealed how the large private corporate sector is strongly backing him. In fact the stock market was having its celebrations with indices shooting up the ceiling with news of the Modi wave in the country much before the declaration of the results. All who is who of Indian industry were present in the Gujarat Conclave and they were almost foreseeing and welcoming the government under Modi's leadership in Delhi. Indeed, predictability and transparency in the vested interest of industrialists, who are into making speculative gains from the system, are a few of the definite signs of crony capitalism. Vardharajan argues that the labour laws, environmental laws, popular movements and agitations are likely to be overlooked by the new regime when the issue will be of providing speedy and one window clearance for the industries. Such predictions made by him and many others reflect ideological predispositions although such apprehensions cannot be dispelled totally. It is, nonetheless, too early to take this negative view. Given the high moral ground BJP has taken in recent months and registering a resounding victory on that count, it seems improbable that the gov-

ernment will soon fall in the trap of parochialism and favoritism in the next three to four years, particularly given the high level of public awareness and sensitivity on this issue.

Narendra Modi in his first public address after the declaration of election results had said that as the Prime Minister, he would be labourer number one. He indirectly reminded everyone of his rising up from an unorganised service sector worker and that he is aware of the problems of low wages, job insecurity and the non-availability of a safety net for this sector. This is a promise he has made to the country, particularly to its young population.

The critical question, therefore, is whether the Modi government will create 12 million decent jobs per year that are needed to meet the challenge. Can he provide social security, health and old age security to them. I must say the dream was conceived by Arjun Senputa Committee in the Commission for Unorganised Workers, appointed by the UPA government. Unfortunately, the government did virtually nothing with the recommendations of the Committee, except passing a couple of legislations. Can the Modi government promote employment with social security? Can the government transform Mujaffarnagar into Manchester or Mannheim, as a few leaders have promised? These currently lie in the realm of expectations and apprehensions.

I would like to address bridging the rural-urban divide, alleviation of poverty and unemployment as the PM himself and the President in his Parliament speech have mentioned. These are important pronouncements. Consider the rural-urban divide from the viewpoint of per capita income or consumption expenditure. The gaps have gone up very sharply over the years. Even in years of depression or recession, when the urban economy in Europe was severely hit – much more than the rural – urban income in India increased faster than that in rural areas. Inequality in terms of social dimensions of development and access to basic amenities became even sharper. The present government is possibly considering scrapping of the major urban missions that is Jawaharlal Nehru National Urban Renewal Mission (JNNURM) and Rajiv Awas Yojana (RAY) or changing their thrust and design so that these benefit the small and medium towns in the country, which will help extending the political base of the ruling party. To my mind, this will be a desirable shift in the context of balanced regional development as these missions were biased in favour of 65 large cities in the country and led to increase in rural-urban inequality. I have been strongly critical of these two missions and hope alternate missions replacing these are launched immediately that can promote growth of a large number of small and medium towns by strengthening their infrastructure base and housing conditions. This would go a long way in bridging the rural-urban divide and promoting more inclusive development in the country.

One major criticism of the Gujarat model of development, which is very proudly mentioned by the Prime Minister, has been that it has ignored health, education and other social concerns. Evidently, he has been quick to learn from this. He has been emphasizing the need to address these social deficits and particularly by meeting these into rural areas. Even the President's speech underlines this point.

A major issue before the government is how to address the deprivations of the Muslim community and their grievances. A Committee under the chairpersonship of Justice Sachar

submitted its report in 2006 which brought out serious socioeconomic deprivation of the Muslims and recommended a set of policy measures. Another committee has been set up just before four months of the election to review the implementation of Sachar Committee recommendations and assess the improvements in the conditions of the Muslims and I have been appointed as its chairperson. Let me present some of the results of the statistical analysis, undertaken by the committee.

The analysis of consumption expenditure and poverty done by our Committee shows that Muslims are better off than SC/ST population in rural areas. That is basically because most of them are not agricultural labourers but artisans and they make somewhat better earnings. However, consumption expenditure among them is less than that of non-Muslim, non-SC/ST population. Understandably, their poverty level is less than SC/ST but much higher than upper caste Hindu population. Also, it is noted that the rate of improvement in this, during the past decade of high economic growth, has not been higher than that of the average rural population in the country. We conclude that Sachar made no difference to their relative poverty levels and relative socio-economic conditions.

The situation in urban areas is more alarming. Urban Muslims are in a much worse situation not only compared to the upper caste Hindus but also the SC/ST population as many among the latter come to urban centres, after obtaining jobs through reservation. Improvement in the wellbeing as a result of shift from rural areas to large cities or small towns is the least in case of the Muslims. What is worrying is that the absolute increase in real consumption expenditure has been the least for the Muslims. Aravind Paragaria of Columbia University, in his paper for the World Bank, claims exactly the opposite result. This is because the scholar used a price index other than what was recommended by the Tendulkar Committee for computing poverty. Also, he calculates the growth rate in consumption rather than absolute increase in consumption in per capita terms. The expenditure base being low for Muslims, they record rapid rise in their consumption expenditure. Our analysis shows that Muslim deprivation is very high in urban labour market, housing market and credit market and things have become worse in recent years.

To conclude, am I scared regarding the future of the country because of the victory of right wing politics? Indeed, I see a panic reaction among my Muslim colleagues and friends, among left secular democratic scholars and administrators. I see in their discourse an expression of serious apprehension. I know, many of them are already in to signature campaigns, organising demonstrations, conventions to save the country from an imminent disaster. I can't help saying they are not showing respect for the democratic traditions in the country. Democracy means the power to dismiss the government; not the power to dismiss the people. I certainly cannot stand in line with them till the time I see the real apprehension of people losing their right of dissention, which their protests show have not been curtailed so far. I do think it will be very difficult for any government to snatch away this right in the present socio-political context of the country.

Once, when the situation was volatile in Bihar during Independence movement, MK Gandhi was asked by Muslim political leaders to come forward and make a joint declaration,

giving a guarantee for certain norms of behavior. Gandhi declared that political leaders are in no position to give the assurance. It is the people who would stand firm and not allow things to get out of hand. Indeed, they can give this guarantee. The country has great tradition and it can deal with a few individuals or change the individuals.

I am not pessimistic like the journalist economist John Eliot who authored a book called „Implosion“ and predicted that India will be destroyed not through explosion but of a process of contraction. He talks of Chalta hai attitude, attitude of tolerance, jugad framework of finding short term solutions for survival that will be responsible for the Implosion. I see no such danger. My empirical sense tells me that the country is already in the process of coming out of it. The process is likely to be expedited if Modi provides the right kind of leadership and keeps the extreme elements of his party in control. We have no reason to feel dispirited. The history, culture and social ethos are much stronger than individuals and political parties. This is true for the European Union. This is true for India as well.

IV. Turbulences in India's Path of Democratization

Matthias Gsänger

This essay is about a developing democracy in a developing society. From that point of view, democratization is an evolutionary, conflictuous, and experimental process with often contradictory course in which concepts of political thought, institutions, practices, and their interplay as well, play a vital role. Those courses and possible institutional learning going along with them are the central topic in this essay. In the beginning, I will state the position that such a dynamic and systemic perspective is superior to a static one where the success of democratization is alone dependent on the presence of some defined prerequisites. Some considerations on the meaning of the notion “democracy” and on potential “problems” that could lay in the course of democratization generally and in the Indian case particularly will follow. In the final part, I will look at some recent events of the democratization process in the state of Bihar

Processes of democratization are always endangered to fail, not only in the Global South. They often did so in 20th century Europe. The first German democratic experiment ended up in sheer disaster. Interestingly, the second one is just of the same age as the Indian Union. Both the democracy of the Federal Republic and the democracy of India succeeded. But while in Germany in the 1960s everyone felt happy to assert that “Bonn isn't Weimar”, not all scholars were so sure about the future of India's democracy. “The preconditions associated with the origins of democracy in the United States and Europe, ranging from the prior formation of a nation-state, a homogenous population, an industrial economy, a strong middleclass, and shared traditions of civic culture were notably absent in 1950 when India first became democratic, secular republic” (Frankel 2000, p. 2). From that perspective, the endurance of the Indian democracy remains difficult to explain. An answer to the problem probably lies in a different view onto the story told about the origins of democracies in Europe.

Looking for example at the history of the 3rd Republic of France and the development of democracy, we find some parallels but also important differences with regard to modern India. Not all of the preconditions, mentioned by Francine Frankel, were present in the France of 1871. At that time we find a republican elite taking over a pre-existing state in a mostly rural society (with an economy that was at best industrializing but not industrialized), trying to transform this state and society respective to their ideals and concepts. The specific meaning they gave to the word “Nation”, for instance, was part of those concepts and had to be implemented first through centralized curricula and compulsive education or an equally compulsive military service – a process that lasted decades. Shared traditions of civic culture were effects of such policies. They didn't exist from the outset.¹

The French republican's concepts also comprised practices aiming to politicize ever larger, formerly excluded parts of the population, turning them into citizens by holding elections,

¹ Another well known parallel from Italy is mentioned in the quote of the Italian conservative politician Massimo D'Azeglio after the Risorgimento: “We have created Italy, now we have to create Italians”.

and the devolution of political power to the local level. Achieving this, the French republic became more and more democratized. But new competing groups emerged, too, and new political concepts challenging those of the republican radicals and even the republic as a whole. These groups and concepts had to be reintegrated on a new level of political discourse. In a Machiavellian sense: the republic grew by transforming the respective conflicts. In these processes, the primal elite was losing its formally hegemonic position

Following an argument by Rajeev Bhargava, we herein find another parallel to India. In his terms, “democracy came to India as nationalism” (Bhargava 2000, p. 26). And in the sense of the Indian founding fathers, the notion implemented universal franchise (pp. 52-53). It can be and is widely valued as a success of this concept that India has experienced a similar expansion of democracy intimately connected with the institution of universal franchise “as individuals and groups that were either marginalized or doubly disadvantaged have come into their own as political subjects” (Chandhoke/Kumar 2013, p. 21). The ever increasing voter turnout is also an indicator for this success.

A hypothesis that can be drawn out of this: Developing democracies are not necessarily dependent on pre-existing conditions to get off the ground, but can also rely on practices and institutions able to produce and reproduce needful resources (like confidence in democratic institutions) in their very cultural and socio-economic environment themselves. Obviously, “universal franchise” conformed to this requirement.²

Nevertheless, the “coming into their own as political subjects” of marginalized groups also reveals problematic and contradictory effects. To discuss such effects, I will pick events from the state of Bihar in the years from 1990 to 2014 as the central theme. Before portraying these events, however, it is necessary to make some notes about the notion “democracy” and what could therefore count as “problems” in processes of democratization. Of course, it would be too simple to use a meager concept of “liberal democracy” reduced to free voting for government. Such downsizing is to be eschewed not only because it squanders all the richness of the liberal tradition but also because “liberal democracy” is only one possible attractor of democratization. If we are looking to Europe, we find a more complex attractor of at least three central points where the democratization processes were (and are) circling around. Beside “liberal democracy” there are “republican democracy” and “social democracy” as concepts as well. “Democracy” is always a hybrid notion formed by specific persons, in concrete situations.

Surely, there are some basic characteristics common to all concepts of modern democracy that have to be used as measure. To these I count sovereignty of the people (where the people is a community of equals) and the quality of being a form of transpersonal abstract rule (for example the rule of law), so that for instance patronage as a personal form of rule definitely is impossible.

But to apply a really suitable measure, we have to take into account the specific elements the Indian founding fathers ascribed to the notion “democracy” in their discourses, according

² For an explanation why see Reddy 2005.

to the aforementioned considerations. The attributes “experimental” and “evolutionary” ascribed to the process of democratization in the preliminary sentences of this essay point to the necessary role political thought plays in such processes. Political thought is practical thought answering to specific problems, the task to develop a form of democracy adequate to the Indian circumstances of that very time.

Ideas and concepts tackling such tasks are partly taken by political thinkers from some archives (in Europe for example from the republican and liberal tradition, but not alone from there), partly invented new, and often they are “post-traditional” mixtures of archival and self-invented material.³ From that perspective, one can approach the discourses leading to the Indian constitution and the constitution itself as an ethical next, stipulating “who we are”, and by which institutions and what practices we hope to achieve which objectives.

Ideas and concepts account for the variations of political institutions and policies. These have to prove their worth respective to social and economic circumstances in which they are inaugurated. And finally, from there it becomes possible to identify problems. Problems are, for instance, inconsistencies in between ideas, institutions, and practices leading to unwanted outcomes. Besides, problems are unintended negative effects resulting from institutional settings that encourage or nurture practices which run counter to basic or specific objectives of a very democracy in India or elsewhere.

For example, there is evidence that devolution of political power by inaugurating the institutions of Panchayati Raj⁴ sometimes leads to an increase of patronage on the local level related to the distribution of “Below Poverty Line“ (BPL) cards⁵ (Sadanandan 2012). Or the “coming into their own as political subjects” of rural folks who are taking their grievances to court instead of parliamentary institutions equally contributes to a de-politicization of democracy and judicialization (Randeria 2007) of politics that runs, in specific circumstances, counter to the idea of sovereignty of the people – a problem that is also asserted by Ingeborg Maus in the German case (Maus 2011, pp. 35-38).

To proceed from these general considerations to the more concrete Indian case, we have to look at some of the specific promises of Indian democracy. Here again I follow Rajeev Bhargava. Beside the already mentioned point, he states

“[...] that (b) the character of this democracy, [...], just had to be liberal not only because of its commitment to civil liberties but also because of equality and social justice; that (c) the predominantly cultural character of nationalism in India and its traditionally proclivity for recognizing the importance of collectivities forced the makers of the Constitution to move beyond individualist liberalism, in order to wrestle with the tension between group disadvantage and personal merit [...].” (Bhargava 2000, p. 26)

According to the “Nehruvian consensus” this commitment to equality and social justice should be met by combat against poverty through advancing an industrialized self-sufficient

³ We should not be surprised to find other hybrids of the notion “democracy” with elements from other cultural archives in India.

⁴ The Indian version of local government.

⁵ The possession of such a card gives a poor family access to specific welfare programs.

economy based on import substituting production (Stein 2010, p. 399). By economic development, so it was believed, not only class inequalities would fade away but also those of caste. Therefore, the main features to counter the problem of group disadvantage in this sense were the reservation of special rights to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes regarding access to higher education, admission to Civil Service, and reservation of seats in parliament.

Here, the Nehruvian left would have done more, if it had the necessary power resources. A crucial theme in India, for instance, was land reform that could have had the effect of improving the situation of poor small farmers and increasing the productivity of fertile soil as well as breaking patronage power of big landowners that were more interested in keeping their sharecroppers down than to enlarge profit gained from their property (Witsoe 2013, p. 39; Robin 2009, p. 70). Nehru, however, had to bow to conservative parts of the Congress under Patel to the effect that private property appropriated by the state should be compensated so that any redistributive land reform would become too expensive to be implemented (Stein 2010, p. 360).

Thus, the social and power structures on the rural level kept widely intact, notwithstanding the abolition of the zamindar-system. The rural landowning elites, stemming from forward castes, served as the Congress Party's personnel that for long dominated the political process. Moreover, the Indian Civil Service was dominated by members of the same forward castes, too, because of their superior access to English education. That's the background of the political rise of the "Other Backward Castes (OBC)".⁶ The aforementioned expanding of democracy in India rests particularly on this rise. To deal with this subject, I will look at some processes in Bihar, as already mentioned.

"[...] from the point of view of the gradual political empowerment of the backward classes, Bihar can be considered as the most 'progressive' state of the Hindi belt. The percentage of upper caste MPs returned from Bihar has declined from 56.4 in 1952 to 27.5 per cent in 2004 whereas the share of the OBC MPs has jumped from 5.5 in 1952 to 37.5 per cent in 2004. As a result, Bihar is the only state of India whose government has been headed by an OBC leader for more than 15 years without any major interruption." (Robin 2009, p. 65)

There is not enough space here to explain the rise of the lower castes in Bihar in detail.⁷ I'm concentrating on events in the years from 1990 to 2014 and the politics eagerly tied with the names of Laloo Prasad Yadav and Nitish Kumar, both stemming from OBC background (Laloo being a Yadav and Nitish a Kurmi). It is an impressive example of the contradictory courses democratization sometimes goes. In 1990, Laloo Prasad became chief minister as the head of the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), a federation of anti-Congress factions. Like most OBC politicians he propagated the subject of "social justice" – meaning equality and opportunity for socioeconomic advancement. But to Laloo, success in the elections didn't obviously mean (re-)programming government in the classical liberal meaning. Different from the case

⁶ All castes that are neither of brahman or kshatriya status nor scheduled castes or tribes fall under this denomination.

⁷ This is done in Robin 2009 and Witsoe 2013.

of “universal franchise”, the upper-caste dominated state institutions of Bihar with their patronage politics had failed to evoke trust in them. Winning an election just meant to gain power. The RJD government did not even attempt to transform the system of patronage politics of the Congress-elite.

“[...] RJD leaders often were explicit about their patronage transactions. Backward-caste leaders highlighted the ways in which the discretionary allocation of state resources had reinforced upper-caste hegemony, and they sought to use patronage politics to benefit their own constituencies.” (Witsoe 2013, p. 187)

Highly problematically, their politics were “not based on notions of universal justice but on the desire for the compensation for past wrongs” (Chandhoke/Kumar 2013, p. 40). Because RJD leaders profoundly distrusted the official administration, they actually bypassed it altogether. The aforementioned benefits for their constituency were dealt by a parallel institution, a network of influential men that effectively mediated ordinary people’s access to government (Witsoe 2013, p. 189). The distrust in state institutions eventually led to an explicit departure from Congress’ development scheme wherefore such institutions were needed; Bihar fell back economically. Interestingly, the RJD was reelected in 1995, last but not least because at that time the subject of acknowledgment obviously weighted more heavily in the discourse of social justice than that of redistribution.

But tables turned in the end. The new institutional features showed deficits. In the first place members of the Yadav-caste profited from the system and people from even more backward castes did not. They weren’t able to get foothold in the Yadav’s networks. The following hypotheses can be drawn from this: Because of their lack of social capital (in the sense of Bourdieu) needed to find their footing in the RJD government’s networks (as well as other forms of capital) these groups rather depended on the institutional performance of an uncorrupt and responsive administration to meet their aspirations for socioeconomic advancement (see Bose 2013, p. 101). Or to put it more simply: An unbiased administration under transpersonal rule of law is a more effective institution for granting social justice than personal networks.

These groups, disadvantaged by the RJD system, finally helped Nitish Kumar, leading the Janata Dal-United, into the office of chief minister in 2005. In 2010, he was reelected leading an alliance consisting of the JD-U and the BJP, winning 206 of 243 constituencies. Nitish again followed an explicit development course for Bihar, and a revival of a reformed bureaucracy. His government both invested in infrastructure like roads as well as in education “with a special emphasis on getting girls to attend and stay in school” (p. 104). It also raised the proportion of seats reserved for women in the Panchayati Raj councils to 50 percent. On the eve of the state elections 2010, he showed himself convinced “that the caste factor will be relegated to the backseat. [...] This time the people will rise above caste considerations to vote for development-centric policies” (p. 105).

Does that mean that the story came to a happy end with a deepened democracy within constitutional institutions? This can be the case, as Jeffrey Witsoe asserts:

“[...] while these two political projects appear contradictory [...] over the long durée they unfolded as alternating phases of a single process. [...] despite of all very visible shortcomings of India’s democracy that are nowhere more visible than in Bihar, this may all be part of a distinctly postcolonial but very real trajectory of democratization that continues to unfold in unexpected directions.” (Witsoe 2013, p. 204)

I do agree with that, but there are problems remaining and open questions that Witsoe also acknowledges. For completing a problem-solving process, a positive test on the derived hypotheses is necessary, particularly if the normative conclusion shall be derived from that experience that a specific institutional form of democracy is not only desired by some people in some circumstances, but desirable in general (in the sense of John Dewey). So it is all but secure that the strengthened representation of women by enlarging their reservation in the Panchayati Raj councils does actually mean additional empowerment (Patnaik 2013). Furthermore, it is not clear whether the developmental policy of Nitish Kumar will help to uplift the depressed classes. As both Bose and Witsoe argue, land reform for the benefit of the very poor is still out of sight because Nitish’s junior partner, the BJP with its upper-caste support, won’t accept that (Bose 2013, p. 107; Witsoe 2013, p. 198). The story is to be continued.

References

- Bhargava, Rajeev. 2000. Democratic Vision of a New Republic: India, 1950. In *Transforming India*, eds. Francine Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava and Balveer Arora, 26-59. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Bose, Sumantra. 2013. *Transforming India: Challenges to the World’s Largest Democracy*. New Delhi: Harvard University Press.
- Chandhoke, Neera and Rajesh Kumar. 2013. Indian Democracy: Cognitive Maps. In *Indian Democracy (Political Science 2)*, ed. K.C. Suri, 17-52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Frankel, Francine. 2000. Contextual Democracy: Intersections of Society, Culture and Politics in India. In *Transforming India*, eds. Francine Frankel, Zoya Hasan, Rajeev Bhargava and Balveer Arora, 1-25. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Maus, Ingeborg, 2011: *Über Volkssouveränität. Elemente einer Demokratietheorie*. Frankfurt/M: suhrkamp.
- Patnaik, Pratyusna. 2013. Does Political Representation Ensure Empowerment? Scheduled Tribes in Decentralized Local Governments of India. In *Journal of South Asian Development* 8 (1): 27-60.
- Randeria, Shalini. 2007. De-politicization of Democracy and Judicialization of Politics. In *Theory, Culture & Society* 24 (4): 38-44.
- Reddy, Sanjay. 2005. A Rising Tide of Demands: India’s Public Institutions and the Democratic revolution. In *Public Institutions in India*, eds. Devesh Kapur and Pratap Metha, 457-475. New Delhi: Oxford University Press
- Robin, Cyril. 2009. Bihar: The New Stronghold of OBC Politics. In *Rise of the Plebeians: The Changing Face of Indian Legislative Assemblies* eds. Christophe Jaffrelot and Sanjay Kumar, 65-102. New Delhi: Routledge.

- Sadanandan, Anoop. 2012. Patronage and Decentralization. The Politics of Poverty in India. In *Comparative Politics* 45 (1): 211-228.
- Stein, Burton. 2010. *A History of India*. 2nd edition. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Witsoe, Jeffrey. 2013. *Democracy Against Development: Low-Caste Politics and Political Modernity in Postcolonial India*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

V. India – an Emerging Economic Power and its Foreign Policy: A Perspective

S. Shaji

Debates on India's foreign policy in the contemporary times have evoked increased responses across the world; especially since the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government came to power at the centre¹ in May 2014. Such responses have been emerging mainly because of the coming into power of BJP, a centre-right party from India's political spectrum, at the centre after a gap of a decade where in BJP itself has absolute majority on its own within the alliance of NDA. In this context, the current paper analyses India's foreign policy, especially its economic dimensions, under the BJP led-National Democratic Front (NDA) - the ruling coalition, by locating it in the overall context of foreign policy shift which began in the early 1990s under the expanding processes of globalisation. The first part of the paper analyses the overall shift/changes of India's foreign policy since 1990s while the second part deals with the analysis of 'continuities and changes' in the practise of foreign policy by the current Government in New Delhi.

India: An Emerging Power

In the present times, India is being viewed as a major pole in the configuration of the emerging global balance of power by out siders as well as Indians themselves (Pant 2009, p. 1). Along with India, states such as China, Brazil and South Africa have evolved as emerging powers and are perceived to be the major poles in the current architecture of international relations (Russia is also added to this league, especially in the economic arena though it has been a well-established military power for a long time). Out of these states, India and China have pre-eminent positions in the league of emerging powers. As far as India is concerned, there are several reasons which make it a major pole in the current architecture of international relations. For instance, Indian economy is the one which belongs to the league of fast growing ones with an annual growth rate of 7.5 (expected for the current financial year) (Economic Times 2015). After the United States (US) and China, India is the third largest economy in the world. It is one the largest functional democracies in the world with around 550 million (Sify 2014) voted in India's general elections to the national parliament which was held April-May 2014. India has one of the largest pools of scientists and engineers while Indian 'soft power' at the international arena is well recognized across the world. In addition, India is one of the biggest military powers in the world which acquired the status of a de facto nuclear weapon state in late Nineties. As far as India's position in South Asia is concerned, it is the largest state accounting for 75 percent of the population of region. It also has more than 70 percent of the total GDP share of the region and around seventy five per cent of the total Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowing into the region. Against this backdrop, such indicators of India's economy and polity are reflected in India's foreign policy which underwent radical changes

¹ It denotes central government (level of federal government).

since early 1990s. Such Changes are broadly in tune with rapidly unfolding processes of the new wave of globalisation which unfolded since late eighties cutting across nation-states.

India's Foreign policy locating in era of Globalisation

As mentioned earlier, India's foreign policy has to be located in the broader context of globalisation which has spread all across the world with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and subsequent collapse of Cold War binaries at the global level. In order to make sense of the intricate linkages between globalisation vis-à-vis India's foreign policy, we need to examine the process of globalisation in its conceptual and empirical aspects. According to Roland Robertson, globalisation as a concept refers to both the compression of the world and the intensification of consciousness of the world as a whole (Robertson 1992, p. 8). At the systemic level, such process of globalisation makes the international boundaries blurred. The interdependence and linkages under globalisation is eroding the boundaries between states and international system, which in turn makes the outer lines of domestic and foreign policy merge to a point where they become difficult to separate. As a result, the process of globalisation has started integrating, transnational capitalist class and global organisation of production and finance at the global level. All these processes have been affected by the onset of neo-liberalism² under capitalism. In fact, in the period of globalisation, capitalism has emerged as a system to promote the notion of globalisation. Capitalism as a world system rests on the private/corporate ownership of the means of production. Thanks to its resilience as well as capacity to reproduce itself through accumulation of capital, capitalism has emerged as the dominant mode of development after the Cold War (Harshe 1998, pp. 24-25). Such a model has been widely accepted by states which were hitherto following different models, in order to address their development issues/crises.

To address issues pertaining to the development issues/crises in developing countries such as poverty, high rate of unemployment, industrial backwardness and so on, neo-liberals have offered technology acquisition and influx of FDI as solutions. In order to acquire these resources, they advocate the entry of global corporations into developing states' markets and FDI from developed states. International institutions such as International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), and World Trade Organisation (WTO) supported this posture of globalisation through their policies pertaining to developing states. In fact, the process of globalisation, thus supported by the global financial and trade bodies, acquired momentum with the advent of information technology, communication technology, transportation technology and new advanced materials (Shaji S. 2009).

All these developments in the global arena brought about a change in the economies of the states across the world, including India. Therefore, India had to initiate economic reforms because of numerous domestic and external compulsions. Domestic compulsions include dismal performance of public sector enterprises, absence of advanced technologies in the production system, lack of export oriented FDI coupled with deep financial crisis (in the late 80s

² In general, neo-liberalism stands for application of market, competition, individual choices and the rolling back of the State from production and service provisions.

and early 90s). External compulsions include the changed international relations following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the consequent ascent of neo-liberal capitalism as a dominant model of development around the world. In order to cope with this situation, India ushered in a range of reforms to overhaul its domestic economic settings through privatisation and marketization of the economy in an unprecedented scale. In sum, such an economic ambience has necessitated redefining and refashioning certain attributes of India's foreign policy to resurrect its economy and acquire advanced technology for improving its economy.

Contextualising India's Foreign Policy since 1990s

The early 1990s marked radical shifts in Indian economy as the country began to introduce economic reforms³ in its domestic front by reforming its economy, which comprised a series of policy reforms which had implications for countries' monetary, trade, service and infrastructure sectors. Against this setting, certain changes were brought into the foreign policy of India which in turn transcended all ideological boundaries and raised certain questions on established perceptions and theories in international relations as well as the practises of foreign policy (Shaji S. 2007). The broader changes in India's foreign policy praxis have been in the realm of non-alignment,⁴ in its increased quantum of relations with major powers, striking new alliances and in the realm of regionalism (Mohan 2003). It has to be borne in mind that India by and large followed a policy of 'positive neutrality' to power politics in the Cold War by way of its emphasis on non-alignment which was in tune with the domestic economic imperatives connected to the partially planned socialist economy. In fact, there was some correlation between India's domestic economy and the policy of non-alignment during the period of Cold War.

In essence, against the changing global and domestic scenario of Nineties, economic and technological priorities became prime focal points which redefined foreign policy against the setting of a global economy which was reeling under neo-liberal globalisation. That is, economic diplomacy attained paramount significance in India's foreign policy. To bring in such a shift, India redefined its traditional foreign policy goals like non-alignment so as to acquire more technology and FDI from different states, especially from the western world. In fact, states like India was weaving counter-hegemonic strategies to neutralise the adverse impact of uneven global economy by restructuring its relations with states from western bloc and reinvigorating its traditional ties with states such as Russia while restructuring its domestic economy. Besides, India slowly built closer ties with middle-level powers such as Israel, South Africa and Brazil. Economic aspects have been crucial in these ties. Regionalism too received

³ In a way, India's economic strategy before 1990s in India was based on Nehruvian ideas on state planning and socialism. In fact, Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, formulated the socialist oriented economic strategy as part of a grand plan. The principal aim of the plan was to ensure the economic, political and foreign policy independence of India and acquisition of a major power role in the world over the long run (Nayar 2001, p. 261).

⁴ Non-alignment was the basic thrust of India's foreign policy in the cold war period. In general, non-alignment was a principle to describe the policy of keeping away from alliance, cold war and power politics between the two powers and their blocs.

a tremendous boost in the foreign policy of India since the 1990s (Mohan 2003). The essence of such arguments is that India's foreign policy has become much more 'pragmatic' and 'diversified' than what it was in Cold War period which centred explicitly on 'moralistic'/idealistic oriented one.

Such major changes/shifts in India's foreign policy can be seen in India's improved relations with various States. For instance, India struck deeper ties with United States; a state with India had lesser engagement during Cold War, as evident from Indo-US Nuclear Deal of 2008. Similarly, in the realm of trade, the bilateral trade in goods and services reached \$100 billion in spite of global recession (Teja 2014). India's trade with Europe has increased by several folds in the same period. Some relevant data shows that volume of trade grew from 28.6 billion Euros in 2003 to 72.7 billion Euros in the year 2013. Similar is the case with Indo-Japan ties. India's new found interest in South-East Asia is reflected in Look East Policy (LEP), which was introduced in the mid-Nineties. Over a period of time, China has emerged as India's largest trading partner. In addition, India has demonstrated increased vigour in joining regional and trans regional blocs such as Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO),⁵ Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional cooperation (IOR-ARC), India –Brazil South Africa Alliance (IBSA) and BRICS and so on, to name a few. In brief, attaining economic strength to acquire and sustain power in international relations has become the new focus of India's foreign policy. On the other end, India could not make greater progress in the realm of striking alliances with South Asian countries as well as achieving greater degree of cooperation among countries under the framework of South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) as South Asia remains one of the least integrated regions in the world.

The Foreign Policy of India of NDA Government and Economic Dimensions: Some Trends

National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government under Narendra Modi came to power promising that it would bring in drastic changes in the foreign policy front. The Election Manifesto of Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), dealt with foreign policy/international relations related matters in very few paragraphs in the fifty page document (for that matter, manifestos of all the political parties gave only similar levels of importance to foreign policy issues⁶). In the pre-election period, it spelt out the ideas/new policies on 'soft power, 'Brand India' and so on which, in a way, gave an impression about the foreign policy of NDA in the future.

After assuming the power BJP led NDA government began to engage in the foreign policy matters as their priorities focused mostly on smoothening relations with neighbours, especially in South Asian and South East Asian and Pacific States while continuing with the previ-

⁵ India was invited to join SCO in a meeting of SCO Summit at Ufa in Russia in July 2015 and India is expected to join by the year 2016. So far India has been a dialogue partner in the aforementioned regional organization.

⁶ An Argument put forward by scholars like Amitabh Matto in *The Hindu: A New Foreign Policy Agenda*, April 8, 2014.

ous government's policy of maintaining good relations with major powers such as United States, Russia, Japan and European Union States. Prime Minister Narendra Modi undertook around twenty foreign visits in its first year since he came to power by visiting prominent States like US, states from West Europe, Russia, Japan, China as well as South Asian states like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, Sri Lanka and so on. NDA government also added policies such as 'Para Diplomacy' (an initiative to give flexibility to cities and states/provinces to have interactions with foreign governments), 'Act East', 'Neighbourhood First' (Focus on giving more priority to deepen ties with South Asian States and China), and 'Link west' (deepen the ties with western world which include US, EU and Russia) and so on. Search economic resources and technology and market assumes prominent place in these initiatives. On the 'change side' of the foreign policy, some scholars are of the opinion that NDA government employs 'business-like approach' in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy against conventional statesman type approach of previous regimes. Similarly, another dimension of foreign policy of NDA government is its emphasis on 'diaspora communities'. This dimension carries significance in India's search for economic resources and technologies from different parts of the world as diaspora communities are economically sound in terms of their business capabilities and skilled human resources. In sum, NDA Government broadly follows the same foreign policy of India which began its journey since early 1990s, of course; there is an incremental approach embedded in it. Search for economic resources, technology and market continue to guide Indian foreign policy which forms the core of foreign policy of India under NDA government too. In such a context, overall, one can see an 'incremental change' rather than complete departure from the foreign policy which India witnessed since 1990s, as the current government by and large stick to 'continuities while retaining the essence of the foreign policy premises of previous governments. This can be due to the overarching economic structures of the contemporary economy warrant such continuities rather than allowing the government to change policies drastically. However, one year is too early a period to draw concrete conclusions though one can see some early trends.

Concluding Remarks

India has emerged as a major power in the global arena in the Post-Cold War period (since 1990s). India, a country which followed 'idealistic'/'moralistic' orientation in its foreign policy turned 'pragmatic' in the post-Cold War period. Under the unfolding processes of globalization, India redefined its policy of non-alignment and involved with deeper multifarious engagement with major powers while developing ties with new powers. These changes were largely the reflections of changing domestic economic settings after the reforms were introduced in the early 1990s. Regionalism too has received enormous attention in the foreign policy of India in the same period. Economic aspects have begun to take centre stage in India's external engagements by way of increased application of the 'economic diplomacy' in the contemporary period. In way, all the government which came to power since 1990s by and large followed essence of the foreign policy of India since the Nineties while governments

from time to time bringing in 'incremental' approach while dealing with foreign policy matters. The current government of NDA by and large follows similar pattern.

References

- Economic Times. 2015. *The World bank Pegs Economic growth at 7.5 in 2015-2016*. <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/indicators/world-bank-pegs-indias-gdp-growth-at-7-5-in-2015-16/articleshow/4708461>. Accessed 25.07.2015.
- Mohan Raja, C. 2003. *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy*. New Delhi: Penguin/Viking.
- Nayar, Baldev Raj and T.V Paul. 2004. *India in the World Order: Searching For Major Major-Power Status*. New Delhi: Cambridge University Press.
- Nayar, Baldev Raj. 2001. *Globalisation and Nationalism: The Changing Balance in India's Economic Policy 1950-2000*. New Delhi: Sage Publications.
- Pant V., Harsh, ed. 2009. *Indian foreign Policy in a Unipolar World*. New Delhi: Routledge.
- Rajen Harshe.. 1998. The Challenges of Globalisation and India: Some Reflections. In *Globalisation and South Asian States*, ed. Ramesh Babu, 24-25. New Delhi: South Asian Publishers.
- Robertson, Roland. 1992. *Globalisation: Social Theory and Global Culture*. London: Sage Publications.
- Shaji S. 2007. *Transfer of Technology and India's Foreign Policy : A Study on Changing Trends since 1990s*, unpublished PhD dissertation, submitted to University of Hyderabad.
- Shaji S. 2009. Transfer of Technology and Foreign Policy of India: Unfolding Strategies during the Era of Reforms. In *ICFAI Journal of Governance and Public Policy*, IV (1): 49-61.
- Sify. 2014. *India's general election vote count begins*. <http://www.sify.com/news/india-s-general-election-vote-count-begins-news-national-ofqiuxgiciasi.html>. Accessed 20.07.2015.
- Sinha, Atish and Madhup Mohta, eds. 2007. *Indian foreign Policy: Challenges and Opportunities*. New Delhi: Foreign Service Institute.
- Teja, Jaskaran. 2014. *United States-India: Enhancing a Strategic Partnership*, *American Foreign Policy Interests*, 36 (3): 183-194.

VI. India as a Member of BRICS and its Relations with South Africa

Aparajita Biswas

“BRIC” – Brazil, Russia, India and China – coined by Goldman-Sachs, and now referred to as “BRICS” with the addition of South Africa, was destined to be a buzzword. Since its inception in 2009, BRICS member states have been regularly holding conferences and discussing issues of global importance at the multilateral level. BRICS is gaining popularity because it is not only conceptually new but it has given a potential alternative power concept. The rise of emerging powers such as China, India and Brazil vis-a-vis traditional powers of USA and Europe is a reality, making the world less Western and more ideologically diverse. Moreover, the high economic growth rates of emerging powers even amidst the slowdown of developed economies has become a cause of concern about the existing world order, for the Western powers.

At the BRICS Summit held in Fortaleza, Brazil, in July 2014, the forming of a joint development bank – the BRICS Development Bank – was formally proposed. This comes against the backdrop of significant concern of BRICS member states regarding a Western dominated international financial order and monetary systems. The creation of the Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is of greater significance, due to its ability to assist BRICS member states to escape the conditionalities and/or sanctions of the IMF.

It may be noted that the first decade of the 21st century saw unprecedented global scenarios, first in the rise of China as a major international player, and subsequently India, Brazil and a few other middle income developing countries. Secondly, these new international players were showing increasing interest on Africa. Thirdly, Africa is gradually emerging in the centre stage of the world economy, especially since it is the third fastest growing region in the world, after the Middle East and Asia.

More recently, Africa’s outlook as the “hopeless continent”, to quote *The Economist* from a decade ago, has been replaced by a more upbeat perception of “Africa Rising”, or “Lions on the Move”. The confidence in Africa as the next frontier of growth stems from a number of socio-economic factors that are already beginning to emerge. The first of these is its demographic trajectory. By 2050, one in four people in the world will live in Africa, or just over two billion people. The second major socio-economic trend is that of urbanization which is on the rise worldwide. It is estimated that by 2025 more than 50% of Africa’s population will be living in cities, as compared to 40% today. Projections by McKinsey show that consumer industries such as retail, telecom and banking, and infrastructure development, agriculture and resources, will be worth \$2.6 trillion annually by 2020. The third related factor is the rise of the African middle class. The middle class is characterised as a household with an income of more than \$20,000 per year. Nevertheless, it is estimated that by 2020 consumer spending will increase to nearly \$1 trillion from its current \$ 600 billion.

The three points above highlight the opportunities that exist beyond the stereotypical understanding of Africa. This is not just because of the commodity boom and the rise of China

and India, but also the result of some of the difficult macro-economic adjustments made by many countries, as well as greater political stability, following the broadening of the political space.

Now the question arises as to why BRICS countries are interested in engaging in African countries so extensively. The answer lies in the fact that they need Africa's natural resources like oil, gold, precious metals, coal and vast markets that are crucial for their emerging economies. For example, India wants to diversify the source of its oil imports and is therefore looking towards African oil. Presently India gets 20% of its oil from oil-rich African countries. It is the same scenario for China, Brazil, South Africa and Russia. The investments of all these countries in Africa have increased considerably. In fact, the largest increase in FDI to Africa in recent years has come from BRICS. Moreover, India, China and Brazil have significant assistance programmes ranging from aid, export and investment opportunities to debt cancellation in Least Developed Countries (LDCs). On the BRICS platform, Russia along with the emerging regional powers, is becoming increasingly active and vocal on the world stage, for the impending reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions and the United Nations system and, ultimately, international governance. The key difference between developed and emerging market investors like BRICS member states is that the latter regard Africa as critical to sustaining their own growth, whereas the former see it as a potential future market to be developed further.

Africa also has benefited from investments of emerging economies in terms of trade, in the backdrop of the increase of prices of primary commodities. The GDP of most African countries has also improved. The continent once described by World Bank and IMF as the "hopeless continent" now enjoys the more upbeat perception of "Africa Rising". A World Bank report published in March 2011 stated that "Africa could be on the brink of an economic take off, much like China was 30 years ago, and India 20 years ago".

Having said this, the paper would like to concentrate on India- South Africa relations. Relations date back to the 1860s when the first Indian indentured labour landed in South Africa to work in the sugar plantations, to replace slaves. A second wave of Indians came after 1880. These Indians were the "passenger Indians" – so called because they paid their fares as passengers on board a steamship bound for South Africa. This was the community of traders who mainly hailed from Gujarat. Today, the South African Indian origin community numbers around 1.5 million and constitutes about 3% of South Africa's total population. The year 2010 marked the 150th anniversary of the first arrival of Indians in South Africa.

Mahatma Gandhi played an important role in connecting India and Africa. His philosophy appealed to people across the world, especially to African leaders. Gandhi who had gone to South Africa as a professional lawyer, suffered racial discrimination and spent 20 years in the country to fight discrimination. It was there that he created his concept of Satyagraha, a non-violent way of protesting against injustice. His experience in South Africa shaped his political ideology in later years. In turn "he had a profound impact on the history of the continent, with his work in South Africa paving the way for his more important work in his homeland".

India was in the forefront of the anti-apartheid movement led by Nelson Mandela. It was the first country to break trade relations and impose a complete embargo on South Africa for its apartheid policy. At that time, India had substantial trade relations with South Africa. Formal diplomatic and consular relations with South Africa were restored in November 1993, only after the dismantlement of apartheid. India was also the first to bring up the issue of apartheid on the agenda of the United Nations. Over the next five decades, it provided continuous moral, material, financial and diplomatic support to the anti-apartheid movement. It also provided financial and material aid to the liberation struggle not directly but through multilateral institutions like the OAU, the UN Fund for Namibia, UN Educational and Training Programme for South Africa and through the Action for Resisting Invasion, Colonialism and Apartheid (AFRICA) Fund. The AFRICA Fund was established by NAM under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi's leadership in 1986, to assist frontline states and liberation movements in South Africa and Namibia. India re-established diplomatic ties with South Africa in November 1993 only after apartheid had come to an end.

Mandela acknowledged his special relationship with India by visiting the country in 1990, only a few months after being released from jail. In fact, India was his first destination abroad as a leader of the South African Congress. India reciprocated with the same warmth when it awarded Mandela the Bharat Ratna, the first non-Indian to receive the highest civilian award of India. His next visit to India was in 1995, as the first non-white president of South Africa. During his tenure from 1994 to 1999, he drove close relations with India and the two countries forged bonds over groupings like IBSA and BRICS. In 2001, the Indian government awarded Mandela the Gandhi Peace Prize for his "exemplary work for promotion of peace and non-violence". In his acceptance address, Mandela acknowledged his indebtedness to Gandhi when he said, "I could never reach the standard of morality, simplicity and love for the poor set by the Mahatma... While Gandhi was a human without weaknesses, I am a man of many weaknesses."

The first truly democratic election in South Africa had substantial implications for the South African Indian community. Although Indians constitute less than 3 per cent of the population of South Africa, they enjoy a high profile in the ANC hierarchy. In fact, as President, Mandela included six Indians in his cabinet of 16 members, which in a way was over-representation of the community at the executive level. Moreover, there were more than 40 members of Indian origin in South Africa's first democratic parliament. When someone complained about this to Mandela, he is said to have answered, "Yes, that is greater than their share in the population, but less than proportionate to their contribution to the struggle."

People also remember the South African of Indian origin, Ahmed Kathrada's involvement in the anti-apartheid activities of the ANC which led to his long-term imprisonment at Robben Island, following the Rivona trial. Others like Abdul Kader Asmal, Fatima Meer, were all prominent activists in the anti-apartheid regime.

There is a strong economic relationship between India and South Africa, with the two countries cooperating in various ways, including through the IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa) forum and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and G20 group-

ing. South Africa is important to India for various reasons, being a sophisticated, diverse and promising emerging market globally. It has a stable economy and enjoys political stability too. It has a big industrial infrastructure – including a modern transport network, widely available energy, and sophisticated telecommunications facilities. It also has a vibrant financial sector. Moreover, South Africa has three of the largest urban agglomerations in Africa (Johannesburg, which is also the financial hub of Africa, Cape Town and Durban, two important port cities). All three are significant entry points for consumer businesses and are also important because of their infrastructure and connectivity into the region.

Moreover, South Africa is already the headquarters of the Africa operations of a number of multinationals. The lifestyle, stable political and economic platform, and the hard and soft infrastructure make the country attractive for expatriates, as well as easy for directing business operations. A brief discussion of the economic relations between South Africa and India will show that in some ways India does regard South Africa as a gateway and as a base for doing business on the continent. Of course, this does not mean that Indian companies carry on their commercial activity in the continent only through South Africa.

Trade between the two countries has been growing steadily, although both sides have greater potential for growth than what has been achieved to date. South Africa is also the largest export market in the continent for India, accounting for over 22% of India's merchandise goods. According to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, total two-way trade amounted to US\$ 13.18 billion in 2012-13. India's most valuable exports to South Africa are pharmaceuticals, organic chemicals, articles of plastics, iron and steel etc. and South Africa's most valuable export to India has been coal and gold. Other items include 'inorganic chemicals, precious metal compound, isotopes' or more recently 'mineral fuels, oils, distillation products, etc.'

Although South Africa does not have a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with India, nevertheless, two-way investment has also grown over the years. At present there are 66 Indian business organisations in South Africa, according to a report of Confederation of Indian Industry. Some of South Africa's key companies have a presence in India, including Sasol, First National Bank and the Airports Company South Africa. Indian companies in South Africa include Tata Motors, Mahindra, United Breweries, Dr Reddy's, Kirloskar and Dabur. To boost trade and investment, India has taken several measures, including an important initiative for preferential trade agreement between India and South African Customs Union. The India-South Africa CEOs' Forum was also set up to improve commercial interaction.

Besides trade and commerce, India has a development assistance programme in South Africa. In the field of higher education, a number of South African universities have established links with counterpart institutions in India. There is also an institutionalized arrangement for a South African academic to occupy the Nelson Mandela Chair funded by ICCR at the Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi.

To sum up, there is substantial opportunity for strengthening of economic relations between India and the African continent, given their development trajectories in the future. South Africa can be a dynamic pivot in the blossoming of this relationship, although it faces

constraints. First, its gateway status to Africa is by no means secure, with African rivals laying claim to their own gateway advantages. Second, while India is an important partner for SA in “clubs” and in global forums, the two countries are as much competitors as they are collaborators in the continent. They both seek markets in Africa for trade and investment, and South Africa is not always seen as the essential springboard into Africa by Indian companies or others. The other issue which I have not discussed in my presentation is China’s enormous engagements and influence in South Africa which would cause concern in the near future in facilitating relations between India and South Africa.

VII. The EU-India Strategic Partnership: Achievements, Shortcomings, Prospects

Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet

In 2004, India and the European Union have jointly upgraded their long lasting relations from a development aid agenda to to a full-fledged strategic partnership. Amongst all the bilateral strategic partnerships the EU has concluded in recent years with emerging powers such as China, Brazil, South Korea, or Mexico, the one with India could well reveal as the most promising one as it binds together the world's largest democracy and the second largest. Their shared commitment to democracy allegedly constitutes a like-mindedness that may justify to label India and the European Union as "natural partners" (Wagner 2008, p. 103).

In practice, however, the EU-India strategic partnership has so far failed to engender convincing results because of contradictory or unrealistic expectations and misinterpretations of the partner's policy priorities and capacities on both sides.

In the following, I first will give a short overview of the structure, contents and goals of the EU-India strategic partnership and, second, I will try to explain some reasons of the partnership's multiple shortcomings. Finally, I will shortly sketch some prospects for the future of EU-India relations.

EU-India strategic partnership: structure, contents and goals

"Bilateral partnerships between major global and regional powers are an increasingly important and central feature of international relations. Bilateral partnerships between this type of actors try to contribute to the creation of a sustainable future world order which has become multipolar and coined by global competition with regard to economic growth perspectives, values and goals to be achieved on the international stage. Strategic partnerships therefore are aiming at handling multipolarity among a growing number of relevant actors; they try to achieve a minimum of stability and reliability challenged by multipolarity." (Grevi 2011, p. 4)

Simultaneously to the EU's strive for greater international actorness, it has deployed this new foreign policy instrument over the last two decades or so, concluding bilateral strategic partnerships with ten countries of major international importance.¹ Following Thomas Renard, the EU's preferred partners can reasonably be categorized as "essential" partners with regard mainly to the USA, as "natural" partners like, for instance, Canada or Japan, or as "pivotal" partners such as particularly Russia and China and – to a lesser degree – Brazil and India (Renard 2011, p. 23).

The 2004 decision to upgrade the existing relations between India and the EU to a strategic partnership fits perfectly well into the above quoted conceptual patterns. Indeed, just like the EU, India has – over the last decades – developed into an international actor of a growing

¹ Furthermore, the EU maintains inter-organizational strategic partnerships with, for instance, NATO and the African Union. On the EU's strategic partnerships as an increasingly important sector of EU foreign policy, see Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet/Rüger 2015, chapter 4.6.2.

weight who is actively and increasingly articulating the wish and claim to get a greater say in world politics. To engage more profoundly with the rich and rather influential EU offered India the opportunity for enhanced international recognition and visibility. Noticeably enough, the founding document speaks of India as “an increasingly important international player and regional power”. The document enumerates a very large range of topics to be addressed by enhanced and intensified cooperation: conflict prevention, for instance, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the fight against international terrorism, the promotion of human rights, and the enhancement of peace, prosperity and stability in South Asia (Commission of the European Communities 2004). Typically enough for EU strategic partnerships, the strengthening of trade relations, of development cooperation including scientific and technical exchanges and transfers occupy center stage in the mutual agreement (Commission of the European Communities 2004).

In December 2005, a first Joint Action Plan (JAP) was elaborated; after a revision, the second JAP of 2008 identifies the following topics as central for the strategic partnership:

- (1) promoting peace and comprehensive security,
- (2) sustainable development,
- (3) research and technology and
- (4) people-to-people and cultural exchanges;²

Furthermore, an EU-India Joint Work Program on Energy, Clean Development and Climate Change was created and since 2006, both partners meet regularly in the framework of an India-EU dialog on human rights. Thus, the EU’s intent to engage emerging India for the sake of contributing to the establishment of a functioning multilateral world order becomes obvious. According to the EU’s general normative foreign policy approach (Manners 2002, pp. 235-258) this intentionally should include, as already mentioned, closer cooperation even in non-proliferation politics – in the Indian case an obviously rather delicate issue.³ In return, the EU has been offering broad trade relations with substantially facilitated export opportunities for Indian goods.

In 2011, the EU-India strategic partnership had been upgraded anew and institutionally enhanced with the establishment of consultations at “senior officials’ level“. This new cooperation structure works on a large agenda of foreign and security policy issues and, furthermore, is charged with the preparation of ministerial meetings and the annually held EU-India summit meetings (EEAS 2011, p. 19).

Without any doubt, trade forges the cornerstone of the EU-India strategic partnership. Indeed, trade relations between India and the EU have tripled in the last decade. With a trade volume of 78.9 billion euro in 2013, the EU is India’s trade partner number one, followed far

² Thus, an Erasmus Mundus program was launched which offers young Indians the opportunity to study in Europe.

³ India is a non-signatory state to the Non-Proliferation-Treaty, in force since 1970. In 1974 and 1998, however, India proceeded to nuclear weapons tests, followed by a severe sanctions regime imposed onto India by Western states. It was only in 2008 that an agreement between the USA and India was concluded which – with the support of most Western states – has brought the sanctions regime to an end.

behind by China (50.5 billion euro), the Arabic Emirates (49.9 billion euro) and the USA (47.6 billion euro). India, on the contrary, is only the ninth most important trading partner of the EU (European Commission 2015). Hence, India awaits large benefits and opportunities for its further development from its cooperation with the EU. Actually, despite very high economic growth rates over the two last decades or so, India has not yet succeeded in overcoming the huge inequalities and inequities which mold the Indian society and consist in, for instance, persisting dismal poverty of large sections of the population as well as in very poor education mainly among large sections of the female population.⁴ The negotiations on an EU-India Free Trade Agreement (FTA) conducted since 2007, however, could not yet be finalized successfully because of numerous contradictory interests at stake on both sides (Khorana/Garcia 2013, pp. 684-700).

How to explain the poor results of the EU-India strategic partnership?

More than ten years after the strategic partnership agreement between India and the EU had been struck, one cannot but recognize its rather poor, at any rate disappointing achievements. Like-mindedness and shared values are not sufficient for a solid cooperation commitment, they “do not necessarily result in common interests, common action or identity of purpose. [...] Normative proximity [...] does not necessarily translate into a convergence of policy priorities or mutual expectations.” (Grevi 2011, p. 5) The underlying reasons are easily found:

“There are fundamental differences between India and the EU on many issues because they are at different levels of development, because they come from two different milieus, and because they have different geographical and geopolitical priorities [...]. Despite shared values, the lack of shared interests on a number of issues will continue to limit co-operation.” (Jain 2013, pp. 227, 230)

The argument of fundamental differences due to strongly diverging development levels as limitation to cooperation shows particularly true with regard to the above mentioned negotiations on the EU-India FTA. On the one hand side, India insists on high protective tariffs for its huge low salary agriculture and claims an easy access to the European single market for its service and IT sector as well as for its pharmaceutical products. The EU, on the other hand side, asks for unhampered export possibilities for European agricultural products and the automobile industry. Furthermore, the EU insists on a strong intellectual property rights protection. This topic engenders deep conflicts between both sides, with India arguing that cheap generic medicines are most helpful to fight pandemics like malaria and aids, whereas the EU – under the label of intellectual property rights – defends the big European pharmaceutical companies (Khorana/Garcia 2013, pp. 690-691; Bava 2008, p. 113).⁵ Because of these kinds of diverging interests, the signing of the FTA had to be postponed already several times.

⁴ For an overwhelmingly informative and impressive analysis of the state of Indian development and inequities, see Drèze/Sen 2013.

⁵ But Indian generic medicine also brings up a security issue; thus, in July 2015, the European Medicines Agency decided upon an immediate sales ban for 80 medical products tested by the Indian company GVK Biosciences with the allegation of fraudulent test procedures (Spiegel Online 2015).

With regard to superordinate issues of world politics, too, the EU-India strategic partnership is not fulfilling the mutual expectations. Thus, concerning international climate politics in the post-Kyoto process, no single common Indian-European stance could be reached during the UN conferences from Copenhagen (2008) to Lima (2014). And despite the allegedly harmonic formula of “common but differentiated responsibilities” which is supposed to enlighten the oncoming COP 21 conference in Paris in November/December 2015, there are no perspectives in sight for any sensible European-Indian cooperation outcome regarding the mitigation of greenhouse gases on the international level. Addressing another domain of urgently needed intensified EU-Indian cooperation, too, deception is prevailing. Thus, concerning the promotion of new and – from a European perspective – progressive international norms like the “Responsibility to protect” or humanitarian (military) interventions, India is defending rather reluctant and classically sovereignty oriented positions. Backed by these foreign policy traditions and approaches, India did not sign the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court as an important step towards the establishment of a judicial body capable to pursue perpetrators of major crimes such a genocide, large-scale human rights violations and war crimes. “Unfortunately, the Europeans live with the illusion that India and the European Union share a common vision of a multilateral world order. But this is not the case”, Christophe Jaffrelot is rightly observing (Jaffrelot 2006, p. 4).

Thus, one is forced to recognize that within the EU-India strategic partnership, an important “strategic mismatch“ is prevailing, with incompatible expectations (Khandekar 2013, p. 2). As pointed out by Ummu Salma Bava, this strategic mismatch holds particularly true with regard to India’s very vivid security concerns, nurtured steadily by an unstable and conflict driven geopolitical surrounding: “[...] there is a deficit in the India-EU-relationship because the EU is not a strategic security actor and its ability to bring security deliverables to the partnership is extremely limited”, Bava writes (2008, p. 113). Indeed, due to its very specific *sui generis* capacities in foreign and security policy, the EU disposes of rather small resources to act as a security provider (Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet/Rüger 2015).

Other pundits, too, deplore the EU’s deficient awareness of Indian foreign policy concerns and call for a deeper consideration of the country’s security interest (Khandekar 2013, p. 2). The EU’s relative weakness in foreign and specifically in security and defense policy may be considered as one of the reasons for Indian’s decisive rapprochement with the USA in the last years, revealing at the same time its preference for international partners with huge military hard power resources at its disposal.

Prospects for the EU-India strategic partnership

At present, the EU-India strategic partnership is still challenged to extend the bilateral relations beyond trade and development cooperation (European Commission 2011).⁶ Due to its overall poor results, the strategic partnership has to be considered as an investment in a common future that has to be tackled for the sake of both sides. Despite India’s growing interna-

⁶ For new European development cooperation offers and opportunities see European Commission 2011.

tional standing and ambitions, the country still needs development aid and technology as well as know-how transfers. Here, largely intensified cooperation in order to prepare India for the devastating consequences of climate change would be a highly promising field with India being one of the countries mostly affected by the foreseeable deterioration and alternation of its environment (Chaturvedi/Doyle 2015).

Generally and finally speaking, a major challenge for the EU will be to acknowledge that her never ending internal crisis (debt crisis in the Eurozone, the present refugees crisis, the looming Brexit and numerous impediments to further deepen the integration process) reduce the Union's attractiveness for partners like India. The EU has not yet succeeded to position itself as an "indispensable partner" (Lang/Wacker 2013, p. 15). Furthermore, the EU must get aware that it is not "the only strategic partner in town" (Grevi 2008, p. 154). From a European point of view, the necessity to reform and strengthen the EU foreign policy in general, as the instrument of strategic partnership in particular, seems to be without any alternative in order to allow the EU-India partnership finally to go strategic (Peral/Sakhula 2012). India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi, too, seems decided to get the EU-India relations to a "new start". This, at least, are Indian expectations articulated in the forefront of the next India EU summit scheduled for the end of 2015 (The Hindu, 17 June 2015).

References

- Bava, Ummu Salma. 2008. The EU and India: Challenges to a strategic partnership. In *Partnerships for effective multilateralism (Chaillot paper no. 109)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 105-114. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
- Chaturvedi, Sanjay and Timothy Doyle. 2015. *Climate Terror. A Critical Geopolitics of Climate Change*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Commission of the European Communities. 2004. *An EU-India Strategic partnership*. Brussels.
- Drèze, Jean and Amartya Sen. 2013. *An Uncertain Glory: India and its Contradictions*. Princeton. Princeton University Press.
- European Commission. 2011. *Increasing the impact of EU Development Policy: an Agenda for Change*. Brussels.
- European Commission. 2015. *Trade with India*. http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113390.pdf. Accessed 16.09.2015.
- European External Action Service (EEAS). 2011. *Annual Activity Report*. http://eeas.europa.eu/background/docs/20121017_eeas_aar_2011_en.pdf. Accessed 16.09.2015.
- Grevi, Giovanni. 2008. The rise of strategic partnerships: between interdependence and power politics. In *Partnerships for effective multilateralism (Chaillot paper no. 109)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 145-172. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
- Grevi, Giovanni. 2011. *Mapping EU Strategic Partnerships*. http://fride.org/download/Mapping_Book.pdf. Accessed 16.09.2015.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2006. Indien und die EU: Die Scharade einer strategischen Partnerschaft (GIGA Focus Nr. 5). http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/27530/ssoar-2006-jaffrelot-indien_und_die_eu.pdf?sequence=1. Accessed 16.09.2015.

- Jain, Rajendra K. 2011. India's relations with the European Union. In *Handbook of India's International Relations*, ed. David Scott, 223-232. London: Routledge.
- Khandekar, Gauri. 2013. Building a sustainable EU-India partnership. http://fride.org/download/ESPO_PB9_Building_a_sustainable_EU_India_partnership.pdf. Accessed 16.09.2015.
- Khorana, Sangeeta and Maria Garcia. 2013. European Union-India Trade Negotiations: One Step Forwardm One Back? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 51 (4): 684-700.
- Lang, Kai-Olaf and Gudrun Wacker. 2013. Die EU im Beziehungsgefüge großer Staaten. Komplex – kooperativ – krisenhaft (SWP Studie). http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2013_S25_lng_wkr.pdf. Accessed 16.09.2015.
- Manners, Ian. 2002. Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms? *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40 (2): 235-258.
- Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet, Gisela and Carolin Rüger. 2015. *Die Außenpolitik der EU*. München: De Gruyter.
- Peral, Luis and Vijay Sakhula. 2012. The EU-India Partnership: Time to go strategic? Paris: Institute for Security Studies.
- Renard, Thomas. 2011. *The Treachery of Strategies. A call for true EU Strategic Partnerships*. Gent: Academia Press.
- Spiegel Online. 2015. Manipulierte Pharmatests in Indien: EU-Kommission stoppt Arzneimittel wegen gefälschter Studien. <http://www.spiegel.de/gesundheit/diagnose/eu-kommission-stoppt-arzneimittel-wegen-gefaelschter-studien-a-1045069.html>. Accessed 16.09.2015.
- Wagner, Christian. 2008. The EU and India: a deepening partnership. In *Partnerships for effective multilateralism (Chaillot paper no. 109)*, ed. Giovanni Grevi and Álvaro de Vasconcelos, 87-104. Paris: Institute for Security Studies.

VIII. Religion within the Secular State – Some Theoretical Remarks

Michael Becker

During the last two or three decades, an interesting development took place in western secular states because political engagement and interventions of Christian Churches and believers didn't decrease but increase within formally organised bodies like ethics committees and informal organisations. Against this background the previous prognosis of the inevitable decline of religion in modern or modernising countries that some social scientist claimed is questionable. Maybe it has been wrong from the beginning because it underestimated the presence of the churches and the durability of its cooperation with the state in matters like religious education, public funding of confessional schools and church taxes (at least in Germany) as well as the engagement of believers in political debates. Of course there are some states, conceiving themselves as laical, which do separate the political and the religious sphere and the respective institutions more strictly. But nevertheless even those states have to face the problem whether religious arguments – concerning for example genetic engineering, euthanasia or positive religious freedom – should be integrated in the political process.

In the following sections I will suggest conditions for the coexistence of different worldviews in a constitutional state. At first I will make some general remarks on the secular state (1). Secondly, I will explore the conception of the “overlapping consensus” from John Rawls (2) and estimate if it is a solid model of the coexistence of secular politics and religion in western and eastern (India) states (3).

The concept of the secular state

Among the different elements of a secular state the following three assumptions at first glance seem to be not seriously contested at least in the West:

- i) a secular state has a (non-religious) normative fundament of its own;
- ii) a secular state is not allowed to propagate a state religion and
- iii) a secular state is not allowed to intervene in religious matters, at least in general.

Concerning the secular fundament of the state recall on the one side the opening passage of the American Constitution claiming that “the people” is the author of the public order and remember on the other side the recourse on people's sovereignty within the diverse human rights declarations during the French Revolution which have been inspired by Rousseau. By and large, these incidents in particular and contract theories of the state in general show that a non-religious fundament of a public order is possible at least in principle.

The requirement that there shall be no state religion in a secular state is realised for example in the United States. According to official reading the political and the religious spheres are strictly separated and a “wall of separation” has been erected between them. In Europe, laical states like France proceed similar. But nevertheless, religion did and does play an important role in the context of the modern state, either within the rise or the legitimization of the state as such or within an established state. Recall for example that Rousseau's mythy-

cal founder of the Republic: the “Législateur” had to make use of divine authority to persuade those who cannot be convinced through reasonable argument alone.⁷ Rousseau also emphasised in the last chapters of his “Social Contract” that a proper Republic necessarily needs something he called “civil religion”. This kind of religion had nothing to do with the established Christian religion which doesn’t teach, according to Rousseau, the citizens to love their political and legal duties; instead he is interested in the “togetherness” of religiously unified people and wants to transfer it to the republican citizenship (Rousseau 2011 [1762], book IV, chapter 8 [Of Civil Religion]). Contemporary political theorists propose the concept of constitutional patriotism as an alternative (Sternberger 1990).

The third assumption mentioned above according to which a state is not allowed to interfere with matters or the inner sphere of the religious groups can easily be fulfilled, it seems, by the secular state. In such a state religion belongs to the private sphere of the individuals which is protected by (liberal) basic rights. Because the right to freedom of religion has a “positive” component allowing for the most part an unrestricted religious practice, state interventions de facto appear only rarely.⁸

To sum up: the three aforementioned features that should characterise a secular state are on the one side sufficient to define a secular political order, but on the other side a religious fundament of the state is coexisting and in some cases political sovereigns even ask for divine support or evoke God to witness the constitutional act. Political theories furthermore have to explain how political engagement of believing citizens is possible in a state with non-religious fundaments.

The weakness of “traditional” concepts of the modern state and its problematical transfer to non-western contexts can be demonstrated easily. D.E. Smith, a prominent scholar in comparative politics and expert in the Indian state, identified three main relations being constitutive for a secular political order (Smith 1963, pp. 4 et seqq.): the relation

- (i) between religion and the individual,
- (ii) between the state and the individual and
- (iii) that between the state and the religion.

According to Smith these relationships reflect the liberal conception of the state, and according to the first relationship an individual should be allowed either to affirm or renounce its religion, to worship and to associate himself with other believers. He also held that within this bilateral relationship a “third factor”, the state, nearly plays no active role: it cannot dictate certain beliefs and enforce financial contributions, although it has to guarantee certain liberty/liberal rights. On the second relationship, that between state and individual, the state views the individual only as citizen and consequently as a bearer of rights and not as a believer. The

⁷ Even in times in which the principle of sovereignty is unrivalled and “the People” is seen as the sole legitimate creator of modern constitutions, the invocation of God is often found in the constitution giving process as the preambles of the German and the Irish constitutions demonstrate.

⁸ Nevertheless there are occasions in which authorities or Courts even in secular states must decide whether such interferences are required. In Germany the Bundestag and Courts have recently been occupied with the topics of circumcision of boys and kosher butchering of animals. This problem cannot not be considered further.

integrity of the individual in both relationships that is the possibility to play his proper roles as a believer on the one side and as a citizens on the other side depends on the third relationship that is the separation of state and religion. If these two spheres are not separated adequately, so the argument continues, either a citizen has to qualify in religious respect (he has to be the 'right' sort of believer) or the state can ban those beliefs it considers as wrong.

This argument is sound insofar as no state religion can be established in a secular state, but nevertheless it is incomplete in saying that the latter "derives its authority" exclusively "from a secular source ('the consent of the governed')" (Smith 1963, p. 6). The "source" is a pure secular one only under the condition that all citizens are pure secular beings. But this is not true, at least it could not be said of all citizens. Referring to 'the' citizen while abandon his religion (or secular world views) in which he is embedded is a bad abstraction. It would be an example of the supposed liberal conception of an "unencumbered self" (M. Sandel) that has been criticised by many communitarian thinkers. Most of the fellow citizens will belong to one religion or another or they will be Marxists, Conservatives or Liberals. Although there probably is a considerable number of those who do not have such a (complete) doctrine, the "consent of the governed" in the end cannot be conceived of as a pure "secular source". It is rather a consent of adherents of different religious and secular doctrines. Therefore a political theory has to explain how this is possible. Interestingly one of the most convincing theories in this respect is John Rawls' Political Liberalism.

Religion and Overlapping consensus

The Rawlsian conception of an overlapping consensus is the result of a renewal of the legitimation parts of "A theory of justice". In this major book, Rawls's liberalism still has been Kantian because the two liberal principles for a well ordered society have been chosen and justified in a setting that resembled the categorical imperative. In his later works Rawls considered this setting as inappropriate for a society with a "reasonable pluralism" in which a lot of different "comprehensive doctrines" must coexist. Under these conditions, so the argument goes, a Kantian justification of the liberal constitutional state would still be possible, but it would probably be attractive to Kantians only. Rawls' new strategy⁹ therefore consists no longer in a *justification* but in an *explanation* of certain principles, namely principles which are embedded in the real political culture of the USA. The most important ones are the principle of practical reason (which manifests itself in the thinking and judging of an individual), the concept of a person (citizen) and that of a well ordered society. Based on these general principles of practical reason, distilled out of the American political culture, Rawls constructs the two principles of justice and he consequently conceives of them as constructed politically and not "metaphysically" anymore. This kind of construction characterises the theory of justice as "freestanding" in relation to comprehensive doctrines of any kind.

Although the *truth* of the principles underlying the constitution can no longer (and need not) be demonstrated from a specific philosophical point of view, the *stability* of that constitu-

⁹ This new strategy is rather complex and even a sketch cannot be given here; see Rawls 1993 (Part One, Lectures I and III), Becker 2013, pp. 15-19.

tional order has nevertheless to be achieved. And that is the opportunity when among others religious doctrines come into play. According to the late Rawls stabilising the public order is the task of those groups holding more or less comprehensive doctrines that are compatible with the political principles. In such a stadium called “constitutional consensus” the constitution is accepted by all doctrinal groups as a general basis to solve political conflicts. In political debates mainly incumbents and candidates but also citizens are obliged to use arguments which are applications or interpretations of the principles of the constitution. Only this can count as an exercise of public reason: discussing and interpreting public principles publically. Consequently members of the different societal groups and their representatives who want to contribute to a political (legal) solution are not allowed to argue directly from the point of view of their ‘private’ doctrine, which is not shared by all fellow citizens (Rawls 1999, § 1). If such an exploration and interpretation of the constitution is successful, something like “full” justification takes place at the same time: Members of groups with comprehensive doctrines learn if and to what degree the public order represents the values of their particular (‘private’) world views. If this inspection ends with a positive result, group members turn into constitutional patriots. Eventually the constitutional consensus turns into an overlapping consensus demanding that all members of all groups recognise themselves as citizens who fully accept the principled public order.

Now the question arises: is this conception of political discourse convincing and does it treat adherents of comprehensive doctrines adequately? One of Rawls’ critics thought it does not. John Finnis criticised his usage of “public“, because it refers only to arguments deduced from constitutional principles and seems to exclude “nonpublic truths and reasons from one’s public discussion”, and said it “prohibits individual recourse to correct principles and criteria of practical judgment” (Finnis 2000, p. 77). Rawls responded to this criticism and claimed that arguments which are drawn from comprehensive doctrines and communicated to others are “public” as well. But these arguments belong to the “background culture” rooted in civil society, and although this discourse is also public, arguments stemming from there cannot be fed in the political discourse.

The result thereof is: The argumentative pool of a citizen in a nearly well-ordered society is so to say split: one part consists of the political reasons drawn from the public constitutional order and understandable to fellow citizens at least in principle. The other part consists of ‘doctrinal’ (Rawls says “comprehensive”) reasons; they are communicated not in politics but in the civil society and will convince in the first place those who adhere to the same comprehensive doctrine.

Nevertheless this second type of reasons can function as a kind of reserve if a problem cannot be solved by political arguments alone. Rawls points out that the abolitionists¹⁰ in the 19th century and the civil rights movement in the 20th century both used religious grounds to support the conclusions of public reason that is the right to equal liberty. However, in these examples from a not well ordered society the religious and non-religious reasons pull into the

¹⁰ They argued that slavery is against God’s law (Rawls 1993: p. 249); in general see Rawls 1993: pp. 247 et seqq.

same direction to improve the public order. It is at least conceivable that both sorts of reasons pull into opposite directions and thereby contribute to further destabilisation or worsening of the situation. In other words: it is everything but easy to reach and to stabilise a constitutional consensus if the society is deeply divided by different religions.

A related critique held that believers or people who adhere to a comprehensive doctrine cannot consent “wholeheartedly” to the public political conception; it recommended rather a weak understanding of overlapping consensus according to which it “does not necessarily mean that the political values will or even should necessarily take priority over the terms of one’s comprehensive view” (Neal 2000, p. 175). This is the crucial question for all normative political theories: how could individuals who are by nature either selfish or parochial or, as discussed above, believers of whatever kind become selfless and good citizens? Rawls is therefore confronted with a similar problem as Rousseau in his *Social Contract*: how can human beings with their particular wills ever generate something like the general will? The “Lé-gislateur” tried to solve this problem by persuasion and trickiness (and the invocation of God). But Rousseau stated at the same time: “Before the arrival of the laws people already ought to be what they should become through them” (Rousseau 2011 [1762], book II, chapter 7). Although the kind of ‘transformation’ Rawls has in mind is not as complete as the one Rousseau postulated there is nevertheless no guarantee that this necessary change in the self-understanding of people will be reached. In the end this process depends on civic education, the ability of the (believing) citizens to self-limitation, on the readiness to accept the priority of the constitutional principles in all political affairs, and on a lot of happy circumstances.

An overlapping consensus in India?

50 years ago D.E. Smith argued that the liberal-democratic state in the West is the paradigm of the secular state and that its essentials could be found also in the Indian constitution. As mentioned above, according to him the state depends on the consent of the governed conceived of as secular beings. Religions do not and should play any role in politics. One of his contemporary critics said that Smith is “allowing the state to cut the religions to fit” and this would result in making out of the prevailing religions a “private faith” (Galanter 2013, p. 246). In more recent debates participants argued, the liberal concept of the secular state is the consequence of scientific attitude and moral arrogance of the West, ignoring the unique meaning of religion in India and elsewhere. The separation of state and religion would be typical of Christendom but not of other religions, secularism and faith were compatible (Madan 2013, pp. 299 and 309).¹¹ These critics are basically right, their statements show that a pure secular state is as much alien to India as it would be to most other western countries including the USA.

In contrast to Smith Rawls’ conception shows convincingly how religion, believers and non-believers do fit into a constitutional state. It explains the conditions for the coexistence of different comprehensive world views by presupposing as starting point the existence of a lib-

¹¹ To others, secularism has failed completely in India and is even responsible for the rise of religious fanaticism (Nandy 2013, p. 332).

eral constitution which is recognised from all religious groups as the fundament for political problem-solving. Recognition means that group-members can accept the public order as one that reflects important principles of their comprehensive doctrines and therefore abstain from introducing religious arguments into political debates. This assumption is not unrealistic: “Political Secularism demands only that everyone – believer, non-believer – gives up a little bit of what is of exclusive importance in order to sustain that which is generally valuable” (Bhargava 2013: p. 496). Therefore the crucial question in the moment is not if India has already reached an overlapping consensus, it is rather if politics and civil society do succeed in stabilising and expanding a constitutional consensus.

References

- Becker, Michael. 2013. Von der Gerechtigkeitstheorie über den Politischen Liberalismus zum Völkerrecht – Stationen der politischen Philosophie von John Rawls. In *Politischer Liberalismus und wohlgeordnete Gesellschaften. John Rawls und der Verfassungsstaat*, ed. Michael Becker, 11-33. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Bhargava, Rajeev. 2013. What is Secularism For?. In *Secularism and its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, 486-542. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Finnis, John. 2000. Abortion, Natural Law, and Public Reason. In *Natural Law and Public Reason*, ed. Robert P. George and Christopher Wolfe, 171-201. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Galanter, Marc. 2013. Secularism East and West. In *Secularism and its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, 234-267. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Madan, T.N. 2013. Secularism in Its Place. In *Secularism and its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, 297-320. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Nandy, Ashis. 2013. The Politics of Secularism and the Recovery of Religious Tolerance. In *Secularism and its Critics*, ed. Rajeev Bhargava, 321-344. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
- Neal, Patrick. 2000. Political Liberalism, Public Reason, and the Citizen of Faith. In *Natural Law and Public Reason*, ed. Robert P. George and Christopher Wolfe, 107-124. Washington: Georgetown University Press.
- Rawls, John. 1993. *Political Liberalism*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Rawls, John. 1999. The Idea of Public Reason Revisited. In *The Law of Peoples*, ed. John Rawls, 129-180. Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press.
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 2011 [1762]. The Social Contract. In *The Social Contract and other later Political Writings*, ed. Victor Gourevitch. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Donald Eugene. 1963. *India as a Secular State*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Sternberger, Dolf. 1990. *Verfassungspatriotismus, Schriften Vol. X*. Frankfurt: Insel Verlag.

IX. (Trans-)Gender Issues in Contemporary Indian and German Society

Elisabeth Schömbucher-Kusterer

Gender issues, such as violence against women, homophobia, and discrimination against persons of non-heteronormative gender, are important issues in contemporary debates, not only in India, but also on a global level. They are part of a global discourse on human rights, according to which every human being should be entitled to freedom and rights as declared in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, “without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.” (Blazer/LaGata 2014) While research and public debate on gender issues have a rather long history, transgender issues became relevant more recently. This is shown in the inaugural issue of the journal *Transgender Studies Quarterly* (2014), published in May 2014, with its focus on terms and concepts central to transgender studies. In this paper I will show how transgender issues are dealt with in India and Germany, and how public debate, research, and the work of social activists are influenced by global flows.

From women’s studies to gender studies in anthropology

In anthropology, the history of gender studies started in the 1970s with the “Anthropology of women” (Reitner 1975). With an increasing demand for studies of women and women’s life worlds, anthropologists wanted to add women’s perspectives to studies of social and cultural life and thus reduce the male bias in social theory. In the 1980s and 90s, the anthropology of women developed into an anthropology of gender. In contrast to the anthropology of women, gender anthropology challenged biological essentialisms. Being a woman was not any more seen as a biological fact. Instead, female and male gender was considered as being conceptualized in culturally specific ways. The move away from biological concepts to culturally constructed concepts made it possible to show that gender, class and ethnicity intersect, resulting in a complex system of inequality which is rooted in assumed biological facts of race and sex differences (del Valle 1993).

In the long history of Women’s Studies and women’s movements in India, the category women has come to be replaced by the category gender. Studies on women in India focus mainly on violence against women, such as rape, dowry deaths, and female foeticide. Instances of violence against women show that being a woman is just one dimension of a person’s identity, in addition to class, caste, region and religion. In May 2014, two teenage girls were found hanging from a tree in a village in Uttar Pradesh after being raped. They went out together to relieve themselves in the fields in the evening, since there are no toilets in their houses. It was assumed that they had been raped and had then committed suicide because they couldn’t bear the shame. Later it turned out that young men from the village had taken the opportunity to rape the girls and then kill them by hanging. BBC News Asia broadcast this event on May 30, 2014 under the headline “The danger of having no toilets“ (BBC News 2014). Gender violence is also caste or class violence. The danger of not having toilets

doesn't refer to everybody, it refers to the poor. Therefore, the authorities were accused by the villagers of 'caste' discrimination, not of 'gender' discrimination.

Gender violence was mentioned as an important issue by Prime Minister Narendra Modi in his speech at India Independence Day on August 15, 2014. Referring to the growing number of reports of sexual assaults against women, he blamed parents and families for gender violence: "Today, as we hear about the incidents of rapes, our head hangs in shame, [...] I want to ask parents, when your daughter turns 10 or 12 years old, you ask: 'Where are you going? When will you return?' Do parents dare to ask their sons: 'Where are you going? Why are you going? Who are your friends?' After all, the rapist is also someone's son. [...]" (Washington Post 2014). Modi also commented on female foeticide as another form of gender violence: "India's sex ratio is 1000 boys for 940 girls. Who creates this disparity? It isn't God. Don't fill your coffers by sacrificing the mother's womb. [...]" (International Business Times 2014).

Constructing gender: gender queer and global flows

The perception of gender as a cultural construct which intersects with other social categories has been developed further by Judith Butler and her concept of performativity. According to this concept, a person's gender identity is not 'naturally' given but is modelled in terms of repetitive performances of gender norms (Butler 1990; Butler 2004). Butler understands performativity as a regularized and constrained repetition of norms. It comprises different levels of social, cultural, verbal and bodily performances, such as state policy, legal issues, social norms, traditions, rituals, speech acts and stage performances. Such performative acts construct gender norms, as well as redefining and re-contextualizing them. Once constructed and shaped through performativity, gender norms are internalized by individuals and society. Any civil society is characterized by co-existing traditional and modern gender norms which are constantly negotiated by social actors with conflicting interests, resulting in various transformations of gender normativity.

Another dimension to the construction, or performance, of gender is the concept of global flows. Arjun Appadurai has identified five dimensions of global cultural flow: ethnoscape, mediascape, technoscape, financescape and ideoscape. (Appadurai 1996) One might add the concept of genderscape, taking into consideration that the construction of gender and transgender is influenced not only by class, caste, ethnicity and religion, but also by global flows of information, concepts and ideologies. The global queer movement comprises persons of diverse categories, such as LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender). All these people have in common that they are considered to be a challenge to heteronormative culture/society, because through them the supposed naturalness of a heterosexual identity gets questioned. Activists of the LGBT Movement argue that non-heteronormative persons get marginalized due to the fear that through them patriarchal genealogies get disrupted and procreative sexuality are challenged. Global flows of gender queer ideologies can be observed in many instances. The film *Fire* (1996) is just one example of how global flows – or, rather, the discourse on global flows – can be used in constructing gender queer. In *Fire*, filmmaker

Deepa Mehta portrays, among other things, the lesbian relationship of the two main protagonists. When the film was screened in metropolitan cities in India, rightist Shiv Sena activists burned down cinema theatres with the aim of averting the spread of global gender ideologies in India. The Shiv Sena's actions were opposed by counter demonstrations in favour of screening the film on the grounds of freedom of speech. The late Shiv Sena leader Bal Thackeray is quoted to have said that "lesbianism is a kind of social AIDS."¹ According to Shiv Sena activists, this disease could spread to India and lead to an "erosion of Indian culture." They saw this danger as being enhanced by an "intrusion of Western values" into India through the liberalization of the economy, the growth of satellite TV, and global access to the World Wide Web.

In the following paragraphs I will compare the situation of transgender persons in Germany and India to show how non-heteronormative gender identity is constructed over time and across cultures, how social actors negotiate the participation and equality of transgender persons in civil society and how this gets influenced by global flows.

Transgender in Germany

Transgender is used as an umbrella term for persons who do not restrict themselves to their biological gender, but perform gender in a non-normative way, for example as cross-dressers, drag-queens, drag-kings, or transsexuals. The term transsexuality is the medical definition for the performance of non-normative gender. Two forms of transgender/transsexuality are distinguished: that of male-to-female (mtf) and female-to-male (ftm) persons (Rauchfleisch 2009). According to the WHO's International Classification of Diseases (ICD-10-GM) of 2011, transsexualism is categorized as 'Gender identity disorder' (F64) in the section of 'Mental and behavioural disorders' (F00 –F99) and the subsection 'Disorders of adult personality and behaviour' (F60-F69) and defined as "a desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, usually accompanied by a sense of discomfort with, or inappropriateness of, one's anatomic sex, and a wish to have surgery and hormonal treatment to make one's body as congruent as possible with one's preferred sex"(F64.0) (DIMDI 2011).

The medical diagnosis 'gender identity disorder' results in pathologizing the performance of non-normative gender, and allows medical treatment which is paid for by the government health insurance. In Germany, medical treatment starts with two independent psychological diagnoses of long-standing strong identification with another gender and the desire to live and be accepted as a member of the opposite sex, either male-to-female or female-to-male. This is followed by psychological counselling and a real-life-test, consisting of the 'coming-out', which includes cross-dressing, changes of physical appearance, a public announcement, and a change of the person's first name. After a successful 'passing', sex reassignment therapy begins with hormone replacement therapy to modify secondary sex characteristics. This is considered to be the 'second puberty'. It is followed by cosmetic treatment and lifelong intake of hormones. The third and final step would be sex reassignment surgery to alter the primary sex

¹ http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fire_%281996_film%29 (accessed 20.08.2014).

characteristics. Male-to-female sex reassignment surgery would include castration, forming of a neo-vagina, and breast augmentation. Female-to-male sex reassignment surgery would include breast amputation, hysterectomy and penis plastic surgery. Parallel to sex reassignment surgery, the person has to apply for the legal change of name and sex. In the past the legal process could last up to 12 months, thus creating problems during security checks at airports or during traffic stops. With their coming out, transsexual persons have changed their physical appearance, but their legal documents still show a person with the appearance of the opposite gender. Therefore, the Transsexual Law of 1981 was reformed in 2011 to make the change of sex and name easier and less time consuming.

The history of sex reassignment surgery began in Europe only in the 1950's. Christine Jorgensen is considered to be one of the first transgender persons in Europe. After hormone replacement therapy, she underwent sex reassignment surgery in 1952 in Copenhagen. She was born as George William Jorgensen and needed permission from the Danish Minister of Justice for the operation. After a successful operation, she became an actress, a night club singer and an activist. Her transformation was reported by the New York Daily News (December 1, 1952) with the headline "Ex-GI Becomes Blonde Beauty". The surgeon Georges Burou (1917-1987) is considered the pioneer of modern male-to-female sex reassignment surgery. Between 1956 and 1973, he carried out more than 3000 operations in his private clinic in Casablanca, Morocco.

Transgender in India: Hijras, Aravanis and Jogappas

Most well-known among India's different transgender persons are Hijras, a traditional community of male-to-female transgendered people (also described as eunuchs, hermaphrodites, transvestites, and transsexuals) that reflects a very complex category of different transgender persons. "Real" Hijras are considered only those persons who have been castrated. Castration together with penectomy (nirvan) is performed as a rite de passage and it is considered a source of ritual power. Nirvan Hijras are ritual specialists who perform at life cycle rituals, such as weddings or the birth of a child. Being infertile themselves, they have the power to bless and grant fertility, but also to curse and cause infertility if their ritual performances are not remunerated adequately. Besides their ritual performances, they live on begging as well as on sex work in the red light districts of big cities. Hijras are considered to be a third gender, living in a third space. Once they have realized their transgender identity, their 'coming out' coincides with leaving their family and joining a transgender community. Hijra communities are organized in hierarchically structured 'houses', each house comprising a guru (teacher, leader) and several chelas (pupils). As devotees of the goddess Bahuchara Mata, they also have their own religious space. Hijras are culturally acknowledged as belonging to an ambiguous gender category, and they have created their own space in social as well as ritual respects, but they are nevertheless a marginalized community in India that is widely discriminated against.

Although Hijras are the most well-known transgender persons in India, there are other examples of cultural performances of transgender. Jogappas are cross-dressed male devotees

of the Goddess Renuka-Ellamma in Saundatti, North Karnataka; Jogammas are her female devotees. Once dedicated to the goddess at an early age, both Jogappas and Jogammas live in separate communities, similar to Hijras. They move in groups and act as ritual specialists, singing and dancing in praise of the goddess (Brückner 2011, pp. 101ff.). As in the case of Hijras, (trans-) gendered identity often intersects with a rural background and lack of formal education. Still another example are Aravanis, transgender persons in Tamil Nadu. They are devotees of the deity Aravan and they perform the change of their deity's gender publicly during the annual festival in Kuvakkam, South Arcot District, Tamil Nadu. According to the Tamil version of the Mahabharata epic, the war between the Pandavas and the Kauravas was at a standstill, because both war parties were of equal strength. Finally, the gods decided that the party in which a young hero would be ready to sacrifice his life in battle would attain the victory. Aravan, the son of Arjuna, was ready to sacrifice his life. He was unmarried, and his only condition was that he should get married first. But nobody wanted to give him a daughter in marriage, because she would be widowed the next day. When Vishnu heard about this, he took the form of Mohini, a beautiful woman, came down to earth and married Aravan. In the annual festival, male-to-female transgender persons from all over India perform Vishnu's change of gender, Mohini's marriage and her widowhood. Transgender persons become brides of the god for one day. Beautifully dressed, they get married to the god and experience their wedding night (with a human man). At noon the next day, the god dies on the battlefield and all the transgender persons turn from wives into widows. They perform this transformation by breaking their bangles and dressing in white saris (Mills/Claus/Diamond 2003, p. 14).

Gender queer movements and global flow

The above mentioned social and cultural constructions of transgender are the result of different transgender politics worldwide. Critical reactions to them are influenced by the global flow of concepts. Pathologization, discrimination and marginalization are the main issues of the LGBT movements. The construction of transsexuality in medical terms as a (psychic) disease has been subjected to different levels of criticism in Germany and other Western countries. Although it enables therapy, paid by the health insurance company, it also enhances stigmatization, especially since it is listed under 'Mental and behavioural disorders'. For the past few years, transgender activists have been demanding the de-pathologization of transsexuality. In the course of these movements, France, the UK, and the USA have removed transsexuality from the ICD-10 list of psychic diseases.

On various platforms, such as the Gender Queer Film festivals in Mumbai, or the annual Trans-Conferences in German cities, activists are fighting for social acceptance of gender ambiguity and the opportunity to lead a dignified life. They criticise concepts of gender heteronormativity and unambiguity of gender. Activists in India have succeeded in advocating the recognition of the legal status of transgender (T) as third gender, besides M and F (Decision by the Supreme Court of India, April 15, 2014). They have also recently succeeded in getting sex reassignment surgery legalized in the state of Tamil Nadu, whereas the traditional proce-

ture of castration is considered illegal according to the Indian Penal Code of 1981. On the other hand, various anti-dedication-campaigns have been organized in Karnataka since 2007. Living and performing as Jogappas and Jogammas is considered a traditional religious practice that is to be denigrated as superstition. The transgender identity of Jogappas is considered as mental weakness or a mental disturbance that should be cured. The performance of Jogammas is held to oppose the concept of female decency and to undermine the institution of marriage. The fact that some Jogammas enter sex work results in criminalizing religious practice on the grounds of the Karnataka Prohibition of Devadasis Dedication Act of 1982 (Brückner 2011, pp. 103ff.).

On a global level, transgender activists criticise the binary concept of gender and opt for a culture of ambiguity instead. On the basis of a binary concept of (biological) sex, persons can only think and act in dichotomies, which are seen as a result of modernity with its striving for gender definiteness, where gender-ambiguous persons are discriminated against and confronted with violence. They demand instead a multi-gender open space (multigeschlechtsoffener Raum) in which gender ambiguity would be ‚normal‘, as shown by statements such as: Couldn't it be normal that a biological woman perceives herself as man or that a biological man feels himself to be a woman? Is it possible to live with gender ambiguity? Are there ways of enacting transsexual identities without hormones and without surgery? Would the challenge of a binary gender model lead to a third gender?² The concept of transgender is developed into a concept of transidentity. ‚Trans‘ is used in the sense of ‚beyond‘, a person being not exclusively a woman or man, but having aspects of both biological sexes. However, performing transgender or, more generally, gender queer, either in films or on stage still provokes protest, opposition, and confusion. A recent example was the stage performance of drag queen Conchita Wurst (born as Tom Neuwirth, 1988). She/he represented Austria at the European Song Contest, held in Copenhagen on May 10, 2014. As “Austria’s bearded lady”, dressed in a beautiful long gown, with long hair and a perfectly trimmed beard, she/he intended to protest against numerous forms of discrimination, such as those based on gender, race, and origin, and to appeal for the acknowledgement of non-heteronormative gender. Her/his performance, and the fact that she/he won the contest, created a sensation in the media and provoked different political reactions. Heinz Fischer, the President of Austria, is quoted to have said: “It is a symbol of tolerance, of diversity, and against discrimination.” On the other hand, the Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky proclaimed: “This is the end of Europe.” A culture of gender ambiguity has yet to be negotiated.

References

- Appadurai, Arjun. 1996. *Modernity at Large. Cultural Dimensions of Globalization*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- BBC News. 2014. *‘Our ambitious girl’: The village where cousins were raped and hanged*. <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-27622236>. Accessed 20.08.2014.

² <http://transtagung-muenchen.com/> (accessed 20.08.2014).

- Blazer, Carsten and Carla LaGata. 2014. Human Rights. *Transgender Studies Quarterly*, 1 (1-2): 99-103.
- Brückner, Heidrun. Folk Culture and Modernity. 2011. The case of Goddess Renuka-Ellamma and her Special Devotees. In *Between Fame and Shame. Performing Women – Women Performers in India*, ed. Heidrun Brückner, Hanne M. de Bruin and Heike Moser. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. 2011.
- Butler, Judith. 1990. *Gender Trouble*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Butler, Judith. 2004. *Undoing Gender*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Deutsches Institut für Medizinische Dokumentation (DIMDI). 2011. Internationale statistische Klassifikation der Krankheiten und verwandter Gesundheitsprobleme, 10. Revision, German Modification. <http://www.dimdi.de/static/de/klassi/icd-10-gm/kodesuche/onlinefassungen/htmlgm2011>. Accessed 17.09.2015.
- International Business Times. 2014. *India Independence Day 2014: Top Quotes From Prime Minister Narendra Modi's First Speech At Red Fort*. <http://www.ibtimes.com/india-independence-day-2014-top-quotes-prime-minister-narendra-modis-first-speech-red-fort-1659466>. Accessed 20.08.2014.
- Mills, Margaret A., Peter J Claus and Sarah Diamond. 2003. *South Asian Folklore. An Encyclopedia*. New York and London: Routledge.
- Rauchfleisch, Udo. 2009. *Transsexualität – Transidentität*. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht.
- Reiter, Rayna R. 1975. *Toward an Anthropology of Women*. London and New York: Monthly Review Press. *Transgender Studies Quarterly*. 2014. 1 (1-2).
- Valle, Teresa del. 1993. *Gendered Anthropology*. 1993. London: Routledge.
- Washington Post. 2014. *India's Modi takes on rape issue in his first Independence Day speech*. http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/indias-modi-calls-for-more-toilets-less-trash-and-chinese-style-manufacturing/2014/08/15/4e024c91-b1e8-4d5b-90ab-851391811e29_story.html. Accessed 20.08.2014.

Contributors

PD Dr. Michael Becker is Associate Professor at the University of Würzburg's Institute for Political Science and Sociology.

Prof. Dr. Aparajita Biswas is Professor for African Studies at the University of Mumbai's Department for African Studies and President of the African Studies Association of India.

Philipp Gieg is Lecturer and Researcher at the University of Würzburg's Institute for Political Science and Sociology.

Dr. Matthias Gsänger is Senior Lecturer and Researcher at the University of Würzburg's Institute for Political Science and Sociology.

Prof. Dr. Amitabh Kundu is Retired Professor at the Centre for the Study of Regional Development, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.

Timo Lowinger is Lecturer and Researcher at the University of Würzburg's Institute for Political Science and Sociology.

Prof. Dr. Gisela Müller-Brandeck-Bocquet is Professor for European Studies and International Relations at the University of Würzburg's Institute for Political Science and Sociology.

Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Schömbucher-Kusterer is Adjunct Professor at the University of Würzburg's Chair for Indology.

Dr. Shaji S. is Assistant Professor at the University of Hyderabad's Department of Political Science.

Prof. Dr. Valerian Rodrigues is Retired Professor at the Centre for Political Studies, School of Social Sciences, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi.