

Not Here, Not Now!

Situational Appropriateness, Negative Affect and the Experience of (Remote) Embarrassment.

A Process Model.

Inaugural-Dissertation

zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der

Fakultät für Humanwissenschaften

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Widmung

A la familia, Potato.

Wildling.

Fritz' Geduld, Ritas können, Andreas' Motivation.

Meiner neuen Heimat.

Kaffee.

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THEORETICAL PART

General Introduction

Fremdschämen or *Fremdscham*, a negative emotion which arises while observing someone behave inappropriately, comes to fame after the turn of the millennium in german speaking countries. There, they name it literally „other's shame" and it becomes obvious that this emotion happens most commonly while watching TV: reality shows, talent shows and bad comedies. The word even makes it to the dictionaries starting 2009 (p. 453, Scholze-Stubenrecht), as its use increases unstoppably in everyday language, starting to get used in more and more situations, seemingly as a synonym of *embarrassing* or *shameful.* Still, a look in the emotional research on the subject returns exactly zero results as of 2011, leaving open the question as of what this emotion might be, and what it is not.

The Lack of a Process Model of Embarrassment

First exploratory studies suggest that *fremdscham* is essentially embarrassment and is only linguistically related to shame (Study 1 and Experiment 1). Since the differentiation between *Shame* and *Embarrassment* has been treated elsewhere and there seems to be little doubt concerning their conceptual differences (Tangney, Miller, Flicker, & Barlow, 1996), the present work will only briefly address the very well studied emotion of *Shame*, and only as needed to clarify that there is no necessity to disentangle both any further. Sadly, on the other hand embarrassment research is until now, at best, of descriptive character. Even highly respected treaties on the subject, like Miller's seminal work *Embarrassment: Poise and peril in everyday life* (Rowland S. Miller, 1996), which is the most relied on source of information on the subject, presents only old —if interesting and useful— heuristic theories as the best explanations available. Essentially, every aspect of the process leading to and influencing the experience of embarrassment has not been studied in a scientific way, thus remaining fremdscham, and surprisingly embarrassment, without an explanation and in need of a theoretical framework from which to develop experimental research.

Thus, the present work aims to resolve some of this deficits. I will here propose a theoretical framework, based on well researched models of emotion and cognition, which will be able to explain both Embarrassment and Fremdschämen in a satisfactory, experimentally useful way and will provide a much needed basis for defining empirical research goals. Then, some of the main aspects of this new *understanding of embarrassment* will be experimentally addressed and the results discussed.

An essential aspect of this work's theoretical part will be presenting a plausible explanation for the emergence of the presented emotions. Results of the theoretical postulates should be compatible with well researched phylogenetic considerations about embarrassment development as of explaining the *function* of the emotions discussed here. Further, assumptions made by the model have to be able to address the complexity of the social interactions in which these emotions typically arise, they being intrinsically social in nature (Miller & Leary, 1992; Semin & Manstead, 1982). Accordingly, experimental research will necessarily be more complex than it has been customary in recent decades in the field social psychological, with the goal of making results as ecologically valid as possible, at the cost of efficiency and simplicity.

The best place to start understanding this phenomena is reviewing the existing points of view regarding embarrassment. In the following pages, I will present an overview of the work done on this subject for the best part of the last century. As it will become obvious, the bulk of it will be several decades old, mostly stopping in the late seventies. As children of its times, theories in the field lack almost entirely assumptions at a process level, clarifying the need for a new push in this direction. Thereafter, I will introduce a new definition of both embarrassment and fremdscham that I consider to be more suitable to the current process-level research interests of social and emotional psychology, and which, with any luck, should stimulate a new round of experimental and theoretical debate.

Embarrassment

As early as the late 1800's, embarrassment was of interest, if also an enigma, for the scientific community. Charles Darwin (1872) famously wondered about the intriguing embarrassment-related phenomenon of Blushing:

> *Blushing is the most peculiar and most human of all expressions. […] It is not the simple act of reflecting on our own appearance, but the thinking of what others think of us, which excites the blush.*

While anger and anxiety, pleasure and happiness are relatively intuitive to gasp, with mostly clear accompanying emotional expressions and behavioural patterns, embarrassment is a very different animal. Which other emotion is so inconsistent within itself? Embarrassment is distinctively and consciously negative, arousing and even painful (as the german word for embarrassment „Peinlichkeit" suggests, which is derived from the word „Pein": *heftiges körperliches, seelisches Unbehagen; etwas, was jemanden quält*[1] (Scholze-Stubenrecht, 2009)), yet it is —in a more complex fashion than assumed by Darwin (Castelfranchi & Poggi, 1990)— associated with funny situations, provokes awkward laughter and one of its most distinctive signs is uncomfortable smiling. The sheer possibility of feeling embarrassed makes people avoid situations, even at very real costs; still, it has mostly prosocial consequences and seldom social costs (Tangney et al., 1996). This dichotomy of good and bad, of nice and awful, of funny and painful might have driven people to wonder about embarrassment's nature, but also made the answers difficult to find, and maybe a bit too steep of a challenge for many to take on.

In this sense, and oddly enough, using the word *embarrassment* is for most of us no challenge, but defining its meaning seems for many an impossible task. We can mostly agree on what *happy* or *angry* roughly mean, or at least on how it's supposed to look like. But this all seems to be different for embarrassment. Indeed, as of June 2015, there is not even a german-language Wikipedia article on the emotion of embarrassment, the word redirecting to an etymological and literary discussion on the mostly out of date term „Pein". One of the reasons, and probably the one making

[1] Freely translated from german: severe bodily, mental discomfort, something that tortures someone.

the task particularly difficult, is the everyday use of *shame* and *embarrassment* as synonyms, although they are two very different phenomena. Once this are disentangled, it is much easier to define the subject of this work, as I will shortly illustrate:

Shame

In supporting the seminal work of Helen Block Lewis on shame and guilt (1974), Tangney and Miller (1996) describe *shame* as a moral emotion resulting from a negative global evaluation of the self: „*I* did that terrible thing, *I* am unworthy, incompetent or bad“ (emphasis in original). If it might as well be that shame can be unleashed by a concrete episode, there seems to be little doubt that it is not the tormenting result of *a deed*, but of the impression of *being faulty* as an individual, in the sense that we don't live up to the expectations we've grown to demand that we ourselves fulfil. The social character of shame is also undeniable, but it doesn't come, as the lay person often guesses, from feeling exposed to other's judging eyes, but to our own; our judgment of being rightful or not being principally the product of socialisation (Tangney & Dearing, 2002).

This is how a social emotion like shame can indeed be very private. There is absolutely no need for others to witness that for what we feel shame. A child might never get caught for stealing a small toy from the store, but having failed to control him or herself might lead to deep feelings of shame once he or she is alone at home with the ill-sourced toy.

As if this wasn't enough, there are further elementary differences between shame and embarrassment which I shall at least name. Shame can be extremely negative, so much that it mostly provokes withdrawal from situations which remind us of our faults, leading to isolation and in some instances reappraisal, justifying the shameful deed to ourselves (Tangney, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007). Constructively eliminating our shame is an arduous task, since it demands repairing our faulty selves. Hence, shame is enduring and has mostly antisocial consequences, going as far as its tendency being overrepresented in repeating felons (Tangney et al., 2007) and extremist groups (Moghaddam, 2005).

When put this into contrast with how embarrassment is understood in psychological research, it becomes quite obvious that the only systematic relationship between them is that they are both negative experiences and that they share a linguistic link.

Understanding Embarrassment

When looking for a definition of embarrassment, a plethora of possibilities emerges. Most of them differ in aspects which imply the cognitive causality of the emotion in question. As an example, Goffman's (1956 in Rowland S. Miller, 1987) attempt *„an uncomfortable state of mortification, awkwardness, and chagrin that can result whenever undesired events publicly threaten one's social identity"* implies causality to some degree: in this case, the perceived threat of one's own social identity. Other authors choose to underline different psychological aspects in their causality propositions. I.e., Modigliani (1968) includes in his definition the loss of self-esteem.

But what do we really know about embarrassment? I will present a working definition of the emotion, based on and limited to the aspects of the phenomenon that seem apparent and to some degree assured by theory and research. This will be necessary in order to understand the discussion on the matter that will follow, since I will attempt to redefine the concept of embarrassment later on and after presenting a new framework to understanding and studying it. This step is necessary, considering the current lack of an explanation for the *process* behind embarrassment, even in the few theories which make assumptions about cognitive states. For the next few pages, I will define embarrassment as follows:

Embarrassment is the negative affective state of arousal (1) elicited in social situations (2) when an interaction doesn't unfold appropriately (3); it serving primarily both as a mean of communication (4) and as motivation for bringing the inappropriate interactional state to an end (5).

(1) Even if sometimes accompanied by reactions mostly associated with positive emotions, Embarrassment is undoubtedly a negative experience (Goffman, 1956b; Rowland S. Miller, 1996; Silver, Sabini, Parrott, & Silver, 1987). Further, I want to postulate that this negativity is strong enough to achieve the activation of reflective information processing, of the likes of

the Reflective System in Strack and Deutsch's Reflective Impulsive Model (2004). An example: At a faculty party at a university in which he just started working, while chatting with a new colleague, a young researcher, after a couple of beers, might playfully make a remark appreciating the aesthetics of a present woman's behind. This otherwise tolerated —although politically incorrect— behaviour can lead to an extremely unpleasant affective experience the moment his interlocutor makes clear, that that woman is his girlfriend. Later in this work I will give a closer account of the reasons to be of this unusually strong affective reaction.

(2) The social aspect of embarrassment is one of its defining characteristics, it being strictly a social emotion. In all its classic and more contemporaneous accounts, the presence of others, real or imagined, is necessary for it to occur (Tangney et al., 1996). When asking lay people —who tend to see it as being almost identical to shame— to recall an embarrassing situation, only a minute fraction of them (2,2%) report being alone while experiencing it, roughly the ninth part of those reporting being alone while feeling ashamed (Keltner & Buswell, 1997). In this way, the faculty newcomer will experience embarrassment only if he realises the unacceptability of his behaviour while being with the woman's boyfriend or while later on, in his mind's eye, replaying the awkward conversation. I choose this point of the definitory process to highlight the differentiation that I make between embarrassment and *fremdscham*, the later being a strict subset of the first; a linguistic specification of the emotion being experienced while, in a passive manner, observing the failed social interaction that induces it.

(3) Even although it took a while for the Idea of embarrassment and shame being two completely different emotions —and not the first a less intensive version of the later— to catch on, researchers early on speculated about embarrassment being caused by pro forma interactional mishaps instead of moral transgressions (for an overview, see Keltner & Buswell, 1997). While this definitory criterion might seem conspicuously vague, I see it of utter importance to allow for the appropriateness of the interaction to be strictly subjective. In our faculty party scenario, the candid newcomer obviously thinks that that kind of remark

should not be made about the girlfriend of a stranger one has just met, the very least about a new colleague's. A different man, with perhaps a more chauvinistic view of society, might not even come close to the idea of his remark's inappropriateness, even if he is made aware of the intimate relationship between the colleague and the woman by an overtly offended conversational partner. This subjectivity of the transgression and the context dependability of the appropriateness of the interaction is what makes embarrassability so different from one subject to another, and the emotion so potentially difficult to assess in a lab, as will be later discussed.

(4) Embarrassment is a very *visible* emotion. Blushing, nervously tapping with our feet, avoiding eye contact, awkwardly smiling: all these *symptoms* are explicitly visible. It almost seems as if there was a *need* for them to be so. Miller (1996, 2013) follows this train of thought, alluding to the communicative function of embarrassment. At the party, the awkward situation will elicit all sorts of visible effects on primarily the new guy, but also on his new colleague. Maybe the dim lightning will hide effectively his burning face, but his nervous smile, wide open eyes and clumsy attempts to excuse his behaviour —or perhaps, if he is unlucky, his uncontrollable mutism— will betray him. Or will they? Miller, as well as myself, would disagree with the term *betrayal.* Particularly since showcasing one's own embarrassment is one of the most effective ways of letting our peers know that we are aware of our mistakes and of the need for amends.

(5) This is also the ultimate goal of embarrassment, its primary function: to motivate the afflicted into taking the steps necessary to overcome the situational inappropriateness that provoked it in the first place. If we imagine ourselves in any given embarrassing situation, or if we return to our party example, it's easy to imagine some reactions, and also to imagine its effects. The new faculty member is probably going to be noticeable agitated, his face in a nice shade of magenta, his eyes wide open, his arms reaching out in a sign of apology, babbling half sentences trying to excuse his unfortunate remarks. This, what we could call an *embarrassment syndrome*, is going to have a direct effect on interactional partners. In this case, as in

most (Rowland S. Miller, 1996), the effect is most probably going to be that of appeasement and interactional restitution.

Some accounts (e.g. Silver et al., 1987) would suggest that the woman's boyfriend, perhaps to a lesser extent, is also going to feel embarrassed, thus being interested in overcoming this negative affective experience, exactly as the „culprit" is. Some speculation about how this „innocent" embarrassment might come to be will be presented when we discuss theories of embarrassment later on. What at this point should be kept in mind is that, once embarrassment becomes obvious in a social situation (and assuming that the transgression merits no punishment or is inconsequential enough!), individuals will, through the negative affect they are experiencing, be motivated to restore the appropriateness of the interaction in which they are involved – or the very least to reduce the negative affect that afflicts them. The boyfriend might downplay the importance of the hapless lad's remark, or even externally agree with it. He might also ignore it altogether or quickly change the subject, a common strategy for overcoming embarrassment (Miller, 2013). If nothing else works, or if none of the men is interested in „solving" the interactional dilemma they are in, escaping the situation might just as well do the trick.

Theories of Embarrassment

Over time, different groups of theories have speculated about the reasons and process leading to embarrassment, of which a comprehensive overview has been written by Keltner and Buswell (1997). They distinguish between theories (1) that assume a concrete psychological self-relevant event at the root of the emotion (specifically: loss of self-esteem or fear of social evaluation), (2) which highlight a very specific aspect of the emotion (mostly: the preceding awkward interactions and (3) that study the effects of embarrassment, particularly the restoring of the interaction and the appeasement of the interactional partners. To explain all this theories again in the present work would be redundant. What is essential is to pinpoint the limitations of these theories, which Keltner et al. (1997) fail to discuss in an acceptable way.

Keltner and Buswell (1997), for example, try to combine every theory into a „prototypical process of embarrassment“ (p. 265), although they somewhat downplay those suggesting loss of self-esteem (rightfully, since research results, as they eloquently show, do not really support the assumption). While the approach yields something plausible and heuristically appealing, something pretty much resembling an actual process and —like they put it—, „typical“, they fail to provide an account of the inner workings of said process by any means:

> *Embarrassment typically begins when an individual acts in a way that violates rules of a conventional nature, thus momentarily threatening the individual's social identity within the interaction. The individual responds with submissive and affiliative behavior. This behavior, in turn, evokes reconciliation-related behavior in others that restores the social interaction and, more broadly, the individual's social identity.*

At the end, their analysis of embarrassment most closely reassembles what Silver and colleagues describe with their *Dramaturgic Account* (1987), but without the added benefit of being able to predict some of the more exotic embarrassing circumstances, like those in which a positive situation elicits embarrassment, fleeing from or ignoring an embarrassing situation, „freezing“ or the phenomenon of Fremdschämen. The strategy applied then by Keltner and Buswell in order to resolve this dilemma is not justifiable: accepting most of the theories as having some degree of truth in them, and implying that they explain „different forms of Embarrassment“ (p. 265, 1997). More interesting and somewhat puzzling is that they fail to include the *emotional experience* of embarrassment itself in their theoretical framework, what seems do defy the aim of their publication.

Miller (2013), in his latest work, challenges not only the integrative proposition of Keltner and Buswell (1997), but even the notion of the interactional approach of the dramaturgical theories. Instead, he heavily favours the idea that *a possible negative evaluation of the self* is what drives the emotion. As I will attempt to demonstrate, his arguments unfortunately are not only not enough to rule out the interactional theories, but also fail to explain certain embarrassing situations like fremdschämen and, while a step in the right direction, he also leaves the processes behind this puzzling emotional episode mostly unattended.

Understanding Embarrassment at a Process Level

A theory describing embarrassment at a process level has to be able to account for all situations from which embarrassment derivates, even those not fitting the stereotype. It also most definitely has to be able to explain the emotional experience, specially since it is so intensive and so rich in symptoms. The function of the process, and ideally its hypothesised phylogenetic development, should also be compatible with, and the resulting behaviour and its consequences to an acceptable degree predictable by the theory. All this while being so parsimonious as possible, but still complex enough to gasp this, in nature, very complex phenomenon, and while not contradicting solid empirical results in this and neighbouring fields of emotion, neuropsychology and social interaction. Adding to this list of necessary features, the theory has to also be capable of accounting for fremdscham. I will now explain why this is the case and the little that is known for sure about this emotional phenomenon.

Fremdschämen and Embarrassment

Contrary to intuition, a first explorative study indicated quite clearly that, while experiencing fremdscham, empathic processes seem to occupy the thoughts of participants recollecting Fremdscham episodes either very little or not at all (Study 1). This was somewhat surprising, since the few studied phenomenons that at first glance seem to be related to fremdscham are both dependent on (broadly understood) empathic processes: *Vicarious* and *Empathic Embarrassment* (Hawk, Fischer, & Van Kleef, 2011; Rowland S. Miller, 1979, 1987) and *Vicarious Shame* (see Welten, Zeelenberg, & Breugelmans, 2012 for a review).

Hawk and colleagues (2011) demonstrate, unsurprisingly, that watching someone you can relate to, who is showing embarrassment in an awkward situation with which you have experience, leads to feeling more embarrassment than if the person sovereignly deals with the situation, showing no embarrassment. In this very clearly cut case, perceiving the felt embarrassment of someone with which you share aspects of your self-concept increases the probability that you share his or her emotional state. This account of *empathic embarrassment* conforms perfectly to what would be expected according to theory and empirical evidence in the past (Fink, 1975; Rowland S.

Miller, 1979, 1987). Not surprisingly, the clearer the display of embarrassment is perceived, the most probable it becomes for people to feel the observed emotion (Hawk et al., 2011).

On the other hand, for vicarious emotions of any kind to occur, it is indispensable that some kind of connection exist between the target and the individual feeling vicariously for the target. This connection most commonly is assumed to be an overlap of the self-relevant social identity (Lickel, Schmader, Curtis, Scarnier, & Ames, 2005), as vicarious emotions obviously vary on occurrence and intensity depending on the salience of this overlap: this is why, for example, a Syrian living in France might feel vicariously ashamed for a Syrian daesh terrorist he sees in the news, in this case being their shared social identity as Syrians chronically salient, but would feel angry or disgusted if he sees the news while being in their common homeland, where the differences between them, and not their similarities, are on the focus of his attention. As I already argued, phenomenologically fremdschämen seems to be embarrassment and not shame, so there is no reason to believe that shame happening through vicarious mechanisms can be a plausible explanation for it. This leaves vicarious embarrassment as an option, for which vicarious processes should operate in the same fashion as those allowing for other vicarious emotions to happen. Still, that people are capable of feeling vicariously embarrassed for others does not mean that fremdschämen *is* embarrassment happening vicariously.

One of the problems to be solved by any explanation of Fremdschämen is the fact that people with very little investment in the observed situation or with no connection to the people involved in it can intensively experience the emotion, even if no one in the situation is showing any kind of awkwardness, much less embarrassment. It is the *Situation as such*, and not the specific behaviour of particular individuals, which is embarrassing (as the results of Study 1 will suggest). Since emotional vicariousness is dependent from the connection to the embarrassing target (Johns, Schmader, & Lickel, 2005; Lickel et al., 2005), and empathic embarrassment from both the empathic tendencies of the observer *and* the display of embarrassment by the observed (Hawk et al., 2011; Zaki, Bolger, & Ochsner, 2008), there is a whole lot of reported fremdscham accounts not covered by any of this two explanations, in which neither embarrassment is displayed or vis-

ible, nor is there any relationship to the targets or personal investment of any kind in the observed situation.

There are no references to this kind of embarrassment in any of the theoretical sources available at the time of writing these pages. Still, anecdotical accounts of fremdschämen under these very special and theory-challenging circumstances abound.

A first study was conducted with the goal of verifying the unrelatedness of both empathic and vicarious processes and fremdschämen (Study 1). Indeed, quite a few of the accounts freely reported by participants described a very distinct emotional episode (as understood by Russell, 2003, 2009) than those fathomable under both theoretical frameworks.

> *„Poetry Slam, ein Teilnehmer auf der Bühne machte erst einen sympathischen Eindruck, aber schon ein Gefühl vorhanden „mit ihm stimmt irgendwas nicht". Dann fing er an, statt eines selbstgeschriebenen Gedichtes eine Geschichte zu erzählen, eigentlich nur eine lose Aneinanderreihung von seltsamem Verhalten und unglaublich schlechten Gags. (…) Hab mich währenddessen immer im Raum umgeschaut, weil ich wissen wollte, ob ich mich als Einzige unwohl fühle. Viele Leute haben von der Bühne weg auf den Boden geschaut oder Verlegenheitslachen gezeigt (…)"*[2]

As this actual account from the study shows, some fremdscham episodes clearly won't fit within the expectations of either one of the alternative mechanisms conceivable, nor with any other documented emotional reaction, making it unique and in need of explanation. The fact that the awkward performer at that poetry slam seemed to show no hint of embarrassment at all would in itself exclude empathic accounts from the list of possible explanations. That the individual describing the episode has no relation to the performer eliminates the vicarious explanation. The last theoretical possibilities for explaining fremdschämen fall due to similar circumstances: *Fantasising* (in the sense of imagining the observed situation happening to ourselves (Davis, 1983a)) although a distinct possibility, is only chronic in some psychological pathologies, like depression

[2] Approximate translation: „Poetry slam, a participant on the stage seems at first likeable, although already a feeling of „something about him is not right" is there. Then he starts, instead of reciting a self-written poem, to tell a story, actually just a loose sequence of strange behaviours and incredibly bad gags. (…) I kept on looking around the room, because I wanted to know if I'm the only one feeling uneasy. Many looked away from the stage and stared at the floor or showed an awkward smile (…)".

(Gilbert, Gilbert, & Irons, 2004). On the other hand, *emotional perspective taking* (Davis, 1983a), which is understood as a different process to visual-spatial perspective taking, has been shown to be not only an effortful cognitive process (Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Lamm, Batson, & Decety, 2007), but actually should not lead to embarrassment, but to whichever emotion the observed person is experiencing, thus actually *inhibiting* fremdscham in cases without embarrassment display (.Zaki et al., 2008), this inhibition being even stronger under anxiety and other uncertainty-related emotions (Todd, Forstmann, Burgmer, Brooks, & Galinsky, 2015), like embarrassment is. The mechanism I propose, which would also effortless apply to first-person embarrassment, can explain why this otherwise seemingly inane emotion not only unfolds, but also why its existence is functional and expected —since both emotional episodes would procedurally be no different from each other— instead of an emotional freak of nature.

Embarrassment antecedents: expectancy violation, negative affect and cultural scripts

For understanding what I would like to propose is the process leading to both fremdscham *and* embarrassment, it is necessary that we bear in mind some well documented theories and processes, on which I base my assumptions.

The very first processes to considerate are those leading to the detection of unexpected events. Expectancies in this context would be a series of features associated with a situation with which we are confronted. According to the views concerning an active, predictive Brain (Bar, 2007), each interaction with our environment in accompanied by predictions made by our minds about what is going to happen next. The more familiar the situation is, the more we are able to predict about it, and so the more details we come to expect. In this way, the brain prepares itself for action via perceived cues, which activate scrips stored in memory, if these happen to be available (Bubic, Von Cramon, Jacobsen, Schröger, & Schubotz, 2009). It's easy to imagine the advantages of this system: simply by perceiving a situation, the brain pre-activates relevant processes, which can include memory contents, attentional tendencies, affective states, behavioural scripts and pretty much anything that has been associated with similar situations in the past, including useful strategies. In fact, this system seems to be so adaptive, that the brain has developed a very effect-

ive way of teaching itself to, in essence, predict the future: it punishes itself when it fails and rewards itself when it correctly predicts what is about to happen and adjusts its predictions according to experience (Bubic et al., 2009; Schiffer & Schubotz, 2011), and thus statistically improving its predictive capabilities over time.

It is not so much the learning aspect of this mechanism, but the detection of the expectancy violation, which comes to be essential for the embarrassment process as I understand it. This system, to which I will refer as an *alarm system*, is refreshingly basic: if the observed situation does not match the expected one, negative affect is elicited. In fact, this system is so basic, that it doesn't differentiate between positive and negative deviance. Russell's theories (2009) assume surprise, for example, to be initially accompanied by slight negativity, even if the surprising aspect of the situation is positive — like finding out that you have a 50€ bill on your wallet about which you absolutely forgot. Only after having caught your attention via said negativity is that you realise that having those extra 50€ is actually a very nice surprise indeed.

The intensity of the elicited negative affect can vary to a great degree. A great example of the effect of expectancy violations so subtle that they don't reach experiential awareness delivers the work of Oyserman on Culture as Situated Cognition (2011). She shows, in rather fascinating fashion, that impressibly subtle cues can measurably influence our behaviour, either by signalling — by means of processual fluency— that everything is fine, or that something might not quite be — by means of negative affect— all this while never reaching consciousness. This *cues of appropriateness* (e.g. a pink frame around a Text on a Valentine's Day; picnic plates with typical images or colours of the holiday being celebrated) seem to give us the sense that things are just as they are supposed to be. On the other hand, the negative affect elicited by *cues of inappropriateness* (i.e. similar picnic plates, but with images of the wrong holiday), leads to a more watchful, perhaps skeptical stance concerning what we are dealing with. Both types of cues might lead to differentiated information processing, likely affecting Regulatory Focus (Brockner & Higgins, 2001; Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Werth & Förster, 2007) and Global Precedence (Baumann & Kuhl, 2005), among a series of others.

What items, colours, aspects of a situation, shown behaviours, and a milliard of other elements, are proper for or typical of a situation, is a matter of experience, stored in memory in the form of scripts and schemas (Oyserman, 2011; Oyserman, Sorensen, Reber, & Chen, 2009). The „Independence Day" schema, for someone familiar with the patriotic culture of the USA, includes barbecuing, fireworks, not going to work, and an overflow of flags — which is why the stars and stripes on the picnic plate lead people to *feeling right*, influencing them to take more food from the open buffet than those with white plates, at a staggering rate of 20%. Of more interest for this dissertation is the fact, that those guests who got plates with images clashing with the schema of the celebrated holiday (i.e. halloween plates on labour day) took 15% less food than those with the plain plates. In this case, there is no fluency experience, but rather the opposite: negative affect arises in such a manner, that it negatively influences the decision of taking more food — since it communicates us that something probably is not quite right. That the very same effects can be found for unrelated tasks in experimental settings (Oyserman, 2011) speaks for behaviour being influenced by the diffuse affect caused by the schema-(in)compatibility of the perceived elements of any given situation, and not by some sort of intrinsic negativity of the elements in question.

How this come to be might best be explained with two process models, since they provide an explanation for the context sensitivity of which we might stay unaware, while also hinting at the possible effects of this processes on executive functioning, intentions and overt behaviour. They achieve this by mostly describing two interactive systems: a basic system in which its elements get engaged via spreading activation, and a system of higher cognitive processes responsible for, among others, conscious behaviour and decision making (for an overview, see Smith & DeCoster, 2000). The effect that the patriotic picnic plates has on our core affect will probably stay limited to our impulsive information processing, but something less subtle might very well catch our awareness and get the Reflective System (as proposed by Strack & Deutsch, 2004) involved in the equation. It is, for example, easy to imagine that, although the flag plates might not get the participants' attention in a 4th of July, the halloween plates might (just as the flag plates would do in the „wrong" holiday).

In her experiments, Oyserman (2011) works explicitly with mild effects of the schema (in)compatibility, which will most probably not escape the boundaries of the Impulsive System (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), thus affecting, other than the accessibility of contents at the impulsive level, at most the mood of her participants, but not causing an emotional episode as understood by Russell (2003, 2009). For this to occur, the shift in the core affect elicited by the situation would need to be strong enough to get noticed, thus unavoidably (and functionally!) engaging the Reflective System (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). On this situations, the attribution of the experienced change in Core Affect to *an object* (as proposed in Russel's Circumplex Model, 2003) is probably the cause that we experience emotions at all: they are there to inform us how to act next, thus facilitating our reaction to specific circumstances. The fact that we notice *the fright* of encountering a bear in the woods (or a mugger in a dark alley) is adaptive in the sense that it guides our immediate behaviour: fight or flight. That we experience anger when someone is unfair to others leads us to do something about it — or at the very least, to change the way we see and interact with this unjust individual. The adaptiveness of this system seems not only plausible, but is strongly substantiated by the proposed universality of the exclusive group of emotions understood as *basic* (Darwin, 1872; Ekman, 1992a, 1992b, 1999): there seems to be the capacity and need for distinctly communicating and identifying specific emotional episodes, and this seems to be the case across cultures. The matter of the existence of basic emotions (concept not shared by Russel, e.g. 2003), or of the definition of embarrassment as one of them or not is not central for this dissertation, but interesting nonetheless and has been discussed elsewhere (Miller, 1996). Still, what embarrassment undoubtedly is, is a distinct, by first and third parties identifiable emotional episode (Keltner & Buswell, 1997; Tangney et al., 1996). In the next part, I will attempt to provide an explanatory model for the inner workings, purpose, consequences and for the experiential aspects of the embarrassment process.

A Cultural-Interactional Process Model of Embarrassment

The first aspect that I find necessary to assert is that we should understand embarrassment as an emotional episode, with all the implications that this entails. By that I refer specifically to the noetic experience (as understood by Strack & Deutsch, 2004) of a shift in core affect (Russell, 2003). Describing embarrassment in this way is intuitive and applicable to our every-day experience of embarrassment: A woman ready to pay at a very busy supermarket, once her full cart of items has been completely scanned by the overwhelmed cashier, realises that she forgot her money at home. She experiences the onset of embarrassment as a strong shift in her own's core affect as she realises the mishap, effectively as an Alarm Signal, attributing it to the anticipation of the awkward situation that will almost certainly follow. The here described shift needs to gain access to the reflective system and thus become a noetic experience — for it is, as any other alarm, only as effective as it succeeds in attracting attention, its function being to alert the misfortunate woman and so rendering possible a change in the way she's currently dealing with a standard situation that has stopped being standard. At the same time, the enduring negativity is a chronic source of motivation: effectively dealing with the situation will lead to its reduction or elimination (equivalently to the motivation we experience to reduce the pain of burning).

To summarise: for social interactions, and particularly for those where embarrassment is a possibility, I propose the necessity of a sudden shift in core affect so strong, as to catch the awareness of the individual experiencing it, and enduringly such a negative experience as to make its reduction a self-relevant motivational goal (as assumed by Markel, 2009).

The second aspect to discuss is the kind of situations that give rise to embarrassment, since a process model that strives to explain this emotion needs to be able to satisfactorily account for cultural, situational and interpersonal differences in its incidence. Classic discussions on the subject primarily limited themselves to categorising situations that typically elicit embarrassment (Parrott & Harré, 1996). Under this method, the embarrassment at the cashier will be categorised as „being conspicuous“ or „showing incompetence“. This method is not only very superficial, but it also fails to address the underlying processes altogether. More modern theories try to find commonal-

ities between this categories, which is a step in the right direction. Regrettably, the theories themselves make no process assumptions, so that this broader categories remained unexplained. According to them, the supermarket example would be categorised as „lost of self-esteem“ or „self-concept threat“ (Parrott & Harré, 1996). A third possibility, and one that is actually able to nicely describe the situations in which people feel embarrassed, is the already discussed *Dramaturgical Account*. According to this heuristic, the woman will feel embarrassed as long as she strives to find a proper way to behave in the situation, because she is „without a role to play“. If she is a competent enough improviser, even if she's never been in a similar situation before, she probably won't have to feel any embarrassment at all (Silver et al., 1987). While extremely useful in describing the social character of these situations, this heuristic also leaves the question about the embarrassment processes completely unattended.

Instead, I will start with the presumption that our expectancy violation detection system earlier described is precursor of and responsible for the onset of the embarrassment experience. The adaptation of this perceptual subsystem to the social context would be in no form an audacious proposition: it has long compellingly been argued, in an analogue way, that the very primitive, very corporal phenomenon of disgust —the active rejection of potentially dangerous substances and speedy learning to avoid such and similar items, a sort of disease avoidance system (Curtis, de Barra, & Aunger, 2011)— is the basis for the very complex human morality, or at the very least heavily related to it, even at a neuropsychological level (Chapman, Kim, Susskind, & Anderson, 2009; Moll et al., 2005; Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008). In the case of embarrassment it is not even necessary to make such a parabolic connection: very similar behavioural patterns are readily observable in social animals (Bekoff, 2000), being a particularly nice example the social routines of captive wolfs that take place when, unintentionally, a low hierarchy wolf crosses a social boundary and notices it, effectively communicating the unintentionality of the transgression, and so avoiding the very real danger of being punished by the affronted higher hierarchy wolf (Fox, 1973; Keltner & Buswell, 1997). In humans, this system detects all kinds of unexpected events, „unexpected“ meaning *not matching the running schema*. This schemas can be as mundane as someone picking up a phone. If the individual carrying the action *unexpectedly* starts cleaning it

with a rag instead of taking it to his ear, our *Alarm System* registers this *schema incompatibility*, directing our attention to it (Hrkać, Wurm, Kühn, & Schubotz, 2013; Hrkać, Wurm, & Schubotz, 2014; Wurm, Hrkać, Morikawa, & Schubotz, 2014). Once our attention has been caught by the unexpected (or „wrong“) element, making it accessible to the Reflective System (Strack & Deutsch, 2004), we can noetically *deal with it.* Since all the Alarm System needs to function is a schema, its implementation in a social situation is trivial, as is our attention being directed to someone not adhering to an expected social schema. Here it might be necessary to clarify that there is no need for suddenness or surprise for the Alarm System to activate. It is even conceivable that knowingly perceiving a flawed interaction, expecting it to be flawed, might increase the accessibility of concepts related to the Alarm System: flight, awkwardness, anger.

Further, I presume that there is a particular sensitivity towards what could be called „social errors“ or „faux pas“ (etiquette or form mishaps of no dramatic consequence), specially in social situations in which experience tells us one might expect embarrassing situations to occur with relative ease: those in which we pay particular attention to impression management (Leary & Kowalski, 1990; Mummendey & Bolten, 1993) and have the active goal of causing a positive impression in others: e.g. at a dinner in a fancy restaurant in which you get to meet your in-laws for the first time, or at a job interview. This examples of threatening situations require particular scrutiny of our every move, effectively keeping us in a constant state of self-awareness (as defined by Duval & Wicklund, 1972; see Silvia & Duval, 2001 for some limitations). Appealing evidence of this state is *self-monitoring*, a cognition-intensive process of which its primary function is to control the way we are perceived by our interactional partners (Markel, 2009; Snyder, 1974). If we consider self-monitoring alone, we can easily explain the way we realise that something we are doing violates the ad-hoc situational appropriateness that the *threatening* social situation demands. The power of self-awareness for causing embarrassment is easily observable: just place a person not used to it in the centre of attention. There's no necessity to give them an embarrassing task or to cause a mishap: just feeling unusually observed or *conspicuous* is enough to start monitoring the way we are being perceived: being sung at for our birthday is often enough to cause some mild embarrassment, consequence of chronic self-monitoring.

Still, this wouldn't necessarily explain our example at the supermarket's cash register, since this is as ordinary a situation as it gets, in which we seldom try to cause a particular impression on the cashier or on the people waiting in line, and hence don't have the need to monitor the way we are perceived — in this case, the experiential episode must begin with the *Alarm Signal* caused by the expectancy violation, and self-monitoring will follow.

I would like to propose a new approach concerning the process behind embarrassment: In order for it to explain all accounts of embarrassment and fremdschämen, I will assume that embarrassment is but the result of not knowing how to properly cope with a social situation. I understand *social* in a broad way and include imagined interactions. Also, situations which might, in some people, trigger the Alarm Signal meant for social situations, but are not actually strictly social. This last point would apply to fremdscham and to those situations in which an individual might fear being observed, but is actually not.

For illustrational purposes, I will proceed to describe *three ways* by which the *one process* that is embarrassment occurs. I don't expect this list to be exhaustive, but it should clarify the aspects necessary for embarrassment to unfold:

1. *Way One: Attentional Embarrassment*

First, a situation unfolds in which we have limited experience and in which we believe to be the centre of the attention of others. Self-monitoring processes chronically assess the appropriateness of our public self during this exposure. Since no adequate behavioural schemas are available, we experience *a shift in core affect* product of this uncertainty. This acts as the motivational drive to deal with the situation in order to *turn off* this Alarm Signal. The motivation drives the search for adequate *Behavioural schemas* and, if available and applicable, their implementation. At last, the emotional episode will end with the successful implementation or with the conclusion of the conspicuous social interaction.

2. *Way Two: Interactional Embarrassment*

First, a *schema* is available of how a running social interaction in which we participate should unfold. This can be derived ad-hoc from similar enough schemas stored in memory. Second, a *violation* of the schema has to be perceived, and this violation is (1) a faux pas and thus of no extreme consequence and (2) attributable directly to one or more participants in the interaction (including oneself). The violation has for consequence *a shift in core affect* that serves, at first, to drive the attention to the violation and then, as the motivational drive to deal with the situation in order to *turn off* this Alarm Signal. The motivation drives the noetic search for adequate *Behavioural schemas* and, if available and applicable, their implementation. At last, the emotional episode will end with the successful implementation or with the conclusion of the conspicuous social interaction.

3. *A Third Way: Fremdscham — or Remote Embarrassment*

First, a *schema* is available of how a running social interaction, of which we *are spectators*, should unfold. This can be derived ad-hoc from similar enough schemas stored in memory. Second, a *violation* of the schema has to be perceived, and this violation is (1) a faux pas and thus of no extreme consequence and (2) attributable directly to one or more participants in the interaction. The violation has for consequence *a shift in core affect* that serves, at first, to drive the attention to the violation and then, as the motivational drive to deal with the situation in order to *turn off* this Alarm Signal. The motivation drives the noetic search for adequate *Behavioural schemas* and, if available and applicable, their implementation (even though they are typically non-applicable). At last, the emotional episode will end with the conclusion of the conspicuous social interaction.

As it becomes obvious, the only relevant part for the process of embarrassment to occur is the *interactionally induced shift in Core Affect and its motivational effects.* Everything leading to that point, and all consequences that follow it, are just peripheral, dependent on the individual, on his socialisation and social competences, and not per se relevant for the model.

Advantages of the Cultural-Interactional Process Model of Embarrassment

In the previous part, I presented three illustrations of situations that lead to embarrassment. All three are different, and still, they lead to experiencing embarrassment. Instead of focusing on the kinds of situations that elicit embarrassment or on its terminal behavioural effects, the model I propose defines the *common effect* shared by all situations in which embarrassment happens: the *perceived urgency* of effectively avoiding situational inadequacy.

The general character of its assumptions facilitates understanding the situational factors and interpersonal differences that affect the experience of embarrassment. Further, it reconciles the empirical discrepancies not explainable by any of the previous attempts, some of which support Miller's (2013) social evaluation assumptions and some that support the interactionist approach (e.g. Silver et al., 1987), but doesn't fall for the fallacy of simply declaring the existence of different types of embarrassment, for which there is no evidence (e.g. Fink, 1975).

Although potentially an important part of the research question, the behavioural effects of embarrassment are not a defining part of the process, but mostly only a clue as of what the function of embarrassment is. By not trying to define the concrete behaviours arising from the emotion, but only by defining their *function*, the model admits to all idiosyncratic behaviours and individual strategies with which people, subcultures and whole societies deal with embarrassment: as long as the behaviour might be effective in turning off the Alarm Signal (and sufficiently socially acceptable), it might be applied to the situation. The lack of competence in dealing with embarrassment (e.g., fleeing the situation or „freezing") is then as well accounted for and a possible outcome of the emotion, even if not necessarily functional: it is, as are any actually effective behaviours, an effect of the motivational drive caused by the Alarm Signal.

What About Fremdschämen?

Contrary to the problems that all other theories of embarrassment face in explaining Fremdscham, the process model here proposed can account for it without any trouble: as long as the Alarm Signal of an individual gets activated by an observed situation, embarrassment can unfold

remotely. It is then up to the idiosyncrasies of each individual to experience or not the urgency communicated by his or her own Alarm Signal. How this differences arise is as of now a matter of speculation and should be addressed by differential and developmental psychologists. The linguistic differentiation between embarrassment and fremdschämen, or as I will refer to, *remote embarrassment*, becomes an interesting aspect of language development and maybe of communicational psychology, but needs not to be addressed by this model.

Still, the most interesting consequence of the functional equivalence between these concepts is that it allows for a common definition of *all instances of embarrassment*. This step is also necessary to mend the artificial fracture of the research in „kinds of embarrassment", which wastefully causes different lines of actually redundant research and divided efforts.

Embarrassment: A Procedural Definition

At this point, it becomes necessary to finally define embarrassment as a process which fulfils a function instead of as a superficial syndrome, so that the assumptions of the model can be tested empirically. This new procedural definition pays out, since it is unitary for all embarrassment episodes, more streamlined and easier to falsify:

> *Embarrassment is the noetic (1), energising (2) experience of urgency (3) resulting from conspicuous form-inadequacy (4) in a social situation (5).*

(1) Noetic since it reaches the awareness of the reflective system.

(2) Energising in the sense that it has the motivating function of mobilising coping resources.

(3) The experience of embarrassment is intensive and pressing, demanding immediate attention.

(4) The eliciting transgression is both perceptible and not grave enough to demand a more grave moral response, for example shame, anger or contempt.

(5) It necessarily unfolds in a context in which presentational norms are of importance: social situations (in its broadest sense).

Just as relevant as this aspects of the definition, are those parts of the embarrassment syndrome that are left out: wherein the responsibility for the conspicuousness lies is not important, just as the form of the resources mobilisation, the resulting overt behaviours or their effectiveness.

This simple, theory-derived definition is now a good start for testing the assumptions made by this understanding of embarrassment. Some of the implications seem trivial, some of them have already been somewhat tested by related fields of research and by past embarrassment research, and some need to be addressed in order to test the model's validity. Some of this assumptions are:

1. Embarrassment is a negative emotional episode.

2. Embarrassment mobilises resources: it is *activating*.

    2.1. The function of embarrassment is applying said activation to end this episode.

3. Embarrassment reaches awareness.

4. Embarrassment is not elicited by concrete behaviours, but by social inappropriateness.

    4.1. This appropriateness is assessed on a case by case basis.

    4.2. An appropriate behaviour in one situation might be inappropriate in a different situation.

5. Embarrassment is dependent from the availability and accessibility of applicable scripts.

    5.1. Experience with some kinds of situations might be required for experiencing embarrassment, or might be necessary for *not* experiencing embarrassment.

    5.2. Preactivation of different situational scripts should influence the probability of the incidence of embarrassment.

6. To what extent inappropriateness in a given interaction elicits embarrassment depends considerably from the subjective assessment of threat posed by the inappropriateness, from the availability of applicable skills to cope with it and from the capacity to apply said skills.

7. Although prosocial in nature and in effect, embarrassment is *not* an empathic process.

    7.1. Studying embarrassment via empathy-related processes (i.e. fantasising or emotional perspective-taking as understood by Davis, 1983b) will compromise the validity of such research and has to be avoided.

8. Since they are the same process, embarrassment can be studied using remote embarrassment as a proxy, and vice versa.

Testing each and every implication of the inner workings of the embarrassment process as I understand it goes well beyond the scope of this dissertation. Further, as I have already stated, existing research supports empirically several of the assumptions made by the model. In the next part, I will present an overview of some of the research supporting this assumptions, as well as of the goals of the research I conducted in order to test some of the mayor implications brought by this new understanding of embarrassment.

Overview of the Present Research and Outlook on the Experiments

If there is one aspect concerning embarrassment for which there is consensus, it is its negative character (1.) (for an overview, see Rowland S. Miller, 1996, 2013), even though smiling and laughing about an embarrassing situation has long been known to be possible *symptoms* of the emotion (e.g. Goffman, 1956b). This impulsive exhibition of positivity has since then been presumed to be of communicative character and facilitate prosocial reactions (Goffman, 1956a; Miller, 2013). Still, some anecdotical accounts of the fremdscham-phenomenon include amusement and/or displays of happiness and enjoyment. If fremdscham is, as I presume it to be, remote embarrassment, it is necessary to clarify this point.

Both the assumptions made about the activating character (2.) and the noetic awareness (3.) of embarrassment work together, since the Reflective System needs to be aware of the source of the emotion in order to reflective address it, as previously discussed. It is conceivable that the activation generated by social expectancy violations can become part of a different emotional episode

(like anger or anxiety, as understood by Russell, 2009) or don't be strong enough to reach awareness (akin of the phenomenon described by Oyserman, 2011), but both are necessary conditions for embarrassment to occur and should be measurable.

A key aspect of my understanding of embarrassment is the *context dependability*, assumption that shall be tested: no behaviour per se is embarrassing, but only in the right (wrong?) social context, which defines its inappropriateness (4.), and only as long as relevant experiences have been made (5., evidence for this is the cultural relativity of embarrassment, (Edelmann, 1990b; Kleinknecht, Dinnel, Kleinknecht, Hiruma, & Harada, 1997)). Further, it is particularly dependent on the individual to determine *which behaviour in which social context* will elicit embarrassment, this being a consequence of socialisation (5.) and of the individual's own capacities to deal with the kinds of situations that, for him, might be potentially embarrassing (6.). This is why the development of stimuli for embarrassment research is so difficult, particularly if confounding processes (for example, the emphatic processes described under point 7. evidence of which is the empathy-inhibiting effects of negative emotions) and intimidatingly complex field studies are to be avoided. In the experimental part, remote embarrassment will mostly be my object and method of study. I do assume that my results will be generalisable to other occurrences of embarrassment (8.), and for this I will compare my results to existent empirical data on embarrassment. Ideally, this functional equivalence should be empirically tested, using one and the same induction in an immediate and in a remote experimental condition. This is regrettably easier said than done, as it will be argued in the Discussion of this dissertation. Still, I do believe that the similarities between the patterns resulting from my studies and those found in previous embarrassment research will suffice to convincingly secure the processual equivalence of embarrassment in both immediate and remote situations, and thus validating the implementation of remote embarrassment as a proxy for studying embarrassment as a whole.

EMPIRICAL PART

Study 1: Defining Fremdschämen

Aiming at exploring the feasibility of studying embarrassment through the phenomenon of fremdschämen, a very simple first study was conducted with two goals: (1) assessing the way that german speakers understand fremdschämen and (2) gathering information about their experiences with it, in order to establish its similarity —or lack thereof— to embarrassment proper. Lastly, some relevant features of recalled episodes and personality traits were assessed to explore their relevance for experiencing fremdscham.

Design

Open reports addressing the intuitive understanding of „fremdschämen“ by the participants (1) where to be recoded according to several aspects and depending on the quantity of the categories found, analysed. Free descriptions of two concrete past experiences in which participants felt fremdscham (2) were to be subjected to a factor analysis after recoding their features into categories. No variable was manipulated.

Method

Participants

A total of 116 german native speakers (98 female) of ages between 18 and 36 years old and an average age of 22,98 (SD = 3,416) were recruited via social networks and student mailing lists „to participate on a study about fremdschämen“. No form of remuneration was offered and no conditions applied to take part in the study, other than being a german speaker.

Procedure

As means of reaching a varied sample with relative ease, the study was conducted in the form of an online survey. Because of its explorative character, it was decided to implement the format of open questions whenever best suited to find out not only if made suppositions were true, but also if any central aspect of the emotion had not been thought of. Few demographic variables were as-

sessed, and this at the very beginning, to assure that dropouts had completed this part of the survey. As usual with long, not remunerated online surveys, a large proportion of dropouts was expected and observed.

Materials

After a short greeting and an introduction regarding the usage of the gathered data and personal information, three demographical data points were assessed on a single page: gender, age and if one of the native tongues of the participant was german.

On the next immediate page, participants were asked to try and explain what they understood by *Fremdscham or sich fremdschämen*[3], even if they themselves had not experienced the emotion in the past. To answer this question a large text field was provided and no further limitations were given. Next, it was assessed if the participant believed to have experienced the emotion in the past (yes or no as possible answers). If they answered affirmatively, a seven-point Likert-scale with the anchors *very weak — very strong* was presented, with which the question *In general, how do you estimate your tendency towards feeling fremdscham?* was answered.

After moving on to the next page, participants were asked to describe the last situation in which they experienced fremdscham. They were instructed to take as long as necessary and that it wasn't particularly important that they describe their actual *last* fremdscham experience. They were supposed to replay the situation in their mind's eye and then to **describe it as accurately as possible**. Above the text field in which they were to describe the situation, the remark was presented, that they were supposed to only describe the situation (including where it took place, who was present, what exactly happened, what they felt, what their thoughts were and how it ended).

Bellow the field, the same Likert-scale from the previous page was presented with the question *how intensive where the emotions that you experienced? [If you can't remember, skip this question],* followed by two open questions: *How long did the situation last? [A rough estimate is enough!]* and *Approximately when did the episode take place? [A rough estimate is enough! (e.g. last week, between May and June, half a year ago…)]* The last

[3] „Sich fremdschämen" being the reflective form of the verb. Roughly: „to fremdscham oneself".

question used again the previous Likert-scale and anchors to answer the question *How strongly did you identify yourself with the person, for which you felt fremdscham? [If you can't estimate it, skip this question].*

On the next page, the same items were presented, but this time referring to the most extreme recollection of fremdscham the participant could remember.

Participants were then asked to evaluate their own capabilities regarding two aspects of empathy, theorised by Davis (1983b) and relevant for empathic accuracy (Zaki et al., 2008): *How good are you at recognising emotions in others? [Meant is the capability of UNDERSTANDING which emotion some else is feeling, independently of if you feel it yourself]* (for which again a seven-point Likert-scale with the anchors *very bad — very good* and the question) *How empathic (mitfühlend[4]) do you think you are? [Meant is, to feel YOURSELF the emotions of others, for example when they are sad or happy]* (Anchored with the categories *almost not at all — exceptionally*).

Lastly, they had the option of leaving their Email-Address if they wished to participate in further studies regarding fremdscham.

Results

Dropouts

As expected, a large proportion of the participants who started the study dropped out after the first few pages, like it usually is the case with online studies (Cronk & West, 2002; MacElroy, 2000). Of the 142 who started, 116 answered enough questions to remain part of the analysis. This 116 participants answered at least until they attempted to define *fremdschämen.* After that, and most probably a consequence of the open format of the questions regarding fremdscham episodes, there was a considerable amount of additional dropouts. The description of the first fremdscham situation was completed by 62 participants, of which 49 remained after some of the episodes described were excluded for being identical to embarrassment (6) or shame (2) of either first-person,

[4] There seems to be no exact translation for this german word. It most closely translates to *having the tendency to feel with others.* The mostly accepted translation, *sympathetic*, is not exactly the same, it implying mostly sympathy and comprehension (Sympathetic [Def. 3], n.d.), which are not necessarily a part of feeling with another person (Davis, 1983b).

vicarious or empathic variety; or were not detailed enough to allow for their analysis (5). 51 participants completed the study.

Analysis

It is absolutely imperative, while interpreting the answers of participants, to keep in mind that embarrassment and shame (or embarrassing and shameful) are used interchangeably in german (as they are in english and several other languages), but are understood as two different phenomenons in psychological research. Accordingly, I will *not* differentiate them when participants use the words, but interpret them if possible from the described situations. In this sense, in every instance I don't differentiate between them, I will be referring to the accounts of the participants who explicitly named them; instances in which I explicitly refer to embarrassment *or* shame (or any other emotional phenomenon for that matter) are interpretations of situations detailed enough to be unambiguously understood in this fashion.

Understanding of „Fremdschämen"

In a surprisingly uniform manner, most participants described *fremdschämen* as a situation in which they feel shame/embarrassment when someone else does something shameful/embarrassing. Regarding their very own experience, 76 of the 115 valid answers (66,08%) explicitly named experiencing shame/embarrassment, while 31 (26,95%) went further and described feeling pain, unwell or wanting to flee the situation, which can be understood as a more detailed description of their personal embarrassment reaction. There were seven outliers: three (2,60%) of the subjects described being afraid of the behaviour of others „spilling over" to them and being unjustly judged for it (actually describing a vicarious or direct episode), two (1,79%) described having no understanding for the other's behaviour, and two feeling pity for the other (*mitleid*, which might imply empathic concern). 92 of the 115 valid answers (80,00%) indicated that there was another person in the situation who did something embarrassing, absurd or shameful (while the other 20,00% refrained from mentioning or describing the behaviour of the other person(s) altogether, but did not mention being alone). The variance of this last variable was too small to allow for a

higher form of statistical analysis by including the outliers: of the seven outliers mentioned earlier, all of them reported the other person doing something embarrassing/shameful.

Further, it was registered if the participant mentioned the other person(s) awareness about their embarrassing behaviour. 82,60% made no mention of this, while the rest showed no consistent pattern: 13,04% said they were unaware, 2,6% were aware, and 5,21% explicitly reported this being irrelevant for them to experience fremdscham.

In an effort to explore the possibility that participants understood *fremdscham* as being vicarious or empathic embarrassment/shame, all definitions that could be interpreted in this (or any other extraneous) way were accounted for. 6,96% of the participants' definitory attempts were found to possibly be explainable via one of these phenomenons, while the rest (93,04%) was not.

Descriptions of Fremdscham-Episodes

As previously explained, there was a strong trend to drop out of the study. While 116 participants attempted to define *fremdscham*, 65 completed the description of their *last fremdscham-episode*. Most participants actually left blank the description of their *most extreme fremdscham-episode* (or pointed to their previous one), even if they completed the study. For this reason, only the first description was analysed.

Of the 65 participants who carried on with the study, nine wrote not recalling a particular situation at the moment or too little to be recoded (e.g. *at the cinema*). Of the 56 left, six described what was a clear-cut embarrassing situation and two described shameful situations.

The remaining 48 where included in the analysis. The recoding was performed in a way that every possibly relevant element of the interaction was recoded as a variable (e.g. *Personal Boundaries Violation*), and for every description the variable took the value 1 if the variable was explicitly true (e.g. *in a full movie theatre*) and 0 if it was explicitly not true (e.g. *home alone watching TV*). If the variable was not explicitly mentioned, it became a missing value, being left out of the analysis.

17 variables were recoded in this fashion:

Variable Name	Interpratation	Yes	No	Missing
Spectator Responsibility	Spectator at least partially responsible for situation	5	43	0
Public Present	Situation with public	44	3	1
Actor Intimacy Violation	Personal space/intimacy transgression	16	30	2
Actor Form Violation	Perceived form transgression	36	9	3
Actor Social Inadequacy	Actor shows social incompetence	37	8	3
Actor Incompetent	Actor shows performance incompetence	26	18	4
Actor Shame Shown	Actor visibly embarrassed/ashamed	**1**	41	6
Possible Identification With Actor	Reported relationship/similarity	12	30	6
Actor Dignity Loss	Behaviour seen as undignified	35	5	8
Spectator Alone	Spectator reports being alone	11	28	9
Spectator Amused	Spectator reports feeling amused	7	28	13
Spectator Feels Concern for Actor	Spectator reports thoughts of concern	9	22	**17**
Spectator Pain/Discomfort/Flight	Typical embarrassment symptoms while observing the situation shown	29	**1**	**18**
Spectator Surprised	By the transgression	21	**2**	**25**
Spectator Perturbed	Spectator agitated on a personal level	19	**2**	**27**
Spectator Aggressive	Spectator reports aggressive tendencies towards actor/situation	9	8	**31**
Spectator Embarrassed	Spectator reports feeling embarrassed	11	**4**	**33**

Table 1: List of resulting variables including frequency of *yes, no, missings* coded. Sorted by missing values. In **Gray**: reason for exclusion from the factor analysis.

The dummy-coded variables (missing, 0 or 1) were then to be included in a Factor Analysis (FA) with the intention of identifying experiential syndromes. This approach is not ideal, since the FA requires normally distributed continuous variables, but since the means of the dummy-coded variables are interpretable (Bortz, 2005), and since it's being used for exploratory analysis with the intention of further studying any resulting outcomes, these are only exploratory results and may not be understood as definite in any way, but only as hints to guide further studies.

From looking at the data, it was obvious that some variables showed too little variance to be usable in the FA. For example, the variable *Actor Shame Shown* (by the party at fault) was 0 = no in 41 cases and 1 = yes in one case (with 6 missings, see Table 1). Still, the criteria used to choose the variables that were included in the final analysis were kept as close to the standard FA as possible: as long as the correlation coefficients were computable, the variables were included in the primary FA. At this stage, several variables were excluded from the analysis, since they had been reported too seldomly to compute (those with more than 13 missing values, see Table 1) and those with too little variance (only the variable *Actor Shame Shown* previously mentioned).

The remaining 10 variables were included in a first factor analysis (extraction: Primary Components; Varimax rotated). Following the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin criteria for including variables in a FA, the Anti-Image-Correlation table was used to identify variables not suited for the analysis. Via this method, two further variables were excluded because this measure of suitability did not reach a value > .50 (Backhaus, Erichson, Plinke, & Weiber, 2006): *Actor Dignity Loss* (0.267) and *Spectator Alone* (.376), and the FA was then repeated.

The resulting FA surprisingly fulfilled even the KMO and Bartlett criteria for sampling adequacy (Backhaus et al., 2006), considering the dichotomous coding of the variables: the value for the KMO-Criterion is .603 and the Bartlett test of sphericity is significant (p = .010). The resulting solution proposes two factors, which respectively explain 30.540% and 25.531% of the variance (convergence in 3 iterations):

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2
Actor Incompetent	**-.792**	.319
Actor Form Violation	**.754**	
Actor Social Inadequacy	**.653**	
Actor Intimacy Violation	**.636**	.439
Spectator Amused	-.463	.256
Public Present	-.226	**.824**
Spectator Alone	-.336	**-.715**
Spectator Responsibility		**-.695**

Table 2: Factor Analysis solution. In **Bold**: Values > 0.6. Not shown: Values < 0.2.

One variable (*Spectator Amused)* seemed to not be loading particularly strongly (<.6) on any, and moderately on both resulting factors. This makes its interpretation difficult and has no benefits, so the variable was excluded from a last FA run, with the intention of comparing the results of both and assessing the value of excluding the variable content-wise.

The exclusion of this variable improved greatly the statistical values of the Factor Analysis: the KMO-criterion improved to a value of .654 and the Bartlett test's *p*-value decreased to .000. Further, the variables load more clearly on each a specific factor, all of them surpassing the threshold of .6:

Variable	Factor 1	Factor 2
Actor Incompetent	**-.726**	.381
Actor Form Violation	**.759**	
Actor Social Inadequacy	**.724**	
Actor Intimacy Violation	**.691**	.355
Public Present		**.857**
Spectator Alone	-.430	**-.612**
Spectator Responsibility		**-.735**

Table 2: Factor Analysis solution. In **Bold**: Values > 0.6. Not shown: Values < 0.2.

Still, both solutions shall be discussed, since in this explorative analysis it is of higher priority to considerate all plausible explanations than to exclude less probable ones.

Lastly, it was explored if the assessed control variables correlated in any way with each other and with the found factors. Of particular interest was to assess if the self-reports of (1) the identification with the responsible party in the interaction and of (2) emotional empathy in any way affected the reported intensity of the emotional episode, as these would be arguments for *vicarious* and *empathic embarrassment* respectively. Linear regressions with the *intensity* as the dependent and each self-report as the independent variables showed no relationship, as expected (identification: β= -.049, t= -.272, p= .788; emotional empathy: β= .236, t= 1.323, p= .196).

Discussion

In this first attempt at understanding fremdschämen two main goals were pursued: to try and understand how subjects who report being familiar with the phenomenon understand it, and, for the first time, to make an effort in analysing the phenomenon directly, so that any assumptions made about it are based on actual hard data, and not only on theoretical deliberation — which might very well accommodate to existing theoretical frameworks, but not necessarily to reality.

In this regard, data shows that people pretty much understand one thing under *fremdscham*: a third party (an actor) does something embarrassing, and then I (the spectator) feel embarrassed, even if I'm not an active part of the situation. Further, the emotional state of the actor was only seldom reported, what can be understood as it not being particularly relevant and hinting at the plausibility of the assumption that fremdscham is not empathic in nature.

The analysis of fremdscham episodes hints a two types of situations reportedly being witnessed: Factor 1 seems to be *Norm Violations (of different kinds) in Social Interactions*, while Factor 2 *Conspicuousness in front of an Audience.* Factor 1 shows in principle a classic embarrassing situation — just perceived from a certain distance, while Factor 2 depicts the now commonly stereotypical fremdscham experience while watching some sort of performance go wrong.

In principle, both factors simply render two known embarrassing situations compatible with the theoretical principles I presented earlier on.

The Variable *Spectator Amused* is consistent with this interpretation, whether it is included in the result or not: people seem to be somewhat *not amused* while witnessing the situation described by Factor 1 and amusement seems to be possible in, but not strongly representative of the situation described by Factor 2. That the Variable *Spectator Alone* loads on both factors negatively is also not surprising, since embarrassment —as I suggest fremdscham to be— is intrinsically social in nature.

Also of importance are the results of the empathic and identificational aspects. After excluding the obviously vicarious (3) or empathic (3) emotional episodes, in which strong relationships with the actors (mostly family members) or direct involvement in the situation are the source of embarrassment, the remaining and analysed descriptions show neither mediation nor moderation of the self-reported empathy or identification with the intensity of the emotional episode. This speaks against the possibility of vicariousness or empathy being at the root of the phenomenon: once situationally controlled, only personal inclination towards empathy or unsystematic identification with the actor should mediate fremdscham — they just seem not to.

Of course, the explorative character of this study cannot be overlooked, at it was meant to only provide a rough picture of the experience of fremdscham and a draft of the typical situations that elicit it, in order to facilitate following experiments — and particularly the choice of stimuli.

Experiment 1: Effect of Regulatory Focus on the Experience of Positive and Negative Affect and Activation in a Typical Fremdscham Situation

After the previous study, it was decided to start testing the assumptions of the model. One top priority of this work was to ensure that results would be generalisable to the field and the real world, and so not be confined to the laboratory or maybe even to our very particular stimulus (for discussions on the subject, see Cacioppo & Cacioppo, 2013; Mitchell, 2012). For this reason, the typical fremdscham situation was to be replicated as truthfully as possible and problematic methodologies, like fantasising, based on considerations previously presented, were to be discarded.

According to the previously explained understanding of Emotional Episodes as psychological construction by Russell (2003, 2009), a shift in the neuropsychological state described as Core Affect should be experiential and measurable. The first obvious and necessary change should occur within the dimensions of (bodily/cognitive) Activation and (positive vs. negative Emotional) Valence. Only when a perceivable change in one or both of this dimensions occur is it possible to experience an emotional episode (which might then include a variety of other components: behavioural scripts, changes in nervous systems, attribution, emotional experience, and, among others, emotional regulation). The way this components interact, are activated, associated with one another and classified as a distinct or more ambiguous emotional episode vary significantly depending on experience, physiological idiosyncrasies and situational variables (which, for example, might facilitate the activation of elements in an individual's semantic network; Russell, 2003).

This all implies that, in principle, it is highly dependent on an individual what kind of emotional episode he or she might feel or not in a given situation. In this way, a video that might induce embarrassment on a viewer, could be funny, boring or annoying for the next one, or even cause no noticeable change in Core Affect at all.

Still, this complexity doesn't imply that specific emotional episodes can’t be induced. Much more, it allows for the measurement of certain aspects of the actual experience that otherwise would only contribute to error variance. In the case of embarrassment, for instance, I argue that it is an intrinsically motivating, negative emotional episode. This hypothesis can be tested by assessing

both dimensions of Russell's model (2003). Assuming that the shift in Core Affect is strong enough to get noticed (and thus causing an emotional episode instead of just a *mood*), and since I stipulate the necessity that embarrassment reaches the same noetic awareness, just asking participants about their experience might be enough to reliably assess embarrassment. If this line of questioning is detailed enough, it might even be enough to identify what kind of emotional reactions and episodes participants are experiencing as consequence of stimuli, which very well might be a different one than intended.

Following this train of thought, items assessing experienced agitation (1) and the valence of experienced feelings (2) were implemented. As a complement, the tendency to approach or avoid the situation (3) was also assessed, as a first attempt at registering some form of overt behaviour as a reaction to the specific emotional episode studied here.

For this first experiment, it was decided to test the role of Regulatory Focus (Higgins, 1997, 1998) on the effects of a fremdscham induction. According to Regulatory Focus Theory (RFT), people can have different foci, either a P*revention* or a *Promotion Focus*, while pursuing strategies, and this is both an individual, stable tendency (a trait) and also situationally variable (a manipulable state, Higgins, 1997; Werth & Förster, 2007). This has direct effects on the way they perceive elements of the situation, such as threat and opportunities, and affects the way the situation is dealt with: the choice of risky over vigilant strategies (Crowe & Higgins, 1997; Ouschan, Boldero, Kashima, Wakimoto, & Kashima, 2007), the way we prioritise speed over accuracy (Förster, Higgins, & Bianco, 2003) and even the emotional experience of the situation (Brockner & Higgins, 2001). Although simply experiencing an emotional episode doesn't necessarily provokes a goal-pursuing resource mobilisation, I argue that embarrassment is a highly emotional motivational state. Under this assumption, chronic and/or induced Regulatory Focus should affect the way a potentially embarrassing situation is perceived as threatening (and thus triggering the theorised *Alarm Signal*), since while in a Prevention Focus the possibility of recognising mistakes (in this case social-interactional ones) and, not less importantly for the onset of embarrassment, the assessment of their threat value should be superior as while in a Promotion Focus.

Still, the trait-state character of the Regulatory Focus shall remain an issue to be considered while attempting to manipulate the induction of fremdscham, but one that ought to be sufficiently controlled. An even bigger problem shall be the social quality of a potentially embarrassing situation and the problematically moral qualities of the most effective Regulatory Focus manipulations, by which the focus is induced autobiographically through reports of certain types of experienced situations (Higgins, Roney, Crowe, & Hymes, 1994). The danger of confounding the moral aspects of the manipulation with the perception of threat that it is supposed to induce is argument enough to discard them, and instead implement manipulations that, while perhaps less effective, should affect the focus without activating social cues (e.g. the manipulations implemented by Friedman & Förster, 2001).

Hypotheses

It was assumed that participants in a Prevention Focus (PreF) would tend to perceive unexpected or *inappropriate* social behaviour more often and more intensively threatening than those in a Promotion Focus (ProF), who might be open to the idea of the behaviour being appropriate or it's unexpectedness of positive character — for example, funny or entertaining. In this sense, it was assumed that participants in a PreF would report a less negative shift in Core Affect than those in ProF:

H1a: Affective Valence in ProF will be more positive than in PreF.

H1b: Activation in ProF will be stronger than in PreF.

H2: Participants in PreF will report stronger Avoidance, participants in ProF stronger approach tendencies towards the videos.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 79 psychology students in their first semester (59 female; of ages between 18 and 42 years old and an average age of 20,69 (*SD* = 3,970)) from the Universität Würzburg participated in this two session study for course credit, the first session being administered in the laboratory and the second one taking place as an online survey. The independent variable was the induced Regulatory Focus (experimental conditions PreF and ProF), the dependent variables were three: (1) Emotional Valence, (2) Activation and (3) Approach-Avoidance.

Procedure

After choosing an appointment, participants came to the laboratory for the first part of the study. Upon arrival, they were instructed to turn off their phones and take place in front of a computer, where the whole of the first part of the experiment took place. They were told that they were going to watch several videos preceded by short descriptions, and then answer some simple questions about their experiences. No further information about their task or contents of the videos was given.

First, a short practice phase took place, in which the participants got to see and apply for the first time the graphic scales used for the DV (and which are further explained in the *Materials* part of this experiment). Here, participants were to indicate their emotional reactions towards a simple stimulus: a picture of ice cream. Each scale was previously explained, to promote its homogeneous interpretation by all participants.

Before each video, they were to solve one labyrinth (which was the Regulatory Focus manipulation) while the computer measured the time. The labyrinth was printed on a sheet of Paper and several of them lied stacked left from the computer upside down. They had then to stop the time with a key press and put the labyrinth in a designated box, and then return their attention to the computer.

At this point, a short description of the following video would appear. In part to avoid surprise from driving any effects, in part to keep the videos short. After reading it, the video was to start with the pressing of a key. Immediately after the video the DV was assessed using the nine-point graphic scales known by the participants from the practice phase, each presented in an individual screen. They were then followed by questions regarding the emotional reactions of the participants. After that, a next round with a different video started, again with a labyrinth, for a total of four rounds.

Two different fremdscham inducing videos were used, as well as a happiness and a sadness inducing video as controls and to distract from the experiment's goals. All of them were presented in fully randomised order.

Following the DV, a series of questions regarding possible emotional reactions by the participants were asked. These were intended as a manipulation check, to test if the videos had the intended effects. To avoid concept preactivation of the studied phenomena, the words *Fremdscham* and *Fremdschämen* were avoided.

Between 20 days and six weeks after the first session, participants got an email with instructions on how to proceed with the online part of the study, including its web address.

Materials

The experiment, like all following studies, took place on a PC computer running Windows XP. For the presentation and recording of the data, the software MediaLab v2006 was used. For the online questionnaires the UniPark service was used. Statistical analysis was conducted on SPSS 20 for Windows.

The practice phase started with concrete instructions for interpreting the graphic scales of the SAM (Self-Assessment Manikin), developed by Bradley & Lang (1994; adapted from the implementation by Bradley & Lang, 1999). Then, a stimulus (IAPS picture No. 5760. Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008), which was picture of ice cream and of positive connotation, was presented in the middle of the screen, being 60% as wide as the screen itself, for a fixed time of six seconds. After

that, the SAM graphic scales (three in total, assessing (1) Emotional Valence, (2) Activation and (3) Approach-Avoidance tendencies) were presented each on its own and in randomised order. With each scale a question appeared, facilitating the correct interpretation of the scale (1: *Alles in allem, wie possitiv oder negativ waren die Emotionen, die du beam Ansehen des Videos gefühlt hast?*[5] 2: *Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen des Videos gefühlt?*[6] and 3: *Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt, dich dem Video zuzuwenden oder von ihm wegzukommen?*[7]) For this and all future experiments, the two first scales were adapted from the original to show positivity or greater quantities of the reported feature on the *right side* of the scale. Like in the original, participants could select a checkbox corresponding to one of the figures or to the spaces between the figures, thus resulting in nine options:



Fig. 1: original graphic scales of the SAM (Bradley & Lang, 1999). For this and all following studies, the scales *Emotional Valence* (top) and *Agitation* (middle) were mirrored horizontally for consistency with other instruments.

Each graphic scale was presented until the participant clicked on one of the checkboxes, action that would prompt the next scale to appear. After the third and last one, participants were informed that the practice phase had concluded, that the scales would be used in identical form later on, and that now the experimental part proper would begin.

[5] All things considered, how positive or negative were the emotions you felt while watching the video?

[6] How agitated did you feel during the video?

[7] How strongly did you feel the impulse, to approach the video or to avoid it (rough approximation).

For this first study, a series of videoclips from movies and TV shows were chosen as stimuli and had as function to generate one of three reactions: inducing positive emotions like happiness, inducing sadness, or generating embarrassment (in the specific form of fremdscham). They were cut together creating a short narrative sequence, which followed the respective text introduction. For the controls, two sequences were used:

The happiness inducing sequence was extracted from the motion picture *Die Unendliche Geschichte* (dubbing of the original The NeverEnding Story; Weigel & Petersen, 1984). The sequence showed the protagonist, Bastian, showing extreme happiness while on a joyride on Fuchur, the lucky dragon. The sequence lasted 5 minutes, 32 seconds.

The sadness induction took place with a sequence from the german dubbed version of the movie *Cast Away – Verschollen (Broyles, 2001).* In the videoclip, it could be seen how Chuck, the protagonist, forms a friendship with a ball he names Wilson after being stranded in a desert island. When he finally manages to leave the island on a boat built by himself, he looses his friend on the open seas, even after risking his life to save him. He is then shown crying for Wilson's forgiveness on his boat. The sequence lasted 5 minutes, 24 seconds.

The fremdscham induction was carried via two clips cut out of two different episodes of the german show *Mein Neuer Freund*, a show for which people have to present an obnoxious character as their new boyfriend or best friend to their families and friends, and aren't supposed to ever break character themselves over the course of a weekend, in order to win a price of 10.000€. In the first clip (FrS1, lasting 6 minutes, 32 seconds; Ulmen, 2005b), the character is called Veith and is a new-age, anti-aggression, touchy-feely empathy coach who has to be presented by a very manly man as his best friend and spiritual coach, playing soccer with angel wings and eventually even coming out to his family as gay. In the second clip (FrS2, lasting 6 minutes, 37 seconds; Ulmen, 2005a) a very nice, shy and well-behaved girl has to present a burping, smelly, vulgar and unemployed character called Jürgen to her friends and family as her new boyfriend, even asking her father for money for his business idea, a phone-sex hotline (concept that she has to loudly demonstrate in a hotel lobby for her father).

The videos were briefly pretested on social psychology seminars (N=63) for their fremdscham-induction capabilities. 46,03% of viewers reported experiencing the emotion to some degree.

The DV were self-reports via an adaptation of the graphic self-assessment scale SAM (Self-Assessment Manikin), developed by Bradley & Lang (1994; adapted from the implementation by Bradley & Lang, 1999). The graphic scales were presented in randomised order immediately after each video, each by its own, and the self-assessment took place via mouse-click on a checkbox, like previously practiced.

Following the SAM scales, participants had to report, choosing *yes* or *no*, if they had experienced each of a series of emotional experiences during the viewing of each video. The 28 experiences reported, which were individually presented in random order, were: Trauer, Wut, Ärger, Genervtheit, Hoffnungslosigkeit, Hilflosigkeit, Mitgefühl, Betroffenheit, Freude, Hoffnung, Selbstsicherheit, Stolz, Genuss, Genugtuung, Zufriedenheit, Unwohlsein, Scham, Isoliertheit, Langeweile, Ekel, Überraschung, Entspannung, Gleichgültigkeit, Verzweiflung, Verblüffung, Belustigung, Schadenfreude and Schmerz[8]. Their rolle was to control for emotional episodes, in order to avoid wrongfully assuming the success of the induction. A last report asked participants to select one of 12 possible emotional reactions as the one which best described their experience, and to then rate the intensity of said experience (from 1 *very weak* to 7 *very strong*). The 12 possibilities were: Überraschung, Ekel/Abscheu, Mitgefühl, Belustigung, Betroffenheit, Schadenfreude, Gleichgültigkeit, Schmerz, Spaß, Unwohlsein, Freude and Scham[9]. These were emotions thought to be most likely to have been experienced and which would cover the most typical reactions to this kind of videos. Further, participants had to shortly (i.e. *in one sentence if possible*) explain the reason for this experience. The idea behind this question was to validate the aggregation of some of the items to a *Fremdscham*-Item (Ekel/Abscheu, Betroffenheit, Schmerz, Unwohlsein and „Scham“ as colloquially used), since I assume this experiences to be all possible outcomes of an embarrassing episode.

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[8] Approximate translation: sadness, ire, anger, irritation, hopelessness, helplessness, compassion, consternation, happiness, hope, self-assurance, pride, enjoyment, satisfaction, gratification, feeling unwell, shame, isolation, boringness, disgust, surprise, relaxation, indifference, desperation, bafflement, amusement, schadenfreude and pain.

[9] Approximate translation: surprise, disgust, compassion, amusement, bafflement, schadenfreude, indifference, pain, fun, feeling unwell, happiness and shame.

For the control videos, the same yes-no-reports were assessed, but the report about the emotional reaction best describing the participant's experience was adapted to the stimulus. For the happiness-induction, the options given were: Spaß, Freude, Glück, Hoffnung, Selbstsicherheit, Stolz, Genuss, Genugtuung, Erfüllung, Zufriedenheit, Langeweile, Sonstiges. For the sadness-induction: Trauer, Verlust, Einsamkeit, Gleichgültigkeit, Ärger, Angst, Hoffnungslosigkeit, Hilflosigkeit, Verzweiflung, Mitleid, Betroffenheit, Sonstiges[10].

At the end of the laboratory session, demographic data was gathered (gender, age, native language), motivation was assessed via a seven-point Likert-scale (from 1 *not motivated at all* to 7 *extremely motivated*) and a personal code was generated in order to pair the data from the following online session. At last, they had to write down their email-address (on a different medium to guarantee for the anonymity of their data) in order to receive the link to the second part.

The online session consisted mostly of questionnaires assessing personality traits of the participants. For this study, of relevance are the german translations of the following instruments: (1) Regulatory Focus Strategies Scale (RFSS; Ouschan et al., 2007), (2) the Social Anxiety Questionnaire (SAQ-A30; Caballo et al., 2008), (3) the Vicarious Experience Scale (Oceja, López-Pérez, Ambrona, & Fernández, 2009) and (4) the E-Scale for measuring empathy (Leibetseder, Laireiter, Riepler, & Köller, 2001), as well as self-reports concerning (5) schadenfreude and (6) fantasising tendencies and (7) Reality-TV watching habits and taste. This measurements were thought to be of relevance, since they measure (1) the disposition to implement strategies compatible with a specific regulatory focus — which probably is detrimental to the effectivity of the manipulation, (2) the level of anxiety usually experienced — and hence expected — from different types of social interactions and (3) since it measures the disposition of experiencing stress through vicarious processes — what would account for an empathic pathway towards fremdscham. The empathy measurements (4, 5, 6) were assessed to test for alternative hypotheses, like those proposed by Hawk and colleagues (2011).

[10] Approximate translation, happiness-induction: fun, happiness, joy, hope, self-assurance, pride, enjoyment, gratification, fulfilment, satisfaction, boringness, other. Sadness-induction: sadness, loss, loneliness, indifference, angriness, anxiety, hopelessness, helplessness, despair, compassion, bafflement, other.

Results

Dropouts

Caused by unexpected technical errors with the experimental software, the laboratory data from seven participants was not recorded, bringing the sample down to 72 participants. Fortunately, dropouts were close to equally distributed over both experimental conditions (three and four). The online data from this participants was discarded.

Analysis

Manipulation Checks and Controls

First, it was tested if the videos induced the emotions for which they were intended. For the happiness and sadness videos, the options provided to participants in order to describe their experience seemed to be exhaustive, since not once the option *other* was chosen. Further, the option *Langeweile* (boringness) was only seldom preferred (by 2 participants in the happiness induction and 3 in the sadness induction).

The first analysis realised was grouping the episodes in the categories "self-oriented", "other-oriented" and "no reaction". In this way, any effect of the Regulatory Focus induction could be tested and compared. Emotions which's intensity was reported being 1 or 2 (on a 1 to 7 scale) were recoded as "no reaction", as well as all "boringness" reports (boringness implying a failure of an emotional episode to develop).

For the happiness induction, an effect of the condition was found. Other-Orientedness was not affected by the Regulatory Focus, but under Promotion Focus were participants more likely to experience self-oriented emotions than in the Prevention Focus. In this last condition, participants were also disproportionately more likely to report being bored: χ^2 (2;72) = 6.381, p = .041.

For the sadness induction no effect of manipulation was found: χ^2 (1;69) = .194, p = .659. In this condition, only two subjects reported no emotional reaction. Since the test stipulates a minimal

expected cell allocation of 5 (Bortz, 2005), this category had to be excluded from this specific analysis (although it changed next to nothing in preliminary results). Under both conditions, participants reported similar reaction patterns (32.40% and 37,50% other-oriented reaction in ProF and PreF respectively).

Next, Chi-Square tests were also implemented to verify the effect of Regulatory Focus on the reported experiences consequence of watching the fremdscham inducing videos. For this, the reported emotions were recoded into three categories: *Enjoyment* (Belustigung, Spaß, Freude, Schadenfreude), *Compassion* (Mitgefühl) and *Fremdscham* (Scham, Unwohlsein, Ekel/Abscheu). Reactions that wouldn't fit into this categories were discarded (For the first Video (FrS1), 3 reports of *surprise* and 4 of *indifference*; for the second one (FrS2) again 3 reports of *surprise* and 2 of *indifference*). For FrS1, no participants had to be excluded from the analysis for reporting very low intensity, while two in the analysis of FrS2.

Reported Emotion			Fremdscham	Compassion	Enjoyment	Sum
Condition	ProF	Observed	5	4	23	32
		Expected	7,4	4,9	19,7	32,0
	PreF	Observed	10	6	17	33
		Expected	7,6	5,1	20,3	33,0
Sum		Observed	15	10	40	65
		Expected	15,0	10,0	40,0	65,0

Table 4: frequencies of reported emotional experiences while watching FrS1.

Compassion did not variate between conditions. Still, if this category is excluded from the analysis (in essence, analysing contrasts), a tendency in the expected direction is observed: χ^2 (1;55) = 2.549, p = .110 (participants in a ProF reported less fremdscham and more enjoyment than those in a PreF).

For FrS2, no difference whatsoever was found between conditions: χ^2 (2;65) = .786, p = .675.

Hypothesis H1: Core Affect

To test the first hypothesis, an Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) was computed, with the IV being the Regulatory Focus manipulation and the two DVs the reports of Agitation and Emotional Valence made using the SAM graphic scales.

For neither video had the manipulation of the Regulatory Focus an effect on the means.

For FrS1: Agitation $F(1,70) = .004$, $p = .948$; Emotional Valence $F(1,70) = .018$, $p = .894$. Still, a Levene-test (W) for variance homogeneity (which was chosen for being more conservative that the alternative Bartlett-Test. Levene, 1960) resulted marginally significant for Emotional Valence: $W(1,70) = 3.860$, $p = .053$: Subjects in ProF showed greater variance than those in PreF ($M = 1.20$, $SD = 2.483$ for ProF; $M = 1.27$, $SD = 1.967$ for PreF).

For FrS2: Agitation $F(1,70) = 1.639$, $p = .205$; Emotional Valence $F(1,70) = 1.656$, $p = .202$. This time, the Levene-test for variance homogeneity resulted significant for Emotional Valence: $W(1,70) = 4.019$, $p = .049$ (M =.37, $SD = 2.568$ for ProF; $M = 1.08$, SD = 2,100 for PreF) and marginally so for Agitation: $W(1,70)$ = 3,541, $p = .064$. ($M = 4.97$, $SD = 2.294$ for ProF; $M = 4.35$, SD = 1.798 for PreF). It should be noted that the greater variance was without exception found in the Promotion Focus condition.

Including the VES and SAQ-A30 as covariates did not influence the results. They also didn't predict fremdscham, joy or compassion.

Hypothesis H2: Approach-Avoidance

The Regulatory Focus failed to affect the Approach-Avoidance tendency reported by participants for both videos. FrS1: $F(1,70) = .560$, $p = .457$; FrS2: $F(1,70) = .921$, $p = .341$. Levene-tests were also not significant.

Hypotheses Summary

H1a, H1b have to be rejected in favour of the null hypothesis.

H2 has to be rejected in favour of the null-hypothesis.

Discussion

Considering that this was a first attempt at reliably inducing fremdscham in the laboratory, one should bear in mind the primary goal of the study was to test the induction through the created stimuli.

Although the videos seemed to successfully generate fremdscham-related reactions on a part of the participants, the first thing that became obvious was the fact that most participants simply found the videos to be *funny and enjoyable.*

Indeed, that the videoclips were cut from a comedy show with some popularity in the country where the study took place, and the fact that the actor is well known and widely popular, might both have conspired against the effectiveness of the stimulus.

It should be seen as problematic that so many subjects found the fremdscham induction to be so funny, with 55.6% and 44.4% of the participants for the first and second videos respectively distinctively enjoying them. It becomes obvious that the selection of the stimulus has to be more careful and, in particular, more theory-driven.

An important part of the participants also reported feelings of compassion. This orientation towards the well-being of others, in principle *Empathic Concern*, is incompatible with embarrassment and with the results from the first study regarding the experience and understanding of fremdscham. Fortunately, it is such a distinct emotional episode from embarrassment that it is reasonable to assume that the cause lies on the stimulus and not on the process assumptions: indeed, the stimuli seem to be less than ideal in several aspects: there are always individuals suffering from the embarrassing actions carried out by the protagonist. It is also left to the participant's idiosyncrasies if they are to focus on the inappropriateness of the interaction (potentially leading

to embarrassment), on the suffering of this individuals (stimulating the concern for their well-being), on the humorous gimmicks of the protagonist (making the viewing enjoyable) or to some other potential reaction, or even no reaction at all (causing indifference or boredom).

To control for as many personal factors as possible and thus to validly interpret results in light of the theoretical assumptions, it is necessary that the stimuli avoid as many elements as possible that might lead to unintended effects.

One further issue with this experiment is that, with the goal of being exhaustive regarding the reports of emotions, the questionnaires turned out to be quite long and probably exhausting. As a first experimental attempt this might be justifiable, but it became obvious from comments made by participants (and from looking at the raw data) that further studies would need to be more streamlined. It is a definite possibility that the expectation that participants are able to reliably report their experiences across such long questionnaires is flawed. Nevertheless, as a way of testing different formats for this assessments and as means of discarding some possible experiences from further research, these experience is of certain value.

Still, a couple of interesting findings could be gained from this experiment and were used in following research:

First, there seems to be rather consistent *Variance Homogeneity Effects* concerning the experiential self-reports. This would actually be in accord with the theoretical assumptions regarding the situational dependability of the experience of *any* emotional episode triggered by a social situation: if for some reason there is more freedom of interpretation about the appropriateness of an interaction (like it is argued for participants in a Promotion Focus), this might lead to increased variance in the reactions of participants and viewers. If there isn't much room for of interpretation, a typical individual's reaction might *have to be* a specific one. This *Variance Homogeneity Hypothesis* should be examined in detail in further studies.

Second, although the idea behind the Regulatory Focus affecting the incidence of embarrassment is valid, manipulations that don't include social-interactional factors might not be powerful

enough to affect such strong emotions, particularly if the effects are further attenuated through competing potential reactions, like it was in this case. A more reasonable next step will need to be the assessment of the adequacy of any new stimuli.

Through the Regulatory Focus manipulation, it was attempted to subtly influence the way people perceived the stimulus, in order to make it more or less probable for it to be associated with social inappropriateness and thus potentially leading to embarrassment. In a next step, a more direct approach should be applied, in order to maximise the effectiveness of the manipulation, and in this way to verify the *Appropriateness Hypothesis.*

Experiment 2: Experiential Fremdscham and Context Dependability

After the previous study, it became obvious that finding the right stimuli for reliably inducing embarrassment in a fremdscham scenario was not as simple as thought. The main problem being that the videos, mostly from TV shows and commercial advertisements, were inducing a lot more than fremdscham: empathic concern, moral anger, boringness and pity were among the emotional episodes regularly reported, which in effect contaminated all attempts at isolating the theorised phenomenon sufficiently for it to be properly studied.

One of the core assumptions of the theoretical framework I present is that embarrassment and fremdscham are, in essence, one and the same distinctive process. Following the assumptions of this model, a new kind of video stimulus was conceptualised and tested for a first time. This new stimulus had to meet several conditions, including not being intrinsically enjoyable, not showing actions that might be interpreted per se as immoral and not showing people suffering or being embarrassed in any way (to hinder compassionate or empathic reactions). The stimulus has to be able to generate fremdscham differentially, depending on the manipulation of the context.

Also, a more direct approach to manipulating the situational appropriateness of the stimulus was introduced. For this experiment, the context in which the witnessed situation took place was directly specified, instead of trying to manipulate the probability of the perception of a social threat. Effects of the manipulation on the emotional experiences resulting from the new stimulus material were to be assessed again via self-reports, using instruments that included the previously used adaptation of the SAM (Morris, 1995) as a measurement of Core Affect (Russell, 2003) and, to further understand the development of the episode, a real-time assessment of Affective Valence was conducted.

With this combination of stimulus and manipulation, I expect the effects on the SAM reports to be more pronounced. There should be, at the very least, a difference in *Emotional Valence* (which might only be measurable through differences in variance, but I expect to be also evident as a difference of the means). If the behavioural tendencies are strong enough to reach noetic awareness, I would expect the same pattern for reports on *Approach-Avoidance tendencies*, with participants

reporting more homogeneously avoidance tendencies while witnessing inappropriate behaviour, but also in general stronger avoidance.

Concerning Activation, first results showed no straightforward pattern. But more than to assume this to be an artefact of the suboptimal experiment, it is actually compatible with the theory: if people feel joy, this has an activating effect, just as negativity does. In this case, joyful activation cannot be differentiated from alarming *agitation*. It can be possible that negative emotions are generally experienced as more activating and more enduringly than positive emotions (Frijda, 2007; Norris, Gollan, Berntson, & Cacioppo, 2010), but it would be adventurous to expect the difference to be measurable, particularly because a sizeable amount of variance is expected to be the result of interpersonal variability, as seen in Experiment 1. This is why no difference is expected between the experimental groups. Still, the role of Regulatory Focus (Crowe & Higgins, 1997) shall be considered for affecting activation, if at least in exploratory fashion, as done in Experiment 1.

Hypotheses

It was assumed that participants that were presented with a behaviour that was *inappropriate* — in the given context — would report a stronger and faster shift in Core Affect towards negativity than those who were told the behaviour to be *appropriate*:

Affective Valence:

H1a: A shift in Affective Valence towards negativity will be experienced more rapidly in a behaviour-inappropriate context than in an appropriate context.

H1b: Affective Valence in an behaviour-appropriate context will be less negative than in an inappropriate context.

H1c: Affective Valence in an behaviour-appropriate context will vary stronger than in an inappropriate context.

Approach-Avoidance tendencies:

H2a: Avoidance in a behaviour-inappropriate context will be stronger than in an appropriate context.

H2b: Approach-Avoidance tendencies in a behaviour-appropriate context will vary stronger than in an inappropriate context.

Activation:

H0: There is no difference in reported activation between the experimental groups.

H3: Activation in a behaviour-appropriate context will be weaker than in an inappropriate context.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 52 psychology students in their first semester (38 female; of ages between 18 and 44 years of age and an average age of 20.54 (*SD* = 3.791)) from the Universität Würzburg participated in this two session study for course credit, the first being administered in the laboratory and the second one taking place as an online survey. The independent variable was the manipulation of the situational context (experimental conditions *Bio* and *Kom*), the dependent variables were: Emotional Valence (as (1a) real-time self-report and (1b) summarised one-time self-report), (2) Activation and (3) Approach-Avoidance — this las two also as one-time self-reports.

Procedure

After choosing an appointment, participants came to the laboratory for the first part of the study. Upon arrival, they were instructed to turn off their phones and take place in front of a computer, where the whole of the first part of the experiment took place. They were told that they were going to watch a couple of pictures and videos, preceded by short descriptions. During the viewing they would need to report part of their experiences using a joystick, which was placed directly in front of them, and then answer some simple questions about their experiences. They were told

that the usage of the joystick was straightforward and would be in detail explained through instructions and practiced. No further information about their task or contents of the stimuli was given.

First, a practice phase similar to the one on Experiment 1 took place. This time around, the practice phase included a mildly negative stimulus, in addition to the mildly positive stimulus from the previous experiment. Stimuli were presented in randomised order for six seconds and then rated immediately after their presentation using the SAM-scales (Bradley & Lang, 1994). The SAM-scales were introduced and explained at the beginning of the practice phase.

After that, the joystick usage was explained and practiced on a total of six stimuli, half of which were positive, half negative pictures, all of which had to be rated in real-time during six seconds according to the *Emotional Valence* experienced by participants. The rating was conducted via moving the joystick to the right or to the left. This concluded the practice phase. At last, the beginn of the experiment proper was announced.

There where two video rounds on this experiment, which followed the practice phase. They both started with a short introductory text about the video, which immediately followed. One of this texts was the IV, the *Appropriateness Manipulation.*

During the viewing of the videos, participants reported their *Emotional Valence* via the joystick, like previously practiced. Immediately after each video, the DV was assessed and a round of questions regarding the participant's emotional experience followed, similar to those in Experiment 1. This concluded each video round.

The first video presented had two functions: further familiarising participants with the different self-report methods and informing participants about the actual induction, which was the second video.

For the reasons presented on the discussion of Experiment 1, in this experiment it was attempted as far as possible to avoid any displays of negative emotion or the presence of individuals for

which participants might feel any social emotions, thus isolating their exposure to the intended induction and from unintended third parties.

After the second video round, participants answered some trait questionnaires and demographic questions. This ended the laboratory session.

Between 18 days and five weeks after the first session, participants got an email with instructions on how to proceed with the online part of the study, including its web address. Here, two additional instruments were implemented: the E-Scale for measuring Empathy (Leibetseder et al., 2001) and the german translation of the Regulatory Focus Strategies Scale (RFSS; Ouschan et al., 2007), amongst data used in a different study.

Materials

Practice Phase

First, a practice phase similar to the one on Experiment 1 took place. This time around, the practice phase included a mild negative stimulus: a picture of a chaotic, somewhat dirty kitchen (IAPS picture No. 9390. Lang et al., 2008), in addition to the mildly positive picture of ice cream (IAPS picture No. 5760. Lang et al., 2008). Stimuli were presented in randomised order and immediately rated after their presentation using the adapted SAM-scales from the previous experiment (Bradley & Lang, 1994). The SAM-scales had been presented and explained at the beginning of the phase.

After that, the joystick usage was explained and practiced on six IAPS pictures (Lang et al., 2008): half positive (IAPS pictures 1750, 5910 and 7330) and half negative (IAPS pictures 1050, 7359 and 9622), which were presented at the centre of the screen in their original size. Participants reported their emotional reactions to the pictures by moving the joystick to the left or to the right, action which actuated a slider on a graphic scale, which was placed central below the stimulus on the screen. The scale was divided by seven unlabelled points which were meant to aid participants in orienting themselves in it. The central point was in the symmetrical centre of the scale and

was both the starting placement of the slider and its resting position, in the case that no force was applied to the joystick. Left and right from the scale, large plus and minus symbols were visible at all times, showing which side stood for positive, which side for negative emotional valence. Half the participants saw the plus sign always to the right and half to the left side of the scale. The joystick and the virtual slider would return to the middle of the scale if participants let loose, forcing them to permanently adjust them to the position they wished to report. On the software side, values from -3 to 3 had been assigned to the scale, with a precision of two positions after the decimal point. Per second, the mean of the value reported by participants was recorded.



Fig. 2: Online-rating of stimuli. This screenshot shows an item used the practice phase (IAPS picture 1750) and the graphic scale with its slider on the start/resting position.

The exact same procedure was repeated for the videos that would follow.

Stimuli

The experimental phase included two video rounds, of which the first actually only had the function of communicating specific information about the second one, which contained the manipulation and the induction. It would also allow for the control of random effects.

This first video („Interview“, with a duration of 61 seconds) showed two young actors — a man and a woman — being interviewed by someone who clearly was behind the camera, out of the picture. They talked about their work on a musical meant for the theatre. Per design, the actors showed no negative emotions or said anything negative about the show or their work in it. They talked mostly about being happy about the opportunity, having worked hard and being proud of the results. They are mildly enthusiastic, but not overly excited. The goal of this message was to make clear to all participants the emotional state and the thoughts of the actors (which would be the same in the second video). Explicitly defining the perspective of the singers and avoiding the involuntary presence of potentially suffering third parties was needed to avoid the possible unwanted effects consequence of perspective taking (Davis, 1983a) that probably resulted in unspecific effects in the last experiment. The video was preceded by following instruction:

> *Im Folgenden wirst du zwei Schauspieler kennen lernen. Sie stellen sich kurz vor und berichten über das Theaterstück, in dem sie mitspielen.*[11]

The second video („Gesang“, during 158 seconds) presented both actors in what was told was a rehearsal shortly before the opening of the musical. They sang without instrumental accompaniment a version of the song *Seasons of Love* (originally from the musical RENT; Larson, 1996) and histrionically moved around what obviously was a theatre stage. After the first few seconds of the video, the camera moves from the side of the stage to the audience floor, while for a short moment showing the empty theatre. From there, the rest of the scene was recorded. The song was presented in its entirety.

Manipulation

The experimental manipulation was limited to the text that preceded the Gesang video. There were two conditions: *Bio*, announcing a biographical musical about two very talented and successful singers at the summit of their careers as musical actors, and *Kom*, announcing a funny musical about two very untalented but relentless aspiring musical actors during a failing audition, who

[11] Approximate translation: Next, you will get to know two actors. They will briefly introduce themselves and tell about the theatre play in which they participate.

are not aware of their lack of talent. Both supposedly take place in *the famous Opera House in Paris.* Both texts were roughly equal in length and were kept as similar to each other as possible:

Bio:

> *Das nächste Video zeigt die beiden bei der letzten Probe zu ihrem aktuellen Stück, einem Musical. Das biografische Stück handelt von zwei Sängern, die ihren Traum von einer Gesangskarriere erfüllen. Sie befinden sich fast auf dem Höhepunkt ihrer Karriere. Im Stück treten sie mit großen Erfolg das erste mal im bekanntem "Pariser Opernhaus" auf.*

Kom:

> *Das nächste Video zeigt die beiden bei der letzten Probe zu ihrem aktuellen Stück, einem Musical. Das lustige Stück handelt von zwei unbegabten Sängern, die trotz mangelnden Talents ihren Traum von einer Gesangskarriere nicht aufgeben wollen. In dem Stück singen sie für das bekannte "Pariser Opernhaus" vor. Sie sind sich nicht bewusst, wie schlecht sie eigentlich singen.*

Controls

Attempting at assessing behavioural tendencies in a more direct way, participants were asked to report how strongly they experienced the impulse to look away from the video: *Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt (oder es tatsächlich getan), vom Video wegzugucken?*[12] — This particular question was the result of the experience gathered during two experiments meant at directly recording behaviour and not further reported on this dissertation. It was observed that many people who reported Fremdscham and other emotional episodes actually managed to control their behaviour quite well, and because of this, the effects of this episodes were not overtly observable. Still, excluding people who can control their overt reactions would be methodically flawed, aside from time-consuming and economically prohibitive. Content wise, the question might be particularly valid as a measure of behavioural tendencies: First, assuming the noetic awareness of embarrassment, and particularly its proposed functions and processes, people who experience behavioural tendencies

[12] Approximate translation: How strongly did you experience the impulse to look away (or actually did look away) from the video?

should be able to report them. Second, while there are many ways of dealing with embarrassment while being an active part of the interaction, the possibilities are much more limited while experiencing embarrassment remotely (since directly influencing the situation is not possible), and specifically in this experimental setting (since often reported strategies, for example changing the channel or distracting yourself with the person next to you were hindered).

With similar considerations in mind, participants were asked to report how much they enjoyed watching the video. This control questions were to be answered via seven-point scales properly anchored to fit the question.

Finally, with the goal of accounting for the Empathy Hypothesis (Hawk et al., 2011), two questions were asked: If participants imagined themselves singing on stage (fantasising) and if participants thought about an audience watching the actors (empathic concern). Both this processes could bring participants to experience negativity and could be, on the worst case, confounded with embarrassment. On the other hand, perspective taking cannot any longer be confounded, since it has been explicitly established that the singers' experience is a positive one.

Results

Dropouts

Online data from six participants was not properly recorded, affecting only the data from the two trait tests gathered there. The rest of their data was included in the analysis. Also, for unknown technical reasons, the experimental software crashed while testing a subject, who has to be excluded from the analysis.

From answers made by participants, three had to be excluded for their experiences in theatre (1) and from knowing the students in the stimuli and knowing first hand its background story (2).

Analysis

First, it was tested if the self-reports made via the SAM-scales were affected by the manipulation. An Analysis of Variance was conducted with the experimental condition as factor (Bio; Kom) and

the three self-reports as DV (Activation, Emotional Valence and Approach-Avoidance). Further, an F-test for variance homogeneity was conducted as planned, with the same factors and DVs.

Results are presented by DV and together with items assessing the same features:

H1: Emotional Valence

Regarding this DV, two main instruments were implemented: the respective SAM-subscale and the real-time online rating of the video via the joystick. First, the SAM-subscale was analysed. As expected, there was a significant difference of both means and variance between the experimental conditions: $F(1,46) = 7.522$, $p = .009$. $M = -2.50$, $SD = 1.102$ for Bio; $M = -.88$, $SD = 2.566$ for Kom.

The Levene-Test showed as expected very strongly significant variance differences: a lot more variance was reported in the Kom condition: $W(1,46) = 15.818$, $p = .000$.



Fig. 4: SAM-Subscale *Emotional Valence*. Complete scale values shown. Box show values within 1SD, lines within 2SD. Numbers show single outliers.

The analysis of the real-time reports of emotional valence was then conducted. Descriptively, the data shows two diverging sets of reports, which could well be significantly different from one another: The Bio curve (after the first 10 seconds,, which seem to describe an orientation phase) de-

scribes a more negative emotional state than the Kom curve. They both start around the middle of the scale (neutral, value 0) and are reported during the first few seconds in the positive side, to then turn increasingly negative with time. Structurally, it seems that the reports in the Bio condition turn negative more quickly, possibly reaching a floor effect after the 60 seconds mark, then staying at the level. The Kom condition seems to take longer to reach this point: around 80 seconds, although a main effect seems likely. After that, a certain parallelism of the curves seems evident, which are probably a consequence of the stimulus (it being more disturbing or funnier at certain points), but the difference between the conditions doesn't seem to increase any further.

The data was then divided in two parts: seconds 11 to 60 (after which the ratings in the Bio group show the floor effect) and 61 to 120 (by which both conditions seem to plateau). First, it was found that the SAM-reports on emotional valence strongly correlate with the online-ratings: $r(47) = .636$; $p = .000$ for the first block, $r(47) = .734$, $p = .000$ for the second one. Thus, it seems valid to assume that the online-rating describes the experience that lead to the SAM-report.



Fig. 5: Online-Reports on *Emotional Valence* over time t. Negative values stand for negative valence, zero for neutral, positive for positive valence. The vertical lines indicate relevant time points in the video, the numbers denoting the seconds. Shown is the whole duration of the video.

To give an idea of what the data might imply, the first block was tested via a one-factor repeated-measures ANOVA. Here, the condition is the IV and the difference in the experimental groups is assessed. Presented are the within-subjects effects and the between-groups effects.

Since the DVs strongly violate the sphericity requirement (*Mauchly-w*(1224) = .000; p = .000), a df-adjustment has to be made. The very conservative Greenhouse-Geisser adjustment was used, since the ε-Value was <.70 (ε = .090; Girden, 1992).

The within-subjects test shows (1): that the emotional valence reports of individual subjects change significantly with time t (F(1,4.400) = 10.374, p = .000) and (2) that the change of valence reports of individual subjects over time marginally differs between experimental groups (t*condition; (F(1,4.400) = 1.954, p = .096).

The between-groups test shows that the emotional valence reports over time significantly differ between experimental groups (t*condition; (F(1,50) = 5.503, p = .026).

Still, this method doesn't comply with the requirements for sample size in repeated-measurements ANOVA with this amount of measurements (Bortz, 2005). A more conservative test was conducted, method which regretfully implies some information loss: the mean of the emotional valence reports was calculated and an one-factor Analysis of Variance conducted, with the mean being the DV and the experimental condition the IV. This test showed significant results, showing that the reported emotional valence was less negative in the Kom condition than in the Bio condition: F(1,48) = 7.263, p = .010. M = -1.010, SD = .865 for Bio; M = -.210, SD = 1.158 for Kom. No variance differences were expected here considering the nature of the measurement, and the fact that the reports' means vary greatly over this first minute, particularly steeply in the Bio condition.

The second block (including seconds 61 through 120) was then tested for differences of the means, to see if there was a main effect of condition, but also for variance homogeneity, since larger variances are expected in the Kom than in the Bio condition.

Even with the bumps and valleys visible on the self-report curves and which add to the variance of the Bio condition, a marginally significant effect of the mean was found: $F(1,48) = 3.438$, $p = .070$. $M = -1.802$, $SD = .974$ for Bio; $M = -1.108$, $SD = 1.542$ for Kom. Further, the expected variance differences were shown by the Levene-Test, as it was expected, which show the increased variance in the Kom condition: $W(1,47) = 6.653$, $p = .013$.

H2: Approach-Avoidance

This subscale of the SAM showed — remarkably strong and in the expected direction — the expected differences of the mean: Participants in the Bio condition reported stronger avoidance tendencies ($M = -3.55$, $SD = .671$) that those in the Kom condition ($M = -1.77$, $SD = 1.861$). This difference was very strongly significant: $F(1,46) = 18.002$, $p = .000$***. The Levene-Test showed also very strongly significant variance differences, just as expected: a lot more variance was reported in the Kom condition: $W(1,46) = 16.543$, $p = .000$***.



Figure 3: Distribution of self-reports by condition. Left: SAM subscale *Approach-Avoidance*. Right: Self-report on impulse to look away from the video. Complete scale values shown. Box show values within 1SD, lines within 2SD. Numbers show single outliers.

Also relevant to avoidance tendencies, the self reported impulse to look away from the Gesang video was analysed. Results are analog to those from the SAM-subscale, even though the signific-

ance levels are not as formidable: Participants in the Bio condition reported stronger avoidance tendencies (M = 5.23, SD = 1.478) that those in the Kom condition (M = 3.54, SD = 2.121). This difference was significant: $F(1,46) = 9.875$, $p = .003$*. The Levene-Test as well showed strongly significant variance differences, just as expected: a lot more variance was reported in the Kom condition: $TestStatistic(1,46) = 6.894$, $p = .012$*.

H3: Activation

As expected, there was no effect of activation: The mean and variance of the self-reports in this scale did not significantly vary with the experimental condition. Further, the p-value doesn't come close to significant, so that the H0 can be assumed with certain confidence: $F(1,46) = .144$, $p = .706$. M = 4.64, SD = 2.735 for Bio; M = 4.35, SD = 2.560 for Kom). At this point, it is important to highlight the very strong variability of self-reports, and that the means are very close to the centre of the scale.



Fig. 4: SAM-Subscale *Activation*. Complete scale values shown. Conspicuously large variance visible on the SD depictions: Box shows 1SD, lines 2SD.

Other Items

The Analysis of several items described in the Materials part of this experiment are now presented, starting with the self-reports on experiencing *Fremdschämen*, which turned out to not depend on the manipulation: $t(46) = -.574$, $p = .569$; the experience of *Compassion*, which was also not significant $t(46) = -.041$, $p = .967$; and the report of the subjects *imagining singing themselves*, which showed the expected effect of it being higher on the Kom condition: $t(46) = 2{,}206$, $p = .032$. $M = -1.41$, $SD = .734$ for Bio; $M = -2.00$, $SD = 1.058$ for Kom, and even the tendency towards the expected variance inhomogeneity: $F(46) = 2{,}677$, $p = .109$.

Hypotheses Summary

Affective Valence:

H1a: A shift in Affective Valence towards negativity was experienced more rapidly in a behaviour-inappropriate context than in an behaviour-appropriate context. The H0 is to be rejected.

H1b: Affective Valence in an behaviour-appropriate context was less negative than in an behaviour-inappropriate context. The H0 is to be rejected.

H1c: Affective Valence in an behaviour-appropriate context did vary stronger than in an behaviour-inappropriate context. The H0 is to be rejected.

Approach-Avoidance tendencies:

H2a: Avoidance in a behaviour-inappropriate context was stronger than in an appropriate context. The H0 is to be rejected.

H2b: Approach-Avoidance tendencies in a behaviour-appropriate context did not vary stronger than in an inappropriate context. The H0 is to be rejected.

Activation:

[H0: There is no difference in reported activation between the experimental groups.]

Discussion

The results of this study started to show the structure of the Fremdscham and Embarrassment phenomenon in a way that was internally very consistent and very much in accordance with expectations, even if a couple of expected positive results were not found.

First, the pattern of Experiment 1 regarding the experience of the subjects while watching the induction repeated itself: there are quite robust variance differences in between the experimental groups, and this can only be interpreted as one condition allowing for subjective interpretation, while the other forcing a much more homogeneous reaction:

While watching the recording of the practice session of the supposedly biographical musical, people uniformly experienced negativity, and this in pretty homogeneous fashion, since the bad singing was unequivocally inappropriate in the situational context — this occasioning the theorised Alarm Signals in the participants to go off.

While watching the recording of the practice session of the supposedly comical musical, people dealt with a completely different situation, even though the stimulus was identical: the bad singing was a necessary part of the situation. It was up to them, as viewers, to then decide if the behaviour was adequate at being funny.

The stimulus seemed to very effectively accomplish that for which it was developed: inducing distress through a situation that is not wildly negative, it's not morally transgressive, shows no suffering of any kind and even more: only people clearly enjoying themselves. This allowed for the interpretation room necessary for the funny condition (Kom) to be experienced accordingly to personal tendencies, experiences and taste in humour (accounting so for the very large variance in self reports), and at the same time took any ambiguity out of the serious biographical condition (Bio), in principle only allowing for negative reactions (these themselves being potentially different from one-another depending on interpersonal differences).

Still, with such clear reported emotional and behavioural reactions, one would expect self-reports of fremdscham to be significantly different between conditions, but they turn out not to be (even

though enjoyment is lower in the biographical condition). But this is actually something I expected. The reason for this is probably multifactorial: first, fremdscham is (in German) a new, ambiguous word. Joy and fun are easy to identify, but many people have never actively used the term fremdscham or ever tried to define its use, and thus try to understand it in the experimental context. Knowledge about fremdscham is often limited to knowing that people report experiencing it while watching comedies and TV, but mostly reality and talent shows — which might have too many parallels with the used stimulus. Part of that knowledge is also the typical situation and expected funny aspects of the experience, which might lead people to over-report it while having (guilty?) fun (and thus actually simply reporting fun in an awkward situation), and under-report it while just feeling embarrassed — since there's no fun in that.

Another factor that might invalidate this self-report is the active coping with the situation that participants experience. (Remote) Embarrassment, it being strongly motivating, demands being dealt with. This means that many kinds of potential (self)-regulations might take place, depending on the viewer. For example, they might get mad — what actually gets reported quite a lot. This reframing of the situation might lead to an underreport of fremdscham in the situation in which *getting angry is a viable option*: while watching the biographical musical.

For this reason, directly asking for a self-report of fremdscham should be avoided and will yield unsatisfactory results — at least as long as the word is not carefully defined and explained previously, like it is necessary with the words *embarrassment* and *shame*, for example, but this will be methodically problematic and have unforeseen effects. Still, the expected differences in Core Affect were found, which is in this case only attributable to the theorised social context dependability at the basis of embarrassment — and all this while going to extremes to control for empathic processes.

So far, the expected effects have been reliably found: Situations turn unenjoyable and awkward when they occur in the inappropriate context. Still, so far this effect has only been shown with the one carefully prepared stimulus. Preparing the material in such an exact fashion was a very necessary step in order to exclude the alternative explanations discussed earlier, but one question

remains in need of an answer: is the phenomenon here shown generalisable to less meticulous prepared stimuli?

In real life, fremdscham is induced by situations which include many features that were excluded in the previously used stimulus. The presence of third parties, moral transgressions and displays of negative feelings might very well be a part of the observed, fremdscham inducing interaction. The next experiment tries to answer the question of fremdscham being strong enough to be the predominant emotional episode, even though a plethora of others would be possible.

Experiment 3: Generalisability of Experiential Fremdscham

After showing the context dependability of the emotional reaction to the video of the bad singers used in the previous experiment, a new one was planed in order to assess if the same kind of manipulation would have comparable effects on other stimuli — this time without them being prepared for the occasion, but taken from elsewhere and plagued with potentially effect-reducing or confounding factors.

In principle, the experimental manipulation of this last experiment was based on a very similar approach to the previous ones: one and the same video would be presented in two conditions differing by the manipulation of the social context in which the video existed: one in which the shown situation was appropriate (if not necessarily funny) and one in which it was definitely inappropriate. For this experiment two new videos were chosen.

Further, a third new video was included and presented after the other two, but without manipulation, to test for carry-over effects. This was done to test for the feasibility of the idea of some sort of *Embarrassment Mindset*, in which new stimuli would prone to be experienced as embarrassing if the previous stimuli were. Theoretically, this would be a simple conceptualisation, if one considers selective accessibility or just affective priming (Erber, 1991; Klauer & Musch, 2003; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999). Still, in a social-emotional context, a strong effect in this regard would challenge some of my assumptions concerning the function and processes of embarrassment: one has to be able to detect embarrassing situations even if none have occurred so far, and liberally over-detecting embarrassing situations is costly and detrimental for social interactions and the self, and actually a known and painfully handicapping phobia (Dohrenwend, 1978; Edelmann, 1987, 1990a).

The stimuli and apparatus from the previous study were also included after the experimental phase, to allow for a possible meta-analysis, but will not be further discussed here.

Hypotheses

It was assumed that participants that were presented with a behaviour that was *inappropriate* —in the given context— would more frequently report experiencing fremdscham and symptoms of embarrassment than those who assumed the behaviour to be *appropriate*:

H1 Context Dependability

H1: Reports of fremdscham and embarrassment symptoms will be more frequent in the inadequate context than in the adequate context.

H0: Reports of fremdscham and embarrassment symptoms will not vary with context adequacy.

H2 Residual Embarrassability

H2: The inappropriateness of the first two stimuli will cause subjects observing a third, non-manipulated video to report fremdscham and embarrassment symptoms more frequently than those who thought the first two videos to take place in an adequate context.

H0: The differential previous experiences of (remote) embarrassment have no influence on the experience of the third stimulus.

Method

Participants and Design

A total of 51 subjects (36 female; of ages between 16 and 34 years of age and an average age of 24.30 (*SD* = 4,156)) were recruited from a catalogue of participants under the condition of being native german speakers and not having being involved in any of my previous embarrassment experiments. The independent variable was the manipulation of the situational context (experimental conditions *Adequate* and *Inadequate*). The dependent variables were: (a) an open, short report of the emotional episode best describing the experience of watching each of the videos and (b) an intensity rating (0 to 6) of the reported emotional episode. The experimental configuration from the previous study was repeated after the experimental part, including IV and DVs.

Procedure

Participants came to the laboratory on an appointment. Upon arrival, they were instructed to turn off their phones and take place in front of a computer, where the whole experiment took place. They were told that they were going to watch a couple of videos, preceded by short descriptions. After the viewing they would need to answer some simple questions about their experiences. No further information about their task or contents of the stimuli was given.

There where four video rounds in this experiment: Two experimental to test for context dependability, one to test for residual embarrassability and one for the aforementioned meta-analysis. They all started with a short introductory text about the video to be shown, which was (where applicable) actually the *Appropriateness Manipulation* and directly preceded the video. The two experimental videos were presented first, in randomised order. It followed the not-manipulated video, and, closing the video rounds, the *Interview* and *Gesang* videos (and the respective manipulation) used on the last experiment were presented.

There were two experimental conditions: *Appropriate* and *Inappropriate*. Participants were randomly assigned to one condition and never were confronted with the other one.

Immediately after each video, the DV was assessed and a round of questions regarding the participant's emotional experience followed, similar to those in Experiment 1 and 2. This concluded each video round.

After the last video round, participants answered some trait questionnaires and demographic questions. This ended the experimental session.

Materials

Stimuli

The experimental phase included two video rounds, each of them containing a context manipulation immediately before each video, and being presented in randomised order.

One of the rounds presented a video („Bundesheer“, 84 seconds long) which is an actual TV advertisement promoting the Austrian army (called *Bundesheer*). In this video, introduced with the tagline *Bundesheer 4U*, the Austrian equivalent of a redneck shows off his sports car to a bunch of women meant to appear somewhat slutty, who react very positively to the whole approach. They are interrupted by nerdy looking soldiers driving a tank, who make a dangerous manoeuvre in front of the bunch, to then proceed to invite the women to join the Bundesheer, where they would get to joyride tanks (instead of normal sports cars). They then drive off, with the women clumsily running after the tank in their high-heel boots and tight pants, leaving the car guy angry and alone by his car. It closes with an invitation made by a narrator to join the Bundesheer, including a cheesy catchphrase. The whole video is poorly made, terribly acted and plagued with cliches and chauvinistic elements.

The video was preceded by a short text, which was the manipulation:

Appropriate

> *Das folgende Video zeigt eine Parodie eines Werbespots des österreichischen Bundesheer (vergleichbar mit der deutschen Bundeswehr).*[13]

Inappropriate

> *Das folgende Video zeigt einen Werbespot des österreichischen Bundesheer (vergleichbar mit der deutschen Bundeswehr)*[14].

The second round presented a video („AstroTV“, 105 seconds long), which is a clip out of the programming of the german TV station *Astro TV*, which primarily presents fortune tellers, spiritual gurus and other bogus *experts* who, for exorbitant fees, „help“ callers with their personal problems. In this clip a caller is answered by Daniel, a strange looking, heavily effeminate thus otherwise very manly sort of karma guru. He „helps“ the caller get rid of his bad love and financial karmas by doing some very sexual sounds with the aid of huge plastic diamonds (which of course are for

[13] The next video shows a parody of a TV ad for the Austrian Bundesheer (comparable to the german Bundeswehr).

[14] The next video is a TV ad for the Austrian Bundesheer (comparable to the german Bundeswehr).

sale) and suggestively gesticulating towards the camera. The caller is thankful and convinced that he's getting the help he needs.

The video was preceded by a short text, which was the manipulation:

Appropriate

> *Das folgende Video zeigt eine Parodie einer Astrologiefernsehsendung.*[15]

Inappropriate

> *Das folgende Video zeigt einen Ausschnitt einer Astrologiefernsehsendung*[16].

The third video (ComedyBus, 174 seconds long) presents a standup comedian doing his show on a so-called *Comedy Bus*, a sight-seeing service that drives tourists around a city (in this case, Berlin), while being entertained by a comedian, who tells funny stories about the landmarks being seen. In this case, the tourists are from the former Eastern Germany and the comedian jokes constantly about *Ossis*, people that come from there. He is mostly unfunny, definitely offensive and at times hurtful, and the people in the bus are, although at first open to a self-ironical laughter or two, soon obviously not amused at all — while still staying calm.

The video was preceded by following explanatory text and included no manipulation:

> *Das nächste Video zeigt einen Ausschnitt aus der ZDF-Sendung „Neo Paradise" in einem Comedybus für Touristen in Berlin.*[17]

A last video block was presented, containing the same videos, manipulation and measurements from the previous study (the *Interview* and *Gesang* videos). The session ended with a block of questionnaires identical to those included in the last study.

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[15] The next video shows a parody of an astrological TV show.

[16] The next video is a clip from an astrological TV show.

[17] The next video is a clip from the ZDF-TV show „Neo Paradise" taken in a Comedy Bus for tourists in Berlin.

Results

Analysis

First, the open answer given to the question *Which emotion best describes what you felt while watching the [previous] video?* was recoded into one of two categories: *(remote) embarrassment,* and *others.* Subjects who reported no reaction were included in the *others* category (excluding them from the analysis did not change the results). This was made for the video blocks (1) AstroTV, (2) Bundesheer and (3) ComedyBus. A more detailed recoding was also conducted, further differentiating the reported emotions between no reaction, positive emotions, negative emotions with approach or with avoidance tendencies, as well as remote embarrassment, but this categorisation was not used for the here presented analysis.

H1: Context Dependability

For all three video blocks the frequency of the reporting of (remote) embarrassment was tested. It was expected that, in an inappropriate context, both the AstroTV and Bundesheer videos would cause significantly more of this kind of reports than in the context in which „silly" behaviour was appropriate — the comical parodies. For the ComedyBus video, no difference was expected, since no manipulation took place. Chi-Square tests were implemented to test for this hypothesis.

For both AstroTV and Bundesheer videos, the expected effect of the manipulation was found: χ^2 (1;51) = 4.449, p = .034 and χ^2 (1;51) = 8.846, p = .003 respectively. Descriptively, the frequency of people reporting (remote) embarrassment if the stimulus showed context-inappropriate behaviour was significantly higher than if the shown behaviour was context-appropriate (even when controlling for affective valence, which did not vary between conditions).

The results of the third video will be presented with those from the next hypothesis.

Reported Emotion			(Remote) Embarrassment	Other	Sum
Condition	Appr.	Observed	7	19	26
		Expected	10,7	15,3	26
	Inappr.	Observed	14	11	25
		Expected	10,3	14,7	25
Sum		Observed	21	30	51
		Expected	21	30	51

Table 5: Observed and expected frequencies of reported emotional experiences while watching AstroTV.

Reported Emotion			(Remote) Embarrassment	Other	Sum
Condition	Appr.	Observed	2	24	26
		Expected	6,6	19,4	26
	Inappr.	Observed	11	14	25
		Expected	6,4	18,6	25
Sum		Observed	13	38	51
		Expected	13	38	51

Table 6: Observed and expected frequencies of reported emotional experiences while watching Bundesheer.

H1: Residual Embarrassability

Regarding the third stimulus, no effects at all were found depending on the experimental condition of the previous stimuli: χ^2 (1;51) = .259, p = .611. People reacted in remarkably similar fashion, about a third of them reporting (remote) embarrassment.

Reported Emotion			(Remote) Embarrassment	Other	Sum
Condition	Appr.	Observed	9	17	26
		Expected	8,2	17,8	26
	Inappr.	Observed	7	18	25
		Expected	7,8	17,2	25
Sum		Observed	16	35	51
		Expected	16	35	51

Table 7: Observed and expected frequencies of reported emotional experiences while watching ComedyBus.



Fig. 5: Observed and expected frequencies of reported emotional experiences while watching all three videos: from left to right (1) Bundesheer, (2) AstroTV and (3) ComedyBus. Observable are the increase in (remote) embarrassment (dark bars) in the first two diagrams when the observed behaviour is unambiguously inadequate in its given context. In the last diagram no significant difference is seen depending on the immediate previous experiences.

One last variable was then assessed to shine a light into the process at play. For the first two videos (in which differences were found), the reported emotional episodes where recoded as positive or negative (if their intensity reached a 3 in the 0 to 6 self-report scale, otherwise coded as a missing) and then Chi-Square tests were conducted. Results indicate that although participants significantly report more (remote) embarrassment under context-inappropriate behaviour, the *valence* of their experience is not any different that in an appropriate context: χ^2 (1;36) = .823, p = .285 and χ^2 (1;45) = .538, p = .337 for (1) Bundesheer and (2) AstroTV respectively. Meaning that instead of reporting (remote) embarrassment, in the appropriate context other negative emotions where reported, but not *positive* emotions. Perhaps also of interest could be the fact that, from the 51 participants, only 36 (70.59%) of them reported an emotional reaction above a 2 while watching the Bundesheer video, while 45 (88.24%) did while watching the AstroTV video: the later was more emotionally engaging.

Discussion

In this experiment, I aimed to test if the effect of the same situational variables shown to affect the carefully developed stimulus from the previous study are generalisable to much less controlled settings.

For this, new stimuli were chosen. These were publicly available, although relatively unknown videos, loaded with elements which could potentially have stronger effects than the manipulation, thus potentially rendering these undetectable.

These videos contained, for example, questionable morals, tastelessness, chauvinism, sexual inappropriateness and ambiguousness and stupid clichés, amongst other for some probably disturbing attributes. A very real possibility would be that, while in a controlled environment, a strong manipulation of the context adequacy of behaviour is enough to create measurable effects on the viewer, but that this effect all but disappears in the real world. This might be so if, in fact, other elements of the situation are more important: moral transgressions, for example, and thus causing

strong reactions among viewers, independently from the context adequacy of particular behaviours.

Still, the results suggest otherwise. In concordance with what would be expected according to the theoretical framework that I earlier presented, the appropriateness of the behaviour shown in the given context *is* central to the going off of the social Alarm Signal I understand as (remote) embarrassment.

The episodes reported while watching the first two videos depict, in a way, how the experience is affected by the context: in the case of the Austrian Army video, if people thought they were watching a parody, even if they did not find the video funny at all, there was no need for the alarm to raise. Almost none of the participants who thought to have watched a parody reported something similar to embarrassment, because in the context there was not much that could trigger an alarm: the observed situation, excluding the presence of a war tank, was not too unfamiliar — we all know the stereotypes about chauvinists with sports cars who often interact with superficial girls, at least from movies, if not from real life. We might find them absurd or we might feel pity or even despise for them, but their existence in the realms of comedy is not unusual and not necessarily disturbing — even if perhaps not our kind of humour. But if participants knew that the video was a real TV ad, they didn't find it more frequently negative, but a whole lot more embarrassing: that someone thought that it would be a good idea to use this motive to promote an actual army is perturbing and simply not *something that people should do*.

The manipulation of the Astro TV video had a similar effect, plus an additive embarrassing component, observable in the frequency of embarrassment reports in the parody condition. Yes, if they knew that the video was from a real TV show, remote embarrassment was reported more often than if they thought it was a parody, but still, there were many more embarrassed participants in the parody condition while watching this video than while watching the Austrian army's ad. I assume the reason to be the quality of the elements in the video, which are per se more likely to be though of as inappropriate, regardless of context. Features like the very effeminate but incongruently masculine show host, the obviously sexual gestures and noises he constantly

makes, the helplessness of the caller seeking the help of a TV karma guru and the blatant ripoff of people in need that is the show might all trigger Alarm Signals much faster in those people who don't find the video to be amusing (and who are not offended enough by the immoral character of the whole enterprise to feel angry or ashamed).

The last video block, the unmanipulated Comedy Bus video, showed, as expected, one important aspect of embarrassment: it needs to be engageable on a situational basis, regardless of a previous, clearly unrelated situation. For the alarm function of embarrassment to work, each new situation has to be assessed independently, and residual effects would be a serious problem. There most probably is some activation of embarrassment-related semantic contents, which could incline people to more rapidly see a potentially embarrassing situation as such — comparable to research on cognitive accessibility, for example on aggression (Anderson, Anderson, & Deuser, 1996; Berkowitz & LePage, 1967) — or even desensitisation (Bandura, Blanchard, & Ritter, 1969; Bradley, Cuthbert, & Lang, 1996), even if this seems less plausible, considering the urgency associated with embarrassment. But in this experiment this effect is counterintuitively negligible. That there seems to be no residual effect whatsoever left from the two previous videos in a way that a third video is found more or less embarrassing after experiencing the emotion *just a couple of minutes ago* is a nice indicator of the assumed processes behind embarrassment indeed being as proposed.

Altogether, it seems that the theoretical considerations I propose and attempt to test in this dissertation are actually traceable experimentally, including (a) the context dependability, (b) the urgency of the experience — this overtrumping the intensity of reactions to many other situational elements —, and (c) its situational specificity — its assessment being mostly independent from immediate experiences, once a situation is over.

In the next part, I will present an overview of the results and a discussion of their implications for further research and for our understanding of embarrassment, local and remote.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

Until now, the probably universal emotion of embarrassment has not been too carefully researched or satisfactorily explained. Mostly legacy theories and heuristic models have been used to understand it, and the limited empirical work done on it has been focused on ways to induce it or on amusing effects.

Further, although at times flirted with, the processes and functions of embarrassment have never been central for a theory attempting at explaining it.

Lastly, these theories have as of late been confronted with the phenomenon of fremdschämen, which has demanded quite a few theoretical acrobatics to let itself be included in any of them — and has been satisfactorily accounted for by none.

In this work, I attempt to delineate a different way of understanding embarrassment. A way as possibly broad as precise, which takes into account and indeed has its own foundations in the processes and functions behind the emotion.

I started by delimiting embarrassment itself from conceptual and colloquial neighbouring phenomena, and then focusing on the functions of the emotion itself, deriving them from known symptoms characterising the phenomenon, from the phylogenetical development of the emotion and from explorative research. From there, processes that would allow for such functions where either found on related research fields or conceptualised. Before starting testing any assumptions, the emotion was redefined as closely matching the found cues and evidence as possible, even if this only rendered a working Definition:

> *Embarrassment is the negative affective state of arousal elicited in social situations when an interaction doesn't unfold appropriately; it serving primarily both as a mean of communication and as motivation for bringing the inappropriate interactional state to an end.*

But this definition itself would only be marginally better than concurring definitions if it was not to be carefully and heavily questioned into fitting the actual functions and processes of embarrassment, as well as being as parsimonious and precise as possible.

Here is where the beauty of a good theory comes to bare: by undertaking a careful dissection of the object of study, in order to improve on our very poor understanding of it, I came to the conclusion that our conceptualisation of embarrassment has been wrong —massively wrong— all along, and a new theoretical framework was needed.

Starting from scratch, but aiming at honouring sound results and ideas from previous research, can be a necessary step towards bringing dynamic into a stale field, and then looking at it from new, different perspectives.

I proceeded by forgetting. A lot. I had to forget many misconceptions and educated guesses and assumptions made by many decades of theory, not only outdated but mostly based on no research at all, and regurgitated in newer, sporadic research every ten years or so since the 1960s.

The new definition of embarrassment that I will come to postulate is, hopefully, a very different kind of animal as we have come to work with in the past. It might look similar to the species with which it concurs, but its insides are completely different altogether. Time and research should prove if it can hold its ground — of if fails victim to darwin's implacable processes.

Of course, the main difference of this reconception is that it is exclusively based on what I hope and aspire is a coherent theory, one I present within this pages.

A New Theory for Embarrassment: The Cultural-Interactional Process Model of Embarrassment

Perhaps the most intriguing aspect of my work on embarrassment has been the lack of a modern explanation for it. Yes, it is not the broadest field of research, and not one at which social psychologists, or even emotion psychologists, have heavily looked. Scientists working in the field have mostly been loners, separated by many years of silence, occupied with only their own ideas on the subject — conditions which do not stimulate too much creativity, critical thinking or necessity for results. But nonetheless, it could be expected of such a flamboyant emotion, and one that has caught the attention of modern scientists for at least well over a century, even Darwin's own, that it would have been well discussed enough for there to be a modern take on its inner workings.

My bad.

On the positive side, this gave me a freedom of movement which was a joy and a luxury, as well as very untypical. One that let me question every concept and implicit assumption, and cherry-pick only that which made sense empirically. Maybe this freedom is what allowed me to develop an understanding of embarrassment so simple and so streamlined, with no need for hat-tipping to „established" embarrassment theories — which could have been intimidating.

Anyhow, concentrating on as few processes as possible, and they being well established and researched, made this process a lot easier than it might have been, and will hopefully allow for some interesting research in the future.

Detecting the Issue

Information processing is a selective thing. As we've known for many years now, our ways of interacting with our environment are heavily limited by bottlenecks. This is why so many systems have evolved to let us cope with this limitations. Not only perceptual systems, like heavily focused attention with limited peripheral information processing (Kunar, Carter, Cohen, & Horowitz, 2008; Tombua et al., 2011), but also on the cognitive level. A system based on spreading activation (like postulated by Strack & Deutsch, 2004) is, while very unspecific, very efficient, and of great help to the very limited executive system. On more complex levels, even the strategies of the later

are optimised to cope with the limited information processing available to it. For example, our perception and even our search for information is biased depending on things so simple and inconsequential as our mood (Scrimin & Mason, 2015), and so complex as the stage of the pursuit of a specific goal in which we find ourselves (Achtziger & Gollwitzer, 2008; Gollwitzer, 2012).

One might interpret some of these effects to be secondary, spill-over or even unwelcome effects of specific systems intended to achieve something different, what they probably were and many times still are. Still, evolution in its ancient wisdom seems to have recognised their potential to be put to good use. In the aforementioned case of goal-pursuing, for example, the „limits" of our system, tailored to the situation, increase our effectiveness and the compromise with which we strive our goals (Armitage & Conner, 2000).

This is also the case in the process of embarrassment, where the automatisms in the production of negativity out of disparities between a situation and a schema stored in memory, which once were essential to *not being eaten by a wild animal*, were adapted to *not making dumb mistakes in front of others*. A system that once alarmed us about bitterness in what should be a sweet fruit, or unexpected movement in the foliage, is now capable of doing the same in complex interactions with peers, even if they probably won't bite our face off — and of course in other situations, which we then just don't call embarrassment.

Funny enough, there really are instances of spill-over and unintended effects of this systems. Visuospacial effectiveness comes at the price of a very hard to overrun system (e.g. Carmel & Lamy, 2015; Simon, 1969) and strategy-adapted information processing leads to potentially important information being overlooked (Ruigendijk & Koole, 2014), just as automatically and unnecessarily detecting social inappropriateness probably leads to the experience of Fremdscham. An experience for which we did not even have a name until recently, and for which we chose a terribly misrepresentative name.

Reacting to the Issue

The rest of the embarrassment experience is, shockingly simply, *reacting to it.* As I've exhaustively argued, some mild negativity or minor arousal won't be enough for explaining the onset of embarrassment — nor for activating its functionality. It might be enough to help us to (falsely) understand our mood (Cohen, 1993; Schwarz & Clore, 1983), and even enough to influence ourselves while snap decision making (Oyserman, 2011), but not enough to motivate us to *deal with the problem.* This is why the reaction has to be strong enough to get noticed and negative enough for us to want to change it.

How we react to the issue is a very different question and one that does not concern the process itself. And even if I tried to include it in the equation, it is an aspect so complex, so dependable from culture, personality, learning experiences and from another milliard individual particularities, that I would, optimistically put, miserably fail. The only aspect of the reaction that can be interesting for studying embarrassment is the expectancy, however palpable or remote, that our strategy will ease the conditions that led to the activation of our Alarm System — or at least to the damn thing shutting down.

Before we discuss the results of the present research in relation to the CIPME, it is necessary to redefine embarrassment in the form of the new definition that it implies.

And a New Matching Definition

Defining embarrassment anew from the ground up, basing its definition on its processes and functions instead of on its superficial features, was a necessary step for making embarrassment more understandable, as well as fremdschämen at all researchable, and both falsifiable at all.

The definition I've developed, based on the assumptions of the CIPME, reads as follows:

> *Embarrassment is the noetic, energising experience of urgency resulting from conspicuous form-inadequacy in a social situation.*

Careful consideration of the implications made by the wording in the definition has been made, since many times they seem to have a reach and might which go well beyond of the intentions — and knowledge— of their authors. Perhaps one particularly emblematic example is the word *fremdscham* itself, which being knowingly a colloquial neologism being used without any boundaries in its language of origin, it has confused researchers and the general public into searching for its answers in the labyrinth of empathic shame implied by its name.

The goal of this undertaking is to provide researchers interested in embarrassment with a modern, comprehensive and evidence-based understanding of the emotion, as well as with a theoretical framework with which to work. In a line of research mostly void of contemporary theories, let alone any which take into account two-process models of information processing, my hope is that this will become a valuable tool to bring research on the subject forward.

Some Empirical Evidence

Research was conducted in order to test some of the assumptions made by this model, and explained in the theoretical part. The list of assumptions is not exhaustive, nor have been all made assumptions empirically tested in the present body of work, but as a parting point for future research, it should suffice, as the promising results I here present might hint at the potential validity of the CIPME.

What I find to be one of the most promising starting points of the model and of my definition of (remote) embarrassment is that most of it is based on heavily studied theories with a plethora of research to sustain them. But what I believe to be more important —and a step riddlingly overlooked so far— is the necessity of bringing in harmony many differential empirical findings, which currently seem to stand in conflict with one another — but are actually not. The problem of course being that the very real processes studied were, contrary to expectations, are not related, or even work against each other, as in the case of empathic processes and fremdschämen.

Still, research was needed to test at least some of the new assumptions made by the CIPME and the resulting definition of embarrassment (and listed on p. 27 and 28 of this work). Some of those, like embarrassment being activating and as a result driving motivation (2.), are trivial enough. The emotion being negative (1.), combined with the previous point, clarifies the motivational goal of the emotion: reducing the negativity (2.1). Still, heavy evidence of this is found over all experiments here presented, including the very first exploratory study.

The necessity for embarrassment to reach noetic awareness (3.) was not explicitly studied, since it is a definitory feature of embarrassment and even of emotions: if the shift in Core Affect stays unnoticed, it's not an emotional episode, but a mood shift (Russell, 2003). The fact that the arousal shift part of the episode might be misattributed —thus making the recognition of embarrassment not infallible—, should not be a major issue, since even emotions which are a lot more straightforward are prone to this long well known process (Dutton & Aron, 1974; Imhoff, Schmidt, Bernhardt, Dierksmeier, & Banse, 2011; B. K. Payne, Hall, Cameron, & Bishara, 2010; for an overview, see K. Payne & Lundberg, 2014). Essential for the episode to be understood as such is not that *people understand or explicitly recognise that they are experiencing embarrassment*, but that they experience its symptoms. Still, over all experiments here presented summarily said, it seems that people are very well able to correctly identify their own embarrassment.

For this dissertation, I focussed particularly on one specific premise: the ambiguity of embarrassment, it being heavily dependent on the social context of the situation (4.). By this I do not mean interpersonal or intercultural differences (that is covered by premises 5. and 6., although the consistent variance homogeneity differences measured over all my experiments can be interpreted in this light), but that *embarrassment is not the result of the features of the situation itself, but of their appropriateness in the social context in which they unfold.* If this seems to be trivial, it is not. Some not quite serious current attempts at studying fremdschämen, as well as many older attempts at understanding embarrassment, focused mainly on the kinds of situations that elicit these emotions, particularly on their features.

Experiments 2 and 3 are, in this regard, good arguments for this social context dependancy. Under optimal (Experiment 2) and suboptimal (Experiment 3) conditions, it was only necessary to relativize the context of the same identical stimuli, via a very simple, short instruction, to completely change the reaction patterns of participants to the stimulus. Hence, one behaviour was absolutely inappropriate in one context, while being anything between obnoxious and funny in the next one (4.2).

But is this at all so surprising? I believe it is not. While there is no doubt that many objects, situations and, why not, behaviours have intrinsic valence (like an open wound being negative), no one in the scientific community would argue with an open wound seeming experientially far less dramatic in an operation room than in a kindergarten. Or a gun in a police station than in the Reichstag. These examples only show changes in the intensity of the negative valence these elements might arouse (on average people), but examples of diametral shifts in the valence of stimuli are just as easy to come by: a bear few meters from oneself in the woods or in the safety of a nice zoo, or children playing on a park against children playing on a waste dump or war zone.

This is why it is somewhat puzzling that the *process* behind the appropriateness assessment of social situations has been for so long left out of attempts at understanding and explaining it.

Also of particular interest —and informative for the inner workings of the embarrassment process— will be researching aspects of the contextual specificity of the experience of emotion (4.1). A first result in this direction was presented as part of Experiment 3. Here, the possibility of a residual effect of embarrassability was studied. A residual effect on a third situation, direct consequence of just having witnessed two quite effectively embarrassing situations, was not found. This, being an expected negative result, might not be very meaningful on and by itself, but still an unexpected outcome in light of all cognitive processes known to cause emotional spill-overs to unrelated stimuli (Oyserman et al., 2009; B. K. Payne et al., 2010 and many others cited in this work), but expected by my theoretical framework. I argue that, even though general associative effects of conceptual vicinity and spreading activation are unavoidable, it is necessary for embarrassment to function on a situational basis, alarming over inappropriate elements concerning the

very specific situation in which they take place, and not situations clearly passed, or affecting following unrelated situations.

This specificity is a necessity of our social world. We, as individuals, might go from a context to a completely different one by simply crossing a door, or when a new individual enters the scene. We need to be able to immediately adapt to the situation. At once understanding that laughing on our boss' behalf at the office is not appropriate once she or some other superior enters the room is indispensable. If it now could cost us our job, it might have once cost us our head. Arguably, the cost of carry-over effects of oversensitive embarrassability would be less than here illustrated. Still, not having found it in Experiment 3 might be an indication of the process' adaptiveness being structurally faster than others. Here, further research would be needed to reach any conclusions.

Since there is no indication of any kind whatsoever that *fremdscham is not embarrassment*, I abstained from explicitly researching this functional equivalence (premise 7.). This might be an interesting aspect to investigate in the future, although the potential value of such an undertaking is questionable, particularly in light of the difficulties it entails and which have already been discussed here.

Lastly, there is the role of empathic processes in (remote) embarrassment (8.). At the beginning of my work, I promptly recognised the luring idea of making empathy responsible for fremdscham. After deeply researching this possibility, it became very clear that, beyond all known links between specific empathic processes and all other emotions, empathy cannot be at the root of the process. Still, although it is an aspect that really makes me passionate —particularly because of the ungraceful and clumsy attempts at trying to causally connect fremdscham with some sort of empathy undertaken by neuroscientists in Germany starting 2011—, I found it a lot more important to address the alarming lack of a process model of embarrassment. Still, only a deep review of existing literature on the subject of empathy and negative affect will suffice to clarify this point to the interested lector.

Contrary to most current dissertations in the field of social psychology, this one has its focal point in the development of theory and theoretical concepts rather than on empirical effects. These definitely less sexy approach to research was in this case indispensable, as I hope to have made clear this far.

With this dissertation I attempt to redefine embarrassment. A task I accidentally acquired while trying to investigate the fascinating —and painfully personal— experience of fremdschämen. After realising the massive connection between both, and the sorry state of modern psychological research in this field, it became clear to me that a new, better understanding of the concept was needed. I hope that my work comes to bear fruit and that it helps future undertakings in the area to be more close to empirical science, and less speculative and anecdotical, as it has been so far.

Last Remarks

Over these pages I've made vocal a very harsh position regarding previous research on embarrassment. I've particularly criticised the paradigm of classifying situations that potentially lead to embarrassment, as well as behavioural tendencies while embarrassed and strategies to coping with this emotion.

First, I would like to again consider the scientific context in which these attempts were developed. The paradigm shift towards processes behind psychological phenomena was still a long time in the future, let alone a focus on the concrete functionality of said processes, which still is materialising. Lastly, I would like to acknowledge the value that these efforts do have. By having at hand a categorisation of situations and reactions typically associated with embarrassment, it was a lot easier to access both functions and processes of the emotion. Even further, embarrassment is a negative emotion with which we, as individuals and as members of society, have to cope with. Many people are able to graciously cope with potentially embarrassing situations in such a way, that the emotion never truly materialises. Others suffer chronically under it, not seldom without social and psychological consequences. For this kind of practical understanding of emotion in a social context, previous research can be extremely valuable. Together with a processual understanding of the emotion and its function, it would allow for pragmatic methods of learning to cope with embarrassment, perhaps making therapy for patients of social anxiety more effective, or simply training individuals on how to avoid it — and its associated costs.

It will be interesting to see in which direction social and emotion psychology, as well as applied and differential psychology, drive the research field of embarrassment. Hopefully at least to a degree where Darwin would be satisfied by the answers found, and which have staid unanswered for already such a long time.

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APPENDIX

Instruments **1**

Regulatory Focus Strategies Scale (RFSS; Ouschan et al., 2007) 1

Social Anxiety Questionnaire (SAQ-A30; Caballo et al., 2008) 3

Vicarious Experience Scale (VES; Oceja, López-Pérez, Ambrona, & Fernández, 2009) 6

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Instruments

Regulatory Focus Strategies Scale (RFSS; Ouschan et al., 2007)

Each Item was presented on a separate screen in randomised order and was to be answered via a anchored 7-Point Likert-scale: 1= gar nicht einverstanden; to 7= vollkommen einverstanden.

Instruction:

Wie sehr bist du mit den folgenden Aussagen einverstanden?

Los geht's mit der LEERTASTE.

Items:

1. Das Eingehen von Risiken ist eine Voraussetzung für Erfolg.
2. Das Schlimmste was man tun kann bei der Verfolgung eines Ziels ist, sich über mögliche Fehler Sorgen zu machen.
3. Das Schlimmste was man tun kann, wenn man nicht versagen will, ist sich über mögliche Fehler Gedanken zu machen.
4. Wenn man etwas erreichen will, muss man optimistisch sein.
5. Wenn man etwas erreichen will, muss man alle Möglichkeiten dazu ausschöpfen.
6. Man muss ein Risiko eingehen, wenn man nicht versagen will.
7. Wenn man sich dauernd um Fehler sorgt, wird man nichts erreichen.
8. Um nicht zu versagen muss man enthusiastisch sein.

9. Vorsicht ist der beste Weg zum Erfolg.

10. Um etwas zu erreichen muss man vorsichtig sein.

11. Vorsicht ist der beste Weg um nicht zu versagen.

12. Wenn man etwas erreichen will ist es am wichtigsten, alle potenziellen Hindernisse zu kennen.

13. Um nicht zu versagen ist es wichtig, an alle potentiellen Hindernisse zu denken, die sich einem in den Weg stellen können.

14. Um nicht zu versagen muss man vorsichtig sein.

Social Anxiety Questionnaire (SAQ-A30; Caballo et al., 2008)

Each Item was presented on a separate screen in randomised order and was to be answered via a anchored 7-Point Likert-scale: 1= sehr unangenehm; 7= sehr angenehm.

Instruction:

Wie angenehm oder unangenehm findest du folgende Situationen?

Weiter mit der LEERTASTE.

Items:

1. Jemanden zu begrüßen, und nicht zurück gegrüßt zu werden.
2. Einem Nachbarn sagen zu müssen, dass er mit dem Lärm aufhören soll.
3. Vor einer Menschenmenge zu reden.
4. Eine anziehende Person des anderen Geschlechts zu fragen, ob sie mit mir ausgehen will.
5. Mich beim Kellner über das Essen zu beschweren.
6. Mich von Personen des anderen Geschlechts beobachtet zu fühlen.
7. Mich von Personen des anderen Geschlechts beobachtet zu fühlen.
8. Mit jemand zu reden und zu merken, dass er mir nicht zuhört.
9. Mich weigern etwas zu tun, was ich ungern mache, wenn jemand mich danach fragt.
10. Freundschaften zu schließen.

11. Jemandem zu sagen, dass er meine Gefühle verletzt.

12. Im Unterricht, auf der Arbeit oder in einer Besprechung reden zu müssen.

13. Mich mit jemandem zu unterhalten, den ich gerade kennen gelernt habe.

14. Ärger gegenüber einer Person ausdrücken, wenn sie mich hänselt.

15. Jeden einzelnen in einer sozialen Situation zu grüßen, wenn mehrere mir nicht bekannt sind.

16. Vor anderen Menschen einen Streich gespielt zu bekommen oder scherzhaft gehänselt zu werden.

17. Mit Unbekannten auf Parties und anderen sozialen Anlässen zu reden.

18. Vom Dozenten oder Vorgesetzten im Unterricht oder in einer Besprechung etwas gefragt zu werden.

19. Jemandem, den ich gerade kennen gelernt habe, in die Augen zu schauen.

20. Von einer Person, zu der ich mich angezogen fühle, gefragt zu werden, ob ich mit ihr ausgehe.

21. Ein Fehler vor Anderen zu machen.

22. Auf eine soziale Veranstaltung zu gehen, auf der ich nur eine Person kenne.

23. Eine Unterhaltung mit einer Person, die mich anzieht, zu starten.

24. Wenn jemand mich mit einem Fehler konfrontiert, den ich gemacht habe.

25. Auf einem Essen mit Kollegen oder Kommilitonen gezwungen zu werden, etwas im Namen aller zu sagen.

26. Jemandem zu sagen, dass sein Verhalten mich stört, und ihn zu bitten, damit aufzuhören.

27. Eine Person, die mir gefällt, zum Tanz aufzufordern.

28. Kritisiert zu werden.

29. Mit einem Vorgesetzten oder einer Autoritätsperson zu sprechen.

30. Einer Person, die mir gefällt, zu sagen, dass ich sie gerne näher kennen lernen würde.

Vicarious Experience Scale (VES; Oceja, López-Pérez, Ambrona, & Fernández, 2009)

Each Item was presented on a separate screen in randomised order and was to be answered via a anchored 7-Point Likert-scale: 1= trifft überhaupt nicht auf mich zu; 7= trifft voll und ganz auf mich zu.

Instruction:

Inwiefern treffen folgende Aussagen auf dich zu?

Weiter mit der LEERTASTE.

Items:

1. Ich schaue mir gerne Baby- und Welpenbilder anderer an.
2. Wenn jemand weint zeige ich ihm, dass ich mir seinen Kummer anhören würde.
3. Wenn ich weiß, dass eine Person jemand nahestehenden verloren hat, meide ich ihre Nähe, denn sonst fühle ich mich unwohl.
4. Wenn ich sehe, dass jemand ein Problem hat oder ihm etwas fehlt, bringt mich das dazu, mich mit seiner Situation auseinanderzusetzen.
5. Die Unschuld eines Neugeborenen wahrzunehmen rührt mich.
6. Das Unglück Anderer zu sehen macht mich nervös.
7. Ein älteres Paar Händchen halten zu sehen bringt mich zum Lächeln.

8. Wenn Jemand etwas Schlimmes durchmacht, rede ich lieber nicht mit ihm, denn sonst fühle ich mich schlechter.

9. Wenn jemand, den ich kenne, leidet, denke ich eher an seine Gefühle als an meine eigenen.

10. Mir fällt es sehr schwer einen Kranken zu besuchen.

11. Es berührt mich zu sehen, wie jemand einen Anderen pflegt und auf ihn aufpasst.

12. Wenn ich jemanden richtig leiden sehe, beschäftige ich mich damit, was die Situation für ihn bedeutet.

E-Scale (Leibetseder, Laireiter, Riepler, & Köller, 2001)

Each item was presented on a separate screen and was to be answered via a anchored 7-Point Likert-scale: 1= trifft gar nicht auf zu; 7= trifft vollkommen zu.

Instruction:

Inwiefern treffen folgende Aussagen auf dich zu?

Weiter mit der LEERTASTE.

Items:

1. Ich bin ein emotionaler Mensch.
2. Ich empfinde meine Emotionen sehr deutlich
3. Ich kann meine Emotionen gut verstecken.
4. Wenn ich einen sehr traurigen Film allein sehe, weine ich.
5. Wenn ich einen sehr lustigen Film allein sehe, kann ich sehr wohl lachen.
6. Ich empfinde sehr schnell Mitgefühl.
7. Man sieht mir ganz klar an, wenn ich sauer oder böse bin.
8. Ich schreie vor Wut.
9. Wenn ich jemanden oder etwas ganz und gar nicht mag, sieht man mir das schnell an.
10. Ich finde, meine Emotionen sind privat und ich brauche sie nicht offen Anderen zu zeigen.

11. Ich kann mich gut von belastenden Situationen emotional distanzieren.

12. Wenn auf einer Party Bekannte von mir sich betrunken blamieren, kann ich mich von ihnen abwenden und sie einfach ignorieren.

13. Wenn Freunde von mir ernste Probleme haben oder ihnen etwas Schlimmes passiert, bin ich selber so betroffen davon, dass ich ihnen nicht helfen kann.

Schadenfreude Self-Report (Self-Developed)

Each item was presented on a separate screen and was to be answered via a anchored 7-Point Likert-scale: 1= gar nicht; to 7= sicherlich.

Instruction:

Wie sehr bist du mit den folgenden Aussagen einverstanden?

Los geht's mit der LEERTASTE.

Items:

1. Ich muss (auch innerlich) schmunzeln, wenn jemandem etwas ein bisschen Böses passiert (Bsp.: Jemandem fährt die Straßenbahn vor der Nase weg, oder jemand bleibt auf der Autobahn wegen einer Panne liegen)
2. Bei reichen oder sehr erfolgreichen Menschen finde ich es weniger schlimm, wenn bei ihnen etwas nicht gut läuft.
3. Ich finde es unterhaltsam, wenn irgendwelche dummen Menschen sich in Talentsendungen im Fernsehen total blamieren.
4. Ich müsste (auch innerlich) schmunzeln, wenn jemandem, der es meiner Meinung nach verdient, etwas ein bisschen Böses passiert (Bsp.:Ein unhöflicher Mann im Anzug wird beim Schwarzfahren in der Straßenbahn erwischt; ein junger Kerl wird von der Polizei angehalten, weil er mit sehr lauter Musik durch die Gegend fährt)

5. Ich schmunzle (auch innerlich), wenn ich lese, dass ein reiches Prominentenpaar sich trennt, oder dass ein Rapper mit Diamantenzähnen seinen 500.000$ teuren Sportwagen verschrottet hat, oder dass eine superbekannte Sängerin wieder vor Gericht steht wegen Wutausbrüchen oder Drogenbesitz.

6. Wenn jemandem, den ich unsympathisch finde und nicht mag, etwas Negatives passiert, finde ich es weniger schlimm.

Fantasising Self-Report (Self-Developed)

Each item was presented on a separate screen and was to be answered via a anchored 7-Point Likert-scale: 1= gar nicht; to 7= sicherlich.

Instruction:

Wie sehr bist du mit den folgenden Aussagen einverstanden?

Los geht's mit der LEERTASTE.

Items:

1. Wenn ich höre, dass Familie oder Freunde von Bekannten einen Unfall hatten, stelle ich mir vor, wie es wäre, wenn es meinen Eltern oder Geschwistern passieren würde.

2. Wenn jemand mir erzählt, dass er einen Preis gewonnen hat oder sonst etwas tolles passiert ist, stelle ich's mir bildlich vor und fühle mich, als würde es mir passieren.

3. Wenn ich sehe, wie jemand weint, muss ich auch weinen oder werde ich traurig, selbst wenn ich nicht genau weiß, was los ist.

4. Wenn ich sehe, wie jemand lacht, lache ich auch mit oder werde ich wenigstens gut gelaunt, selbst wenn ich nicht genau weiß, was los ist.

5. Ich schaue meist nüchtern auf die Emotionen Anderer, diese haben keine großartige Wirkung auf mich. [Scale Response: 1= stimmt überhaupt nicht; 7= stimmt vollkommen]

6. Wenn jemandem- egal ob Freund oder Bekannter-etwas Peinliches passiert, ignoriere ich dies, um ihn nicht bloßzustellen.

7. Wenn jemandem- egal ob Freund oder Bekannter- etwas Peinliches passiert, mache ich einen kleinen Scherz, um ihn nicht bloßzustellen.

8. Wenn jemandem- egal ob Freund oder Bekannter- etwas Peinliches passiert, lenke ich schnell mit einem anderen Thema ab, um ihn nicht bloßzustellen.

9. Wenn jemandem etwas Peinliches passiert, stehe ich über der Situation und denke "das kann ja jedem mal passieren".

10. Wenn jemand- egal ob Freund oder Bekannter- etwas Peinliches macht/ihm etwas Peinliches passiert, weiß ich nicht, wie ich reagieren soll. Ich bin dann schnell überfordert und würde am liebsten nicht mehr da sein.

11. Wenn jemand- egal ob Freund oder Bekannter- etwas Peinliches macht/ihm etwas Peinliches passiert, finde ich es amüsant und verarsche sie damit, auch wenn es ihnen nicht angenehm ist.

Reality-TV Viewing Habits (Self-Developed)

1. Ungefähr wie viele Stunden pro Woche schaust du fern? Bitte eine Zahl eingeben: 0; 2; 20; 100...[fill-in-the-blank]

2. Ungefähr wie viel Prozent der Zeit, die du fernsiehst, schaust du private Sender? (RTL,RTL2,Super RTL, VOX, Pro7...)? Bitte einen Prozentwert zwischen 0 und 100 eingeben! [fill-in-the-blank]

3. Schaust du in den Privatsendern auch "reality Shows"? z.B. Supernanny, Deutschland sucht den Superstar, Teenage Mom, Bauer sucht Frau, das perfekte Promi-Dinner, Frauentausch, Germany`s next Topmodel, und/oder andere? [Scale Response: Niemals. ich schalte lieber ab.; Manchmal, wenn sie schon laufen...; Die eine oder andere Sendung, ja, gern.; Häufig. Ich mag solche Sendungen.; Sehr oft! Ich liebe sowas :)

4. Im Allgemeinen, wie bewertest du solche Realityshows? [Scale Response: Sie machen mir gar keinen; Ich liebe sie! Sie sind genau meins.; Ich finde sie regelrecht unangenehm.; Ich finde sie total lustig.; Ich finde sie menschenverachtend.; Ich finde sie harmlos.; Ich muss dabei sogar wegschauen.,;Ich kann nicht weggucken.; Ich finde sie total langweilig.; Ich finde sie total unterhaltsam.;]

Regulatory Focus Manipulation

Example Promotion Focus Induction



Example Prevention Focus Induction



Video Stimuli

All used videos are included in the annexed electronic data medium. This are, in sequence of implementation:

1. Veith
2. Jürgen
3. Freude
4. Trauer
5. Vid Interview
6. Vid Gesang
7. AstroTV
8. Bundesheer
9. ComedyBus

Study 1

Introduction

Hallo und Willkommen!

Als Erstes möchten wir uns für Ihr Interesse und Ihre Bereitschaft, mitzumachen, bedanken!

Seit jüngster Zeit beschäftigt sich eine Forschungsgruppe der Universität Würzburg mit einem speziellen Gebiet. Zu diesem Thema ist jegliche Forschung so gut wie nicht existierend. Ihre Teilnahme wird uns helfen, die ersten Schritte zu unternehmen, um die Basis aller zukünftigen Erkenntnisse aufzubauen.

Im folgenden werden Ihnen ein paar Fragen zu Ihrer Erfahrung mit dem Phänomen, dass unter "sich Fremdschämen" bekannt ist,

gestellt. Dabei ist es nicht wichtig, dass Sie viel Erfahrung damit haben, oder sogar überhaupt welche! Es reicht, wenn Sie uns das mitteilen, was sie können.

Ihre Teilnahme ist vollkommen anonym. Keine Informationen zu Ihrer Person, Rechner oder Internetverbindung werden gesammelt, die nicht direkt von Ihnen eingegeben werden. Persönliche Angaben wie Alter oder Geschlecht dienen ausschließlich der statistischen Auswertung dieser Befragung, und keine Informationen werden an Dritte weitergegeben!

Gegen Ende der Befragung haben Sie die Möglichkeit, Ihre eMail zu hinterlassen. Dies ist keine Voraussetzung zur Teilnahme! Wir wollen Ihnen damit nur die Möglichkeit anbieten, Ergebnisse dieser Befragung und Informationen über zukünftige Forschung zu bekommen, falls wir Ihre Neugier geweckt haben :)

Für Rückfragen oder Kommentare sind wir unter folgender Adresse erreichbar: XXX@XXX.com

Indem Sie auf die "WEITER"-Taste klicken, geht es mit der Umfrage los!

—

Demographical Information

Geschlecht [Scale Response: männlich/weiblich]

Alter [fill-in-the-blank]

Ist Deutsch Ihre Muttersprache (bzw. eine Ihrer Muttersprachen)? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Unabhängig davon, ob Sie es selbst erleben: Was verstehen Sie unter FREMDSCHAM bzw. SICH FREMDSCHÄMEN? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Haben Sie schon selber Fremdscham erlebt? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Alles in Allem, wie stark schätzen Sie Ihre Neigung zu Fremdscham ein? [Scale Response: 1= sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Die Fragen auf dieser Seite beziehen sich auf eine Situation, in der Sie sich fremdgeschämt haben.

Versuchen Sie sich an das letzte Mal, dass Sie Fremdscham empfunden haben, zu erinnern. Es ist unwichtig, wann genau das war.

Sie brauchen vielleicht ein Moment Zeit, um sich daran zu erinnern, das ist ok so. Wenn Sie sich nicht sicher sind, ob das das letzte Mal war, ist auch nicht schlimm!

Wenn Sie sich an die Situation erinnern, schließen Sie Ihre Augen und versuchen Sie, so detailreich wie möglich die Situation in Ihrem Kopf durchzumachen. Danach öffnen Sie Ihre Augen und beantworten Sie bitte die folgenden Fragen:

Beschreiben Sie bitte die Situation so gut wie möglich.

Dabei ist es wichtig, dass Sie diese nur beschreiben (wo es war, wer dabei war, was passiert ist, wie Sie sich dabei fühlten, wie Sie darauf reagiert haben, wie es zu Ende war). [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv waren die Emotionen, die Sie selbst erlebt haben? Wenn Sie sich nicht daran erinnern können, beantworten Sie nicht die Frage. [Scale Response: 1= sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie lange hat diese Episode gedauert? Eine knappe Einschätzung reicht! [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wann hat diese Episode ungefähr stattgefunden? Eine knappe Einschätzung reicht! (z.B. letzte Woche, zw. Mai und Juni, vor einem halben Jahr...) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie sehr haben Sie sich mit der Person, für die Sie sich fremdgeschämt haben, identifiziert? Wenn Sie es nicht einschätzen können, beantworten Sie nicht die Frage. [Scale Response: 1= sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Die Fragen auf dieser Seite beziehen sich auf eine Situation, in der Sie sich intensiv fremdgeschämt haben.

Was war eine Ihrer extremsten Erlebnisse von Fremdscham? Sie brauchen vielleicht einen Moment Zeit, um sich daran zu erinnern, das ist ok so.

Wenn die vorher erklärte Situation die Selbe ist, dann können Sie diese Seite überspringen. Wenn Sie sich doch an eine extrem fremdpeinliche Situation erinnern, schließen Sie Ihre Augen und versuchen Sie, so detailreich wie möglich die Situation in Ihrem Kopf durchzumachen. Danach öffnen Sie Ihre Augen und beantworten Sie bitte die folgenden Fragen:

Beschreiben Sie bitte die Situation so gut wie möglich.

Dabei ist es wichtig, dass Sie diese nur beschreiben (wo es war, wer dabei war, was passiert ist, wie Sie sich dabei fühlten, wie Sie darauf reagiert haben, wie es zu Ende ging). [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv waren die Emotionen, die Sie selbst erlebt haben? Wenn Sie sich nicht erinnern können, beantworten Sie nicht die Frage. [Scale Response: 1= sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie lange hat diese Episode gedauert? Eine knappe Einschätzung reicht! [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie sehr haben Sie sich mit der Person, für die Sie sich fremdgeschämt haben, identifiziert? Wenn Sie es nicht einschätzen können, beantworten Sie nicht die Frage. [Scale Response: 1= sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Menschen unterscheiden sich darin, wie sie auf Fremdscham-Situationen reagieren. Auf dieser Seite interessiert uns, wie Sie sich typischerweise in Situationen fühlen und verhalten, in denen Sie sich fremdschämen. Versuchen Sie sich auch für diese Frage wieder, sich so genau wie möglich an Ihre Fremdscham-Erlebnisse zu erinnern, indem Sie Ihre Augen schließen. Beantworten Sie anschließend die Fragen.

Wie fühlen Sie sich typischerweise in Situationen, in denen Sie sich fremdschämen? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie verhalten Sie sich typischerweise in Situationen, in denen Sie sich fremdschämen? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Auf dieser Seite interessiert uns nun, wie Sie sich Ihre Fremdschamerlebnisse erklären. Bitte nehmen Sie sich für diese Frage genügend Zeit zum Nachdenken. Ziehen Sie für die Beantwortung der Frage erneut Ihre Erinnerungen an das/ die Erlebnis(se) heran.

Warum glauben Sie, empfanden Sie in der/ den von Ihnen geschilderten Situation(en) Fremdscham? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Waren Sie mal in einer Situation, in der Sie zugeschaut haben, wie jemand sich blamiert hat bzw. etwas für Sie äußerst peinliches gemacht hat, und das wurde für Sie recht unangenehm? Meist passiert so etwas beim Fernsehen oder im Kino, aber auch beim Zuschauen von anwesenden Menschen, wie im Theater, Kabarett oder in Gruppenunterhaltungen, bei einer Präsentation oder Arbeitstreffen usw. [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Die Fragen auf dieser Seite beziehen sich auf eine solcher Situationen, in denen Sie sich wegen des unpassenden Verhaltens eines Anderen unwohl gefühlt haben.

Versuchen Sie sich an ein Beispiel eines solchen Erlebnisses zu erinnern. Sie brauchen vielleicht einen Moment Zeit, um sich daran zu erinnern, das ist ok so.

Wenn Sie sich an die Situation erinnern, schließen Sie Ihre Augen und versuchen Sie, so detailreich wie möglich die Situation in Ihrem Kopf durchzumachen. Danach öffnen Sie Ihre Augen und beantworten Sie bitte die folgenden Fragen:

Beschreiben Sie bitte die Situation so gut wie möglich.

Dabei ist es wichtig, dass Sie diese nur beschreiben (wo es war, wer dabei war, was passiert ist, wie Sie sich dabei fühlten, wie Sie darauf reagiert haben, wie es zu Ende ging). [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv waren die Emotionen, die Sie selbst erlebt haben? Wenn Sie sich nicht erinnern können, beantworten Sie nicht die Frage. [Scale Response: 1= sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie lange hat diese Episode gedauert? Eine knappe Einschätzung reicht! [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie sehr haben Sie sich mit der Person, für die Sie sich fremdgeschämt haben, identifiziert? Wenn Sie es nicht einschätzen können, beantworten Sie nicht die Frage. [Scale Response: 1= sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Empathie

Wie gut schätzen Sie Ihre eigene Fähigkeit ein, Emotionen in Anderen korrekt zu erkennen?

Hier ist nur die Fähigkeit gemeint, zu VERSTEHEN, welche Emotion ein Anderer fühlt, unabhängig davon ob Sie diese mitfühlen oder nicht. [Scale Response: 1= sehr gut; 7=sehr schlecht]

—

Wie empathisch (mitfühlend) schätzen Sie sich selbst ein? Gemeint ist, die Emotionen anderer SELBST ZU EMPFINDEN, zum Beispiel wenn sie traurig oder glücklich sind. [Scale Response: 1= kaum; 7= äußerst]

—

Nach den Antworten, die Sie eben eingegeben haben, sind Sie einer derjenigen Menschen, die Fremdscham erleben. Das Thema Fremdschämen ist ein ganz neues und aktuelles Forschungsgebiet, zu dem kaum Ergebnisse vorliegen. Falls Sie neugierig geworden sind bzw. Sie Interesse daran haben, uns mit unserer Forschung weiter zu helfen, haben Sie jetzt die Gelegenheit, Ihre eMail zu hinterlassen.

Wir sind eine junge Gruppe Wissenschaftler der Uni Würzburg, und wir sind auf die Hilfe von Menschen wie Ihnen angewiesen! Forschung lässt sich nur wegen Freiwilligen wie Ihnen weiter betreiben, und wir würden uns sehr freuen, wenn wir Ihre wertvolle Unterstützung weiterhin hätten!

Wenn Sie Ihre eMail hinterlassen, werden Sie Ergebnisse zur dieser Untersuchung bekommen. Zusätzlich können Sie gelegentlich (nicht mehr als ein paar Mal im Jahr) eingeladen werden, an weiteren Kurzuntersuchungen über Fremdschämen teilzunehmen, bei denen als Dankeschön Gutscheine unter den Teilnehmern verlost werden. Dabei gehen Sie selbstverständlich keine Verpflichtungen ein, ihre Email wird NIE weitergegeben, und Sie können jederzeit Ihre Meinung ändern, dann wird Ihre eMail ohne weiteres gelöscht.

Datenschutzrechtlich wollen wir auch hiermit garantieren, dass Ihre eMail nicht zusammen mit den Antworten dieser oder anderer Befragungen zusammen gespeichert wird, so dass die Anonymität Ihrer Antworten gewährleistet bleibt.

Wenn sie noch irgendwelche Fragen haben, zögern Sie nicht uns anzusprechen! Ansonsten bedanken wir uns zunächst für das Mitmachen und wir hoffen, mit Ihnen in der Zukunft weiter rechnen zu können.

hier können Sie Ihre eMail-Adresse hinterlassen: [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Im Prinzip das war's!

Wir wollen Sie nur um etwas noch bitten. Wenn Sie ein Video im Netz kennen, bei dem Sie sich stark fremdschämen müssen, senden Sie uns bitte den Link zu unserer eMail-Adresse: XX@XX.-com. Unter denen, die uns Videos senden, werden drei Amazon-Gutscheine im Wert von 50€ verlost!

Besten Dank für's Mitmachen! Ihre Hilfe wird sehr geschätzt.

Dipl.-Psych. Paul Álvarez Löblich.

—

Herzlichen Dank für Ihre Teilnahme!

Experiment 1

Lab Session

This part of the experiment took place on a computer in the lab, on an individual session.

Willkommen!

Danke, dass Du Dich bereit erklärt hast, an dieser Untersuchung teilzunehmen.

Deine Antworten werden anonym gespeichert, und nur zu Zwecken der Auswertung verwendet.

Meist wirst du während der Untersuchung allein sein. Falls etwas nicht funktioniert oder unverständlich ist, wende dich an die Versuchsleitung, die vor der Tür sein wird.

Viel Spaß!

Weiter mit der Leertaste

—

In dieser Untersuchung werden wir eine Skala verwenden, anhand derer du angeben kannst, wie AUFGEREGT du dich zu einem gegebenen Zeitpunkt fühlst.

Die Skala zeigt dafür kleine menschenähnliche Figuren, die Aufgeregtheit darstellen, von ganz ruhig bis extrem aufgeregt. Ob die Aufregung positiv oder negativ ist, spielt hierbei keine Rolle.

Deine Aufgabe ist dann, diejenige Figur auszuwählen, die am besten wiedergibt, wie aufgeregt du dich fühlst.

An jeder Figur ist eine Nummer, die du dann UNTEN eingeben kannst, wenn du dich entschieden hast. Wenn du dich zwischen zwei Figuren nicht entscheiden kannst, kannst du die Nummer vom Block zwischen Ihnen auswählen. Drücke anschließend die Eingabetaste (Enter) um fortzufahren.

Drücke jetzt die LEERTASTE, um ein Beispiel zu sehen.

—

Wie aufgeregt fühlst du dich?

Nun werden wir dir eine neuartige Skala vorstellen. Um sicher zu gehen, dass du sie richtig anwendest, werden wir diese hier genauer beschreiben und dann kurz üben.



Wie du sehen kannst, kannst du in der Skala von links nach rechts eingeben, wie deine Emotionen sind (von negativ über neutral bis zu positiv). Deine erste Entscheidung wäre dann, welche der Figuren die Valenz (positiv oder negativ) deiner Emotionen am besten wiedergibt. Falls du dich zwischen zwei Figuren nicht entscheiden kannst, kannst du auch den Raum dazwischen auswählen. Die zentrale Figur stellt eine neutrale Stimmung dar.

Von oben nach unten siehst du Figuren, die Annäherung und Distanzierung darstellen. Je kleiner die Figur, desto weiter weg würdest Du am liebsten von einer gegebenen Situation oder vorgestellten Person sein. Je größer die Figur, desto näher möchtest du der gegebenen Situation oder vorgestellten Person kommen.

weitere Instruktionen mit der Leertaste.

—

Beachte dabei, dass Entfernen oder Annähern nicht unbedingt mit Gut oder Schlecht gleichzusetzen ist. Du möchtest dich zum Beispiel von leckerer Schokolade (positive Valenz) abwenden, wenn du eine Diät machst, oder dich einem verletzten Freund (negative Valenz) zuwenden, um ihm zu helfen. Fühlst du keine Neigung in die eine oder andere Richtung, dann nimm die mittlere Figur, die keine Distanzänderung wiedergibt.

weiter mit der Leertaste.

—

Um die Skala zu verwenden, wählst du zuerst die Figur, die die Positivität oder Negativität deiner Emotionen repräsentiert, und merkst dir ihren BUCHSTABEN. Dann wählst du die Figur, die deinen Entfernungswunsch am besten wiedergibt, und merkst dir ihre NUMMER.

Im Raster siehst du dann die BUCHSTABEN-NUMMER-Kombination, die deine Auswahl wiedergibt. Wenn du zufrieden mit deiner Entscheidung bist, gib bitte diese Kombination in die jeweiligen Eingabefelder UNTEN RECHTS ein, und drücke dann die Eingabetaste (Enter).

weitere Instruktionen mit der Leertaste.

—

Nun ein Übungsdurchgang: Auf der nächsten Seite wird dir ein Bild gezeigt. Es geht nach wenigen Sekunden automatisch weiter zur Skala. Beantworte diese wie eben beschrieben, und drücke dann die Eingabetaste (Enter).

Weiter mit der Leertaste.

—

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen vom Bild gefühlt?



—

Welche Kombination spiegelt am besten deine Gefühle und deinen Entfernungswunsch zum gezeigten Objekt wider?



—

Links von Dir findest du einen Stapel Blätter. Auf jedem Blatt findest du ein Labyrinth.

Nimm jetzt das oberste Blatt und dreh es um.

Wenn du soweit bist, drücke die Leertaste und löse dann das Labyrinth.

—

Löse jetzt das Labyrinth.

Wenn du fertig bist lege aus auf die rechte Tischseite und drücke die Leertaste

—

Nun wirst Du ein Video sehen.

Es werden keine Fragen zu Details oder zu konkreten Inhalten gestellt. Schau einfach aufmerksam zu.

Drücke die Leertaste für ein Paar Informationen zum Video.

—

Im folgenden Video geht's um einen Jungen, Bastian, der ständig in der Schule gehänselt wird und Ärger vom Vater und von den Lehrern bekommt, weil er lieber in seiner Imagination als in der Realität ist.

Bastian entdeckt ein Buch, das ihn in ein wundersames Land, Phantasien, führt. Hier begleitet er seine neuen Freunde auf gefährliche Abenteuer, während sie ihre magische Welt zu retten versuchen.

Am Ende, als alles verloren scheint, kaum etwas von Phantasien übrig bleibt und es seine Freunde nicht mehr gibt, bekommt Bastian unerwartet die letzte und wichtigste Aufgabe, um Phantasien vor der Zerstörung durch die Kraft des Nichts' zu retten, was er auch mühevoll schafft.

Los geht's mit der Leertaste!

—

[VideoFreude]

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen vom Video gefühlt? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Welche Kombination spiegelt am besten deine Gefühle und deinen Entfernungswunsch während des Videos wider? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Was hast du beim Zuschauen vom Video gefühlt?

Jetzt werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" (linke ROTE taste), bzw. "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste) an, je nach dem, ob DU die jeweilige Emotion empfunden hast. Es gibt keine richtige oder falschen Antworten!

Versuche zügig zu antworten. Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

Hast du folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Trauer, Betroffenheit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Langeweile, Gleichgültigkeit, Einsamkeit, Spaß, Selbstsicherheit, Erfüllung, Überraschung, Ausgeglichenheit, Ärger, Freude, Stolz, Zufriedenheit, Entspannung, Verblüffung, Mitgefühl, Glück, Genuss, Unwohlsein, Ruhe, Belustigt, Schadenfreude.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am stärksten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste. [Multiple Response: Spaß/ Freude/ Glück/ Hoffnung/ Selbstsicherheit/ Stolz/ Genuss/ Genugtuung/ Erfüllung/ Zufriedenheit/ Andere <specify>]

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am ehesten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die relevanteste Emotion. [Scale Response: Spaß/ Freude/ Glück/ Hoffnung/ Selbstsicherheit/ Stolz/ Genuss/ Genugtuung/ Erfüllung/ Zufriedenheit/ Andere <specify>]

—

Warum hast du dich so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotionen empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie angenehm oder unangenehm fandest du das Video? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unangenehm; 7= sehr angenehm]

—

Fandest du es schmerzhaft das Video anzusehen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr]

—

Die Hauptfigur im Video empfindet verschiedene Emotionen.

Im folgenden werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" an (linke ROTE taste), wenn du glaubst, dass die Hauptfigur diese Emotion im Video eher empfunden hat und "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste), wenn du denkst, dass der Protagonist diese Emotion eher nicht empfunden hat. Weiter geht es mit der LEERTASTE.

—

Hat der Protagonist folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/ eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Einsamkeit, Freude, Stolz, Zufriedenheit, Entspannung, Verblüffung, Wut, Glück, Genuss, Trauer, Ruhe, Belustigung, Betroffenheit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Selbstverliebtheit, Gleichgültigkeit, Spaß, Selbstsicherheit, Erfüllung, Überraschung, Ausgeglichenheit.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am stärksten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste. [Multiple Response, Max 3 Items]

Einsamkeit, Freude, Stolz, Zufriedenheit, Entspannung, Verblüffung, Wut, Glück, Genuss, Trauer, Ruhe, Belustigung, Betroffenheit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Selbstverliebtheit, Gleichgültigkeit, Spaß, Selbstsicherheit, Erfüllung, Überraschung, Ausgeglichenheit.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hat deiner Meinung nach der Protagonist am ehesten empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die Emotion, die die Person am meisten empfunden hat. [Scale Response: Spaß/ Freude/ Glück/ Hoffnung/ Selbstsicherheit/ Stolz/ Genuss/ Genugtuung/ Erfüllung/ Zufriedenheit/ Liebe/ Andere <specify>]

—

Warum hat der Protagonist sich deiner Meinung nach so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hat der Protagonist deiner Meinung nach die Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie stark kannst du dich mit dem Protagonisten im Video identifizieren? [Scale Response: 1= gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Alles in allem: Wie ähnlich bist du dem Protagonisten? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unähnlich; 7= sehr ähnlich]

—

Hast du dir das Video durchgehend angeschaut? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= durchgehend]

—

Hast du dich mit anderen Gedanken beschäftigt, während das Video lief? [Scale Response: 1=die ganze Zeit; 7= ich habe nur an das Video gedacht]

—

Wie aufmerksam hast du das Video verfolgt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= maximal]

—

Hast du dich in die Hauptfigur des Videos hineinversetzt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Wie sehr hast du es versucht, dich in die Perspektive der Hauptfigur hinzuversetzen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Denke daran zurück, als du das Video geschaut hast. Hast du dir vorgestellt dich selbst in der Situation des Protagonisten zu befinden? als würde es DIR passieren? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Bewerte nun das Verhalten der Hauptfigur!

In jeder Gesellschaft gibt es bestimmte Normen, die unser Zusammenleben regeln. Wie stark hat das gezeigte Verhalten der Hauptfigur Regeln unserer Gesellschaft verletzt? Gehe hier von dem extremsten gezeigten Verhalten aus! [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Kanntest Du das Video schon? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

Links von Dir findest du einen Stapel Blätter. Auf jedem Blatt findest du ein Labyrinth.

Nimm jetzt das oberste Blatt und dreh es um.

Wenn du soweit bist, drücke die Leertaste und löse dann das Labyrinth.

—

Löse jetzt das Labyrinth.

Wenn du fertig bist lege aus auf die rechte Tischseite und drücke die Leertaste

—

Nun wirst Du ein Video sehen.

Es werden keine Fragen zu Details oder zu konkreten Inhalten gestellt. Schau einfach aufmerksam zu.

drücke die Leertaste für ein Paar Informationen zum Video.

—

Das nächste Video handelt von Chuck, der nach einem Flugzeugabsturz als einziger Überlebender vier Jahre auf einer einsamen Insel mitten im Pazifischen Ozean lebt.

Nach dem Absturz werden einige Pakete, die an Bord des Flugzeuges waren, angespült. In einem befindet sich ein Volleyball. Nach einem vergeblichen Flucht- und Selbstmordversuch wird dieser, als Chuck ihm mit dem Blut seiner verwundeten Hände ein menschliches Gesicht aufgemalt hat, zu seinem einzigen, stummen Freund, mit dem er immer wieder Gespräche führt und sich berät, und der ihn so vor Wahnsinn und völliger Verzweiflung bewahrt.

Aus verschiedenen Materialien, baut Chuck sich ein Floß und versucht nun erneut die Insel zu verlassen und wieder zurück in die Zivilisation zu kommen. „Wilson“, der Volleyball, soll ihm auch hier als Begleiter zur Seite stehen und ihm Kraft geben.

Los geht’s mit der Leertaste!

—

[VideoTraurig]

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen vom Video gefühlt? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Welche Kombination spiegelt am besten deine Gefühle und deinen Entfernungswunsch während des Videos wider? Was hast du beim Zuschauen vom Video gefühlt? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Jetzt werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" (linke ROTE taste), bzw. "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste) an, je nach dem, ob DU die jeweilige Emotion empfunden hast. Es gibt keine richtige oder falschen Antworten!

Versuche zügig zu antworten. Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

Hast du folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Trauer, Betroffenheit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Langeweile, Gleichgültigkeit, Einsamkeit, Spaß, Selbstsicherheit, Erfüllung, Überraschung, Ausgeglichenheit, Ärger, Freude, Stolz, Zufriedenheit, Entspannung, Verblüffung, Mitgefühl, Glück, Genuss, Unwohlsein, Ruhe, Belustigt, Schadenfreude.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am stärksten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste.

[Multiple Response: Spaß/ Freude/ Glück/ Hoffnung/ Selbstsicherheit/ Stolz/ Genuss/ Genugtuung/ Erfüllung/ Zufriedenheit/ Andere <specify>]

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am ehesten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die relevanteste Emotion. [Scale Response: Spaß/ Freude/ Glück/ Hoffnung/ Selbstsicherheit/ Stolz/ Genuss/ Genugtuung/ Erfüllung/ Zufriedenheit/ Andere <specify>]

—

Warum hast du dich so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotionen empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie angenehm oder unangenehm fandest du das Video? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unangenehm; 7= sehr angenehm]

—

Fandest du es schmerzhaft das Video anzusehen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr]

—

Die Hauptfigur im Video empfindet verschiedene Emotionen.

Im folgenden werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" an (linke ROTE taste), wenn du glaubst, dass die Hauptfigur diese Emotion im Video eher empfunden hat und "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste), wenn du denkst, dass der Protagonist diese Emotion eher nicht empfunden hat. Weiter geht es mit der LEERTASTE.

—

Hat der Protagonist folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/ eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Einsamkeit, Freude, Stolz, Zufriedenheit, Entspannung, Verblüffung, Wut, Glück, Genuss, Trauer, Ruhe, Belustigung, Betroffenheit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Selbstverliebtheit, Gleichgültigkeit, Spaß, Selbstsicherheit, Erfüllung, Überraschung, Ausgeglichenheit.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am stärksten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste. Multiple

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hat deiner Meinung nach der Protagonist am ehesten empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die Emotion, die die Person am meisten empfunden hat. [Scale Response: Spaß/ Freude/ Glück/ Hoffnung/ Selbstsicherheit/ Stolz/ Genuss/ Genugtuung/ Erfüllung/ Zufriedenheit/ Liebe/ Andere <specify>]

—

Warum hat der Protagonist sich deiner Meinung nach so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hat der Protagonist deiner Meinung nach die Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie stark kannst du dich mit dem Protagonisten im Video identifizieren? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Alles in allem: Wie ähnlich bist du dem Protagonisten? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unähnlich; 7= sehr ähnlich]

—

Hast du dir das Video durchgehend angeschaut? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= durchgehend]

—

Hast du dich mit anderen Gedanken beschäftigt, während das Video lief? [Scale Response: 1=die ganze Zeit; 7= ich habe nur an das Video gedacht]

—

Wie aufmerksam hast du das Video verfolgt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= maximal]

—

Hast du dich in die Hauptfigur des Videos hineinversetzt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Wie sehr hast du es versucht, dich in die Perspektive der Hauptfigur hinzuversetzen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Denke daran zurück, als du das Video geschaut hast. Hast du dir vorgestellt dich selbst in der Situation des Protagonisten zu befinden? als würde es DIR passieren? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Bewerte nun das Verhalten der Hauptfigur!

In jeder Gesellschaft gibt es bestimmte Normen, die unser Zusammenleben regeln. Wie stark hat das gezeigte Verhalten der Hauptfigur Regeln unserer Gesellschaft verletzt? Gehe hier von dem extremsten gezeigten Verhalten aus! [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Kanntest Du das Video schon? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

Links von Dir findest du einen Stapel Blätter. Auf jedem Blatt findest du ein Labyrinth.

Nimm jetzt das oberste Blatt und dreh es um.

Wenn du soweit bist, drücke die Leertaste und löse dann das Labyrinth.

—

Löse jetzt das Labyrinth.

Wenn du fertig bist lege aus auf die rechte Tischseite und drücke die Leertaste

—

Nun wirst Du ein Video sehen.

Es werden keine Fragen zu Details oder zu konkreten Inhalten gestellt. Schau einfach aufmerksam zu.

Drücke die Leertaste für ein Paar Informationen zum Video.

—

Im folgenden Video geht es um Veith, ein sexuell undefinierbarer Typ der keine Privatsphäre respektieren kann und durchaus unangenehm wirkt. Er wird dabei Andre, wer ziemlich konservativ und ein klassischer „richtiger“ Mann ist, und für wen seine Männlichkeit eine große Rolle spielt, mehrere Tage lang begleiten.

Andre hat für Aufgabe, den außergewöhnlichen Veith als seinen Therapeuten und neuen besten Freund auszugeben. Veith begleitet ihn ein ganzes Wochenende lang auf Schritt und Tritt und muss dabei Familie und Freunden vorgestellt werden. Problematisch dabei ist, dass Andre allen Wünschen, Ideen und jedem Verlangen Veiths nachkommen und jeder Zeit zu ihm stehen muss.

Dabei wissen nur Veith und Andre, dass sie gefilmt werden. Das macht die Situationen desto schwieriger und unangenehmer für Andre, und für Veith den größten Spaß.

Los geht’s mit der Leertaste!

—

[Video FrS1]

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen vom Video gefühlt? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Welche Kombination spiegelt am besten deine Gefühle und deinen Entfernungswunsch während des Videos wider? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Was hast du beim Zuschauen vom Video gefühlt?

Jetzt werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" (linke ROTE taste), bzw. "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste) an, je nach dem, ob DU die jeweilige Emotion empfunden hast. Es gibt keine richtige oder falschen Antworten!

Versuche zügig zu antworten. Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

Hast du folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Trauer, Hoffnungslosigkeit, Freude, Genuss, Scham, Überraschung, Verblüffung, Wut, Hilflosigkeit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Isoliertheit, Entspannung, Belustigung, Ärger, Mitgefühl, Selbstsicherheit, Zufriedenheit, Langeweile, Gleichgültigkeit, Schadenfreude, Angst, Betroffenheit, Stolz, Unwohlsein, Ekel, Verzweiflung, Schmerz, Schadenfreude.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am stärksten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste. [Multiple Response: Überraschung; Ekel/Abscheu; Mitgefühl; Belustigung; Betroffenheit; Schadenfreude; Gleichgültigkeit; Schmerz; Spaß; Unwohlsein; Freude; Scham]

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am ehesten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die relevanteste Emotion. [Scale Response: Überraschung; Ekel/Abscheu; Mitgefühl; Belustigung; Betroffenheit; Schadenfreude; Gleichgültigkeit; Schmerz; Spaß; Unwohlsein; Freude; Scham]

—

Warum hast du dich so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotionen empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie angenehm oder unangenehm fandest du das Video? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unangenehm; 7= sehr angenehm]

—

Fandest du es schmerzhaft das Video anzusehen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr]

—

Veith, die Hauptfigur im Video, empfindet verschiedene Emotionen.

Im folgenden werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" an (linke ROTE taste), wenn du glaubst, dass Veith diese Emotion im Video eher empfunden hat und "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste), wenn du denkst, dass Veith diese Emotion eher nicht empfunden hat. Weiter geht es mit LEERTASTE.

—

Hat der Protagonist folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/ eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Trauer, Hoffnungslosigkeit, Freude, Genuss, Scham, Überraschung, Verblüffung, Wut, Hilflosigkeit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Isoliertheit, Entspannung, Belustigung, Ärger, Mitgefühl, Selbstsicherheit, Zufriedenheit, Langeweile, Gleichgültigkeit, Schadenfreude, Angst, Betroffenheit, Stolz, Unwohlsein, Ekel, Verzweiflung, Schmerz, Schadenfreude.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hat deiner Meinung nach Veith am ehesten empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste. [Multiple Response: Unwohlsein; Spaß; Freude; Genuss; Glück; Genugtuung; Stolz; Scham; Selbstverliebtheit; Andere <specify>]

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hat deiner Meinung nach Veith am ehesten empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die Emotion, die die Person am meisten empfunden hat. [Multiple Response: Unwohlsein; Spaß; Freude; Genuss; Glück; Genugtuung; Stolz; Scham; Selbstverliebtheit; Andere <specify>]

—

Warum hat Veith sich deiner Meinung nach so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hat Veith deiner Meinung nach die Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie stark kannst du dich mit Veith im Video identifizieren? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Alles in allem: Wie ähnlich bist du Veith? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unähnlich; 7= sehr ähnlich]

—

Hast du dir das Video durchgehend angeschaut? [Scale Response: 1=ich habe gar nicht hingeschaut; 7= ich hab die ganze Zeit hingeschaut]

—

Hast du dich mit anderen Gedanken beschäftigt, während das Video lief? [Scale Response: 1=die ganze Zeit; 7= ich habe nur ans Video gedacht]

—

Wie aufmerksam hast du das Video verfolgt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= maximal]

—

Hast du dich in Veith hineinversetzt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Wie sehr hast du es versucht, dich in Veiths Perspektive hinzuversetzen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Denke daran zurück, als du das Video geschaut hast. Hast du dir vorgestellt dich selbst in Veiths Situation zu befinden? als würde es DIR passieren? [Scale Response:1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Bewerte nun Veiths Verhalten!

In jeder Gesellschaft gibt es bestimmte Normen, die unser Zusammenleben regeln. Wie stark hat das gezeigte Verhalten Regeln unserer Gesellschaft verletzt? Gehe hier von dem extremsten gezeigten Verhalten aus! [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Kanntest Du das Video schon? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Links von Dir findest du einen Stapel Blätter. Auf jedem Blatt findest du ein Labyrinth.

Nimm jetzt das erste Blatt und dreh es um.

Wenn du soweit bist, drücke die Leertaste und löse dann das Labyrinth.

—

Löse jetzt das Labyrinth.

Wenn du fertig bist lege aus auf die rechte Tischseite und drücke die Leertaste

—

Nun wirst Du ein Video sehen.

Es werden keine Fragen zu Details oder zu konkreten Inhalten gestellt. Schau einfach aufmerksam zu.

drücke die Leertaste für ein Paar Informationen zum Video.

—

Im folgenden Video geht es um Jürgen, der ein ziemlich unerträglicher Kerl ist. Sandra, der es eigentlich sehr unangenehm ist, Schimpfwörter zu verwenden oder offen über Sex zu reden, hat als Aufgabe, Jürgen als ihren neuen festen Freund auszugeben.

Jürgen erfüllt jedes Klischee eines „Fußballprolls“ und Machos. Er begleitet sie ein ganzes Wochenende lang auf Schritt und Tritt und muss dabei Familie und Freunden vorgestellt werden. Sandra muss dazu noch allen Wünschen und jedem Verlangen Jürgens nachkommen und jederzeit zu ihm stehen, um 10 000 Euro zu gewinnen.

Dabei wissen nur Jürgen und Sandra, dass sie gefilmt werden. Das macht die Situationen desto schwieriger und unangenehmer für Sandra, und für Jürgen den größten Spaß.

Los geht’s mit der Leertaste!

—

[VideoFrS2]

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen vom Video gefühlt? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Welche Kombination spiegelt am besten deine Gefühle und deinen Entfernungswunsch während des Videos wider? [fill-in-the-blank]



—

Was hast du beim Zuschauen vom Video gefühlt?

Jetzt werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" (linke ROTE taste), bzw. "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste) an, je nach dem, ob DU die jeweilige Emotion empfunden hast. Es gibt keine richtige oder falschen Antworten!

Versuche zügig zu antworten. Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

Hast du folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Trauer, Hoffnungslosigkeit, Freude, Genuss, Scham, Überraschung, Verblüffung, Wut, Hilflosigkeit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Isoliertheit, Entspannung, Belustigung, Ärger, Mitgefühl,

Selbstsicherheit, Zufriedenheit, Langeweile, Gleichgültigkeit, Schadenfreude, Angst, Betroffenheit, Stolz, Unwohlsein, Ekel, Verzweiflung, Schmerz, Schadenfreude.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am stärksten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste. [Multiple Response: Überraschung; Ekel/Abscheu; Mitgefühl; Belustigung; Betroffenheit; Schadenfreude; Gleichgültigkeit; Schmerz; Spaß; Unwohlsein; Freude; Scham]

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hast du am ehesten während des Videoschauens empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die relevanteste Emotion. [Scale Response: Überraschung; Ekel/Abscheu; Mitgefühl; Belustigung; Betroffenheit; Schadenfreude; Gleichgültigkeit; Schmerz; Spaß; Unwohlsein; Freude; Scham]

—

Warum hast du dich so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotionen empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie angenehm oder unangenehm fandest du das Video? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unangenehm; 7= sehr angenehm]

—

Fandest du es schmerzhaft das Video anzusehen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr]

—

Jürgen, die Hauptfigur im Video, empfindet verschiedene Emotionen.

Im folgenden werden verschiedene Emotionen genannt.

Klicke "eher ja" an (linke ROTE taste), wenn du glaubst, dass Veith diese Emotion im Video eher empfunden hat und "eher nein" (rechte ROTE taste), wenn du denkst, dass Veith diese Emotion eher nicht empfunden hat. Weiter geht es mit LEERTASTE.

—

Hat der Protagonist folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: eher ja/ eher nein]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Trauer, Hoffnungslosigkeit, Freude, Genuss, Scham, Überraschung, Verblüffung, Wut, Hilflosigkeit, Hoffnung, Genugtuung, Isoliertheit, Entspannung, Belustigung, Ärger, Mitgefühl, Selbstsicherheit, Zufriedenheit, Langeweile, Gleichgültigkeit, Schadenfreude, Angst, Betroffenheit, Stolz, Unwohlsein, Ekel, Verzweiflung, Schmerz, Schadenfreude.

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hat deiner Meinung nach Jürgen am ehesten empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für bis zu DREI Emotionen. Anschließend geht es weiter mit der Leertaste. [Multiple Response: Unwohlsein; Spaß; Freude; Genuss; Glück; Genugtuung; Stolz; Scham; Selbstverliebtheit; Andere <specify>]

—

Welche dieser Emotionen hat deiner Meinung nach Jürgen am ehesten empfunden? Bitte entscheide dich für die Emotion, die die Person am meisten empfunden hat. [Multiple Response: Unwohlsein; Spaß; Freude; Genuss; Glück; Genugtuung; Stolz; Scham; Selbstverliebtheit; Andere <specify>]

—

Warum hat Jürgen sich deiner Meinung nach so gefühlt? (kurze Begründung) [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hat Jürgen deiner Meinung nach die Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: 1=sehr schwach; 7= sehr intensiv]

—

Wie stark kannst du dich mit Jürgen im Video identifizieren? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Alles in allem: Wie ähnlich bist du Jürgen? [Scale Response: 1=sehr unähnlich; 7= sehr ähnlich]

—

Hast du dir das Video durchgehend angeschaut? [Scale Response:1=ich habe gar nicht hingeschaut; 7= ich hab die ganze Zeit hingeschaut]

—

Hast du dich mit anderen Gedanken beschäftigt, während das Video lief? [Scale Response:1=die ganze Zeit; 7= ich habe nur ans Video gedacht]

—

Wie aufmerksam hast du das Video verfolgt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= maximal]

—

Hast du dich in Veith hineinversetzt? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Wie sehr hast du es versucht, dich in Jürgens Perspektive hinzuversetzen? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Denke daran zurück, als du das Video geschaut hast. Hast du dir vorgestellt dich selbst in Jürgens Situation zu befinden? als würde es DIR passieren? [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Bewerte nun Jürgens Verhalten!

In jeder Gesellschaft gibt es bestimmte Normen, die unser Zusammenleben regeln. Wie stark hat das gezeigte Verhalten Regeln unserer Gesellschaft verletzt? Gehe hier von dem extremsten gezeigten Verhalten aus! [Scale Response: 1=gar nicht; 7= sehr stark]

—

Kanntest Du das Video schon? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Zuletzt für statistische Zwecke einige Angaben.

Los geht's mit der LEERTASTE.

—

Alter [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Geschlecht [Scale Response: männlich/weiblich]

—

Ist deine Muttersprache deutsch? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Studierst du Psychologie? Wenn ja, in welchem Semester bist du? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie motiviert warst du bei dem Versuch? [Scale Response: 1= gar nicht motiviert; 7= sehr motiviert]

—

Hast du einen konkreten Verdacht, worum es ging?

Wenn bisher nicht, gib einfach "nein" ein. [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Ist dir etwas Besonderes beim Versuch aufgefallen? Falls dir nichts aufgefallen ist, gib einfach "nein" ein. [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Hast du eine nichtkorrigierte mittelstarke bis starke Sehschwäche? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Wie sehr hasst du uns gerade, weil wir dir das mit dem doofen Gesangvideo angetan haben? [Scale Response: 1= leichte Mordgedanken; 7= konkrete Mordpläne]

—

Was ist der Sinn des Lebens? [Scale Response: Liebe ; 42; Geld; Macht]

—

Wie Sexy findest du deine Versuchsleitung? [Scale Response: sexy; recht sexy; sehr sexy; super sexy; mega sexy; ultra sexy; mamacita!]

—

Für diesen Versuch ist es sehr wichtig, dass keine Versuchsperson vor Teilnahme am Versuch weiß, was sie erwarten wird.

—

Das War's!

Besten Dank für deine Teilnahme.

Online Session

On a separate online session, following instruments were presented in a randomised order:

1. Regulatory Focus Strategies Scale (RFSS; Ouschan et al., 2007),
2. Social Anxiety Question- naire (SAQ-A30; Caballo et al., 2008),
3. Vicarious Experience Scale (VES; Oceja, López-Pérez, Ambrona, & Fernández, 2009),
4. E-Scale (Leibetseder, Laireiter, Riepler, & Köller, 2001),
5. Schadenfreude Self-Report (Self-Developed),
6. Fantasising Self-Report (Self-Developed) and
7. Reality-TV Viewing Habits (Self-Developed).

Experiment 2

Lab Session

This part of the experiment took place on a computer in the lab, on an individual session.

Lieber Versuchsteilnehmer!

Vielen Dank, dass du an unserem Experiment teilnimmst.

In dieser Untersuchung geht es um emotionale Reaktionen auf Videos.

Als erstes werden dir in einer Übung ein paar der hier verwendeten Instrumente erklärt.

—

Jetzt wirst du drei verschiedene graphische Skalen kennenlernen. Diese werden dir nacheinander erklärt.

Weiter geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

Mit der ersten Skala berichtest du über die Aufregung, die du beim Betrachten des Bildes erlebt hast. Dabei wähle den Punkt der Skala, der deine Aufregung am besten wiedergibt. Klicke dafür das dazugehörende Kästchen an.

Bedenke dabei, dass Aufregung sowohl positiv als auch negativ sein kann!

Benutze die ganze Bandbreite der Skala. Sollte deine emotionale Reaktion zwischen zwei der Menschenfiguren liegen, darfst du natürlich auch die Quadrate zwischen den Menschen der Skala wählen. Weiter mit der Leertaste.

—

Mit der zweiten Skala berichtest du wie stark eine Tendenz ist, dich dem Bild anzunähern oder dich von ihm zu entfernen. Dabei wähle den Punkt der Skala, der deine Tendenz am besten wiedergibt. Klicke dafür das dazugehörende Kästchen an.

Je kleiner die Menschenfigur, desto weiter möchtest du dich entfernen. Je größer die Figur, desto näher willst du dem Bild sein.

Benutze die ganze Bandbreite der Skala. Sollte deine emotionale Reaktion zwischen zwei der Menschenfiguren liegen, darfst du natürlich auch die Quadrate zwischen den Menschen der Skala wählen. Weiter mit der Leertaste.

—

Mit der dritten Skala berichtest du ob deine Emotionen zu dem vorher gezeigten Bild positiv oder negativ sind. Dabei wähle den Punkt der Skala, der deine Reaktion zum Bild am besten wiedergibt. Klicke dafür das dazugehörende Kästchen an.

Benutze die ganze Bandbreite der Skala. Sollte deine emotionale Reaktion zwischen zwei der Menschenfiguren liegen, darfst du natürlich auch die Quadrate zwischen den Menschen der Skala wählen. Weiter mit der Leertaste.

—

Jetzt wirst du die Verwendung der drei Skalen üben.

Ein Bild wird dir sechs Sekunden lang gezeigt. Danach werden dir alle drei Skalen nacheinander gezeigt.

Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen des Bildes gefühlt? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]

—

Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt, dich dem Bild zuzuwenden, oder dich davon zu distanzieren? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]

—

Wie negativ oder positiv waren die Emotionen, die du beim Ansehen des Bildes gefühlt hast? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]

—

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen des Bildes gefühlt? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]

—

Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt, dich dem Bild zuzuwenden, oder dich davon zu distanzieren? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]

—

Wie negativ oder positiv waren die Emotionen, die du beim Ansehen des Bildes gefühlt hast? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]

—-

Jetzt wirst du die Benutzung vom Joystick üben.

Stell ihn dafür vor dich.

Auf dem Bildschirm wirst du ein Bild sehen. Während dessen sollst du deine emotionale Reaktion auf das Bild mit dem Joystick berichten.

Bewege den Joystick nach RECHTS, wenn du POSITIVE Emotionen empfindest. Je positiver deine Emotionen, desto weiter nach rechts sollst du den Joystick bewegen.

Bewege den Joystick nach LINKS, wenn du NEGATIVE Emotionen empfindest. Je negativer deine Emotionen, desto weiter nach links sollst du den Joystick bewegen.

Du darfst jeder Zeit und so oft du willst die Joystickstellung anpassen.

Es wird dir immer angezeigt, welche Seite negativ und welche positiv ist.

Jedes Bild wird sechs Sekunden lang gezeigt. Danach geht es automatisch zum nächsten Bild weiter.

Bereit?

Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

[Online Rating for each of the following images]



—

Im Folgenden wirst du zwei Schauspieler kennen lernen. Sie stellen sich kurz vor und berichten über das Theaterstück, in dem sie mitspielen.

Dabei sollst du aufmerksam zuschauen und wie vorher mit dem Joystick geübt berichten, ob du positive oder negative Emotionen empfindest.

Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

[Online Rating] & [VideoInterview]

—

[Manipulation Condition Bio]

> *Das nächste Video zeigt die beiden bei der letzten Probe zu ihrem aktuellen Stück, einem Musical. Das biografische Stück handelt von zwei Sängern, die ihren Traum von einer Gesangskarriere erfüllen. Sie befinden sich fast auf dem Höhepunkt ihrer Karriere. Im Stück treten sie mit großen Erfolg das erste mal im bekanntem "Pariser Opernhaus" auf.*

[Manipulation Condition Bio]

> *Das nächste Video zeigt die beiden bei der letzten Probe zu ihrem aktuellen Stück, einem Musical. Das lustige Stück handelt von zwei unbegabten Sängern, die trotz mangelnden Talents ihren Traum von einer Gesangskarriere nicht aufgeben wollen. In dem Stück singen sie für das bekannte "Pariser Opernhaus" vor. Sie sind sich nicht bewusst, wie schlecht sie eigentlich singen.*

—

[Online Rating] & [VideoGesang]

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen des Videos gefühlt? [Scale Response]

—

Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt, dich dem Video zuzuwenden, oder dich davon zu distanzieren? [Scale Response]

—

Wie negativ oder positiv waren die Emotionen, die du beim Ansehen des Videos gefühlt hast? [Scale Response]

—

Während des Videos hast du möglicherweise von positiven Emotionen (mit dem Joystick) berichtet. Nenne die positive Emotion, die du dabei am meisten empfunden hast: [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Während des Videos hast du möglicherweise von negativen Emotionen (mit dem Joystick) berichtet. Nenne die negative Emotion, die du dabei am meisten empfunden hast: [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie gut hat das mit dem Joystick geklappt? [Scale Response: gar nicht (1) meistens nicht (2); oft nicht (3); ich weiß nicht (4); oft (5); überwiegend (6); so gut wie immer (7)]

—

Was hast du beim Anschauen des Videos gefühlt?

Jetzt werden verschiedene Emotionen nacheinander genannt.

Klicke den passenden Wert der Skala an, je nach dem wie intensiv du die Emotion empfunden hast. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten!

Versuche zügig zu antworten. Los geht's mit der Leertaste.

—

Wie sehr hast du folgende Emotion empfunden?
[Scale Response: 1= überhaupt nicht; 7= sehr stark]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Hilflosigkeit	Betroffenheit	Zufriedenheit	Freude
Scham	Ärger	Entspannung	Langeweile
Unwohlsein	Angst	Genuss	Gleichgültigkeit

—

Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt (oder es tatsächlich getan), vom Video wegzugucken? [Scale Response: 1= überhaupt nicht; 7= sehr]

Wie fandest du es, das Video zu schauen? [Scale Response: -2 to 2: Ich hätte es lieber nicht geschaut; Es war mir gleichgültig ; Ich fand's toll]

—

Wie sehr hast du folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: 1= überhaupt nicht; 7= sehr stark]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Fremdscham, Schadenfreude

—

Zuletzt für statistische Zwecke einige Angaben.

Los geht's mit der LEERTASTE.

—

Alter [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Geschlecht [Scale Response: männlich/weiblich]

—

Ist deine Muttersprache deutsch? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Studierst du Psychologie? Wenn ja, in welchem Semester bist du? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie motiviert warst du bei dem Versuch? [Scale Response: 1= gar nicht motiviert; 7= sehr motiviert]

—

Hast du einen konkreten Verdacht, worum es ging?

Wenn bisher nicht, gib einfach "nein" ein. [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Ist dir etwas Besonderes beim Versuch aufgefallen? Falls dir nichts aufgefallen ist, gib einfach "nein" ein. [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Hast du eine nichtkorrigierte mittelstarke bis starke Sehschwäche? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Wie sehr hasst du uns gerade, weil wir dir das mit dem doofen Gesangvideo angetan haben? [Scale Response: 1= leichte Mordgedanken; 7= konkrete Mordpläne]

—

Was ist der Sinn des Lebens? [Scale Response: Liebe ; 42; Geld; Macht]

—

Wie Sexy findest du deine Versuchsleitung? [Scale Response: sexy; recht sexy; sehr sexy; super sexy; mega sexy; ultra sexy; mamacita!]

—

Für diesen Versuch ist es sehr wichtig, dass keine Versuchsperson vor Teilnahme am Versuch weiß, was sie erwarten wird.

—

Das War's!

Besten Dank für deine Teilnahme.

Online Session

On a separate online session, following instruments were presented in a randomised order:

1. Regulatory Focus Strategies Scale (RFSS; Ouschan et al., 2007),
2. Social Anxiety Question- naire (SAQ-A30; Caballo et al., 2008),
3. Vicarious Experience Scale (VES; Oceja, López-Pérez, Ambrona, & Fernández, 2009),
4. E-Scale (Leibetseder, Laireiter, Riepler, & Köller, 2001),
5. Schadenfreude Self-Report (Self-Developed),
6. Fantasising Self-Report (Self-Developed) and
7. Reality-TV Viewing Habits (Self-Developed).

Experiment 3

This experiment took place entirely on the lab in one experimental session. All instructions, stimuli and items were presented individually on a computer screen:

Lieber Versuchsteilnehmer!
Vielen Dank, dass Sie an unserem Experiment teilnehmen.
Weiter geht es meistens, indem Sie die Leertaste drücken.

Klicken Sie jetzt auf die Leertaste um anzufangen.

—

Sie werden nun fünf Videos gezeigt bekommen. Vor jedem Video werden Sie eine kurze Erklärung erhalten. Bitte lesen Sie diese aufmerksam durch.

Nach jedem Video werden wir Ihnen wenige, einfache Fragen stellen. Es gibt keine richtigen oder falschen Antworten. Denken Sie beim Beantworten der Fragen nicht zu lange darüber nach.

Sollte etwas unklar sein, wenden Sie sich an die Versuchsleitung, welche sich im Vorraum befindet.

Weiter mit der Leertaste

—

Stimulus Bundesheer

Manipulation: Condition 1 (Appropriate)

> *Das nächste Video zeigt eine Parodie eines Werbespots des österreichischen Bundesheers (vergleichbar mit der deutschen Bundeswehr).*
>
> *Los geht es mit der LEERTASTE.*

Manipulation: Condition 2 (Inappropriate)

> *Das nächste Video zeigt einen Werbespot des österreichischen Bundesheers (vergleichbar mit der deutschen Bundeswehr).*
>
> *Los geht es mit der LEERTASTE.*

—

[Video_Bundesheer]

—

Welche Emotion hast du während des Zuschauens am stärksten gefühlt (wenn du keine Emotion gefühlt hast, trage bitte "keine" ein)? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotion erlebt? [Scale Response 0 to 7: 0=keine; 1=sehr schwach; 7=sehr stark]

—

Stimulus AstroTV

Manipulation: Condition 1 (Appropriate):

> *Das nächste Video zeigt eine Parodie einer Astrologiefernsehsendung.*
>
> *Los geht es mit der LEERTASTE.*

Manipulation: Condition 2 (Inappropriate):

> *Das nächste Video zeigt einen Ausschnitt einer Astrologiefernsehsendung.*
>
> *Los geht es mit der LEERTASTE.*

—

[Video_AstroTV]

—

Welche Emotion hast du während des Zuschauens am stärksten gefühlt (wenn du keine Emotion gefühlt hast, trage bitte "keine" ein)? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotion erlebt? [Scale Response 0 to 7: 0=keine; 1=sehr schwach; 7=sehr stark]

—

Stimulus ComedyBus

Das nächste Video zeigt einen Ausschnitt aus der ZDF-Sendung "Neo Paradise" in einem Comedybus für Touristen in Berlin.

Weiter geht es mit der LEERTASTE.

—

[Video_ComedyBus]

—

Welche Emotion hast du während des Zuschauens am stärksten gefühlt (wenn du keine Emotion gefühlt hast, trage bitte "keine" ein)? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotion erlebt? [Scale Response 0 to 7: 0=keine; 1=sehr schwach; 7=sehr stark]

—

Im Folgenden wirst du zwei Schauspieler kennen lernen. Sie stellen sich kurz vor und berichten über das Theaterstück, in dem sie mitspielen.

Los geht es mit der LEERTASTE.

—

[Video_Interview]

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen des Videos gefühlt? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]



—

Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt, dich dem Video zuzuwenden, oder von ihm wegzukommen? [Scale Response: -4 to 4]



—

Alles in Allem, wie negativ oder positiv waren die Emotionen, die du beim Ansehen des Videos gefühlt hast? [Scale Response: -4 to 4]



—

Wie groß schätzt du die Entfernung zwischen dem Kameramann und den Schauspielern? Gib diese in cm an. [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie fandest du es, das Video zu schauen? [Scale Response: -2 to 2: Ich hätte es lieber nicht geschaut(-2); es war mich gleichgültig (0); Ich fand's toll (2)]

—

Welche Emotion hast du während des Zuschauens am stärksten gefühlt (wenn du keine Emotion gefühlt hast, trage bitte "keine" ein)? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotion erlebt? [Scale Response: 0= keine Emotion; 1= sehr schwach; 7=sehr stark]

—

Wie sehr ähnelt der Mann im Video dir als Person? [Scale Response: 0 to 6; 0 = gar nicht; 6 = sehr]

—

Wie sehr ähnelt der Mann im Video dir als Person?

—

Manipulation: Condition 1 (KOM)

> *Das nächste Video zeigt die beiden bei der letzten Probe zu ihrem aktuellen Stück, einem Musical. Das lustige Stück handelt von zwei unbegabten Sängern, die trotz mangelnden Talents ihren Traum von einer Gesangskarriere nicht aufgeben wollen. In dem Stück singen sie für das bekannte "Pariser Opernhaus" vor. Sie sind sich nicht bewusst, wie schlecht sie eigentlich singen.*
>
> *Los geht es mit CONTINUE*

Manipulation: Condition 2 (BIO)

> *Das nächste Video zeigt die beiden bei der letzten Probe zu ihrem aktuellen Stück, einem Musical. Das biografische Stück handelt von zwei Sängern, die ihren Traum von einer Gesangskarriere erfüllen. Sie befinden sich fast auf dem Höhepunkt ihrer Karriere. Im Stück treten sie mit großen Erfolg das erste Mal im bekanntem "Pariser Opernhaus" auf.*
>
> *Los geht es mit der LEERTASTE.*

—

[VideoGesang]

—

Wie aufgeregt hast du dich beim Ansehen des Videos gefühlt? [Scale Response: 1 to 9]

—

Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt, dich dem Video zuzuwenden, oder von ihm wegzukommen? [Scale Response: -4 to 4]

—

Alles in Allem, wie negativ oder positiv waren die Emotionen, die du beim Ansehen des Videos gefühlt hast? [Scale Response: -4 to 4]

—

Welche Emotion hast du während des Zuschauens am stärksten gefühlt (wenn du keine Emotion gefühlt hast, trage bitte "keine" ein)? [fill-in-the-blank]

—

Wie intensiv hast du diese Emotion erlebt? [Scale Response: 0= keine Emotion; 1= sehr schwach; 7=sehr stark]

—

Wie ähnlich schätzt du dich zu dem Mann in den Videos ein? [Scale Response: -3 to 3: -3 = gar nicht ähnlich; 3=sehr ähnlich]

—

Wie ähnlich schätzt du dich zu der Frau in den Videos ein? [Scale Response: -3 to 3: -3 = gar nicht ähnlich; 3=sehr ähnlich]

—

Wie sympathisch fandest du den Mann in dem Video während des Zuschauens? [Scale Response: 1= garnicht; 7=äußerst

—

Wie sympathisch fandest du die Frau in dem Video während des Zuschauens? [Scale Response: 1= garnicht; 7=äußerst]

—

Fandest du eine Person im Video auffallend attraktiv? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Wie sehr hast du folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: 1= überhaupt nicht; 7=sehr stark]:

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Hilflosigkeit, Betroffenheit, Zufriedenheit, Freude, Scham, Ärger, Entspannung, Langeweile, Unwohlsein, Angst, Genuss, Gleichgültigkeit.

—

Wie sehr hast du den Drang verspürt (oder es tatsächlich getan), vom Video wegzugucken? [Scale Response: 1= überhaupt nicht; 7=sehr]

—

Wie fandest du es, das Video zu schauen? [Scale Response: -2 to 2: -2= überhaupt nicht; 0=es war mir gleichgültig; 2=sehr]

—

Wie sehr hast du folgende Emotion empfunden? [Scale Response: 1= überhaupt nicht; 7=sehr stark]

[This question was asked for each oft the following emotions]

Fremdscham, Schadenfreude, Mitleid

—

Kennst du eine der Personen oder beide Personen, die du in diesem Video gesehen hast? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Hast du selbst schon Erfahrungen mit Schauspielerei gemacht? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Hast du das Musical RENT der KHG gesehen? [Scale Response: ja/nein]

—

Vor dem Gesangsfilm wurde dir gesagt, worum es in dem Musical geht. Fasse dies bitte ganz kurz zusammen. [Essay]

Wenn du fertig bist, klicke auf CONTINUE.

—

Du hast nun den ersten Teil des Experiments geschafft. Hole jetzt bitte die Versuchsleitung aus dem Vorraum.

On a separate computer, following instruments were presented in a randomised order:

1. Regulatory Focus Strategies Scale (RFSS; Ouschan et al., 2007),
2. Social Anxiety Question- naire (SAQ-A30; Caballo et al., 2008),
3. Vicarious Experience Scale (VES; Oceja, López-Pérez, Ambrona, & Fernández, 2009),
4. E-Scale (Leibetseder, Laireiter, Riepler, & Köller, 2001),
5. Schadenfreude Self-Report (Self-Developed),
6. Fantasising Self-Report (Self-Developed),
7. Reality-TV Viewing Habits (Self-Developed) and
8. The same demographical questions from Experiment 2.

ZUSAMMENFASSUNG

Bisher blieb die wahrscheinlich universelle Emotion Peinlichkeit unzureichend erforscht. Grundsätzlich beschränkt sich die Forschung zum Thema auf heuristische Erklärungsansätze und die Empirie auf lustige Methoden, diese Emotion zu erzeugen.

Die Prozesse hinter der Entstehung der Emotion sind bis dato weitestgehend vernachlässigt worden und haben kaum Berücksichtigung in der Forschung gefunden.

Zudem gerieten in den letzten Jahren die meisten existierenden Erklärungsansätze unter Druck, als die ersten Fragen zum Thema Fremdscham bzw. Fremdschämen in einen wissenschaftlichen Rahmen gestellt wurden. Denn die offensichtliche phänomenologische Ähnlichkeit von Peinlichkeit und Fremdschämen kann von keinem der bisherigen Erklärungsansätze widerspruchsfrei durchleuchtet werden.

Dies liegt unter anderen Dingen auch darin begründet, dass selbst die Emotion Peinlichkeit kaum auf Prozessebene erforscht wurde.

In dieser Arbeit wird daher ein neues Verständnis der Emotion Peinlichkeit angestrebt. Eines, bei dem Fremdscham Berücksichtigung findet und das dieses Phänomen ohne Denkakrobatik befriedigend erklären kann.

Eine Arbeitsdefinition von Peinlichkeit wurde zunächst aus den Funktionen der Emotion gewonnen. Folglich wurden die für diese Funktionen verantwortlichen Prozesse identifiziert bzw. ggf. neu skizziert. Aus dieser Vorgehensweise ergab sich folgende Definition:

Peinlichkeit ist der negative affektive Aufregungszustand, der in sozialen Situationen entsteht, wenn eine Interaktion nicht angemessen verläuft. Sie erfüllt primär die Funktionen von Kommunikation und Motivation zur Korrektur der erkannten unangemessenen Interaktion.

Das starke Hinterfragen dieser Definition führte jedoch schnell zu der Erkenntnis, dass unser Verständnis von Peinlichkeit sehr beschränkt ist, und dass ein neues theoretisches Gerüst benötigt wird. Dieses wurde folglich entwickelt – nun aber auf Basis nahvollziehbarer Theorien, Prozesse und Forschung, und nicht amüsanter Randphänomene und Heuristik:

Das kulturell-interaktionistische Prozessmodell der Peinlichkeit, oder CIPME (Kurz für Cultural-Interactional Process Modell of Embarrassment).

Maßgebend dabei war, so wenige Prozesse wie möglich darin zu integrieren, und dann nur solche, für die ausgereifte empirische Evidenz vorliegt. Zusammengefasst kann man von zwei Schritten zur Peinlichkeit reden: zunächst die Erkennung der situativen Unangemessenheit durch die Erzeugung starker Negativität als Alarmsignal. Anschließend die Reaktion auf die Unangemessenheit – mit dem klaren Ziel, das Alarmsignal auszuschalten. Hierbei ist für das Modell nur die Dringlichkeit zu reagieren relevant, aber die Reaktion an sich deutlich weniger – denn diese kann intra- und interindividuell äußerst unterschiedlich ausfallen und wirksam sein.

Daraus ergibt sich die letztendliche Definition von Peinlichkeit:

Peinlichkeit ist die noetische (1) und antreibende (2) Erfahrung von Dringlichkeit (3), resultierend aus wahrgenommener Formunangemessenheit (4) in einer sozialen Situation (5).

(1) Noetisch, denn sie erreicht unser Bewusstsein

(2) Antreibend, denn sie mobilisiert Ressourcen

(3) Die Erfahrung ist intensiv und bedrückend, verlangt dadurch sofortige Aufmerksamkeit

(4) Die Unangemessenheit ist wahrnehmbar, jedoch nicht moralisch verwerflich – sonst wäre eine andere Reaktion angemessener, wie Ärger, Scham oder Verachtung

(5) Voraussetzung ist, dass die Unangemessenheit in einem Kontext stattfindet, in dem Darbietungsnormen relevant sind, nämlich (breitgefasst) in sozialen Situationen

Zu diesem Zeitpunkt kann angemerkt werden, dass diese Definition gültig ist für die Erfahrung von Peinlichkeit und von Fremdscham. Sie sind, nach meinem Verständnis, ein und dieselbe Emotion, und nur durch eine Sprachkonvention zu unterscheiden: die erste als Protagonist, die zweite als Zeuge einer sozialen Interaktion.

In diesem Sinne kann man Erfahrung von Fremdscham angemessener von Peinlichkeit unterscheiden durch die Bezeichnung Fernpeinlichkeit.

Einige theoretische Annahmen vom CIPME werden durch schon vorhandene Forschung stark gestützt. Diese wissenschaftliche Arbeit strebt jedoch an, erste spezifische Schritte zur Überprüfung der restlichen Modellannahmen vorzunehmen. Hierzu wurde ein Aspekt des Modells gewählt, das besonders geeignet erscheint um gewisse Grundannahmen dessen zu überprüfen: die starke Kontextabhängigkeit von Peinlichkeit. Gemeint ist, dass Peinlichkeit nicht Folge bestimmter Situationsmerkmale ist, sondern derer (Un-)Angemessenheit im gegebenen situativen Kontext.

Zu diesen Zwecken werden in dieser Arbeit eine Studie und drei Experimente vorgestellt.

Die erste Studie analysierte mittels Faktorenanalyse die Beschreibungen fremdschämender Episoden von Probanden. Zwei Faktoren wurden gefunden: Normbruch in einer sozialen Interaktion bzw. auffällig unangemessenes Verhalten vor Publikum. Beide lassen sich jedoch zusammenfassen: Peinlichkeit erleben wenn eine weitere Person sich unangemessen benimmt.

Experiment 1 hat eine neu entwickelte Fremdschaminduktion durch Videos getestet und regulatorischen Fokus manipuliert. Eindeutige Probleme mit der Induktion wurden festgestellt und in späteren Experimenten durch hierzu neu entwickelte Induktionen beseitigt.

Experiment 2 führte diese Stimuli ein und stellte das darin gezeigte Verhalten in einem situationellen Rahmen vor, in dem es entweder angemessen oder unangemessen war. Ergebnisse zeigen starke Effekte in der Varianz erlebter emotionaler Valenz: wenn das Verhalten eindeutig unangemessen war, war die Varianz gering. Wenn das Verhalten eindeutig situationsangemessen

war, hing es von den Zuschauern ab, diesen mehr oder weniger negativ zu finden oder nicht. Selbstberichtete Annäherungs- und Vermeidungsverhaltenstendenzen zeigten sich in Übereinstimmung mit diesen Effekten.

Experiment 3 testete die Verallgemeinerbarkeit dieser Effekte durch drei neue Stimuli mit einer analogen Manipulation. Die Wirksamkeit dieser Videos zur Erzeugung von Fremdscham war aufgrund der etlichen nichtkontrollierten Elemente im Stimulusmaterial als geringer zu erwarten. Sinn dieser „Verunreinigung" der Stimuli war, realitätsnähere Bedingungen zu simulieren. Im Anschluss wurde ein letzter Stimulus ohne Manipulation dargeboten, um Übertragungseffekte zu überprüfen. Wie erwartet, wurde Fernpeinlichkeit signifikant häufiger berichtet wenn der Kontext das beobachtete Verhalten unangemessen gemacht hat. Übertragungseffekte auf den letzten Stimulus wurden modellkongruent nicht beobachtet.

In den Seiten dieser Dissertation machen sich die Vorteile eines prozessorientierten Verständnisses von Peinlichkeit für zukünftige Forschungsansätze deutlich. Meine Hoffnung ist, dass das Modell nun kritisch hinterfragt wird und zukünftig durch Ergänzungen und Veränderungen nachgebessert wird. Viel Forschung wird notwendig sein, um sämtliche Annahmen des CIPME zu überprüfen.