

Author Manuscript of:

Martin Klein: „Metaphors, Dead and Alive“, in: J. P. Hochschild et al. (eds.), *Metaphysics Through Semantics: The Philosophical Recovery of the Medieval Mind*, International Archives of the History of Ideas Archives internationales d'histoire des idées 242, Springer 2023, 133–152.
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-15026-5_8; First Online: 28 April 2023.

Metaphors, Dead and Alive

Abstract: This paper examines how the medieval distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. I will show how Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ordinary ambiguous terms and metaphors, whereas William of Ockham and Walter Burley do not leave room for this distinction. I will argue that Ockham's conception of transfer of sense through subsequent institution of words is best thought of as an explanation of how ordinary usage can contain ambiguities, whereas Burley's conception of transfer of sense without new imposition is more plausible when it comes to explaining metaphors. If metaphorical use is lumped together with equivocation, the account of how they work cannot do full justice to either, an insight that we already find in Peter Abelard, if not in Boethius.

Keywords: Aquinas, Ockham, Burley, Abelard, Boethius, metaphor, equivocation, signification, imposition, transference

1. Introduction

Medieval philosophers were well aware of the fact that language permits many kinds of figurative speech and metaphors. At the same time, they were concerned about the use of figurative speech and metaphors in philosophy. As logicians, they worried about the ambiguities which result from metaphorical expressions, which they took to be a use of words in a non-literal sense. A common medieval example of a metaphor was the

expression ‘The meadows laugh’: properly, the verb ‘to laugh’ applies to human beings, whereas a meadow (or the flowers in a meadow) are said to bloom (Rosier-Catach 1997). From this metaphorical use of the verb ‘to laugh’, a paralogism such as the following can result: Whatever laughs has a mouth; but the meadow laughs; therefore, the meadow has a mouth. We arrive at this wrong conclusion because we have confused a metaphorical sense of a word with its literal sense (Peter of Spain 2014, 276–78: *SL* 7.32). But metaphors were not seen only as a potential source of misleading talk and fallacies. For one, they were also considered to be important for preparing prospective students of theology for careful interpretations of the Bible, which is full of metaphors, and according to Thomas Aquinas, ambiguous expressions even have a value in themselves when it comes to religious instruction (Aquinas 1888, 23–24: *ST* I.1.9; Dahan 2009, 249–282).

Metaphors were explained as a deviant use of language which would be wrong if the words were understood in the literal sense. Laughing is properly attributed to creatures that have a mouth, but wrongly attributed to meadows. Hence medieval philosophers discussed metaphors within the broader context of how to distinguish the literal sense from a non-literal one. In line with Aristotle’s remark in the *Poetics* (Aristotle 1968, 1457b6–9), *metaphora*, translated as *translatio* or *transumptio*, was conceived of as a transfer of sense. Medieval philosophers accounted for the distinction between a word’s literal sense and any metaphorical sense by reference to what we would call foundational theories of meaning.¹ Words are considered to have their ‘proper’ signification when used

¹ On medieval views on the origin of language(s), see, e.g., Eco 1993; Ashworth 2013.

in accordance with how they were originally instituted. When usage deviates from the sense given to a word by its original institution the signification is considered ‘improper’.²

However, what once might have involved a transference of sense can become well established over time. Even if ‘foot’ in English is supposed to have been instituted for “the terminal portion of a limb which bears weight and allows locomotion” (as the English entry in Wikipedia defines the term), we also use it to refer to a unit of length. This is clearly a case where a word originally used for one thing gets applied to another. But although this new application creates an ambiguity, we would not say that ‘foot’ has a metaphorical sense when used to mean a unit of length. Similarly, the expression ‘foot of a mountain’ might originate from the feet of vertebrates, given that it is the lowest part of an elevated landform; as an established technical term, however, it should rather be called a conventional expression and distinguished from those figurative expressions that actually go against the literal sense of words.

Even though our languages have many established figurative expressions (some of which we might not even be aware when speaking), they should be distinguished from actual metaphorical uses of a term, that is, when we use a word in such a way that it deviates even from established ambiguous expressions. To put it differently, the

² Jennifer Ashworth has provided excellent surveys on this matter. See Ashworth 1991; 2007; 2013a. See also Purcell 1987 for the increasing use of *transumptio* for metaphor instead of metalepsis in the 13th century.

metaphorical use of a word should be distinguished from those expressions which are so common and deeply seated in our language that it seems odd to call them metaphors.

The question I want to explore in this paper is how a distinction between proper and improper signification can give a plausible explanation of both metaphorical use and the usual transformations a language can undergo. In Section 2, I will show how Thomas Aquinas distinguishes between ordinary ambiguous terms and metaphors, whereas William of Ockham and Walter Burley do not leave room for this distinction. In Section 3, I will argue that Ockham's conception of transfer of sense through subsequent institution of words is best thought of as an explanation of how ordinary usage can contain ambiguities, whereas Burley's conception of transfer of sense without new imposition is more plausible when it comes to explaining metaphors, as I will argue in Section 4. In the end, if metaphorical use is lumped together with equivocation, the account of how they work cannot do full justice to either.

2. *Translatio* and Proper Usage

Aquinas gives various examples of terms that have different interpretations without being improper. As he makes clear with regard to the term 'light', which we use for corporeal and incorporeal things, the proper way to use the term is surely to refer to corporeal things; however, Augustine claims that 'light' is properly predicated of spiritual things, and not, or at least only metaphorically, of corporeal things. As a solution, Aquinas proposes that there are two ways in which we can apply a name: in accordance with its original institution or "first imposition," or in accordance with how the name is used by our

contemporaries (Aquinas 1889, 163: *ST I.68.1*). Accordingly, ‘light’ can be said properly of both corporeal and spiritual things, in a way similar to the verb ‘to see’, which was originally instituted for the act of seeing, though people later started using it for other kinds of cognitions in relation to other sense modalities (“See how it tastes!”) and even in relation to the understanding (“Now I see what you mean!”).

In the same way, Aquinas concludes, the name ‘light’ can be properly used for both corporeal and spiritual things:

Any word may be used in two ways—that is to say, either according to its first imposition or according to the usage of a word. [...] And thus it is with the word ‘light’. For it is first instituted to signify that which makes manifest to the sense of sight; afterwards it was extended to that which makes manifest to cognition of any kind. Therefore, if the name ‘light’ is taken according to its first imposition, then it is said metaphorically in the case of spiritual things. [...] But if it is taken according to the way it is extended in the usage of speakers to any kind of manifestation, then it is properly said in the case of spiritual things (*ibid.*).³

³ “[...] de aliquo nomine dupliciter convenit loqui: uno modo, secundum primam eius impositionem; alio modo, secundum usum nominis. [...] Et similiter dicendum est de nomine ‘lucis’. Nam primo quidem est institutum ad significandum id quod facit manifestationem in sensu visu: postmodum autem extensum est ad significandum omne illud quod facit manifestationem secundum quamcumque cognitionem.—Si ergo accipitur nomen ‘luminis’ secundum suam primam impositionem, metaphorice in spiritualibus dicitur

As this passage makes clear, if someone uses the word ‘light’ for spiritual things but in accordance with its original institution, it is used metaphorically, since ‘light’ was instituted for corporeal and not spiritual things. By custom, however, the term has obtained a broader application and is also used for spiritual things. Hence, if we use it in accordance with this established usage we do not speak metaphorically, nor do we when we extend the verb ‘to see’ to other kinds of cognition.

From this we can extract the following threefold distinction between proper and improper signification:

- (1) When a term is applied to a thing for which it was originally instituted, then it is used *properly*. (For instance, when we use ‘light’ for corporeal things.)
- (2) When a term is applied to a thing for which it was not originally instituted but for which it has acquired an established use, then it is likewise used *properly*. (This is the case when we use ‘light’ for spiritual things.)
- (3) When a term is applied to a thing for which it was not instituted and for which it has *not* acquired an established use, then it is used *improperly* or *metaphorically*. (This is the case of light, when it is used “according to its first imposition” but said of spiritual things.)

How is the third case different from the second? If the original institution of a word provides its literal signification, it seems that only derivative usage could explain how we

[...] Si autem accipiatur secundum quod est in usu loquentium ad omnem manifestationem extensum, sic proprie in spiritualibus dicitur.”

come to metaphorical expressions, precisely because they deviate from the original meaning. However, as Aquinas makes clear, usage too provides ways of speaking properly even if the use of a word differs from its original signification. As he puts it, “it is usual for words to be “twisted away from (*detorqueantur*) from their original signification,” from which they “are derived” (*derivatum*) to signify something else (Aquinas 1897, 4: *ST* II-II.57.1ad1). For this derivation of a new sense of a word from its original meaning as an instance of proper signification, Aquinas also uses the technical term *translatio* (Aquinas 1903, 22–23: *ST* III.2.1; Ashworth 2013a, 227). He also uses this term frequently as equivalent to the Greek-derived *metaphora* (though he more often uses *transumptio*); it turns out, however, that he recognizes two kinds of transfer of sense, only one of which is improper.⁴ Thus, what distinguishes cases (2) and (3) above is not their deviation from the original institution of a word, since both cases deviate from the original signification, but rather the different ways in which we use a word.

The difference lies not just in whether we use a word either according to its original institution or according to usage, but in how this comes about. First of all, it has to do with the frequency with which we use a word. When a word is used frequently by speakers differently from its original meaning—for example, the more often they use the word “light” for spiritual things—the more common, and thus more proper, it is for them to use the word in this new sense. But frequency alone seems not to explain how proper use

⁴ For *metaphora* connected to *translatio/translative*, see Aquinas 1970, 202a: *De veritate* 7.2. For the pair *metaphora–transumptio/transumptive* see Dahan 2009, 261–262.

according to common usage is different from metaphorical expressions, since the latter can also have a quite long history of usage. Take the typical medieval example of a metaphor already mentioned: the laughing meadows, which appears to be of biblical origin in the Book of Isaiah and is explained by Aquinas in his commentary on this book.⁵ We can assume that this metaphor was well known to the medieval congregant and theologian; and the more they heard and used it, the more it would be commented on and used as an example in other contexts. It seems it could equally count as a regular use like ‘light’ for spiritual things.

It is generally recognized that what allows the transfer of sense in both (2) and (3) is a similarity between two different things. As Aquinas explains with regard to the example of a real human being and a painted human being (used by Aristotle to introduce equivocals in the opening passage of the *Categories*), the real human and the painted one share a certain similarity (Aquinas 1884, 354: *In Phys.*7.8.8). The same might be said about seeing (the example used by Aquinas to make clear how ‘light’ can be used properly in a transferred sense): seeing is used not only for sight but also for the intellect, since both “make manifest to cognition.” But it is also similarity of things which allows us to use a word metaphorically. A meadow full of flowers in bloom can be said to smile

⁵ See Is 35:1 in Aquinas 1974, 153: *Exp. Isia* 35: “letabitur deserta et inuia, et exultabit solitudo et florebit quasi lilium.” Aquinas comments (ibid., 153): “Primo (*ed. add.* ponit) hominum iocunditatem, quam comparat prato florenti, quod etiam ridens dicitur, quod quidem habet pulcritudinem in flore.” Also Aquinas 1892, 132: *ST* I-II.88.1 seems to allude to the Isaiah passage.

because its blooming is somehow similar to a smiling human being (Aquinas 1888, 150: *ST* I.13.6co).

The distinctive feature in this metaphorical use is that we linguistically relate two different things, on account of the similarity we attribute to them, from the one for which the word has proper signification to the other for which it has not. In saying that flowers smile, one does not just apply words to things as they usually apply, but one intends to apply them against custom and in deviation from the common use. In this sense, a metaphorical expression is not the result of *translatio*, but consists in *translatio* itself, which comes about when one produces a metaphor by transferring a word from one thing to another and when one notices a metaphorical expression and tries to fathom its meaning (Dahan 2009, 261–264).⁶

Plausibly, a metaphorical expression can come to seem natural as it used more and more frequently in ordinary language. It might then be the case that a word acquires an established use which is proper even though it was originally transferred. However, Aquinas does not give *translatio* in terms of accustomed usage a conceptual clarification.

⁶ Cf. Reginaldo of Piperno's *reportatio* of Aquinas' *Super I Cor.* 11.2 (Aquinas 2019, n. 87584): "Dicendum quod in omni figurata locutione, commune est quod sensus non est ille quem primo aspectu verba praetendunt, sed ille quod ille qui loquitur significare intendit, sicut si dicam: pratum ridet, non est sensus huius locutionis quod illud pratum rideat, sed illud quod ego significare intendo, scilicet quod pratum similiter se habet in decore cum floret sicut homo cum ridet. Hoc etiam modo se habet in locutionibus ironicis: cum enim non intendo hoc quod verba praetendunt significare, sed contrarium, ille est verus sensus quem ego intendo, et ideo nihil falsitatis est ibi."

Ex negativo, we can determine that in Aquinas the transference of sense is not something we have to actively bring about; rather, we use the word in a different sense because that is just the way we are accustomed to speak. Quite naturally, we call different things by the same name in this case. To be sure, what grounds both metaphor and usage is similarity, but in usage we do not intend to allude to certain characteristics of things that would not be accentuated by the normal expressions we use for them but only to signify one thing rather than the other, even though originally it was also some similarity which motivated the transference of sense. But when using an ordinary ambiguous word, we can be totally ignorant of this.

But shouldn't we then say that such regular and yet deviant use is characterized as proper for similar reasons as it is when it is used in accordance with the original institution, namely, precisely because there has been an imposition to which a speech community conforms? In fact, since Aquinas speaks of a "first imposition" of a word in the passage quoted above, one might think that he has in mind something like a second imposition which would explain a derivative and yet proper use of a word. However, he nowhere speaks of a second imposition being the reason for a term becoming proper by transference (Ashworth 2013a, 227).⁷

⁷ Of course, Aquinas uses the distinction between first and second imposition but in a different sense and in line with the common medieval distinction between first and second intentions. A second imposition is the case when words are imposed for words (Aquinas 1929, 624: *Super Sent.* I.26.1.1ad3).

Unlike Aquinas, Burley and Ockham treat any *translatio* as belonging to a certain type of equivocal words called “deliberate equivocals”. Consequently, every use of a word not according to its original signification counts as improper in their view. Generally, a word is equivocal when it is applied to two essentially different things because it is related to two concepts (Ockham 1974, 45: *SL* 1.13; Burley 1967, 16ra: *In Praed.*). This can occur in two different ways. Ockham and Burley resort to the distinction between *chance equivocals* (*aequivocum a casu*) and *deliberate equivocals* (*aequivocum a consilio*) made by Boethius when he comments on the opening passage of Aristotle’s *Categories* (Boethius 1847, 166; cf. Aristotle 1961, 1a1–12). In equivocation *by chance*, the occurrences of equivocal expressions are totally unconnected; as Ockham characterizes it, “a name is imposed on one thing so that it will not be imposed on another thing, and it is not imposed on both.” (Ockham 1978b, 124: *In Praed.* 1). In order to show how two expressions can be totally unconnected in this sense, both Ockham and Burley refer to the institution of proper names. To use an example from Ockham, the name ‘Socrates’ can be imposed on a person in Rome, and it can be imposed on a different person in England. The name given to a person in Rome has been imposed on that person only and no one else, especially not the person in England baptized with the same name, which has been instituted exclusively for the person in England. On the other hand, an equivocal is *deliberate* if there is a connection between the different concepts that are expressed by the same word. This applies to Aristotle’s example of ‘man’, which is used equivocally for real human beings and painted ones. According to Ockham and Burley, the same term refers to both because ‘man’ was imposed for real human beings and then was deliberately

applied to pictures of human beings on account of some similarity between the two. Hence, unlike in chance equivocals the word is intended to be linked to two different concepts. Given that real and painted human beings look similar, our mental representations also share some resemblance on account of which the term is applied to two different kinds of thing (Ockham 1974, 45: *SL* 1.13; 1978b, 142: *In Praed. 1*; 1980, 353: *Quodl.* 4.12; Burley 1967, 16ra: *In Praed.*; 2003a, 62: *EVP* 1.1.1).

In the *Sophistical Refutations*, Aristotle distinguishes three cases of how an equivocation can come about: first, when a name principally signifies more than one thing; second, “when we are accustomed to speak in that way”; and third, when in a propositional context words have ambiguous signification (Aristotle 1975, 166a15–20). Ockham and Burley, however, adopt Boethius’s distinction from the context of the *Categories*, and link equivocation by chance to a word’s proper signification of more than one thing. Deliberate equivocation, on the other hand, applies to language use as a case in which one word has a proper signification and an improper signification in virtue of being instituted first for one thing and then later being transferred to signify something else. Hence, in the case of deliberate equivocals, the use of an already established term comes into play. As Ockham and Burley insist, *every* usage by transference is a case of improper signification. Thus, on their account Aquinas’s distinction between (2) and (3) is a misconception.

Burley and Ockham disagree, however, on how to understand transference of signification. Ockham claims that a word is transferred to signify a new thing because of another imposition of the term. Burley objects that terms can be imposed only once, which

is why usage cannot be a case of imposition. Jennifer Ashworth has pointed out this difference on several occasions (Ashworth 1991, 31–32; 2007, 325–327; 2013a, 226). But in what sense does it make a difference whether a term acquires a new meaning by imposition or by transference without imposition? In what follows I want to show that *translatio* as *impositio* gives a plausible explanation of how a word can get used as an ordinary equivocal term, whereas metaphorical use of a term is better conceived of as *translatio* without *impositio*. Unlike Aquinas, Ockham and Burley fail to acknowledge that these are two quite different modes of how transference works.

3. *Translatio* and Imposition

In the *Summa logicae*, Ockham describes the process by which a term becomes equivocal by deliberation and not by chance as follows:

Another kind is equivocal by deliberation, when an utterance is first imposed on some thing or things and is subordinated to one concept, and later on, on account of some likeness of the first significate to something else or on account of some other reason, it is imposed on that other [thing], in such a way that it would not be imposed on that other [thing] except because it was first imposed on the former. This is the case with the name ‘human being’ (*homo*). For it was first imposed to signify all rational animals in such a way that it was imposed to signify all that is contained under the concept ‘rational animal’. But later on, the users, seeing a likeness between such a human being and the image of a human being, at some time used the name ‘human being’

for such an image, so that if the name ‘human being’ had not first been imposed on human beings, the name ‘human being’ would not be used or imposed to signify or to stand for such an image (Ockham 1974, 45: *SL* 1.13).⁸

How does a term, such as *homo*, become equivocal? First, it had to be already established as a sign for real human beings by being originally instituted. According to Ockham, words and concepts both directly signify things (*ibid.*, 7–8: *SL* 1.1). While concepts are said to signify naturally, words do so conventionally. What makes a word a sign is its being related to a concept, although the term does not signify the concept. The concept might be very vague—indeed, sometimes it is merely a description of what the speaker intends to name⁹—but there must be some mental sign in order for a term to be imposed as a linguistic sign for something.

⁸ “Aliud est aequivocum a consilio, quando vox primo imponitur alicui vel aliquibus et subordinaretur uni conceptui et postea propter aliquam similitudinem primi significati ad aliquid aliud vel propter aliquam aliam rationem imponitur illi alteri, ita quod non imponeretur illi alteri nisi quia primo imponebatur alii, sicut est de hoc nomine ‘homo’. Primo enim imponebatur ad significandum omnia animalia rationalia, ita quod imponebatur ad significandum omne illud quod continetur sub hoc conceptu ‘animal rationale’, postea autem utentes, videntes similitudinem inter talem hominem et imaginem hominis, utebantur quandoque hoc nomine ‘homo’ pro tali imagine, ita quod nisi hoc nomen ‘homo’ fuisset primo impositum hominibus, non uterentur nec imponeret hoc nomen ‘homo’ ad significandum vel standum pro tali imagine” (trans. Spade 1995, 34, slightly modified).

⁹ “[...] potest aliquis imponere hoc nomen ‘a’ ad significandum quodcumque animal quod occurret sibi cras. Hoc facto, distincte significat illud animal, et significabit apud omnes volentes uti voce sicut imposita

Instead of signifying the concept, a word is *subordinated* to a concept. Thus, a word has signification if and only if it is subordinated to a concept having signification, and once a word is subordinated to a concept, it signifies the same thing as the concept. Moreover, subordination is not something that has to be brought about actively by someone; rather, it first and foremost describes the relation between word and concept, of which the person can be entirely unconscious. For instance, the impositor does not need to know that her word is subordinated to a concept. What she wants do is to name things. What she *does* is to impose a sound on a thing of which she has a concept, and by this imposition a mere sound, in being subordinated to a concept in virtue of being imposed on a thing, is turned into a word.¹⁰

The original institution of a term fixes the relation between the word and the concept to which it is subordinated. No further reimposition is needed when the word is used subsequently, not even if the concept to which it is subordinated were to change its significates.¹¹ Of course, the word needs to be accepted by other language users, since it

est, quantumcumque illud imponens non distincte intelligat, nec forte distincte intelliget quando sibi occurret.” Ockham 1979b, 47: *Ord.* 22.

¹⁰ I am following Schierbaum 2014, 82–87 here, but with one qualification. According to her, subordination should in no sense be thought of as a mental activity. If it were, the only way to subordinate a word to a concept would be by imposition, but this does not seem to be entirely Ockham’s view; see below.

¹¹ It is open to discussion what exactly Ockham means by a change of the concept’s natural signification. See Schierbaum’s discussion in Schierbaum 2014, 87–92. Ockham himself gives the example that a concept

is possible to imagine original institutions of terms which are simply ignored and so do not get established in a language community. In fact, Ockham is well aware that someone wanting to establish a term must communicate this linguistic sign to others. Without shared understanding between speakers and listeners the sign is unlikely to become established; this is how they become conventional signs (Ockham 1979, 471: *Ord.* 35.4).

A word can take on an additional meaning and become equivocal. The term is then related to a different concept by being reimposed, as Ockham makes clear for the case of transference of signification in the passage quoted above. People using a word according to its original institution can become aware that the things signified by a term bear striking similarities to other things, to which they start applying the same word; in our example, they start to use *homo* not just for human beings but also for images of human beings such that the word becomes related to an additional concept, that of images of human beings. As we have seen, in order for a word to conventionally signify something it needs to be subordinated to a concept. Hence, the relation between a term and a new concept needs to be one of subordination as well. But why does it also need to be imposed in this case? The reason seems to be that subordination in this sense is a semantic relation, not an activity. One does not subordinate a term to a concept; rather, subordination results from instituting a term for a thing. Ockham thus seems to hold that, generally, subordination can be established only by imposition.

(and thus the subordinated word) loses its signification when all of its individual significates cease to exist; see Ockham 1978a, 347: *In De int.*, prooem. 2.

If this is indeed his view, he has to explain deliberate equivocals, which come into existence by subordination to a new concept, in terms of reimposition. But does Ockham really mean that we need to reimpose a term every time we want to use it in a sense different from how it was originally instituted? In the passage quoted above, Ockham seems at first sight to be focusing on what is the case every time an individual speaker uses a word in its derivative meaning. In order to use *homo* not according to its original institution for real human beings, but subordinated to the concept for paintings of human beings, a speaker would need to impose the term anew every time she wants to talk about, say, portraits.

Ockham seems to be alluding to a view similar to the one defended by Roger Bacon (Schierbaum 2014, 97). According to Bacon, after the original institution, the imposition of words needs to be constantly renewed by speakers, often silently in their minds, when they use them. Bacon illustrates his position with the example of the utterance of ‘John is dead’ in reference to poor John who has just died. The problem is that John’s corpse is strictly speaking no longer John, since it is no longer an animated being. How then can we say that it is *John* who is dead? Of course, while pointing to the corpse, the bearer of the news of John’s death does not first say: “Let this name ‘John’ be imposed for the corpse.” Instead, the utterer of ‘John is dead’ and the hearer silently renew the word’s

signification. According to Bacon, this process is to be regarded as imposition (Bacon 1988, 16–17: *CST* 125).¹²

It is a position like this which Walter Burley seems to have in mind when he argues that the transference of sense does not come about through subsequent acts of imposition and that only usage explains a word's transfer of sense. Burley claims:

By virtue of the fact that there is a similitude between two things, the utterance that is imposed on the one is transferred to the other. Thus, because the beam of a bridge supports the bridge just as the foot of an animal supports the animal, and because the word 'foot' is imposed to signify the foot of an animal, the word 'foot' is transferred to signify the beam of the bridge. But this is not by imposition, since imposition is totally *ad placitum*, and the intellect is led by some reasoning to make 'foot' signify such a beam or to be taken for it, and so it is not [a case of] imposition but [of] transference (Burley 2003b, 201–202: *In Fallac.*, dub. 1.2).¹³

¹² The example of a dead man goes back to Aristotle and inspired the popular sophism of the dead man alive; see Ebbesen 1979. Ockham mentions the dead man as an example of metaphorical speech but without referring to imposition; see Ockham 1974, 758: *SL* 3-4.3.

¹³ “Ex hoc enim quod est aliqua similitudo inter duas res, vox quae imponitur uni transfertur ad aliud, ut quia sicut pes animalis substat animali, sic lignum substat ponti, et hoc nomen ‘pes’ imponitur ad significandum pedem animalis, transmittitur tamen hoc nomen ‘pes’ ad significandum lignum substans ponti. Sed hoc non est ex impositione, quia imponitur totaliter ad placitum; modo quod ‘pes’ significet tale

The example that Burley gives, though apparently not very common, is brought up by his contemporary Thomas de Wyk to arrive at the same conclusion, namely, that the transfer of sense is not by imposition (Thomas de Wyk 1997, 143: *Fallaciae*). It appears to be an adaptation of Boethius's example for the *translatio* from *pes hominis* to *pes navis* and *pes montis* as instances of the case in which a word is transferred from one thing to something else for which no separate word exists (Boethius 1847, 166: *In Cat.* 1). However, Burley and Thomas seems to treat the other thing for which the word is newly used as if someone wants to linguistically point it out for the first time and it lacks the proper word (because there is none). Burley insists that the intellect is led here by some reason when transferring a word; therefore, he claims, this cannot be an arbitrary choice, unlike when a word is originally instituted. He seems to be saying that if we were to think of imposition as what goes on in the mind of an individual speaker when applying a term to a different thing, we would be introducing an unfortunate ambiguity in the term 'imposition', since unlike when we transfer a word, in imposition we are not led by reason, but rather we relate a term to a thing arbitrarily.¹⁴

lignum vel pro tali accipiatur, ad hoc intellectus quodammodo ratione ducitur, et ideo non est impositio sed transumptio" (trans. Ashworth 2013c, 146, slightly revised).

¹⁴ Like Ockham, Burley claims that our words directly signify things, not our concepts of things. However, they disagree about whether the things directly signified by words are particular objects or their common natures. Ockham holds the former, Burley the latter. Burley on signification, see Cesalli 2013, 93–99. For a comparison of their views on signification see Dutilh-Novaes 2013, 74–79.

Ockham can readily agree with Burley that in originally instituting a name an impositor is free to name whatever she wants to name, and that it is entirely up to her which sound she imposes on a given thing. However, he is careful to distinguish between two cases of how deliberate equivocals can come about by subsequent imposition. On the one hand, a term can be subsequently imposed when it is not considered under the same concept, precisely because of some similitude or relation between the things to which the term now applies. On the other hand, a name can be deliberately imposed on different things without any consideration on the part of the impositor but simply because the impositor wants to. Ockham gives the example of a baptizer imposing the same name on the same occasion on three different persons (Ockham 1979b, 277: *Ord.* 29). One might argue that this is precisely what happens in chance equivocals. The difference seems to be that it is the same person on the same occasion who baptizes different people, while a chance equivocal is at work when there is no relation whatsoever between the instances of baptismal ceremonies. Now, the case is obviously different when different things share features which lead us to refer to them with the same word, such as the similarity of shape in humans and their portraits, or the similarity of function between the foot of an animal and the beam of a bridge.¹⁵ Moreover, we might object against Burley that there are already cases of original imposition which are not totally *ad placitum* but are led by reason as well, as in onomatopoeic words for example.

¹⁵ From an exegetical point of view, one finds both aspects in Boethius, that is, the user's reason and will; however, Boethius does not mention imposition, see Boethius 1847, 166: *In Cat.* 1.

Burley's objection does not actually apply to a conception like Ockham's, since it would take Ockham to be talking about transference as something happening in the mind of an individual speaker when the comparison of some objects is being made and a word is attributed to a new object. But this is not what Ockham is talking about in the passage quoted above. What he actually claims to be giving an account of when explaining the existence of deliberate equivocals in our language is how equivocal terms become commonly accepted within a language community. As Ockham says, a term could not be subsequently imposed on a second thing if it had not been originally imposed on some first thing; that is, the term not only has to have been originally instituted, but also has to be established within a language community. The same acceptance condition for imposition also applies to reimposition, since Ockham claims that reimposition requires that a plurality of speakers start to use the term for a different thing. According to him, not all the words we use gain their signification by an arbitrary original institution; for instance, in the case of the use of the word *homo* for pictures of human beings, a different story has to be told, since the new usage is established communally.

Admittedly, there is one difference between imposition and reimposition. There could be an original institution without subsequent use, since a language community might just not be willing to adopt the term. A subsequent imposition, however, not only is in need of a first imposition and accepted usage, but itself occurs *in the course of the speakers' frequent use of the word in the new sense*. As Ockham's passage indicates, it does not suffice that some person relates a term to a new thing occasionally; rather, the term has to be used in this way frequently or repeatedly, since otherwise no subsequent imposition

will take place. It is established use itself that amounts to a further imposition and explains why we can use words in a sense different from their original meaning (see also Ockham 1974, 756: *SL* 3-4.3).

Of course, those speakers who are the first to use a word in a derivative sense have to somehow relate the term to a concept which differs from the one to which the word was subordinated by its original institution. After all, before the word *homo* can be regularly used for pictures of human beings as well as for actual human beings, some similarities between the two things have to be discovered so that people can begin to apply the word to pictures of human beings. Even if subordination is usually not something which the impositor brings about actively in her mind, our relating a word to a different concept is not ruled out—not to signify the concept but to subordinate the word to it in order to apply the word to something other than its original significates. But once the word is regularly used in an equivocal sense—that is, once it is reimposed—its additional signification is an established fact for subsequent speakers. Unless we invent a new word that might make its way into common usage, we use words whose institution and fixed signification is just given for us.

This even enables us to use words of which we do not have a clear understanding because we lack proper concepts. We use words whose signification has already been established and which were subordinated to a concept at the moment of their original imposition. As Claude Panaccio and Sonja Schierbaum have shown, in Ockham the subordination of a word to a proper concept does not need to take place in our mind at the moment of utterance (Panaccio 2015; Schierbaum 2010). As Ockham claims we can

use words for things we have never seen and yet those words have a signification on account of their original institution (Ockham 1974, 558: *SL* 3-2.29). This can be applied not only to our use only of chance equivocals but also of deliberate equivocal terms. The proper sense of an equivocal term, once it is established, can be external to subsequent speakers, and they do not need to relate their words to the proper concept at the moment of utterance; instead, they rely on an established signification by imposition, regardless of whether this imposition was dependent on the original institution or on subsequent reimposition. In this sense, speakers take meanings that were derivatively imposed as if they had been originally instituted; it is quite natural for us to use the same word for real human beings and for pictures of them, for example. When using words, speakers do not necessarily have to know their origins and meanings, when meaning is taken to be the signification that is fixed by original institution. In fact, we are often surprised when we finally learn the etymology and original meaning of a word after we have already been using the word correctly for a long time.

Usage taking on the role of original institution has a significant consequence which Ockham himself does not address. When a word gets used so naturally for different things—in the case of *homo*, human beings and depictions of humans—we might ask whether the difference between deliberate and chance equivocals still applies, no matter how differently they came about originally. Recall that the different meanings of a chance equivocal are totally unconnected, and their signification is thus considered proper, unlike a deliberate equivocal, which is considered an improper use. In his discussion of

Aristotle's three modes of equivocation, Peter of Spain pointed out that the same thing can happen to deliberate equivocals through frequent use:

Or else we must reply (and this is better) that the signification said to belong properly to a word is the one that usage commonly accepts. Hence, what some word signifies now by transference will be signified properly when usage has increased, and then the word will be equivocal as to the first mode. And therefore it happens in this way that a signification that is not proper now, but transferred, becomes proper later through frequent use (Peter of Spain 2014, 296: *SL* 7.54).¹⁶

It might be asked why a transferred signification should be treated as an improper use of a word if, as Peter puts it, the same word signifies a variety of things equally. Ockham does not venture this step, and still less does Burley's account consider this consequence of communal language use. His view of the signification of our words strictly fixed only by original institution conceives of every further development of their application within a language community as deviant. But this does not seem to give us a plausible account

¹⁶ "Vel dicendum (et melius) quod propria significatio dicitur dictionis quam recipit usus communiter. Unde quod modo per aliquam dictionem significatur transsumptiva, cum usus inoleverit, significabitur proprie, et tunc erit dictio equivoca quoad primum modum. Et ideo [...] contingit sic significationem que non est modo propria, sed transsumptiva, fieri postea propriam per frequentem usum" (trans. Copenhaver et al., slightly revised).

of how words can be so frequently used that they take on a secondary meaning that is nonetheless proper.

4. Metaphor and Equivocals

Does Ockham's conception of transference through imposition give us a suitable account for the signification of words used metaphorically? I think it does not, and that Burley's conception of *translatio* without imposition gives a better account.

Ockham claims that metaphorical meanings too should be thought of as deliberate equivocals that come about by reimposition, usually calling them *metaphorice*, *transumptive*, *improprie*, *equivoce*, *large*, or even *false* (Ockham 1974, 236–237, 264 and 757: *SL* 1.77, 2.4 and 3-4.3; 1967, 164: *Ord.* prol.5; 1970, 34, 41 and 467: *Ord.* 2.1 and 3.5; 1979b, 252 and 544: *Ord.* 27.3 and 36; 1984, 26: *Quaest. var.* 1). According to him, “there is hardly a word in the books of the authorities which is not used sometimes properly and according to its primary signification, and sometimes improperly and metaphorically and according to its improper signification” (Ockham 1979a, 312: *Exp. SE* 2.18.3).¹⁷ Although the improper usage is clearly a matter of how the words supposit in a propositional context, Ockham traces improper supposition back to improper signification of words in the second and third modes of Aristotle's equivocals in the

¹⁷ “Vix etiam est aliquod vocabulum, quin in libris auctorum aliquando sumatur proprie et secundum suam primam significationem, et aliquando improprie et metaphorice et secundum significationem impropriam.”

Sophistical Refutations (ibid.).¹⁸ He gives a long list of how a word can be transferred from its proper signification to an improper one, which would introduce the risk of fallacies of equivocation, among them “metaphora, senecdoche, metonymia”, all of which “are called by Boethius equivocal by consideration” (Ockham 1974, 759: *SL* 3-4.3).¹⁹

However, when treating this type of equivocation, Ockham does not discuss these cases—and nowhere does he mention Boethius’ example of ‘charioteer’ for helmsman, and at best he alludes to the famous example of the laughing meadows (Ockham 1979a, 23: *Exp. SE* 2.8)—but always resorts to Aristotle’s example of real and painted human beings. However, this is not an apt example for cases in which someone, for ornamental reasons and perhaps only to “show off with rhetorical brilliance or erudition”, comes up with “different words” although she could easily use the words that are common in usage

¹⁸ Recall that Ockham relates Aristotle’s second mode of equivocation with Boethius’ deliberate equivocals. See also ibid, 22–23: *In SE* 2.2.8. For improper supposition, see Ockham 1974, 236–237: *SL* 1.77.

¹⁹ “Istis modis et multis aliis possunt dictiones a propria significatione transferri ad impropriam, cuiusmodi translationis grammatici diversas docent species. Inter quas continentur istae: metaphora, senecdoche, metonymia, antonomasia, emphasis, catachresis, metalempsis, anthropopathos, onomatopoeia, phantasia, paralange et multae aliae [...]. Et nota quod aequivocum tale, iuxta istum secundum modum, vacatur a Boethio aequivocum a consilio.”

(Ockham 1974, 758: *SL* 3-4.3)²⁰, since it is quite ordinary to refer to a sculpture of a person as a human being. Ockham seems to have a profound lack of interest in poetic language, which leads him to simply subsume metaphors under equivocation. This leads him to overlook the fact that metaphors do not (or at least do not necessarily) amount to an established ambiguous use of language. If this were the case, then they would no longer be metaphors.

Boethius himself, however, whom Ockham claims to follow closely, saw metaphorical use as a special case of equivocation. For after introducing the distinction between chance and deliberate equivocals, Boethius adds a little later that there seems to be another type of equivocals which Aristotle does not take into consideration (in the *Categories*). He claims that if there does not exist a term for the thing to which a word is transferred, *translatio* amounts to equivocation. His example is the one we have already encountered in the previous section, namely, the application of ‘foot’ to a part of mountains and ships, to which Boethius also adds the example of *homo* for real and painted human beings. There is neither a special name for painted human beings nor for the beams supporting bridges or the bottom of a mountain; by transference, they are named for the first time. Metaphorical use differs from those examples where a term is transferred from its original sense in order to signify something which does not yet have a name. Suppose a word is

²⁰ “[...] scriptores veteres, quia tam profunditate scientiae quam splendore eloquentiae praepollebant, necesse fuit eos propter ornatum eloquii per diversa vocabula et varias dictionem orationum formas suam intentionem exprimere [...]”

said of something for which a proper linguistic expression already exists. If it is for ornamental reasons that we use a word for a thing which already has its own proper word, Boethius thinks that this should not be considered an equivocation. His example is the transference of the name for the “navigator” of a chariot, the charioteer (*auriga*), to the navigator of ship, whom we usually call a helmsman (*gubernator*) (Boethius 1874, 167: *In Cat.* 1).²¹

Transference is different when it comes to things that are already significates of terms, since here a term which is usually used for one thing is transferred to refer to another thing for which we already have a proper expression. And for this it is Burley who seems to have the more plausible explanation, when he thinks that transference happens without imposition:

An utterance is made a sign of a thing [...] by transference when the utterance, taken as having the *ratio* of a sign, is imposed on a thing primarily and by means of a proper *ratio*, and then, because of a similitude to the thing on

²¹ “Videtur autem alius esse modus aequiuocationis quem Aristoteles omnino non recipit. Nam sicut dicitur pes hominis, ita quoque dicitur pes nauis, et pes montis, quae huiusmodi omnia secundum translationem dicuntur. Neque enim omnis translatio ab aequiuocatione seiungitur sed ea tantum cum ad res habentes positum uocabulum, ab alia iam nominata re nomen ornatus causa transfertur, ut quia iam dicitur quidam auriga, dicitur etiam gubernator, si quis ornatus gratia cum qui gubernator est dicat aurigam, non erit auriga nomen aequiuocum, licet diuersa, id est, moderatorem currus nauisque significet. Sed quoties res quidem uocabulo eget, ab alia uero re quae uocabulum sumit, tunc ista translatio aequiuocationis retinet proprietatem, ut ex homine uiuo ad picturam nomen hominis dictum est.”

which it was primarily imposed, or because of a proportion of relation which it has to some other thing, this utterance is transferred to represent some other thing, as is clear. In fact, ‘to laugh’ is properly attributed to, and by means of imposition it signifies the laugh of a human being, and, because of a certain similitude of this act with flourishing, this sound ‘to laugh’ is transferred to represent or signify flourishing (Burley 2005, 280: *QSE* 12).²²

As Burley goes on to say, ‘laughing’ signifies flourishing only by usage and not by imposition; if it were by imposition, then the difference between proper and improper signification would vanish. Hence, the word by transference signifies a thing that it does not signify in its proper use. We cannot account for this by appealing to reimposition, since this would explain only how the signification of a word gets fixed and established for new things. But we need to explain how words can be applied occasionally to different things although they have a proper meaning. Hence, the question is what it means for the word being transferred to signify improperly in such cases.

For a speaker to transfer a word it is crucial that she have some intention to use the word differently. Burley mentions that there need to be discovered some similarities

²² “Sed vox fit nota rei [...] ex transumptione autem ut quando vox imponitur rei primo in ratione signi et sub propria ratione, deinde, propter similitudinem rei illius cui primo imponebatur vel propter proportionem vel relationem quam habet ad aliquam aliam rem transumitur ista vox ad aliquid aliud repraesentandum, ut patet: ‘ridere’ enim proprie attribuitur et ex impositione significat risum hominis, propter quandam similitudinem huius actus ad florere transumitur haec vox ‘ridere’ ad repraesentandum vel significandum florere.”

which tempt a speaker to transfer a word. Note that Burley prefers to say that the word is transferred to represent something else. In a sense, of course, Burley also says that the word signifies the thing to which it is metaphorically applied, but he seems to take this kind of signification as something different from the signification which words inherit from their original institution. Burley is not explicit on this point, but the opposition between proper signification by imposition and improper signification by transference can be interpreted in terms of modern pragmatist accounts as a distinction between what words mean and what a speaker means (see, e.g., Grice 1969). Someone who says “the meadows laugh” usually does not intend to act as an impositor and to give the word a new sense or to extend the literal sense. We use a metaphor in order to convey certain aspects about things that are not captured by the literal sense of the word, but we do not establish a new meaning for the word.

What Ockham and Burley confounded, we find neatly distinguished in Peter Abelard. He noticed clearly that Boethius is making a distinction between two types of *translatio*. First, it can occur “due to the necessity of signification”, when there is not yet a word for a thing to name and one uses an already existing word for the thing; second, it can be done for rhetorical reasons, when one transfers a word to a thing which already has an established term. Following Boethius in conceiving of only the first case as equivocation, Abelard emphasizes that in the second case, the transference of a name does not come about through an act of imposition, because the things signified have already been subjected to a name. He distinguishes this latter case from equivocation, claiming that transference leading to equivocation comes about through a new imposition (Abelard

1921, 121: *Sup. Per.*).²³ This is plausible, given that Abelard thinks that imposition endows a word with what he calls natural signification, in that it fixes the reference of the word for subsequent speakers. This is precisely *not* what happens with metaphorical expressions.²⁴

5. Conclusion

Medieval authors agreed that the proper signification of a word is given according to its original institution, but they disagreed about when a signification of a word should be considered improper. A clear-cut distinction would be to consider every signification of a word improper when it deviates from the word's original signification. However, this would make it difficult to do justice to deviant but commonly accepted usages, as well as to metaphors. The term *translatio* itself turns out to be an ambiguous expression and can mean either the institution of equivocal words in the course of language development or the production of metaphors; but the two phenomena should get distinct explanations.

Aquinas wants to do justice to cases in which a certain usage of a word has become so prevalent that it would be misleading to consider the signification improper. His distinction between original imposition and usage can be fleshed out with Ockham's

²³ “[...] quando sermonem exornamus [...] non novam impositionem vocis facimus [...] Quod itaque in ‘auriga’ vel in ‘ridere’ quandoque aliud intelligimus ex adiunctis sibi, quam habeat eorum propria impositio, non est hoc aequivocationis multiplicitati deputandum.”

²⁴ However, Abelard also saw that metaphorical expressions can also make their way into ordinary usage and thus get a “quasi-imposition” (Rosier-Catach 1999, 164). See also Martin 2011.

approach of subsequent imposition. A usage that deviates from the original sense and yet is well established has pretty much the same effect as the original institution of a word. However, Ockham should have drawn the consequences of this: such a usage should not be counted as improper merely because it deviates from the word's original signification. Moreover, Ockham was certainly misled in thinking that metaphors should be explained in the same way. For if they are, they are already so well established as equivocal that they are no longer metaphors.

Here Burley has a point against him in claiming that a metaphor does not establish a new signification as a result of imposition. Rather, what happens in the case of metaphor is that a word with a proper signification is applied to another thing. However, Burley makes a parallel mistake on the other extreme, for he fails to acknowledge that words can take on a quite ordinary equivocal sense which is not metaphorical. Words taken metaphorically are properly used neither in the sense of their original institution nor in a common usage which can deviate from the original meaning.

In treating both metaphors and quite ordinary equivocal expressions as cases of Boethius's deliberate equivocal, Ockham fails to give a plausible explanation of metaphors, while Burley similarly fails to account for ordinary equivocal expressions. The transfer of sense in a metaphor is best explained by usage rather than imposition, but a transferred sense becoming proper in itself seems to be best conceived of as a case of imposition. Aquinas, who acknowledges cases in which words which already name something can acquire another proper signification through frequent figurative usage, distinguishes metaphors from the original sense and the ordinary ambiguities of language.

What seems to allow him to do so is to keep metaphors out of the box of deliberate equivocal where already Boethius did not want to put them in the first place. Abelard draws this consequence when he explicitly keeps metaphors entirely separate from equivocation.

Perhaps we can say that Abelard comes close to what Donald Davidson wanted to show about the semantics of metaphorical expressions: that words used metaphorically do not have an additional meaning. Words have an ordinary meaning (whether univocal or equivocal), and they can also be used in an unusual way but without taking on a new meaning. Metaphors belong exclusively to the realm of usage, but not in the sense of bringing about new significations, as happens when a term is transferred to name something which does not yet have its own name. If a word used metaphorically thus acquired a transferred sense—that is, a sense additional to the sense (or senses) it already has—then a metaphor would function like the other transferred senses that language already has anyway. Abelard was aware that on such an account, in Davidson’s words, “to make a metaphor is to murder it” (Davidson 1978, 249).

Martin Klein, University of Würzburg

martin.klein@uni-wuerzburg.de

Bibliography

- Abelard, Peter. 1921. *Die Logica 'Ingredientibus' 2. Glossen zu den Kategorien (= Sup. Per.)*. In *Peter Abaelards philosophische Schriften 1,2*, ed. Bernhard Geyer. Münster: Aschendorff 1921.
- Aristotle. 1961. *Categoriae vel Praedicamenta. Translatio Boethii, Editio Composite, Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka, Lemmata e Simplicii commentario decerpta, Pseudo-Augustini Paraphrasis Themistianae*. In *Aristoteles Latinus*, vol. I 1-5, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello. Bruges: Desclée De Brouwer.
- Aristotle. 1968. *De arte poetica. Translatio Guillelmi de Moerbeka*. In *Aristoteles Latinus*, vol. XXXIII, ed. Lorenzo Minio-Paluello. Bruxelles: Desclée De Brouwer 1968.
- Aristotle. 1975. *De sophisticis elenchis. Translatio Boethii, Fragmenta Translationis Iacobi et Recensio Guillelmi de Moerbeke*. In *Aristoteles Latinus*, vol. VI 1-3, ed. Bernard G. Dod. Leiden: Brill.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1884. *Commentaria in octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis (= In Phys.)*. In *Opera omnia*, vol. 2, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1888. *Pars prima Summae theologiae, q. 1-49 (= ST I)*. In *Opera omnia*, vol. 4, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.

- Aquinas, Thomas. 1889. *Pars prima Summae theologiae, q. 50–119* (= ST I). In *Opera omnia*, vol. 5, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1892. *Prima secundae Summae theologiae, q. 71–114* (= ST I-II). In *Opera omnia*, vol. 7, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1897. *Secunda secundae Summae theologiae, q. 57–122* (= ST II-II). In *Opera omnia*, vol. 9, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1903. *Tertia pars Summae theologiae, q. 1–59* (= ST III). In *Opera omnia*, vol. 11, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ex Typographia Polyglotta S. C. de Propaganda Fide.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1929. *Scriptum super libros Sententiarum. Commentum in primum librum*, ed. Pierre Mandonnet. Paris: Lethielleux.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1970. *Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, q. 1–7*. In *Opera omnia*, vol. 22 1/2, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Ad Sactae Sabinae.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1974. *Expositio super Isaiam ad litteram* (= *Exp. Iasia*). In *Opera omnia*, vol. 28, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1976. *De fallaciis*. In *Opera omnia*, vol. 43, ed. Commissio Leonina, 383–418. Rome: Editori di San Tommaso.
- Aquinas, Thomas. 1989. *Expositio libri Peryermenias, Editio altera retractata*. In *Opera omnia*, vol. 1/1*, ed. Commissio Leonina. Rome: Commissio Leonina.

- Aquinas, Thomas. 2019. *Super I Epistolam B. Pauli ad Corinthios lectura, cap. XI–XIII.9. Reportatio Reginaldi de Piperno (= Super I Cor.)*. In *Corpus Thomisticum*, ed. Enrique Alarcón. <corpusthomisticum.org/c1r.html>.
- Ashworth, Jennifer E. 1980. Can I speak more clearly than I understand? A problem of religious language in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham. *Historia linguistica* 7: 29–38.
- Ashworth, Jennifer E. 1991. Equivocation and analogy in fourteenth-century logic. Ockham, Burley and Buridan. In *Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi. Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters. Festschrift für Kurt Flasch zu seinem 60. Geburtstag*, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta, 23–43. Amsterdam: Grüner.
- Ashworth, Jennifer E. 2007. Metaphor and the logicians from Aristotle to Cajetan. *Vivarium* 45: 311–327.
- Ashworth, Jennifer E. 2013a. Analogy and metaphor from Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus and Walter Burley. In *Later mediaeval metaphysics. Ontology, language, and logic*, ed. Charles Boylard and Rondo Keele, 223–248 and 291–299. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Ashworth, Jennifer E. 2013b. Aquinas, Scotus and Others on naming, knowing, and the origin of language. In *Logic and language in the Middle Ages: a volume in honour of Sten Ebbesen*, ed. Jakob L. Fink, Heine Hansen and Ana Mariá Mora-Márquez, 257–272. Leiden: Brill.
- Ashworth, Jennifer E. 2013c. Being and analogy. In *A companion to Walter Burley, late medieval logician and metaphysician*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, 135–65. Leiden: Brill.

- Bacon, Roger. 1988. *Compendium studii theologiae* (= *CST*), ed. Thomas S. Maloney. Leiden: Brill.
- Boethius. 1847. *In Categorias Aristotelis*. In *Migne Patrologia Latina* 64, Paris: Garnier.
- Burley, Walter. 1967. *Super artem veterem Porphyrii et Aristotelis* (= *In Praed.*). Venice, 1497. Repr. Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva.
- Burley, Walter. 2003a. *Expositio vetus super librum Praedicamentorum* (= *EVP*), ed. Mischa von Perger, *Franciscan Studies* 61: 55–95.
- Burley, Walter. 2003b. *Super tractatum fallaciarum* (= *In Fallac.*), ed. Sten Ebbesen, *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 74: 197–207.
- Burley, Walter. 2005. *Quaestiones super Sophisticos Elenchos 4-12* (= *QSE*), ed. Sten Ebbesen, *Cahiers de l'institut du moyen-âge grec et latin* 76: 239–281.
- Cesalli, Laurent. 2013. Meaning and Truth. In *A companion to Walter Burley, late medieval logician and metaphysician*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, 87–133. Leiden: Brill.
- Dahan, Gilbert. 2009. Saint Thomas d'Aquin e la métaphore. Rhétorique et herméneutique. *Medioevo. Rivista di Storia della Filosofia Medievale* 18 (2008): 85–118; repr. Dahan, Gilbert. *Lire la bible au Moyen Âge: essais d'herméneutique médiévale*, Geneva: Droz, 249–282.
- Davidson, Donald. 1978. What metaphors mean, *Critical Inquiry* 5.1: 31–47.
- Dutilh-Novaes, Catarina. 2013. The Ockham-Burley dispute. In *A companion to Walter Burley, late medieval logician and metaphysician*, ed. Alessandro D. Conti, 49–84. Leiden: Brill.
- Ebbesen, Sten. 1979. The dead man is alive. *Synthese* 40: 43–70.

- Eco, Umberto. 1993. *La ricerca della lingua perfetta nella cultura europea*. Rome: Laterza.
- Geach, Peter. 1969. Utterer's meaning and intentions, *The Philosophical Review* 68: 147–77.
- Martin, Christopher G. 2011. "What an ugly child". Abaelard on translation, figurative language, and logic. *Vivarium* 49: 26–49.
- Ockham, William. 1967. *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, prol., d. 1 (= Ord.)*. In *Opera theologica*, vol. 1, ed. Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Ockham, William. 1970. *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, d. 2-3*. In *Opera theologica*, vol. 2, ed. Stephen Brown and Gedeon Gál. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Ockham, William. 1974. *Summa logicae (= SL)*. In *Opera philosophica*, vol. 1, ed. Philotheus Boehner, Gedeon Gál and Stephen Brown. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Ockham, William. 1978a. *Expositio in librum Perihermenias Aristotelis (= In De int.)*. In *Opera philosophica*, vol. 2, ed. Angelo Gambatese and Stephen Brown, 345–504. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Ockham, William. 1978b. *Expositio in librum praedicamentorum Aristotelis (= In Praed.)*. In *Opera philosophica*, vol. 2, ed. Gedeon Gál, 135–339. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.

- Ockham, William. 1979a. *Expositio super libros elenchorum* (= *In SE*). In *Opera philosophica*, vol. 3, ed. Francesco del Punta. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Ockham, William. 1979b. *Scriptum in librum primum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, d. 19–48* (= *Ord.*). In *Opera theologica*, vol. 4, ed. Gerald Etzkorn and Francis E. Kelley. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Ockham, William. 1980. *Quodlibeta septem* (= *Quodl.*). In *Opera theologica*, vol. 9, ed. Joseph C. Wey. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Ockham, William. 1984. *Quaestiones variae* (= *Quaest. var.*). In *Opera theologica*, vol. 8, ed. Gerald Etzkorn, Francis E. Kelley and Joseph C. Wey. St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute.
- Panaccio, Claude. 2015. Ockham's externalism. In *Intentionality, cognition, and mental representation in medieval philosophy*, ed. Gyula Klima, 166–185. New York: Fordham University Press.
- Peter of Spain. 2014. *Summulae logicales. Summaries of logic. Text, translation, introduction, and notes* (= *SL*), ed. Brian P. Copenhaver, Calvin Normore and Terence Parsons. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Purcell, William. 1987. *Transsumptio*. A rhetorical doctrine of the thirteenth century. *Rhetorica: A Journal of the History of Rhetoric* 5: 369–410.
- Rosier Catach, Irène. 1997. Prata rident. In *Langages et philosophie. Hommage à Jean Jolivet*, ed. Alain de Libera, Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal and Alain Galonnier, 155–176. Paris: Vrin.

- Rosier-Catach. 1991. La notion de translatio, le principe de compositionnalité et l'analyse de la prédication accidentelle chez Abélard. In *Langage, sciences, philosophie au XIIIe siècle*, ed. Joël Biard, 125–164. Paris: Vrin.
- Schierbaum, Sonja. 2010. Knowing lions and understanding 'lion': two jobs for concepts in Ockham? *Vivarium* 48: 327–348.
- Schierbaum, Sonja. 2014. *Ockham's assumption of mental speech. Thinking in a world of particulars*. Leiden: Brill.
- Spade, Paul Vincent. 1995. *William of Ockham. From his Summa of logic, part I*, <pvspade.com/Logic/docs/ockham.pdf>.
- Thomas de Wyk. 1997. *Fallaciae*, ed. Sten Ebbesen, "Texts on Equivocation. Part II. Ca. 1250–1310", *Cahiers de l'Institut du Moyen-âge Grec et Latin* 67: 139–143.