Intentionality of perception
An inquiry concerning J.R. Searle’s conception of Intentionality with special reference to Husserl*

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1. Introduction

Searle’s “primary aim” in his Intentionality1 “is to develop a theory of Intentionality” (1983, vii). In what follows we shall discuss some main points of his concept(s) of Intentionality: (1) The (re-)construction of Intentionality; (2) The Intentionality of perception. Its genesis and causality; (3) Some remarks concerning the background of Searle’s Intentionality program.

The concepts of Intentionality.
In his Minds, Brains and Science, Searle remarks with respect to the social sciences that “What we want from the social sciences and what we get from the social sciences at their best are theories of pure and applied Intentionality”. (Searle 1984, 85)2. What Searle is saying in the passage just quoted, namely his differentiation of Intentionality into pure and applied holds, in our opinion, for his “primary aim”, the pure theory of Intentionality and for his secondary aim, the applied versions of Intentionality3.

2. (Re-)construction of pure4 Intentionality

Searle’s approach to the problem of Intentionality started via his former studies on speech acts (1969; 1975; 1979). Speech acts are taken as a type

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* Our special thanks to Josef H. Röll for his technical advice and helpful comments.
1 A forerunner to this book is Searle (1979a).
2 Our emphasis.
3 Searle proposes “the explanation of human behavior [...] in a subsequent study”. (Op.cit., x)
4 This is to show not only the objective fact that there are subjective mental states (in the world), but also and especially, that (most) mental states “have logical properties and are representations in their purest [...] form.” (Searle in Heyer/Münch 1984, 30) They are intentions but do not intend.
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of human actions (applied intentional forms) and seen as an extension and a derived (not intrinsic, not pure) form of Intentionality. Their capacity to represent objects and states of affairs is fundamentally based on the non-derived, intrinsic representational capacities of the mind’s Intentionality.

So, “the basic assumption” is that “the philosophy of language is a branch of the philosophy of mind” (1983, vii), and by investigating the nature of (some) mental states Searle wants to provide a foundation for (1) his theorems on philosophy of language; (2) his way towards the philosophy of mind. He goes, as it were, backwards from a (dependent) “branch” to its roots in order to show “the more general [more biologically fundamental] capacity of the mind to relate the organism to the world [...] [and] how the mind/brain relates the organism to reality”. (Op.cit., vii)

Here we are confronted with two more naturalistic holistic assumptions: that there is an organism, or an organic-unity-structure of the “mind and brain” and that the mind is in fact the subjective side of the physical brain or at least causally related to the brain. (Searle goes on towards the end of his book in chapter 10 “to demythologize the whole [Cartesian] mind-body problem a bit” (op.cit., 265) by explaining the interrelatedness of mind and brain: “mental states are as real as any other biological phenomena” (op.cit., 264), they “are caused by biological phenomena and in turn cause other biological phenomena” (op.cit.), and “there really are such things as intrinsic mental phenomena which cannot be reduced to something else or eliminated by some kind of re-definition”.

In our first chapter we try to describe Searle’s approach to the elements, the internal structure and the interrelatedness of Intentional states. Let us see how Searle proceeds in his “hard work [...] not only in trying to get each part right, but also in making all the parts cohere in the general conception”. (Op.cit., x)

2.1. The Intentionality of mental states

In an interview Searle said that “a point of his book [Intentionality] was in a certain sense to establish a short ‘taxonomy’ of the different aspects of Intentionality”. (Heyer/Münch 1984, 26) These aspects are directedness; representation; meaning, belief, and desire.

2.1.1. Directedness

In accordance with “a long philosophical tradition” (Searle does not specify) Intentionality is formulated as “that property of many mental

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5 Our emphasis.
states and events by which they are directed at or about or of objects and states of affairs in the world.” (1983, 1)

Searle “dissociates” himself from “certain features of the tradition” (op.cit.). He points out what he finds to be insufficient or misleading in it and contrasts it with his use of the term:

Searle distinguishes those mental states which have Intentionality, which are intentionally directed towards something and which are characteristically accompanied by beliefs or desires on the one hand from the other mental states (e.g. being anxious) which lack the momentum of directedness.

Searle holds that Intentionality is not identical with consciousness. For conscious states such as being anxious are not necessarily directed towards something (not directed to something other than themselves); and there are intentional states such as unconscious beliefs (beliefs one normally does not think about) which nevertheless refer to something. So Searle separates the “class of conscious states and the class of Intentional mental states” (op.cit., 3) from one another (though they may overlap they do not include each other, they are not coextensive).

Intentionality (capitalized) is an Intentional state or event, exclusively. Searle’s use of Intentionality (as just one form of intending in general) is restricted to directedness. An Intentional state does not “act” (“acts are things one does”, e.g. speech acts, — even “in your head”, e.g. mathematics), Intentionality does “not intend anything”.

2.1.2. Representation

Intentional states always are directed towards something, even if there is no object one could direct one’s attention to. So the question is that of the Intentional relationship of directedness, or, how Intentionality can be explained “without using metaphors like ‘directed’”. (Op.cit., 4)

A solution to this is proposed in explaining the representational character of Intentional states. Yet “the notion of representation is conveniently vague. [...] There is probably no more abused term in the history of philosophy than ‘representation’” (op.cit., 11), Searle remarks. So “we could in principle dispense with the terms ‘representation’ and ‘represent’ altogether in favor of [...] other notions, since there is nothing ontological about the use of ‘representation’. It is just shorthand for [the] constellation of logical notions borrowed from the theory of speech acts.” (Op.cit., 12)6

Searle uses his speech act model, the various types of speech acts, to explicate Intentionality in terms of language. Since speech acts have a derived form of Intentionality, their representational character is a derived

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6 Our emphasis.
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(not intrinsic) one. Language is logically dependent on Intentionality. Only for heuristic and pedagogical reasons, Searle emphasizes, is he explaining Intentionality in terms of language. He makes use of the “prior knowledge” of the logic of speech acts to translate it into the logic of Intentional states in order to show “how and in what sense Intentional states are also representations” (op.cit., 5). The observation of the structure of speech acts (the distinction between propositional content and illocutionary force; the different directions of fit; the parallel between the performance of an illocutionary act and the corresponding Intentional state; the notion of “conditions of satisfaction”) “carries over to Intentional states.” (Op.cit.)

Let us illustrate these similarities, analogies, connections (cf. op.cit., 4–22).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Speech acts consist in</th>
<th>Intentional states consist in</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Propositional content (p) and illocutionary force (F) which presents the propos. cont. (F (p))</td>
<td>Representative content (r) and psychological mode (S) which presents the repr. cont. (S (r))</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Directions of fit (d.o.f.) of Speech acts</th>
<th>Directions of fit (d.o.f.) of Intentional states</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assertive speech acts (F): →</td>
<td>Beliefs (S): → mind (S) → to world (r)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(true or false statements etc.)</td>
<td>(true or false) changeable unchanged</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Match the world faulty unchanged</td>
<td>Faulty unfauly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Or not</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Directive sp.acts: → world → to word d.o.f.</td>
<td>Desires: → world → to mind d.o.f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Orders etc.)</td>
<td>(Fulfilled or desired not false)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Obeyed or disobeyed)</td>
<td>Not true or false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissive speech acts → (Promises etc.)</td>
<td>Intentions: → world → to mind d.o.f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Kept or broken)</td>
<td>(Fulfilled or intended not false)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Null cases: null d.o.f. (Apologies etc.)</td>
<td>Null d.o.f. (Sorrows)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Words (F) and minds (S) have a logical responsibility of fitting (in all d.o.f.).

World is the world of speech acts (p) and Int. states (r) (in all d.o.f.), not an ontological (de re) world.
Internal parallelism

(speech act)

performance of an illocutionary act with a propositional content (direction of fit)

(assertive) statement that p (directive) order to do A (commissive) promise to do A

(null d.o.f.) apology

presupposes a propos. content

( Intentional state)

is eo ipso\(^7\) \(\leftarrow\) sincerity \(\leftarrow\) condition (s.c.)

expression of belief that p expression of desire to do A expression of intention to do A

expression of sorrow contains belief

Parallelism and identity of truth conditions/conditions of satisfaction (c.o.s.) in case of d.o.f.

(speech act)

(assertive) statement true (directive) order obeyed (commissive) promise kept

(d.o.f. satisfied) iff c.o.s. fulfilled (d.o.f. satisfied) iff c.o.s. fulfilled (d.o.f. satisfied) iff c.o.s. fulfilled

(d.o.f. satisfied) iff c.o.s. fulfilled (d.o.f. satisfied) iff its c.o.s. fulfilled (d.o.f. satisfied) iff its c.o.s. fulfilled

expressed belief true expressed desire fulfilled expressed Intention carried out

For all d.o.f.-speech acts:

their c.o.s. obtain iff Intentional states have c.o.s. (logical primacy of Intentionality). Assertive statements about Intentional states (and Intentional states), being representations, are representations of representations (representation without c.o.s.; the proposition taken to be true).

\(^{7}\) Cf. ibid., 18f. It is misleading to say that an intentional state is a two-term relation between, say, a belief and a proposition and to say that a statement is a two-term relation between a speaker and a proposition. A proposition is not the object of a statement or belief but rather its content. A statement is identical with the proposition stated; a belief is identical with the proposition believed. There is no sense in a basic distinction between so-called de re and de dicto intentional states.
An assertive statement about a propositional content of an Intentional state is a presentation of representation (truth conditions neglected).

For all d.o.f.-Intentional states:
they are representations/have a not separable propositional content (in different modes) of their c.o.s.; the content determines their respective c.o.s.; their c.o.s. in turn depend on (are determined by) (1) a representational Network of other Intentional states; they are embedded in a whole Network of other Intentional states; they thus cannot be described exhaustively, but only as logical consequences of an initial Intentional state. Intentional states are, in general, parts of the Network; they have their c.o.s. relative to their position in the Network of representation. (2) The determination of the c.o.s. of an Intentional state works only against a nonrepresentational "Background of practices and of preintentional assumptions" ("nonrepresentational mental capacities") (cf. op.cit., 19 and 21). One consequence is: the c.o.s. are not independently determined, but depend on a Network and a Background.

For all not d.o.f.-Intentional states:
they are not representations / have no specified propositional contents, presuppose the propositional content, have no 'Intentionally inexistent objects' other than themselves / have no d.o.f., no c.o.s.
Sorrows, joy, e.g. have/are a psychological mode but no d.o.f.

2.1.3. Meanings, beliefs, desires
Meanings, beliefs and desires are not primary forms, but are etiolated by more primordial (biological) experiences in perceiving and doing. So the conjunction hypothesis marks the "beginning of a general theory of Intentionality". (Op.cit., 35)

Meaning states cannot stay on their own. They are not proper Intentional states. They apply to sentences and speech acts only, i.e. they exist iff a distinction is made between the content and the form of externalization. To ask for the meaning is to ask for an Intentional content that goes with the form of utterance. So meaning implies an overt action (which in turn converts the utterance act into an illocutionary act and thereby imposes Intentionality on the utterance).

Believing and desiring: Searle tries by analyzing belief and desire (the degrees of conviction/cognition and the degrees of desire/volition, respectively) to give an account for a hypothesis of a conjunction analysis of these Intentional states. He distinguishes (1) beliefs and desires as Intentions

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8 In contrast to F. Brentano, cf. ibid., 14, 18. It is essential, according to Searle, to distinguish in these cases between the content (i.e. a proposition) of an Intentional state -- which obtains, though it does not specify -- and the object (= ordinary object; there are only ordinary objects, no Meinongian entities, for Searle) of an Intentional state -- which is not there and, consequently a statement in these cases is not about anything. (Cf. ibid., 17.)
with whole propositions as contents from (2) beliefs and desires which involve Intentional states with no whole proposition as contents, yet their Intentionality being in part explainable in terms of beliefs and desires, and (3) from those Intentional states which are nonpropositional cases with no d.o.f.

3. Intentionality of perception — its genesis and its internal causality

After the discussion of the logic of Intentionality of perception of (some) mental states Searle goes on to consider the nature of the biologically primary Intentional states: perceiving (perceptual experience) and doing (Intentional action) and their causal relatedness to the world.

So, in this chapter, we have a genetic description of some primary Intentional states. Perceiving (or perceptual experience) and doing have their Intentional causation "in their conditions of satisfaction" or truth conditions. (Cf. op.cit., 36)

Visual experience (Searle is dealing with visual experience most of the time) is but one example of a perceptual experience, or "a component of any visual perception". (Op.cit., 38) Visual experience has Intentionality because it has its c.o.s. analogously as Intentional states have Intentionality. (An experience is always an experience of something and, by this fact, an experience of Intentionality). The Intentional content of the visual experience determines its c.o.s. because of its intrinsic Intentionality.

There are some analogies and some disanalogies between Intentional representations (such as belief) and Intentional perceptions/presentations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Analogies</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intentionality of representation</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content: a whole proposition or a part-proposition explainable in terms of belief and desire has a propositional content: a visual experience that ... is the case</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.o.f.: mind to world false not false</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Intentionality of visual experience</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>content: the existence of a whole proposition or state of affairs required as its c.o.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>having a visual experience to see that ...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.o.f.: mind to world misled not misled</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Disanalogies</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Representations</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>not ontological/ontologically neutral independently motivated notions such as: c.o.s. Intentional content d.o.f.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Perceptions</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ontological (requires an object) directly, immediately presented</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>caused by its c.o.s.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d.o.f.: mind to world</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conscious mental states/events</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
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For a visual experience:
its visual (perceptual) Intentional content requires an object/a state of affairs as the cause of that specific visual experience to be satisfied.
It is the realization of causation of the Intentional content.
Its visual Intentional content is causally self-referential (independent of a verbal representation).
It "is an Intentional and causal transaction between mind and world" (op.cit., 49).
Its d.o.f. is mind to world; its direction of causation is world to mind; and both directions are causally interrelated.

Further disanalogies

representation
of the object itself, not just
of an aspect of the object
not of different contents
(but by different Intentional modes)
the different aspects being the objects

Searle hereafter discusses some complications and interrelations: (1) A representative Network and Background affect the content of a perceived Network and Background (cf. op.cit., 55). (2) The content of representation is constant and so it is inconsistent with the differently appearing visual content (the representation "overrides" the visual experience). (3) There are cases where the content of a representation and a content of perceptual experience are consistent, i.e. have the same c.o.s.

Searle's "naive" (noninferential) realism in his account of causal visual perception (against the representative theory and against phenomenalism) can be stated as follows:

(1) With respect to the elements of visual perception (perceiver, visual experience, object); where the perceiver or the mind, respectively, is directed by his visual experience to its existing, material objective states of affairs, or the world.

So visual experience is to be understood as a causal transaction, as a d.o.f., which has (but is not) an Intentional content; the "vehicle" (op.cit., 61) or transactor of the Intentional content is the visual perception.

The object is the Intentional object (of the existing material world) being the c.o.s. for the d.o.f.. The experienced object or world is neither a private sense datum, nor an impression, nor a representation, it is argued.

(2) With respect to the truth conditions/c.o.s.; in a sentence \( x \) sees \( y \) (in front of \( x \)), \( x \) is to be understood in the context of its Network with other
Intentional states and its nonrepresentative Background; seeing is to be understood as the visual experience, the "basis" (cf. op.cit., 73) of a self-referential event (x just sees y; he does not infer the existence of y) with the following properties: (a) It has certain c.o.s.: the fact that there is a y; the fact causes regularly a corresponding visual experience. The causation as part of the natural world is external to the other c.o.s.; and causation is as causal relation part of the Intentional content; and causation is experienced as caused; and causation as a relation is eo ipso transitive. (b) It has certain phenomenalistic properties; its c.o.s. are determined regularly by the visual experience. (c) Its c.o.s. are satisfied by the fact that there is an actual y, causing the visual experience, which embraces the intentional content. The Intentional content in turn is not isolated, nor is it independent; it is internally, holistically as well as indexically related to other present Intentional contents (the elements of the Network) and to present nonrepresentative capacities (the Background).

Now there is the question whether there is a close connection (involvement) between Intentions (Intentional actions) and what one can tell people to do, i.e. whether there is an involvement or a logical connection in ordering people to do something and their being able to do it Intentionally.

On the one hand one has to consider whether or not a word is a verb which denotes an action, i.e. whether or not there is a symmetry relation of Intention to action. (Op.cit., 81–3)

Searle goes on "to develop an account of the relations between Intention and action that will show how the relations fit into the general theory of Intentionality". (Op.cit., 83) One has to look for "those Intentions that are formed prior to actions and those that are not". (Op.cit., 84) This is to distinguish between (1) cases where the agent has the Intention to perform the action prior to the performance of the action itself (prior Intention), e.g. somebody knows what he is about to do because he already has the deliberate, conscious Intention to perform it; and (2) cases, where an Intention was in action without there being a prior, conscious Intention, cases in which one just performs things or just acts. (Cf. op.cit., 84) All Intentional actions have included Intentions in action; not all Intentional actions have prior Intentions. (Cf. op.cit., 85) Prior Intentions as well as Intentions in action are causally self-referential (like perceptual experiences). So, their c.o.s. require that the Intentional states themselves stand in certain causal relations to the rest of their c.o.s. (Cf. op.cit.)

To explain the causal self-referential character of Intentions and the role of action one has to look back to what has been said about speech acts (vide above diagram of assertive, directive, commissive speech acts). The self-reference does not imply an infinite regress in a directive speech act, for instance. One orders somebody to do something and thereby one is creating a reason for him to perform the act in question and the directive
will be obeyed if and only if somebody performs that act for exactly that, and no other reason. (Cf. op.cit., 86)

These are connections between prior Intentions and Intentions in action. There are some more analogies between perceptual experiences that are characteristic of actions, and actions "just as there are characteristic experiences of seeing a table, so [...] there are characteristic experiences of raising your arm". (Op.cit., 87) In each case there are two components (1) the experience of raising your arm and (2) the physical movement of your arm. The two components are interrelated (both have Intentionality and have c.o.s.). (Op.cit., 87)

Intentionality of the visual experience of something is a mind-to-world d.o.f. Its direction of causation is the direction of the object (world) to the visual experience (mind). (Cf. op.cit., 88)

In the case of the experience of acting there is a world-to-mind d.o.f. The experience of acting is a presentation of its c.o.s. Action is, like perception, a causal and Intentional transaction between mind and world. (Cf. op.cit., 88) There is always an experience of acting present as a component of acting. One has to take care to distinguish these kinds of Intentional actions from bodily movements that do not have Intentional components. (Cf. op.cit., 89)

Any conscious Intentional action implies the experience of performing that action, and that experience has an Intentional content. A conscious experience of acting involves a consciousness of the c.o.s. of that experience. (Cf. op.cit., 90) The Intentional content of the Intention in action and the experience of acting are identical. The experience of acting merely is the Intention in action. (Cf. op.cit., 91)

Unintentional actions have to be distinguished carefully from Intentional actions because they are said to be actions that are Intentional under one description but not Intentional under another description. (Cf. op.cit., 101)

It is proposed that we count an action as unintentional under those aspects which, though not Intended, are within the field of possibility of Intentional actions of the agent as seen from our point of view. (Cf. op.cit., 102)

Intentionality and causality are internally related terms as put forward by Searle for achieving his aim of "Intentionalizing causality" and, thereby, naturalizing Intentionality. (Cf. op.cit., 112; cf. also Brand 1984)

Intentional causation, as it is explainable and describable as having both its d.o.f. and c.o.s., differs from the standard Humean theory of causation. (Cf. op.cit., 119)

(1) By knowing the Intentional causality without further observations; the justification or c.o.s. does not depend on other observations.
(2) Intentional causation of events is independent of any relevant causal laws. (Cf. op.cit., 120)
(3) There is a logical or internal relation between cause and effect because there is always an Intentional content that is causally related to its c.o.s. As cause and effect themselves are logically related, we are provided with logically related descriptions of cause and effect. (Cf. op.cit., 121)

Thus the statements of Intentional causation are, in general, intensional. (Cf. op.cit., 123) The notion of Intentional causation is that we directly perceptually experience the causation (the causal relation that one thing makes another thing happen).

Searle points out against “the view of several philosophers from Reid to von Wright” (op.cit., 124), (a) that not by observing our actions but by (in) performing our actions do we experience (“become aware of”) Intentional causation; (b) that we are directly aware of causation (the “causal nexus”) in action as much as in perception; the causal nexus is internal to the content of experience, not to its object; (c) that one experienced event is a causal and logical presentation or representation of another event. Both events constitute a compositive event. Causes and events are internally related this way, and we, who know it, are aware of the relation by our Intentional experience (which is part of the Intentional content). The Intentional content “must be a causally relevant aspect and it must exemplify a planable regularity”. (Op.cit., 140)

By these explanations of causalities, Searle shows how, in his sight, some traditional problems of the philosophy of perception, namely its causality, and its mind-body(world)-relation are to be solved.

4. Some remarks with respect to Husserl, and Brentano

Searle’s book on Intentionality is a systematical, intrinsic, logical account, a convincing one, too, if one neglects the contributions to the topic done by others, to the same extent as Searle neglects them. He knows about the historical background yet does not care too much about it: in his acknowledgements he lists “helpful” commentators, but it does not seem that he openly has made much use of them. Instead he partly “ignores” (at least he says so) and partly ridicules (as it might seem) “all this distinguished past” in favour of “the relentless pursuit of my own investigations”. (Op.cit., ix)

This is a frank confession which has to be taken seriously. At least we did so in our re-description of some main features (in order to make their interrelations explicit to ourselves, following Searle’s maxime). So we do not discuss Searle’s concept of Intentionality in its details, but rather Searle’s background, as Holenstein (1985) did. There are some “backgrounds” (“nonrepresentative” but present in a double meaning to Searle, not only in the “distinguished past” but also in the present time, e.g. Chisholm,
who provided several fundamental studies in the last three decades from his (1955/6) onwards), that are left aside nearly undiscussed, though known to Searle.

Searle quite often tells us that he is dissociating himself from certain features of the philosophical tradition. He explicitly owes some debts to Frege and Wittgenstein, but one wonders about the fact that he hardly mentions other authors who are known indeed for their major contributions to the topic of Intentionality, e.g. Husserl, and, before him, Brentano. (Both of them he critically mentions only one time each). Asked about Brentano’s contributions to intentionality and the contributions of “a famous philosophical school, which tries to elucidate the intentional structure of the consciousness” Searle laconically answers: “Yes, I have heard of them; they are called phenomenologists.” (Heyer/Münch 1984, 25)

In the following part, we shall stress some aspects of both philosophers or schools in order to question whether Searle is right in “dissociating” himself from that “traditional literature I really do not know well enough”. (Heyer/Münch, ibid.)

(1) Concerning the term of directedness it is obvious that Searle had taken the idea of aboutness from both, Brentano especially, and Husserl. Brentano for instance says that psychological states have an “intentional (and supposedly a mental) inexistence of an object”, that they are the “relation towards a content”, and that they are a “direction towards an object without there being (necessarily) a real object” (1874).9 Husserl (1901)10 discusses and develops these topics: The “mental” or “immanent” object. “Each intentional experience [Erlebnis] has not only a relation to objects but is itself an object of certain intentional experiences”. He criticizes “the containment of one mental content in the other”, introduces the term “immanent objectivity” (immanente Gegenständlichkeit) as a denomination of an essential property of intentional experiences, and rediscovers the synonym scholastic expressions intentional or mental inexistence of an object. Husserl points out (1) that the intentional experiences have the property to refer to presented objects in different ways; they do it in the sense of intention. (2) An object is meant to be intended in a psychological mode; i.e. there are some certain experiences present that have an intentional character. (3) There are not two things copresent in the mental state; there is not the experienced thing and, in addition to it, the intentional act which is directed towards the thing; there are not two things in the sense of part and whole but there is only one thing present: the intentional experience. (4)

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10 Cf. 1901, V. Logische Untersuchung, §§ 8—11, 16—7.
Husserl suggests it would be better to avoid the improper speech of "immanent objects"; instead one should notice the experience of a psychological state and our relation towards it. Translated into proper speech one has to say — instead of having an intentional object of my presentation — : In my "I", being a concrete complexity of experiences, there is a specific presentation of a certain experience really present. (5) Husserl goes on to discuss the differences of descriptive and intentional contents. By "contents" he means the object of an intentional state, its material, and its intentional essence (Wesen).

This seems to be the part of the directedness of Intentionality Searle has in mind. It has to be added that it is Brentano's, too (cf. 1911): there is no peculiar ontic "intentional inexistence" as Husserl, and Searle, ascribe to Brentano. 11

A further step in the interpretation of directedness, as just pointed out, is that in directedness we have an "immanent objective" in different modes: "In love something is beloved, in hate something is hated". The mental state has a content different from itself. Hearing has a content different from hearing as hearing.

If there is an undirected feeling, that state is a self-referential one. In a mental state like this (Searle's null d.o.f. cases) both the content and the object of Intentionality are "melted together in one 'subject object'". 12

A mental state is a "real state". It exists "intentionally and really". It is the expression of a natural point of view towards the world with its "background" (natürliche Einstellung; Weltglauben). In the sense of a reflection it has a conscious relation to or of the world (Bewusstseinsbezogenheit der Welt). 13

(2) Concerning (re-) presentation and perception, too, Searle follows the feature of Brentano's/Husserl's notion of presentation (Vorstellung). In a presentation there is always something presented. Something is "in us", a "thought of something", a "concomitant presentation together with its object" or a "melting of a presentation with its object" (Cf. Brentano 1874, 114, 116, 121, 183, 196). Husserl differentiates that "there is no difference [...] between an experienced [erlebt] conscious content and the experience [Erlebnis] itself. The sensed [Empfundenes] e.g. is nothing else than the sensing [Empfindung]." If one has an experience of an "object other than

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itself” then “the object is not experienced [erlebt] [...] but perceived [wahrgenommen].” (1901, II, 352)\(^{14}\)

There might be some question about (1) the nomenclature of (re-)presentation and perception and (2) the status of representation and perception as to whether they are of an ontological character or not. In one sense a presentation is in a **logical** connection with other Intentional states, on the other hand it is a presupposition (a “fundamental” mental state) for other Intentional states, and it is itself a reality. That is, a perception can function both as a mental and as an ontological presupposition. A judgment **implies** a representation and not vice versa. A representation is a presupposition or “motive” of a judgment (logical version); or: A (re-)presenter is a presupposition of a judge (ontological version). There is no judgment without a representation in Brentano. A judgment is “motivated” (1) if it is “caused immediately” by the “content of the (re-)presentation” (Vorstellungsmaterie) and (2) if the “causation is noticed” (cf. Brentano 1956, 128f., 168; 1966, 219f.).

(3) Concerning Searle’s to against “mental acts” in Brentano it must be said that though Brentano is known for the Aktpsychologie attributed to him and though he often speaks of acts and mental actions (psychische Tätigkeiten) he explicitly tells us what he means by “acts”, namely “mental appearances”, “mental states”, “mental phenomena”, “mental elements”, and in it something is present and presented. (Cf. Brentano 1874, 19, 27, 31, 107, 114) There is no primary activity in Brentano’s acts as Searle suggests. The same holds for Husserl’s “modes of inactuality” in his Ideen of 1950 (cf. op.cit., § 35) concerning the Erlebnisstrom, part of which is a passive experience. “Acts” in Husserl are experiences and thus are motivated by its contents. There are no “acts” in the sense Searle uses “acts” as doings. There is really a crucial point in defining acts, actions, acting and the like.\(^{15}\)

(4) Concerning the Network and the Background, Husserl speaks (cf. 1954) of horizon intentionality (Horizont-Intentionalität), of a stream of consciousness or parts of that stream (Erlebnisstrom und Teile davon) which have **Intentional Backgrounds**. This Background is not a conscious mental state of incomplete experiences. It is a Background which is not particularly intended. It is a sort of undefined periphery as an antecedent undefined possibility and necessity. In Brentano (1874) there is discussion of the Network-interconnection of psychical states, such that one psychological mode is evoked by another one; and that there is a dependence of mental states on physical ones; and that the “physiological preconditions and

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\(^{14}\) Husserl 1901, II/1, 352. (Our translation)

\(^{15}\) Cf. e.g. Husserl 1901, V. Logische Untersuchung, § 30.
coconditions" of a mental state have to be considered; and that the
dependence of physiological events on one another has to be taken into
account, and that there are mental events with a Background that goes
unnoticed or is not conscious.

These remarks should be sufficient. It is not our intention to write the
missing footnotes to Searle's book, but rather to recall some underlying
standards of Intentionality, that cannot be discovered anew. This does
not affect, however, Searle's merits concerning the reinforced discussion
of the mental.

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16 Brentano 1874, vol. I, 19, 20, 66, 67, 133. Cf. 1982, 1–10, where he discusses (1) the
differences between descriptive (pure) psychology and genetic (physiological/psychophysical)
psychology, (2) their interrelations (reciprocal services).


18 To give but one last example: Mohanty's *Concept of Intentionality* (1972), which could have
served Searle for his study.