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Civil society organizations only started to be considered a sector in the 1970s in the United States. Amitai Etzioni pioneered the use of the expression third sector, which became common in academic and political literature. However, in the United States, the non-profit sector concept gradually became more robust and was spread internationally based on the studies conducted by Lester Salomon and associated researchers.
The theory built on the concept of the non-profit sector is strongly related to the North American cultural context, marked by the tradition of philanthropy and volunteerism, but with little importance given to associative and cooperative organizations.
The non-profit sector is implicitly or explicitly conceived as part of the private sphere. In contrast, theoretical currents such as liberal communitarianism, the theories of cooperation, common goods, social capital, European social economy, and the Latin American solidarity economy highlight the primacy of cooperation in solving collective problems. These theories underpin the associative approach of the third sector and link it to the community, not to the market.
This paper argues that the associative approach is more appropriate for international studies on the third sector and the relevance of self-organization. The third sector, i.e., the set of organizations created and maintained by civil society, is the inheritor of the millennial associative tradition, including both entities whose values are compatible with the common good and those with particularistic values, authoritarian and contrary to human rights. The third sector is not entirely virtuous, but it is a vital sector for solving great human problems.
Just do it! Guilt as a moral intuition to cooperate - A parallel constraint satisfaction approach
(2011)
After a long dominance of rational models of judgment and decision-making in moral psychology (e.g. Kohlberg, 1969) there is now a strong interest in how intuitions and emotions influence moral judgments and decisions (e.g. Greene, 2007; Haidt, 2001; Monin, Pizarro, & Beer, 2007). In the literature, the influence of emotions on moral decisions is explained by heuristic or non-compensatory information processing (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong, Young, & Cushman, 2010; Sunstein, 2005; Tobler, Kalis, & Kalenscher, 2008). However, the process of emotion elicitation is ignored. Appraisal theories postulate that emotion elicitation is due to the incoherence (or discrepancy) of behavioral representations like goals and actions (Moors, 2009). Emotion elicitation and intuitive decision-making can be combined if both processes apply a connectionist information processing structure (e.g. Barnes & Thagard, 1996). The current work contrasts both perspectives of intuitive-emotional decision-making with respect to guilt and cooperation.