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Materiell-reparative Handlungen wurden auf einer bipolaren Gut-Böse-Skala beurteilt, da bisherige Arbeiten zu diesem Thema unter Verwendung der unipolaren Strafe-Skala unklare Ergebnisse zeigten. 40 Erwachsene und 80 Kinder hörten 12 Geschichten über die Ruinierung von Briefmarken, in denen die Tatentstehung (Verschulden) und die Höhe der Ersatzleistung variiert wurden. Die Ergebnisse besagten im einzelnen, daß Kinder des Vor- und Grundschulalters stärker die Ersatzleistung als das Verschulden in Gut-Böse-Urteilen berücksichtigten und daß Erwachsene beide Informationen gleichstark in ihre Gut-Böse-Urteile einfließen ließen. Bei beiden Gruppen schienen Verschulden und Ersatz jedoch mit unterschiedlicher Absicherung nicht-additiv zusammenzuwirken. Die Ergebnisse enthielten eine Replikation US-amerikanischer Befunde mit der Strafe-Skala und diesem Szenario, wiesen aber darüber hinaus auf einen Entwicklungstrend in der NonAdditivität hin. Außerdem ließen sie Zweifel an der Allgemeingültigkeit von Aussagen der sozialpsychologischen Equity-Theorie aufkommen, da Schilderungen vollständiger Ersatzleistungen in keiner Gruppe unabhängig vom Verschulden beurteilt wurden.
From simply ringing a bell to preparing a five-course menu, human behavior commonly causes changes in the environment. Such episodes where an agent acts, thereby causing changes in their environment constitute the sense of agency. In this thesis four series of experi-ments elucidate how the sense of agency is represented in complex action-event sequences, thereby bridging a gap between basic cognitive research and real-life practice. It builds upon extensive research on the sense of agency in unequivocal sequences consisting of single ac-tions and distinct, predominantly auditory, outcomes. Employing implicit as well as explicit measures, the scope is opened up to multi-step sequences.
The experiments show that it is worthwhile devoting more research to complex action-event sequences. With a newly introduced auditory measure (Chapter II), common phenomena such as temporal binding and a decrease in agency ratings following distorted feedback were replicated in multi-step sequences. However, diverging results between traditional implicit and explicit measures call for further inspection. Multisensory integration appears to gain more weight when multiple actions have to be performed to attain a goal leading to more accurate representations of the own actions (Chapter III). Additionally, freedom of choice (Chapter III) as well as early spatial ambiguity altered the perceived timing of outcomes, while late spatial ambi-guity (Chapter IV) and the outcome’s self-relevance did not (Chapter V). The data suggests that the cognitive system is capable of representing multi-step action-event sequences implicitly and explicitly. Actions and sensory events show a temporal attraction stemming from a bias in the perception of outcomes. Explicit knowledge about causing an event-sequence facilitates neither feelings of control nor taking authorship. The results corroborate current theorizing on the un-derpinnings of temporal binding and the divergence between traditional implicit and explicit measures of the sense of agency. Promising avenues for further research include structured analyses of how much inferred causality contributes to implicit and explicit measures of agency as well as finding alternative measures to capture conceptual as well as non-conceptual facets of the agency experience with one method.
The “active self” approach suggests that any object we manipulate voluntarily and foreseeably becomes part of our “self” in the sense that we feel control over this object (sense of agency) and experience it as belonging to our own body (sense of ownership). While there is considerable evidence that we can indeed experience both a sense of agency and a sense of ownership over a broad variety of objects when we control these through our actions, the approach has also been criticized for exaggerating the flexibility of the human self. In this thesis, I investigate the influence that the relationship between the body movements controlling an object and the movements of the object itself has on the process of integrating an object into the self. I demonstrate that fully controlling an object is not sufficient for it to be integrated into the self since both explicit and implicit measures of the sense of agency and the sense of ownership indicate less or no integration when body movements are transformed into inverted object movements. Furthermore, I show that such inversions lead to the downregulation of sensory signals either from the body or from the controlled object in order to deal with the conflicting multisensory information when performing such actions. I argue that this downregulation is the underlying factor behind the diminished or eliminated integration of inverted body and object movements and I discuss further pathways for possible future studies building up on these findings.
Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions.
The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1–3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4–5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6–8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects.
In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.
Durch Variation des Konfliktgehalts zwischen zwei Alternativen und damit der Begründbarkeit von Entscheidungen sollte geprüft werden, ob das Auftreten magisch-animistischer Begründungen bei Schulkindern nur Begründungsschwierigkeiten anzeigt und nicht magisch-animistisches Denken. Mit Hilfe einer erfragten Glückszahl beim Würfeln sollte außerdem die Validität des magisch-animistisehen Gehalts von derartigen Begründungen untersucht werden. Es zeigte sich bei 61 11jährigen Vpn, daß magisch-animistisch klassifizierte Antworten mit dem Konfliktgehalt der Alternativen zusammenhingen und bei eine Glückszahl besitzenden Vpn, die diese in den Entscheidungen berücksichtigen, häufiger vorkommen als bei Vpn zweier Vergleichsgruppen.
Cognitive control is what makes goal-directed actions possible. Whenever the environment or our impulses strongly suggests a response that is incompatible with our goals, conflict arises. Such conflicts are believed to cause negative affect. Aversive consequences of conflict may be registered in a conflict monitoring module, which subsequently initiates attentional changes and action tendencies to reduce negative affect. This association suggests that behavioral adaptation might be a reflection of emotion regulation. The theoretical cornerstone of current research on emotion regulation is the process model of emotion regulation, which postulates the regulation strategies situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. Under the assumption that conflict adaptation and affect regulation share common mechanisms, I derived several predictions regarding cognitive control from the process model of emotion regulation and tested them in 11 experiments (N = 509). Participants engaged in situation selection towards conflict, but only when they were explicitly pointed to action-outcome contingencies (Experiments 1 to 3). I found support for a mechanism resembling situation modification, but no evidence for a role of affect (Experiments 4 to 10). Changing the evaluation of conflict had no impact on the extent of conflict adaptation (Experiment 11). Overall, there was evidence for an explicit aversiveness of cognitive conflict, but less evidence for implicit aversiveness, suggesting that conflict may trigger affect regulation processes, particularly when people explicitly have affect regulation goals in mind.