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Conflict Management
(2014)
Humans have a remarkable ability to plan ahead, set goals for the future and then to act accordingly. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. Everybody has experienced situations in which motivational urges like a tendency to drink another beer, or over-learned behavioral routines like driving on the right side of the road collide with ones´ goals. This tug of war between impulsive or habitual action tendencies and goal-directed actions is called a conflict.
Conflict is ubiquitous and comes in many different ways. Not surprisingly, the means to control conflict are diverse, too. Clearly, people can manage conflict in multiple ways: When expecting a conflict situation to occur in the future, one can recruit more effort to resolve the conflict, for instance by inhibiting unwanted urges or habits. Alternatively one can avoid the conflict situation and thereby circumvent possible failures to control habits and impulses. Furthermore, when currently facing a conflict, people can mobilize more effort to overcome the conflict. Alternatively they can withdraw from the conflict situation to minimize the risk of indulging in their impulses and habits.
To account for these different ways to master a conflict, the present thesis takes an initial step towards a characterization of the variability of control. To this aim, two dimensions of control will be identified that result from partially incompatible constraints on action control. These dimensions depict a trade-off between flexibility and stability and between anticipatory early selection and reactive late correction of control parameters. To describe how these control trade-offs interact and to explain how conflict is handled to ensure adaptation behavior, the conflict management framework is proposed. A corollary of this framework suggests that one strategy to control conflict comprises of a tendency to withdraw from a conflict situation.
The empirical part probed this behavioral response to conflict and tested whether participants withdraw from conflict situations. To approach this hypothesis, three series of experiments are presented that employ free choice paradigms, speeded response classification tasks and continuous movement tracking tasks to reveal withdrawal from conflict. Results show that conflict caused motivational avoidance tendencies (Experiment 1 &2), biased decision making away from conflict tasks (Experiment 3 & 5) and affected the execution of more complex courses of action (Experiment 6 & 7).
The results lend support for the proposed conflict management framework and provide the ground for a more thorough treatment of how the different conflict strategies can be integrated. As a first step, a connectionist model is presented that accounts for the simultaneous implementation of two conflict strategies observed in Experiments 3 – 5. The remainder of the present thesis analyses failures to integrate different conflict strategies. It is discussed how the conflict management framework can shed light on selected psychopathologies, inter-individual differences in control and break-downs of self-control.
Social Cueing of Numerical Magnitude : Observed Head Orientation Influences Number Processing
(2019)
In many parts of the modern world, numbers are used as tools to describe spatial relationships, be it heights, latitudes, or distances. However, this connection goes deeper as a myriad of studies showed that number representations are rooted in space (vertical, horizontal, and/or radial). For instance, numbers were shown to affect spatial perception and, conversely, perceptions or movements in space were shown to affect number estimations. This bidirectional link has already found didactic application in the classroom when children are taught the meaning of numbers. However, our knowledge about the cognitive (and neuropsychological) processes underlying the numerical magnitude operations is still very limited.
Several authors indicated that the processing within peripersonal space (i.e. the space surrounding the body in reaching distance) and numerical magnitude operations are functionally equivalent. This assumption has several implications that the present work aims at describing. For instance, vision and visuospatial attention orienting play a prominent role for processing within peripersonal space. Indeed, both neuropsychological and behavioral studies also suggested a similar role of vision and visuospatial attention orienting for number processing. Moreover, social cognition research showed that movements, posture and gestures affect not only the representation of one's own peripersonal space, but also the visuospatial attention behavior of an observer. Against this background, the current work tests the specific implication of the functional equivalence assumption that the spatial attention response to an observed person’s posture should extend to the observer’s numerical magnitude operations.
The empirical part of the present work tests the spatial attention response of observers to vertical head postures (with continuing eye contact to the observer) in both perceptual and numerical space. Two experimental series are presented that follow both steps from the observation of another person’s vertical head orientation (within his/her peripersonal space) to the observer’s attention orienting response (Experimental series A) as well as from there to the observer’s magnitude operations with numbers (Experimental Series B). Results show that the observation of a movement from a neutral to a vertical head orientation (Experiment 1) as well as the observation of the vertical head orientation alone (Experiment 3) shifted the observer’s spatial attention in correspondence with the direction information of the observed head (up vs. down). Movement from a vertical to a neutral end position, however, had no effect on the observer's spatial attention orienting response (Experiment 2). Furthermore, following down-tilted head posture (relative to up- or non-tilted head orientation), observers generated smaller numbers in a random number generation task (range 1- 9, Experiment 4), gave smaller estimates to numerical trivia questions (mostly multi-digit numbers, Experiment 5) and chose response keys less frequently in a free choice task that was associated with larger numerical magnitude in a intermixed numerical magnitude task.
Experimental Series A served as groundwork for Experimental Series B, as it demonstrated that observing another person’s head orientation indeed triggered the expected directional attention orienting response in the observer. Based on this preliminary work, the results of Experimental Series B lend support to the assumption that numerical magnitude operations are grounded in visuospatial processing of peripersonal space. Thus, the present studies brought together numerical and social cognition as well as peripersonal space research. Moreover, the Empirical Part of the present work provides the basis for elaborating on the role of processing within peripersonal space in terms of Walsh’s (2003, 2013) Theory of Magnitude. In this context, a specification of the Theory of Magnitude was staked out in a processing model that stresses the pivotal role of spatial attention orienting. Implications for mental magnitude operations are discussed. Possible applications in the classroom and beyond are described.
Human actions are generally not determined by external stimuli, but by internal goals and by the urge to evoke desired effects in the environment. To reach these effects, humans typically have to act. But at times, deciding not to act can be better suited or even the only way to reach a desired effect. What mental processes are involved when people decide not to act to reach certain effects? From the outside it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening, because no action can be observed. However, I present three studies which disclose the cognitive processes that control nonactions.
The present experiments address situations where people intentionally decide to omit certain actions in order to produce a predictable effect in the environment. These experiments are based on the ideomotor hypothesis, which suggests that bidirectional associations can be formed between actions and the resulting effects. Because of these associations, anticipating the effects can in turn activate the respective action. The results of the present experiments show that associations can be formed between nonactions (i.e., the intentional decision not to act) and the resulting effects. Due to these associations, perceiving the nonaction effects encourages not acting (Exp. 1–3). What is more, planning a nonaction seems to come with an activation of the effects that inevitably follow the nonaction (Exp. 4–5). These results suggest that the ideomotor hypothesis can be expanded to nonactions and that nonactions are cognitively represented in terms of their sensory effects. Furthermore, nonaction effects can elicit a sense of agency (Exp. 6–8). That is, even though people refrain from acting, the resulting nonaction effects are perceived as self-produced effects.
In a nutshell, these findings demonstrate that intentional nonactions include specific mechanisms and processes, which are involved, for instance, in effect anticipation and the sense of agency. This means that, while it may seem that nothing remarkable is happening when people decide not to act, complex processes run on the inside, which are also involved in intentional actions.
Cognitive control is what makes goal-directed actions possible. Whenever the environment or our impulses strongly suggests a response that is incompatible with our goals, conflict arises. Such conflicts are believed to cause negative affect. Aversive consequences of conflict may be registered in a conflict monitoring module, which subsequently initiates attentional changes and action tendencies to reduce negative affect. This association suggests that behavioral adaptation might be a reflection of emotion regulation. The theoretical cornerstone of current research on emotion regulation is the process model of emotion regulation, which postulates the regulation strategies situation selection, situation modification, attentional deployment, cognitive change, and response modulation. Under the assumption that conflict adaptation and affect regulation share common mechanisms, I derived several predictions regarding cognitive control from the process model of emotion regulation and tested them in 11 experiments (N = 509). Participants engaged in situation selection towards conflict, but only when they were explicitly pointed to action-outcome contingencies (Experiments 1 to 3). I found support for a mechanism resembling situation modification, but no evidence for a role of affect (Experiments 4 to 10). Changing the evaluation of conflict had no impact on the extent of conflict adaptation (Experiment 11). Overall, there was evidence for an explicit aversiveness of cognitive conflict, but less evidence for implicit aversiveness, suggesting that conflict may trigger affect regulation processes, particularly when people explicitly have affect regulation goals in mind.
