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The Minimal Self
(2017)
The aim of The Minimal Self is to undertake a conceptual analysis of the term ‘self’ and thereby establish the minimal conditions that must be met to ascribe selfhood to an entity. This conceptual analysis focuses on what is termed ‘intrinsic reflexivity’, which is taken as the defining feature of selfhood. Three underlying categories of intrinsic reflexivity are distinguished: self-maintenance, self-reproduction and self-containment. These three fundamental categories provide a framework within which it is possible to distinguish entities that can be designated ‘selves’ from entities that are merely ‘self-like’, thus establishing the logical preconditions for the ‘emergence’ of selfhood. By examining the fuzzy borderlines between selves and the merely self-like as manifest in phenomena such as dissipative systems, genetic material, viruses and bacteria, it becomes possible to ascertain a form of ‘minimal selfhood’, a mode of being shared by all selves qua selves. Free-living single-celled organisms such as protozoa are paradigmatic instances of minimal selfhood to the extent that they can be characterized in terms of the three intrinsically reflexive processes of self-maintenance, self-reproduction and self-containment. Minimal selfhood is also presupposed by more complex multicellular selves such as animals. Such an analysis is found to shed light on the origin of life and on the nature of organisms and biological individuals.
Geteilte Emotionen
(2016)
Geteilte Emotionen
In dieser Arbeit verteidige ich die Auffassung, dass geteilte Emotionen nicht nur metaphysisch möglich, sondern darüber hinaus auch ein integraler Bestandteil unseres sozialen Lebens sind. Dabei diskutiere ich in dieser Arbeit zunächst die begrifflichen und metaphysischen Vorannahmen, welche einer philosophischen Analyse von geteilten Emotionen zugrunde liegen. Ausgehend davon versuche ich eine Theorie der Emotionen zu entwickeln, welche Emotionen als wesentlich in soziale Kontexte eingebettet begreift. Daneben beleuchte ich die kognitiven und non-kognitiven Mechanismen, etwa die Gefühlsansteckung, Empathie oder geteilte Intentionalität, welche Konstitutiv für die Hervorbringung geteilter Emotionen sind. Das Ergebnis meiner Arbeit besteht darin, dass ich dafür argumentiere, dass die stark intellektualistische Ausrichtung in der gegenwärtigen Sozialphilosophie und in der Philosophie der Emotionen dazu führt, dass die entsprechenden Theorien die Phänomenologie geteilter emotionaler Erfahrungen nicht adäquat erfassen können. Als Konsequenz dessen versuche ich ein alternatives Modell zur Erklärung von geteilten Emotionen zu entwickeln, welches die Bedeutung von körperlicher Interaktion hervorhebt.
The impact of acquired severe motor impairments is pervasive and may lead to a complete loss of communication and voluntary motor control, rendering the patient behaviourally unresponsive. In routine clinical care it may thus be unclear, whether some of these patients are even conscious. Given that finding a cure is unlikely, care focuses on providing the best possible quality of life (QoL), and knowing its predictors might contribute to that aim. Patients who still can communicate often report a high QoL, and several predictors have been identified. However, many instruments used to assess QoL require at least residual verbal and motor abilities. Thus, a method to assess QoL independent of these requirements is desirable. In addition, many instruments assume QoL to be temporarily stable, and little information is available on predictors of instantaneous QoL, i.e. QoL as it fluctuates from moment to moment throughout the day.